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in this salutary sense, a range of contemporary critical theories suggest that it 
is from those who have suffered the sentence of history—subjugation, domina-
tion, diaspora, displacement—that we learn our most enduring lessons for liv-
ing and thinking. There is even a growing conviction that the affective experience 
of social marginality—as it emerges in non-canonical cultural forms—trans-
forms our cultural strategies.
—homi K. bhabha, “The Postcolonial and the Postmodern”  
(172, emphasis added)
What is the economy of sentiment surrounding the nation form? [. . .] What 
do we know about propaganda? We know nothing . . . when it works we don’t 
know why it works. So what are the practices which produce affect for the 
nation? [. . .] What are the practices through which this set of feelings about 
this entirely abstract form are produced, and more importantly, reproduced?
—arjun appadurai, in conversation with vikki bell and Paul Gilroy in 
1997 (bell, Historical Memory 37–38)
In hIs 1993 book Moving the Centre, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o describes racism 
as “a conscious ideology of imperialism” (117) that “often wages its offen-
sive in print between hardcovers, magazines and newspapers long before it is 
imprinted on the general consciousness as the basis of personal and institu-
tional practices” (126). I want to bracket the question raised by that claim of 
whether there has ever been a time before racism was imprinted on the gen-
PRefaCe
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eral consciousness,1 and go straight to the question that will help me clear the 
ground for a somatic approach to postcolonial identity, namely: who exactly 
is conscious in a conscious ideology, and of what, and just how conscious is s/
he? Is a conscious ideology one that its holder affirms consciously, so that the 
definitive criterion for a conscious racist ideology, for example, would be that 
its holder would be willing or able to say “I am a racist”? Or, taking one step 
back from that extreme reading, would it be enough for the holder of a con-
scious racist ideology to be able to say “I hate black people,” or “I feel uneasy 
around black people,” without consciously labeling those feelings as racist? 
The problem with this approach to racism, obviously, is that then a person 
who has so successfully repressed his or her racism as to be able to say “I am 
not a racist” and believe it sincerely may still feel subliminally inclined to racist 
actions, to let a general racist “consciousness” serve as “the basis of personal 
and institutional practices,” so that we would still want to call him or her a 
racist. But if racism serves as such a basis unconsciously, as it often seems to, in 
what sense is it a racist consciousness that so serves?
 Or does Ngũgĩ mean that imperialists are the conscious ones, that impe-
rialists consciously wage a racist offensive in print in order to imprint rac-
ism on a not-quite-conscious ideology or “general consciousness,” so that that 
ideology will in turn become “the basis of personal and institutional prac-
tices”? In other words, does he mean that imperialists consciously (and per-
haps repeatedly) reinvent racism as part of their strategy of oppression, which 
the masses then internalize in less conscious ways? This would constitute a 
kind of conspiracy theory of the origins—or at least the widespread dissemi-
nation—of racism. Ngũgĩ seems to be modeling that dissemination as a three-
stage process: first, racism is consciously developed by imperialists as a useful 
idea (ideology as thought structure); second, it is inculcated textually, through 
books, magazines, and newspapers, in a mass “consciousness” that may or 
may not involve actual conscious awareness (ideology as belief structure); and 
third, that consciousness becomes the basis of social practices that support the 
imperialist project (ideology as behavioral structure). Just before that earlier 
passage, in fact, from “The Ideology of Racism,” he describes “the weapon of 
mental and spiritual subjugation” as “the ideological weapon” which “comes 
wrapped up in many forms: as religion, the arts, the media, culture, values, 
beliefs, even as feelings” (117), suggesting that someone, some group, namely 
imperialists, is wielding that ideological weapon, presumably as part of the 
second stage; in the latter passage, from “Racism in Literature,” he defines 
ideology as “the whole system of symbols, images, beliefs, feelings, thoughts, 
and attitudes by which we explain the world and our place in it” (126), which 
sounds more like the third stage.
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 A good deal rides, in fact, on the ontopsychological status we assign rac-
ism and other ideological orientations and identities. If we treat them as biol-
ogy, as “human nature,” or even as “mammalian nature,” as “hard-wired” into 
the autonomic nervous system, so that “we are all racists” becomes a univer-
salizing/biologizing truth-claim, then we are stuck with them, or else stuck 
trying to discover the “racist gene” or to invent an “antiracism vaccine.” If 
we want to resist this notion of racism as indelible in us, as a form of primi-
tive mammalian xenophobia that can only be tempered and controlled, never 
eradicated, it is going to be important for us to historicize it, to show that it 
came from somewhere, that it was introduced into human dispositions. And 
it does seem to me that Ngũgĩ has something like this binary in mind, some-
thing like this absolute choice between a radically unattractive universalizing 
mystification of racism and a far more attractive historicist unmasking of rac-
ism—more attractive specifically because if something can be historicized, it 
can be resisted.
 But then how are orientations and inclinations introduced into human 
dispositions? I think Ngũgĩ is quite right to insist, for example, that rac-
ism works by “sapping the moral energies of the victims by moulding and 
remoulding their personalities and their perceptions to make them view the 
world in accordance with the needs and programmes of the exploiter and the 
oppressor” (126), but think it unlikely that this sort of project could ever func-
tion on a conscious level, as thought. Surely in order to get black Africans to 
accede to colonial or neocolonial oppression and exploitation, imperialists 
have had to sap their moral energies and mold and remold their personalities 
and perceptions unconsciously, below the radar of conscious awareness. Con-
sciousness of what is being done to us is our first essential step in a program of 
resistance, and thus something to be assiduously avoided by those intent upon 
sapping black Africans’ moral energies. And in fact this notion of racism as a 
conscious ideology strains credulity even if we opt for the conspiracy-theory 
reading of Ngũgĩ’s model and imagine imperialists as the original and sole 
conscious wielders of racist ideology—imagine them sitting around a table 
agreeing, “let’s convince everybody that white skin signifies intelligence and 
culture and black skin signifies subhumanity, so that it seems natural for their 
work to fill our pockets, but let’s make sure that we’re the only ones wielding 
this ideology consciously, that everybody else, black and white alike, takes it 
for ‘universal human nature.’” Surely imperialists too are always already rac-
ist, and mostly unconsciously so—indeed mostly to be distinguished from the 
victims of their exploitation not in the degree to which their racism is con-
scious but rather in the degree to which they are sociopolitically positioned 
and economically and emotionally prepared to profit from it?
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 In fact, how conscious are people typically? How conscious is “the general 
consciousness”? How many of our personal and institutional practices are 
shaped by consciously held views, values, norms, beliefs, opinions? If ideol-
ogy or “the general consciousness” includes “symbols, images, beliefs, feel-
ings, thoughts, and attitudes,” how conscious is our possession or use of those 
things? How conscious are we typically of our beliefs or attitudes? How con-
scious are we of our feelings? When a symbol or an image works on us, from 
within or without, to what extent are even intellectuals conscious of that work-
ing? We can, by a great intellectual effort, make any of those things conscious; 
but it seems relatively uncontroversial to assert that normally they function in 
us beneath the level of conscious awareness.
 And yet it is equally problematic to insist that ideologies wield us as their 
mechanical toys—that we are automata unconsciously motivated and directed 
by our ideological orientations. Death-of-the-subject deconstructions of 
human agency as just another fictitious construct of liberal bourgeois ideol-
ogy are as passivizing and mystifying as universalistic biologisms: both make 
resistance unthinkable. Whether we are made mindlessly and will-lessly racist 
by God, biology, or some vaguely mentalist ideology, we are equally trapped—
and in fact “ideology” then becomes just another mystified term for “God,” or 
“biology,” or “destiny,” or what have you. In order to imagine the possibility 
of resistance, we have to imagine a subject with agency—a fictitious subject 
with limited agency, perhaps, a socially constructed virtual “self ” that has 
pragmatic rather than ontological value, but a subject nonetheless, with the 
ability to plan and take action—and we have to explain how this subject is able 
to function in the complex middle ground between absolute automatism and 
absolute autonomy.
P.1 SomaticS
The “somatics” in my title signals my attempt in the book to chart out that 
middle ground. I will be covering the rudiments of somatic theory in §1.1, 
and complicating the model throughout the book; but let me anticipate briefly 
here. The fundamental assumption in somatic theory is that normative orien-
tations or inclinations are circulated through a population as social feelings, 
especially approval and disapproval, and that this collective circulation of feel-
ings is the channel through which any group regulates itself—something I call 
“ideosomatic regulation,” the term “ideosomatic” indicating my belief that the 
regulatory “ideas” that circulate are grounded less in words or thoughts (ideo-
logos: idea as stable word/mind), and more in feelings or somatic responses 
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(ideo-soma: idea as emotional body). (Actually, somatic response is body-
becoming-mind—a homeostatic middle excluded by Cartesian mind-body 
dualism. See the Glossary for somatic terminology.) These somatic responses 
signal to us whether the group(s) to which we belong would approve or dis-
approve of the action we’re contemplating—and while they can be brought to 
conscious awareness, we are not usually aware of their operation. We typically 
call them “hunches” or “gut feelings,” rather inchoately distinguishing them on 
the one hand from whims (unorganized inclinations) and on the other from 
reasons (analytical inclinations).
 A preliminary formulation, then: insofar as ideology is conscious 
thoughts, ideas, images, and beliefs, it is carried on the backs of ideosomatic 
impulses channeling collective approval or disapproval. The only way to sap 
a dark-skinned population’s moral energies and to mold and remold their 
personalities and perceptions, for example, is to circulate to and through the 
larger group containing that population (light- and dark-skinned alike) rac-
ist ideosomatic impulses channeling images and ideas of the dark-skinned 
group charged with collective disapproval: contented collaborationist natives 
as domestic pets, say, angry rebellious natives as vicious wild animals. I bor-
row these images from Ngũgĩ’s reading of Karen Blixen’s Out of Africa: “What 
she is really saying,” he notes there, “is that her knowledge of wild animals 
gave her a clue to the African mind,” and “So to Karen Blixen, Kamante [her 
cook] is comparable to a civilized dog that has lived long with human beings, 
Europeans of course” (Moving 133). What makes Ngũgĩ’s demystification of 
Blixen’s racism so powerful, of course, is that his words are fueled by feeling, by 
carefully harnessed fury—the same kind of fury directed at and against rebel-
lious African blacks like him by white imperialists and colonialists and their 
black collaborators, a regulatory fury that puts normative somatic pressure on 
the reader not just to accept the writer’s valuation but to conform his or her 
whole emotional orientation to the writer’s guidance. A writer or a speaker 
who channels powerful enough ideosomatic approval and disapproval (group 
regulatory guidance) into his or her words can indeed bring about large-scale 
personality and behavioral changes in readers or listeners—can make them 
(more) racist, in the colonial context, or in a decolonizing context less racist, 
or at least more guilty about their racism.
 Implicit in this somatic approach is the assumption that the images Ngũgĩ 
identifies in Blixen’s memoirs are not intrinsically negative, in the abstract, 
in the null context; an image of a human being as a domestic pet or a wild 
animal will have a negative effect only if it is charged ideosomatically with 
negativity, through the bodily force of collective disapproval (or if it is con-
structed as so charged by its audience, which, as we’ll see, comes to the same 
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thing). It’s not just the context in which the image is offered to the reader or 
listener that limits its meaning, in other words; rather, the words carrying the 
image are themselves charged with feeling, saturated (to use Bakhtin’s formu-
lation) with ideosomatic tonalizations and attitudinalizations, and transfer 
those emotional orientations to the reader or the listener. Just as it is possible 
to inflect “you’re my pussy cat” or “he’s my loyal dog” or “what a jackal he is” 
with approval or disapproval, with loving admiration or contemptuous dis-
gust, so too is it possible for Ngũgĩ to resomatize Blixen’s loving admiration 
for the Kĩkũyũ, Kawirondo, and Wakambo who worked for her as patroniz-
ing racism—to “revoice” her racism, as Bakhtin would say, to reinflect it with 
his own disapproving tonalization, and to infect us as well with the resulting 
resomatization.
 Bakhtin would also insist that these images have iterative histories behind 
them, iterosomatic histories by which countless somatizations of the images in 
actual discourse have charged them with a “positive” or “negative” tonalization 
that feels so stable as (almost) to constitute an objective semantics. “Pussy cat” 
and “loyal dog” have both been iterosomatized as predominantly “positive,” 
though with an undercurrent of loving condescension; “jackal” is predomi-
nantly negative. It is possible to resomatize “pussy cat” or “loyal dog” nega-
tively and “jackal” positively, but in doing so we can feel ourselves estranging 
a familiar somatic current. It is also possible to displace (abstract) the iterative 
history of this ideosomatic regulation out of these images and reify the cat and 
dog images as objectively or intrinsically (semantically) positive, the jackal 
image as semantically negative; but this dehistoricization/desomatization viti-
ates the abstraction and mystifies the process by which images and words 
come to mean anything at all.
 Somatic theory attributes to the ideosomatics of racism (or of any other 
group orientation) the power to mold and remold personality because it takes 
individuality to be in large part a collective construct anyway, the product of 
ideosomatic regulation—what Nietzsche calls the internalization of mastery, 
or what Foucault calls discipline. We are, by and large, what the group says we 
are. And what the group “says,” mostly, according to somatic theory, it says 
with its (dis)approving body language, but also with punitive physical pain 
(Nietzsche) and various physical and socioideological regimens (Foucault). 
To the extent that any one individual’s experience of the world slips out of the 
group’s control (and there is always some slippage, because ideosomatic regu-
lation is a kluge), that individual may become the targets of intensified group 
regulation, which may generate shame and a redoubled effort to conform; 
but this stepped-up pressure may also generate rebellious impulses, which 
may ultimately impel the individual out of one group and into another. Thus 
PrefaCe |  xv
Ngũgĩ, for example, was impelled out of the group of elite collaborationist 
Anglophile Africans at the Alliance High School to which he had won a schol-
arship, and into the ideological camp of Marxism, African nationalism, and 
the Mau Mau struggle against British rule, a move marked by his name change 
from James Ngũgĩ to Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o, and later also by his controversial 
decision to write only in Gikũyũ, no longer in English.
 In somatic theory, any impulse that is perceived as nonconformist by the 
group is “idiosomatic,” any specifically rebellious impulse “counterideoso-
matic”: counterideosomaticity is a subset of idiosomaticity, which includes 
both failures and refusals to conform. But ideosomatic regulation can and 
often does break down as well, as social groups are thwarted in their ongoing 
attempts to regulate themselves homeostatically. The three essays in this book 
chart three different disruptions of ideosomatic regulation, and thus of the 
individual identities shaped and maintained by the group:
•	 (First Essay) ideosomatic dysregulation: the breakdown of ideosomatic 
regulation in the refugee experience, which destroys or scatters or con-
taminates the group;
•	 (Second Essay) ideosomatic counterregulation: the introduction into a 
group of a new and more powerful “corrective” ideosomatic regulation 
in the colonial experience, and again, at least in idealized theory, in 
decolonization; and
•	 (Third Essay) paleosomatic regulation: the survival of an old ideoso-
matic regulation into a new social context, in intergenerational trauma.
P.2 homeoStaSiS/alloStaSiS
Somatic theory begins in the homeostatic regulation of the individual organ-
ism: an entire iterosomatic history of sociobiological evolution provides for 
the emergence of regulatory emotions as homeostatic mappings of appetites 
and other body states, of regulatory feelings as mental representations or map-
pings of emotions, appetites, and other body states, and of rational thoughts 
as mental representations of feelings, emotions, appetites, and other thoughts. 
This is the body-becoming-mind. An appetite like hunger is itself a homeo-
static body map of specific shifting biological states in the stomach (muscle 
contraction), endocrine activity (lowered blood glucose, raised insulin levels), 
fatty acid metabolism (raised fatty acid levels), and heat management (low-
ered body temperature)—all, of course, designed to prompt the organism to 
eat and maintain homeostasis (stability) around a set-point conducive to the 
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organism’s survival. But the emergence of an appetitive state does not lead 
mechanically to the satisfaction of the appetite; higher self-regulatory levels 
are activated as well, so that physiological hunger signals may be accompanied 
by emotions, which are felt, experienced as feelings, which in turn are thought 
(experienced as mental images and ideas). Based on the use of feelings to reg-
ulate emotional states, we may begin to feel eager as we move toward dinner, 
or annoyed if dinner is delayed; based on the emergence of thought to regulate 
feelings, we may institute a daily regimen, breakfast at 7 a.m., lunch at noon, 
dinner at 5 p.m. Not only that: the higher levels can trigger the lower levels, as 
when a feeling of sadness or loneliness triggers a hunger for comfort food, or 
a steaming-hot commercial image of dinner makes us realize that it’s long past 
dinnertime and we’re famished.
 The study of homeostatic self-regulation in the individual organism begins 
to shift over into social theory when, say, repeated patterns of undersatisfied 
hunger in a family or a community trigger collective feelings of depression, 
resentment, or rage: in the colonial context you see the colonizer, fat and gouty 
with overeating, and build a mental comparison with your own family’s and 
community’s hungry bellies. What happens next is part of ideosomatic group 
self-regulation: you suppress your anger (convert it back into depression), 
because you want to be a good citizen, because you know that no good can 
come of rising up against superior power (i.e., the reigning colonial ideoso-
matic regulation is still functioning more or less smoothly in your group and 
inside each of its members); or you begin to build a new ideosomatic counter-
regulation, work together in the group of the oppressed to retheorize hunger 
as a goad to political and even military action.
 This would be group homeostatic self-regulation; but note that, to the 
extent that it arises in response to perceived social change, to a significant 
alteration in external conditions, it is technically group allostatic self-regula-
tion. In the example from the previous paragraph, the overlord’s overeating 
is itself an allostatic adaptation to wealth: it raises the homeostatic set-point 
around which his body regulates his food intake, so that it comes to feel physi-
ologically necessary for him to continue (over)eating at that raised level. Your 
undereating is an allostatic adaptation to poverty: it has been lowering the 
homeostatic set-point for you and your family and community, so that if food 
suddenly became abundant, it might even be difficult to eat enough of it at 
first. This makes allostasis a far more pressing concept in the sociopolitical 
study of postcolonial and other at-risk identities than the more “normal” 
homeostasis, which reflects ideosomatic self-regulation in contexts of relative 
social stability.
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 Bruce S. McEwen, one of the leading medical theorists of allostasis, has 
coined the term “allostatic load” to describe “the long-term effect of the physi-
ologic response to stress”: “Allostasis—the ability to achieve stability through 
change—is critical to survival. Through allostasis, the autonomic nervous sys-
tem, the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis, and the cardiovascular, 
metabolic, and immune systems protect the body by responding to internal 
and external stress. The price of this accommodation to stress can be allo-
static load, which is the wear and tear that results from chronic overactivity 
or underactivity of allostatic systems” (171). In conditions of acute stress, the 
organism adapts briefly and reversibly, turning an allostatic response first on 
and then off: in activation, the nerves and the adrenal medulla release cat-
echolamines and the pituitary gland releases corticotropin, which prompts the 
adrenal cortex to release cortisol; in inactivation, cortisol and catecholamine 
secretion returns to baseline levels. In chronic stress, however, such as we typi-
cally find in the postcolonial contexts that we’ll be looking at here—long-term 
physical and cultural displacement—the entire organism adjusts homeostati-
cally to a higher level of readiness, raising base-line set-points, which alone 
creates considerable allostatic load. That load is often further compounded by 
inefficient system response: after months or years or even generations of cop-
ing with chronic stress, the stress hormones may (a) never activate fully, leav-
ing the organism overexposed to stress, or (b) never deactivate fully, leaving 
the organism overexposed to stress hormones, or (c) activate and deactivate 
repeatedly, abruptly, disjointedly, disrupting the homeostatic stabilizations 
that are essential for smooth functioning. When an entire population is sub-
jected to this sort of allostatic overload, the ideosomatic regulation that main-
tains social order (stable identities, a shared reality) almost always breaks 
down, and various socioemotional and sociopolitical pathologies result.
 But not invariably. The disruption of ideosomatic regulation is also an 
opportunity, one that is occasionally accompanied by stunning explosions of 
artistic and philosophical creativity—as it was in the first years of the Soviet 
Union, during and immediately after the lengthy, brutal, and socially disrup-
tive Civil War, before the Stalinist Thermidor began to shut it down in the 
mid-1920s. Postcolonial theorists often theorize postcoloniality in terms of 
this utopian response to ideosomatic dysregulation and counterregulation—
Deleuze and Guattari’s nomad thought and deterritorialization, for example, 
or Homi Bhabha’s hybrid cultures—and have been criticized for this sexy uto-
pianism by other scholars more solidly grounded in the often disastrous eco-
nomics, politics, and social psychology of postcoloniality; but I will be arguing 
in the book that we need utopian theories of postcolonial identities precisely 
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so that we don’t simply succumb to the disastrous somatics of despair, don’t 
simply thematize postcolonial populations as inevitably the passive victims 
of war, genocide, domination, and exploitation. I will also be arguing that the 
abstract binarisms of Saussurean thought that inform much poststructural-
ist theory (signifier–signified, speech–writing, synchronic–diachronic) have 
led many postcolonial theorists into discursive traps from which it becomes 
impossible to imagine a lived phenomenology of postcolonial identity. In the 
First Essay (§1.3.1) we will see Deleuze and Guattari theorizing the social 
machine as a protosomatic body-without-organs in order to steer clear of 
pure Saussurean discursivity; in the Second Essay (§2.2) I will also be pushing 
hard on the work of Homi Bhabha and Gayatri Spivak to bring out their own 
somatic thinking on postcolonial intersubjective affect.
 One postcolonial theory that has attracted no utopian or other poststruc-
turalist spins is intergenerational trauma, the theory that traumatized popu-
lations pass some form of allostatic overload on to their descendants—that 
allostatic overload is sustained not only through a single lifetime but at least 
from one generation to the next, and, some argue, through the collective life-
time of an entire culture, even for hundreds of years. This theory was first 
adumbrated by Friedrich Nietzsche in A Genealogy of Morals, where trau-
matic slave experiences survive for centuries as an allostatic/paleosomatic 
slave morality, and was picked and developed explicitly by Sigmund Freud, 
in Totem and Taboo and Moses and Monotheism, where his theorization of 
the history of religion entailed the intergenerational repression of an origi-
nary guilt, the guilt felt by the primal brothers at the murder of their father. 
The theory resurfaced in the 1970s, under the term “transgenerational trans-
mission of trauma,” and has been gaining momentum under the term inter-
generational trauma in the 1980s, 1990s, and the new millennium, first in 
the context of the symptomatologies experienced by the second- and third-
generation descendants of Holocaust survivors, later in broader contexts 
as well, especially perhaps the American Holocaust, the genocide, resettle-
ment, and reeducation of Native Americans and its effects on later genera-
tions, whose disproportionate rates of PTSD, cardiovascular disease, diabetes, 
obesity, alcoholism, and early death suggest some sort of lingering, buried 
response to trauma. What plagues most intergenerational trauma research 
to date, I will be suggesting, is the lack of an adequate explanation of storage, 
of how and where the allostatic overload is stored during whole lifetimes and 
across generational gaps; Ruth Leys, for example, suggests that it is stored as 
memories, “veridical memories or representations of the traumatic event,” as 
“literal replicas or repetitions of the trauma . . . that as such . . . stand outside 
representation” (229). It is important for her to represent those memories as 
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“outside representation” because, as many intergenerational trauma scholars 
have noted, one of the most telling features of traumatic memories is their 
absence (see Fine)—suggesting that trauma is transmitted from generation to 
generation submentally, in some lower stratum of allostatic self-regulation. 
My theory of paleosomatic regulation is an attempt to solve this conundrum.
P.3 diSPlacement
Displacement is a term used in many scholarly fields to indicate some sort 
of key shift in space or time: in the physical sciences, the displacement of air 
in an engine, of water by a ship’s hull, of the earth’s crust in various theories 
of global rebalancing; in the social sciences, time spent on the computer dis-
places face-to-face sociability and time spent watching television displaces 
reading. Criminal displacement theory argues that attempts to prevent crime 
by enhancing security measures actually only moves crime around, to a differ-
ent place (geographical displacement), time (temporal displacement), target 
(target displacement), or type or method of crime (crime type or tactical dis-
placement) (Felson and Clarke 25).
 Sigmund Freud first theorized displacement (Verschiebung) as part of the 
dream-work, the displacement of elements in the dream-thought by entirely 
other elements in the dream-content, so that the dream becomes “differ-
ently centred from the dream-thoughts” (Interpretation 340). The displace-
ment principle at work in that theory, that we unconsciously channel affect 
from feared to safe objects, has come to inform our understanding of numer-
ous other key psychological phenomena as well, including transference and 
countertransference (the displacement of affect from a parent onto the ana-
lyst or the analysand), scapegoating (the displacement of affect from power-
ful or inaccessible objects to powerless objects, such as members of minority 
groups), and sublimation (the displacement of libido into socially useful out-
lets like art and work).
 In structuralist and poststructuralist language theory, displacement began 
as a topical movement or shift of meanings and then in the mid-1950s was 
picked up by Jacques Lacan, drawing both on Freudian displacement and 
on Roman Jakobson’s theorization of metonymy, as the structural principle 
behind the Peircean “signifying chain” (Écrits 170), in which meaning is end-
lessly displaced along the syntagmatic chain of signifiers, and ultimately is 
to be found (or “insists”) only in that endless displacement (“the meaning 
‘insists’ but . . . none of its elements ‘consists’ in the signification of which it is 
at the moment capable” [170]). By the early 1980s, something like this Laca-
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nian concept had arguably become the organizing idea or strategy in post-
structuralist thought: as Robert Young wrote in his introduction to his 1981 
“post-structuralist reader” Untying the Text, “The name ‘post-structuralism’ 
is useful in so far as it is an umbrella word, significantly defining itself only 
in terms of a temporal, spatial relationship to structuralism. This need not 
imply the organicist fiction of a development, for it involves, rather, a displace-
ment. It is more a question of an interrogation of structuralism’s concepts 
by turning one against another” (1). Two years later, in 1983, Mark Krupnik 
collected a group of disparate essays under the title Displacement: Derrida 
and After, noting in his introduction that “if displacement is always with us 
in post-structuralist theory, it has no official status within it. It is no sacred 
word, unlike ‘tension’ and ‘paradox’ in the New Criticism, or ‘intertextuality’ 
and ‘repetition’ nowadays” (4). Gayatri Spivak’s article in that collection, “Dis-
placement and the Discourse of Woman,” is pure feminist critique of phal-
logocentrism—there is not a trace of subaltern studies in it yet (1983 was 
the year she delivered the lecture that eventually became “Can the Subaltern 
Speak?”—an argument I analyze at the end of the Second Essay [§2.2.2.3]). 
She reads Freud on displacement against the grain, identifying his use of the 
term Entstellung (“distortion”) as a surreptitious morphological translation 
of displacement (ent “away, aside” + stellen “to set or place”) in order to focus 
attention on his displacement not of dream-thoughts but of the female subject, 
“the moment when woman is displaced out of this primordial masculinity” 
(172).
 Displacement entered the sociopolitical discourse that feeds postcolonial 
studies in the sense of the forced geographical removal of individuals from 
their home or home regions; the people thus removed become displaced per-
sons, also known as forced migrants or refugees. This is the subject of the First 
Essay. The term was later extended metaphorically to cultural displacements 
without geographical removal, as when a foreign power invades, occupies, 
and colonizes one’s country and imposes a new ideosomatic regulation on 
one’s group, “displacing” the old cultural regime through education and other 
forms of social and institutional discipline—the subject of the Second Essay. 
In the Third Essay I will be expanding the term slightly to include the tempo-
ral displacement of a traumatic group allostasis past the era of its contextual 
relevance.
 I will, in other words, be discussing displacement almost exclusively in its 
sociopolitical extension, as a sociopolitical phenomenon that disrupts peo-
ple’s lives and identities. It would, however, be irresponsible for me to ignore 
the limitations and complications that a poststructuralist perspective would 
discover in the Freudian “displacements” in my project—the accusation, for 
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instance, that as a white middle-class American male English professor who 
has never been a refugee and has never been colonized I am arguably study-
ing a displaced object, a “safe” (because distant, because politically correct, 
because not-me) object that disguises my own political complicity in the 
sociopolitical damage I study. I am thinking in particular of accusations like 
these that Terry Eagleton vents in his 1999 review of Spivak’s book A Critique 
of Postcolonial Reason:
This book takes a few well-deserved smacks at the wilder breed of post-
colonialist critics, whose fascination for the Other is in part a demoralised 
yearning to be absolutely anyone but themselves. (“Gaudy Supermarket” 5)
But there are discreditable as well as creditable reasons for the speedy sur-
facing of post-colonialism, and Spivak remains for the most part silent 
about them. Its birth, for example, followed in the wake of the defeat, at least 
for the present, of both class-struggle in Western societies and revolution-
ary nationalism in the previously colonialised world. American students 
who, through no fault of their own, would not recognise class-struggle if it 
perched on the tip of their skateboards, or who might not be so keen on the 
Third World if some of its inhabitants were killing their fathers and broth-
ers in large numbers, can vicariously fulfil their generously radical impulses 
by displacing oppression elsewhere. This move leaves them plunged into 
fashionably Post-Modern gloom about the ‘monolithic’ benightedness of 
their own social orders. It is as if the depleted, disorientated subject of the 
consumerist West comes by an extraordinary historical irony to find an 
image of itself in the wretched of the earth. (5–6)
Deconstruction can indeed be a politically destabilising manoeuvre, but 
devotees like Gayatri Spivak ought to acknowledge its displacing effect, 
too. Like much cultural theory, it can allow one to speak darkly of subver-
sion while leaving one’s actual politics only slightly to the left of Edward 
Kennedy’s. (6)
 “Demoralised yearning to be absolutely anyone but themselves,” “vicari-
ously fulfil their generously radical impulses by displacing oppression else-
where,” “can allow one to speak darkly of subversion while leaving one’s actual 
politics only slightly to the left of Edward Kennedy’s”: these are displacements 
in Freud’s original sense of the term, liberal American students and postco-
lonial critics displacing their own uncomfortable complicity in their (our) 
country’s imperialist domination and exploitation of the rest of the world onto 
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safely foreign topics. Eagleton might have added that we white American non-
Marxists also in the process distort (in Freud’s displaced sense of Entstellung, 
as theorized by Spivak a decade and a half before her Critique) the safe foreign 
topics we study—but then according to him the same is true of Spivak herself, 
who, though a Third World feminist Marxist, for Eagleton is not nearly Marx-
ist enough.
 I not only plead nolo contendere to Eagleton’s charges but intend to com-
pound them by admitting that I here displace oppression still further: not 
just from America to the Third World, and not just from the plight of the 
Third World to theory, but from postcolonial theory to somatic theory. In 
fact, I went around and around on whether to use “postcolonial” at all in my 
title; I considered “postnational culture,” “postcollective culture,” even “post-
culture,” and only finally settled on “postcolonial culture” because it suggested 
not just the transformation of traditional sedentary cultures but also their dis-
ruption in and by and through hierarchizing regimes of sociopolitical power. 
Still, in that light I’m not sure that the refugee experience necessarily counts 
as postcolonial—masses of people are displaced (First Essay) not only by colo-
nial wars and campaigns of ethnic cleansing but also by floods, earthquakes, 
hurricanes, and other such decidedly nonpostcolonial phenomena—and the 
allostatic overloads that are passed down to later generations (Third Essay) 
can be caused by any number of traumatic events, not all of them tied to 
coloniality.
 Still, despite my misgivings, I do think somatic theory has an important 
contribution to make to postcolonial studies. One of the biggest debates in 
the field almost from its beginnings in the late 1970s has been between those 
who understand postcoloniality politically, in terms of actions undertaken 
in the public domain, and those who understand it discursively, in terms of 
the fractalized thought-structures of French poststructuralist theory. Every-
thing the “traditionalists” hold most dear—in Bart Moore-Gilbert’s list, “the 
centred subject, the aesthetic sphere, foundational identities, the nation and 
nationalism, ‘master’-narratives of liberation and emancipation, and authorial 
intention” (21)—seems to the poststructuralists hopelessly mired in an epis-
temologically discredited essentialist agenda that is complicit with colonialist 
thought; for the traditionalists, poststructuralist postcolonial theory is propa-
gated by deracinated Third World intellectuals ensconced in prestigious U.S. 
universities and out of touch with the cultures they theorize, and consists of 
highly abstract but faux-politicized versions of First World linguistic philoso-
phies that are complicit with global-capitalist/neocolonialist thought.2
 I suggest that these two approaches to the study of postcolonial realities 
and identities are so radically and even ferociously polarized (see, for example, 
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Ahmad’s In Theory) because they lack a theoretical framework for the analy-
sis of the interactions between thought and action—between the private and 
public spheres, between psychoanalysis and sociology, between linguistic phi-
losophy and politics. The poststructuralists—notably Edward Said, Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak, and Homi K. Bhabha—have worked very hard to politi-
cize the differential strategies of poststructuralist thought, following Foucault 
in arguing that “the relations of discourse are of the nature of warfare” (Bhab-
ha’s paraphrase, Location 145); but it is almost invariably difficult, reading 
Bhabha and Spivak and their many followers, to see how a politicized decon-
struction of the discursive traces of postcolonial identities might meet the 
traditionalists halfway, or even one-tenth of the way, because they don’t know, 
and don’t seem at all inclined to wonder, how discursive structures are con-
verted into the group orientations that condition action. Bhabha and Spivak 
are brilliant at recuperating verbal texts (literary, theological, administrative, 
and anthropological) for poststructuralist theory, but they have no theoretical 
shuttle that would ferry the “relations of discourse” they discover there back 
into the felt or lived phenomenologies of (post)colonial warfare and other 
realities and identities; and the “traditionalists” don’t seem to be particularly 
interested in building that kind of bridge or shuttle either. Terry Eagleton, for 
that matter, for all his ranting and posturing about liberal radicalism and fake 
Marxism—the review of Spivak’s book is notoriously vicious—doesn’t have a 
clue himself about the conversion of proletarian ideology into revolutionary 
action or proletarian action into revolutionary ideology. It just sort of hap-
pens, as if by magic. Ideology is mental and action is physical, and somehow 
the one keeps making the quantum leap into the other, through a black-box 
theoretical vacuum.
 Somatic theory does model a shuttle of the necessary sort. It opens the 
black box through which discursive “inscriptions” are marked somatically 
for behavior and people, places, actions, and things are mapped physically-
becoming-mentally into knowing and saying and believing. It explains how 
evaluative affect is not only circulated collectively through thoughts, words, 
actions, and orientations to places and things but stored as learned and more 
or less stable “structures” in the proprioceptive body of the group,3 and how 
normative and counternormative pressures, impulses, and orientations do 
battle in that regulatory affective economy. Raymond Williams has theorized 
something like this somatic economy for a Marxism that Terry Eagleton has 
dismissed contemptuously as more liberalism, under the rubric “structures 
of feeling”4; and as we’ll see in the Second Essay, both Bhabha and Spivak 
find themselves groping in this direction as well, Spivak even using Williams’s 
phrase in her discussion of Kant’s analytic of the sublime in the book Eagle-
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ton vilified, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason (14). But neither theorist quite 
knows what to do with postcolonial affect—certainly neither knows how to 
use it to build a theoretical bridge between thought and action—because, I’ll 
be arguing, they lack somatic theory.
 Ultimately I am interested here less in anything so vague and abstract as 
“postcoloniality” than in the disruption of ideosomatic regulation, something 
that I have in fact experienced first-hand, in spending half my adult life in 
foreign countries (especially perhaps the two years I’ve spent to date in post-
Soviet Russia and the two years I’ve most recently spent in the Hong Kong 
New Territories). While the sociopolitical default setting of somatic theory is 
successful ideosomatic regulation, my interest in this book is in the failure of 
that regulation, in the theory’s problematic borderlands, which I suspect will 
shed more light on ideosomaticity than would an exhaustive mapping of its 
ideal functionality.
 This is in fact the transformative effect that postcolonial studies has on 
somatic theory: studying the dysregulatory effects of the refugee experience, 
the reregulatory effects of (de)colonization, and the paleoregulatory effects of 
intergenerational trauma forces the somatic theorist to explore and explain 
the failure of the ideosomatic model of regulation that lies at the core of 
somatic theory. My efforts to apply somatic theory to postcolonial culture 
have had the salutary effect of expanding the scope of somatic theory: I have 
here developed the concepts of paleosomaticity and endo- and exosomaticity, 
of loco-, meta-, poly-, and xenonormativity (and panicked loconormativity), 
and allostatic overload precisely in order to increase the conceptual capacity 
of somatic theory to account for the myriad “postcolonial” breakdowns of the 
“normal” homeostatic functioning that lies at the core of somatic theory. How 
do we explain the traumata that result from such breakdowns, and the survival 
of individual and group adaptations to trauma for generations and even centu-
ries after the initial traumatizing event or series of events? How do we explain 
the movement not just of peoples but of their cultural normativizations, and 
the clashes that result from the normativizing pressures placed on individuals 
and groups by different cultures sharing a geography? How do we explain the 
apparent stability of “home,” of familiar places and objects, even after they’ve 
been destroyed or lost forever?
P.4 the Structure of the Book
I focus here on three broad areas of cultural identity-(de)formation that you 
may or may not agree are roughly postcolonial in genesis, one in each essay: 
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forced migration, (de)colonization, and intergenerational trauma. These can 
be thought of as vaguely sequential, beginning with the traumata that scatter 
citizens out into the world as refugees, moving through the attempts (first by 
the colonial power, and then by the politicians and intellectuals of the newly 
independent former colony) to manage and banish the traumata of the recent 
past, and ending with the survival of migratory and colonial traumata unto 
the second and third and nth generations—beginning with ideosomatic dys-
regulation (breakdown), moving through ideosomatic counterregulation (new 
organization), and ending with paleosomatic regulation (persistence of the old 
breakdown in the midst of the new organization).
 Within each of these three essays, then, I do three things: I read the data-
driven (“empirical”) sociological and psychological studies of the phenom-
enon under consideration and suggest some ways in which somatic theory 
can organize and explain the data more powerfully; I apply the somatic theory 
developed in those early sections to a literary or cinematic representation or 
series of such representations of the phenomenon; and, finally, I apply somatic 
theory to a series of poststructuralist/postcolonialist theoretical spins on the 
phenomenon, pushing on the broken binary abstractions of structuralist lin-
guistics that power poststructuralist theory in search of the vestiges of corpo-
real phenomenology that they don’t quite manage to suppress.
 The First Essay, “Displacement of Persons/Forced Migration/Ideosomatic 
Dysregulation,” begins in §1.1.1 by outlining what I take to be the “primal 
scene” of refugee studies, the encounter between the “loconormative” thera-
pist or researcher or aid worker and the “xenonormative” refugee, and com-
plicates this scene in §1.1.2 by exploring the ways in which each side of this 
encounter dysregulates the other. §1.1.3 taxonomizes the refugee experience 
in terms of the dysregulatory effects of the event(s) in the home region that 
trigger(s) flight, of flight itself (including refugee camps), of early contact with 
the new host community, and of traumatic memories that continue to plague 
later interaction with the host community, supposedly after assimilation. §1.2 
reads two texts by the Haitian-American author Edwidge Danticat: “Children 
of the Sea” as a study of dysregulation at home and in flight, and Breath, Eyes, 
Memory as a study of dysregulation in initial and continuing contact. The First 
Essay concludes in §1.3 with a discussion of the metaphorical uses to which 
migrants and refugees have been put in postcolonial theory, with examples 
from Deleuze and Guattari on “nomad thought,” and from Iain Chambers on 
migrancy.
 The Second Essay, “Displacement of Cultures/Colonization and (De)Col-
onization/Ideosomatic Counterregulation,” begins in §2.1 with a reading of 
classic studies of the (de)colonizing process—C. L. R. James’s The Black Jaco-
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bins, Albert Memmi’s The Colonizer and the Colonized and Decolonization and 
the Decolonized, and Frantz Fanon’s Black Skins, White Masks—as a series of 
attempts to impose a new “corrective” ideosomatic counterregulation on an 
already existing one. §2.1.3.3 reads a cinematic representation of (de/re)colo-
nization in the 2004 Spanish short film Binta and the Great Idea. The Second 
Essay concludes in §2.2 with a close reading of several essays by Bhabha and 
Spivak that tease out of their poststructuralist and Marxist theoretical strate-
gies an emerging concern with postcolonial affect, including (in §2.2.2.4) Spi-
vak’s reading of Mahasweta Devi’s novella “Douloti the Bountiful.”
 The Third Essay, “Displacement of Time/Intergenerational Trauma/Paleo-
somatic Regulation,” reads the growing body of work on the phenomenon that 
is variously called the intergenerational, multigenerational, and transgenera-
tional transmission of trauma. Following a quick prehistory of this theoretical 
orientation in Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals and Freud’s Moses and Mono-
theism, I summarize the empirical research in §3.1 and then devote the bulk 
of the essay (§3.2) to readings of three literary texts, James Welch’s The Death 
of Jim Loney (1979), Toni Morrison’s Beloved (1987), and Percival Everett’s 
“The Appropriation of Cultures” (1996). Through these readings I also expand 
and develop the theoretical model broached in §3.1; and I conclude the essay 
and the book in §3.2.4 with a reading of Dominic LaCapra’s application of the 
Freudian acting-out/working-through binary to trauma studies.
I began writing this book while teaching a graduate seminar on its prede-
cessor, Estrangement and the Somatics of Literature (Robinson 2008), specifi-
cally my concluding reading of Brecht’s postcolonial play Mann ist Mann, and 
as they emerged I discussed my ideas for it with my students, Phillip Gordon 
and Katie Burnett. Phillip and Katie also read early drafts of the book and gave 
me many useful comments. Sandy Crooms at The Ohio State University Press 
was an early believer in the book and sensitively shepherded it through what 
proved to be a long and difficult acquisition process.
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1.1 emPirical StudieS
1.1.1  the dysregulation and reregulation of refugee reality 
and identity
The German-born Norwegian psychotherapist Stefi Pedersen (1908–80), her-
self twice a refugee from Nazi Germany (she fled Berlin to Oslo in 1933 and 
took Norwegian citizenship, and then fled Nazi-occupied Norway to Sweden 
in 1943), writes in her 1949 article “Psychopathological Reactions to Extreme 
Social Displacements ‘(Refugee Neuroses)’” of World War II refugees dis-
placed from various European countries to Sweden:
Psychopathological reactions among refugees, which one has been able 
to observe especially during the recent world war, assume a middle-posi-
tion between war-neuroses on the one hand and on the other the mental-
hygienic difficulties met by emigrants of earlier times in the new countries 
to which they came. In common with the war-neuroses are the psychic 
traumata and the extreme physical exhaustion connection to the flight 
from the mother country; and the forced adjustment to unknown social 
relationships and the consequent necessity of finding places in new social 
1
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groups of varying patterns of behavior associate the refugees with the emi-
grants.
 In those cases in which the experience of the flight is especially trau-
matic, it seems as though acute dissociations of consciousness, hallucina-
tions, depersonalization, and amnesia assume a central position among the 
psycho-pathological reactions. The sudden severance from the mother-
country, the flight and the pursuit, appear to arouse so much strong anxiety 
that the sense of reality is temporarily set out of function, and thus there 
occur false evaluations and lack of orientation in the new surroundings. 
(344)
This is where I want to start: the disruptive effects that traumatic displace-
ment is seen to have on refugees’ social construction of both identity, through 
depersonalization and other dissociations, and reality, through hallucina-
tions and amnesia. Their identity, according to these therapeutic construc-
tions, is inwardly split (dissociated) or socially isolated (depersonalized); the 
group constructions of reality that seemed so real, so solid, and so stable in 
the bosom of the old community are scrambled (hallucinations) or forgotten 
(amnesia) in the painful transition to the new.
 But by way of getting us started with this material, note Pedersen’s specific 
phrasings: “the sense of reality,” she writes, “is temporarily set out of func-
tion.” There is only one sense of reality; and it is a mental mechanism of some 
sort that either functions properly or goes on the fritz. In the refugee, appar-
ently, at least for a while, it malfunctions, with the result that “there occur 
false evaluations and lack of orientation in the new surroundings.” When “the 
sense of reality” functions properly, there occur true evaluations; when it mal-
functions, there occur false ones. These are problematic formulations, not just 
because we now come to these issues after nearly a half-century of postmod-
ernist and poststructuralist problematizations of “reality” and “truth” and the 
stable unity implied by “the sense of reality,” but because Pedersen’s simple 
mechanical model of “the sense” of reality cannot explain how anxiety might 
disrupt it. What power can anxiety have over the mechanical functioning of 
“the sense of reality”? And why is its effect specifically to corrupt and falsify 
evaluations of reality? Above all, how exactly is “lack of orientation in the new 
surroundings” another effect of anxiety, and of the malfunctioning of “the 
sense of reality” it occasions? Surely, at the very simplest level, it’s the other 
way around: the refugee’s new surroundings are so radically and disturbingly 
unfamiliar that the old stable group constructions of reality become inoper-
able, and the resulting disorientations cause the anxiety?
 Let’s read on:
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These conditions obviously become more difficult when the refugee, 
immediately after he has come to a foreign country, is forced to find new 
social contacts, new work, a new place to live, and last but not least, new 
friends. For most of the refugees, this readjustment meant that they were 
forced to give up a great deal of the expectations and social ambitions they 
had had in their mother-country. They had to arrange their affairs under 
pressing conditions, they were relegated to a lower social position, they had 
to relinquish much of their influence in social groups (in their professions, 
at their places of work, in their families), they were looked upon with less 
respect, and they lost much of their individuality by becoming a number 
in the grey, anonymous mass of refugees.
 I am, therefore, inclined to believe that the situation in which refu-
gees find themselves is severely injurious to their self-assurance and can 
easily provoke—together with the original traumatic experience—the dis-
turbances of consciousness of personality which the Danish psychiatrist 
Strömgren (5) considers to be the basis for the development of paranoid 
reactions.
 The most comprehensive definition of consciousness of personality is 
to be found, remarkably enough, not in the work of Strömgren himself, but 
in that of Färgeman (2), who describes it as:
“a complex of ideas that a human being has about his own capabili-
ties, powers, and potentialities in every respect; his relationship to 
other people and to society. Briefly: a set of ideas of a most highly 
private and intimate nature. All endeavor, all earlier failures and 
all expectations of social and sexual success and of intellectual and 
ethical development are permanent constituents of consciousness 
of personality; and it thus acquires such an intimate nature that it 
is hardly surprising that most human beings are themselves fully 
aware of it only at rare moments.”
 This theory of Strömgren has a great advantage in that it joins together 
a broad social element and a special individual element by taking into con-
sideration the social situation that has released an actual neurosis—which, 
for its own part, is conditioned by the patient’s constitution and his earlier 
experiences and conflicts. (344–45)
 This “broad social element” amounts to a social conditioning of individu-
ality, a sense in which the individual is constituted as such in and by the group. 
The apparent oxymoron that “consciousness of personality” is in Freudian 
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terms preconscious—that “most human beings are themselves fully aware of it 
only at rare moments”—is another function of its social origins: the individual 
is only rarely aware of his or her individuality because it is a collective rather 
than an individual or a personal construct. The true oxymoron in that passage 
is “self-assurance”: the assured “self ” that is severely injured by traumatic dis-
placements is a group construct. How the group constructs and “assures” the 
self, and how the destruction or disruption of the group destroys or disrupts 
that self-assurance as well, is one of my primary concerns in the First Essay.
 Pedersen continues:
A long list of other writers have devoted their attention to this interchange 
of effect between personal conflict and social catastrophe. It appears in 
Allers, who describes several cases of psychogenic psychosis among pris-
oners-of-war in foreign-language environments during the first world war. 
After the recent war, Gillespie (3), in particular, has called attention to the 
fact that most cases of amnesia after air-raids did not depend upon the very 
capability of remembering being itself set out of function by trauma, but 
rather, in the greater number of cases, the loss of memory evolved about a 
“defensive amnesia,” in which self-reproach, in regard to the patient’s own 
behavior during the bombing, gave rise to a suppression of all the memory 
material.
 What is new in this theory of Strömgren is not simply that he points 
out what a central psychic function this consciousness of personality is 
and how inseparably it is bound to social surroundings, but above all the 
importance he gives to the intimate interplay between paranoid reactions 
and changes or conflicts within the realm of the ego.
 I believe, therefore, that it is no mere coincidence that in the treatment 
of refugees one is almost everywhere dealing with paranoid reactions, 
which apparently indicates that severe social trauma—in and of itself—has 
a tendency to release paranoid reactions, regardless of the character struc-
ture involved. (345)
 Note there the social orientation of self-reproach: the “self ” as a group 
construct is one of the way-stations through which group norms circulate, 
specifically the group’s normative attitudinalizations of behavior, including 
reproach. What R. D. Gillespie is suggesting in the 1942 book Pedersen cites 
is that the amnesia he found after air-raids was not simply a mechanical mal-
functioning of memory but a social disruption of memory, the individual pre-
emptively foreclosing on memories that would cause the group distress.
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 But why “release paranoid reactions”? This makes it sound as if paranoid 
reactions were lying in wait, held in storage, but dammed up by normal social 
relations, which, breaking down, could no longer contain the flood—or, to 
metaphorize that differently, as if “civilization” based on “consciousness of 
personality” were a thin veneer stretched flimsily across a great surging abyss 
of psychopathological response. That Pedersen also thematizes “normal” con-
structions of reality as “true” and paranoid constructions as “false” suggests 
that truth is a weak force everywhere besieged by the overwhelming forces of 
falsehood, and therefore in constant need of reinforcements from normality, 
from civilized social order, under the leadership of the psychotherapist (“No 
one, in fact, can be more opposed to war and conditions of social displace-
ment than the psychotherapist” [354]).
1.1.1.1 The Primal Scene of refugee STudieS
Now let us turn to Pedersen’s first case study:
A woman, 30 years old, who had been in Sweden for several months, com-
plained that she never got the right change back when she made purchases. 
When she went into a store, all the other customers were waited on ahead 
of her. One day, she said, a clerk in a large department store had indig-
nantly turned her back upon her when she had asked to buy something. 
When she looked more closely at her own way of conducting herself, she 
discovered by herself that it had actually been her own behavior that had 
resulted in her being treated in the way she was. She stood, uncertain and 
embarrassed, in the background and let other people go ahead of her. 
When she was to ask for what she wanted, her voice was so uncertain and 
indistinct that the very busy department-store clerk had quite simply not 
understood that she had said anything at all.
 This patient felt as though the general attitude toward refugees in Swe-
den was just as she herself had judged it to be: unjust, degrading, and ostra-
cizing.
 The patient completely lacked insight into her difficulties. She first 
visited me to discuss problems her daughter had been having in school. It 
became obvious that the daughter had adopted her mother’s paranoid atti-
tude. The child felt that she had been treated badly and neglected by both 
the other pupils and the teachers. When the mother clearly understood her 
false evaluation of the real situation, not only her own paranoid attitude 
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disappeared, but the child’s as well—without the need for any further treat-
ment. (346)
 Notice especially that “by herself ”: certainly no coercion is involved in 
the client’s movement to her therapeutic revelation, probably not even pres-
sure. Completely lacking insight into her difficulties, with no nudging from 
her therapist, the client somehow magically begins to look more closely at her 
behavior and discovers that she is herself to blame for her “unfair treatment.” 
This true perception of her relationship with the social situation in Sweden 
banishes her false paranoid perception and cures both her and her daughter. 
Pedersen, the refugee psychotherapist become refugee theorist, is merely pres-
ent at the self-healing.
 Our typical lack of awareness of “consciousness of personality,” however, is 
as socially circulated as the consciousness of personality itself—which is to say 
that we are as little aware of the shaping or guiding effect we have on others as 
we are on the shaping or guiding effect they have on us. Something like this 
socially circulated unawareness is at work in Pedersen’s approach to her client, 
I suggest: her own successful assimilation to Swedish society works on her 
sub limen to repress awareness of the guidance she gives this client. Pedersen, 
the professional or institutional representative of Swedish mental health, the 
client’s exemplar of (refugee adaptation to) Swedish calm, fair, tolerant ration-
ality, is her ideal guide to “true” perception, which is to say, to Swedish percep-
tion, to the proprioception of the Swedish body politic, or the group norms 
governing ordinary life in Sweden; and Pedersen’s inclination to report the 
normative therapeutic guidance she has been giving her client as the client’s 
own self-discovery is itself part of this guidance. A tolerant, liberal Swede or 
fully assimilated foreigner in Sweden would never pressure an immigrant into 
adjusting to Swedish group norms. Swedish group norms require that every-
one accept Swedish group norms as natural, not as group norms at all but as 
the natural rational telos of right living, as a default state to which all things 
return at rest, and therefore as something that requires no coercion or pres-
sure, and in fact recoils with ideological disgust and horror from such hostile 
and alien forces. Swedish group norms, in other words, require that Pedersen 
be simply the benign witness to the woman’s transformation—so she is.
 I would argue that something like this “therapeutic” encounter between 
assimilated therapist and unassimilated refugee constitutes the primal scene 
of refugee studies—this mundane clash between two value systems, one local, 
the other foreign, one central, the other peripheral, one included, the other 
excluded, one empowered, the other disempowered, one explaining and heal-
ing, the other perceived or portrayed as in need of explanations and a healing 
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transformation. The scene is at once one of dysregulation, in that collectively 
organized communication (the circulation of mutually accepted norms) has 
broken down, and of reregulation, in that the authoritative representative of 
resettlement, of the new host community, manages to “convert” the refugee to 
an assimilative ethos that facilitates her inclusion in the community.
 What I propose to do in the rest of §1.1.1, then, is to explore the soma-
ticity of this scene—or, to run that the other way, to exfoliate the interactive 
complexities of the scene by way of introducing the key concepts of somatic 
theory.
1.1.1.2  SomaTic mimeSiS, The SomaTic TranSfer, and The 
SomaTic exchange
Were the Swedes truly kind and open to this woman, and to refugees in gen-
eral, as Pedersen seems to assume and to want her client to assume, so that the 
woman’s feeling that she was being treated unfairly and unjustly was “false” 
and a sign of a “paranoid reaction”? Or was she in fact being treated unfairly 
and unjustly, and in order to get over her anger and suspicion simply had to 
adjust to life in Sweden as a refugee, to accept the dual “truth” that Swedes are 
suspicious and impatient with refugees and yet determined to portray them-
selves as fair-minded and open? We don’t know, because we never do know. 
This particular form of uncertainty is unavoidable. That we don’t know the 
“truth” behind all these constructions may seem like a limitation on the kinds 
of claims we can make about refugeeism; but of course in a Kantian universe 
such truth-claims are by definition unavailable to proof or disproof, and there-
fore they must be made not to matter.
 What can matter is the observation that virtually all the truth-claims in 
this case study, both before and after the woman’s “conversion,” are based on 
interpretations of body language: Pedersen tells us that the woman felt ignored 
and neglected in stores because the clerks turned their bodies to other cus-
tomers before her and away from her; and once the woman begins to “look 
more closely at her own way of conducting herself,” she realizes that it was the 
clerks’ readings of her body language that had made them respond to her as 
they did. She hung back, “uncertain and embarrassed”; she “let other people 
go ahead of her”; her voice was “uncertain and indistinct.” Whether Pedersen 
is guiding her to these latter realizations or not, it is clear that before the cli-
ent’s therapeutic conversion she reads only the clerks’ body language and fails 
to recognize the ways in which she too is participating in the ideosomatic 
regulation of the events in question, and after her conversion she reads the 
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clerks’ readings of her body language, thus nudging her interpretations of the 
events in the direction of what I call the somatic exchange.
 The somatic exchange, simply put, is the circulation of group norms, val-
ues, orientations, and inclinations through the somatic economy of those 
involved—whether they are physically present to each other or only nar-
ratively or otherwise imaginatively projected. It is the definitive channel of 
ideosomatic regulation, the channel by which regulatory norms are circulated 
through the group in the form of somatic approval and disapproval responses. 
More specifically, they are circulated through the group in the form of both 
outward body language and inward body states, linked serially by the Car-
penter Effect—the fact observed by William B. Carpenter in 1874 that we 
unconsciously tend to mimic other people’s body language in our own bod-
ies, picked up by Howard Friedman’s nonverbal communication team in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s as the channel for the interpersonal transmission 
of emotional states (see also Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson). In the early 
1990s these findings were incorporated by Antonio Damasio’s neurological 
research team at the University of Iowa into somatic theory: Ralph Adolphs 
headed up a smaller group that began to investigate it, and, beginning in 1994, 
to publish papers that addressed subjects’ ability to recognize somatic states in 
other people’s faces. None of the group’s publications in the late 1990s, how-
ever, addressed the question of an actual transfer or transmission of evalu-
ative/regulatory social feelings from one person to another; it was not until 
a medical paper published in 2002 that the subgroup offered a very sketchy 
neurophysiological model for what I call the somatic transfer, suggesting in 
a scant eight lines that “knowledge of other people’s emotions may rely on 
simulating the observed emotion” (Adolphs 171). But the very next year, in his 
2003 book Looking for Spinoza, Damasio summarizes that study and expands 
significantly on Adolphs’s team’s hints; let me quote at some length:
It also is apparent that the brain can simulate certain emotional body states 
internally, as happens in the process of turning the emotion sympathy into 
a feeling of empathy. Think, for example, of being told about a horrible 
accident in which someone was badly injured. For a moment you may 
feel a twinge of pain that mirrors in your mind the pain of the person in 
question. You feel as if you were the victim, and the feeling may be more or 
less intense depending on the dimension of the accident or on your knowl-
edge of the person involved. The presumed mechanism for producing 
this sort of feeling is a variety of what I have called the “as-if-body-loop” 
mechanism. It involves an internal brain simulation that consists of a rapid 
modification of ongoing body maps. This is achieved when certain brain 
regions, such as the prefrontal/premotor cortices, directly signal the body-
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sensing brain regions. The existence and location of comparable types of 
neurons has been established recently. Those neurons can represent, in 
an individual’s brain, the movements that very brain sees in another indi-
vidual, and produce signals toward sensorimotor structures so that the 
corresponding movements are either “previewed,” in simulation mode, or 
actually executed. These neurons are present in the frontal cortex of mon-
keys and humans, and are known as “mirror neurons.”
 The result of direct simulation of body states in body-sensing regions 
is no different from that of filtering the signals hailing from the body. In 
both cases the brain momentarily creates a set of body maps that does not 
correspond exactly to the current reality of the body. The brain uses the 
incoming body signals like clay to sculpt a particular body state in the 
regions where such a pattern can be constructed, i.e., the body-sensing 
regions. What one feels then is based on that “false” construction, not on 
the “real” body state.
 A recent study from Ralph Adolphs speaks directly to the issue of 
simulated body states. The study was aimed at investigating the underpin-
nings of empathy and involved more than 100 patients with neurological 
lesions located at varied sites of their cerebral cortex. They were asked to 
participate in a task that called for the sort of process needed for empathy 
responses. Each subject was shown photographs of an unknown person 
exhibiting some emotional expression and the task consisted of indicating 
what the unknown person was feeling. Researchers asked each subject to 
place himself or herself in the person’s shoes to guess the person’s state of 
mind. The hypothesis being tested was that patients with damage to body-
sensing regions of the cerebral cortex would not be capable of performing 
the task normally.
 Most patients performed this task easily, precisely as healthy subjects 
do, except for two specific groups of patients whose performance was 
impaired. The first group of impaired patients was quite predictable. It was 
made up of patients with damage to visual association cortices, especially 
the right visual cortices of the ventral occipito-temporal region. This sector 
of the brain is critical for the appreciation of visual configurations. Without 
its integrity, the facial expressions in the photographs cannot be perceived 
as a whole, even if the photos can be seen in the general sense of the term.
 The other group of patients was the most telling: It consisted of sub-
jects with damage located in the overall region of the right somatosensory 
cortices, namely, in the insula, SII and SI regions of the right cerebral hemi-
sphere. This is the set of regions in which the brain accomplishes the high-
est level of integrated mapping of body state. In the absence of this region, 
it is not possible for the brain to simulate other body states effectively. The 
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brain lacks the playground where variations on the body-state theme can 
be played. (115–17)
 This is the neurophysiological explanation of the “contagion” or “infection” 
of feelings or somatic states from one body to another, the fact that yawns and 
moods are so powerfully contagious: through empathy, based on seeing, hear-
ing (about), or reading about external evidence of other people’s body states, 
we simulate those states. Nor is this a voluntary process undergone by espe-
cially sensitive people who deliberately project themselves into other people’s 
feelings, because they want to; it happens to all of us, all the time, except to 
people with those specific types of brain damage Damasio mentions. It is not 
just “sensitive” people who yawn, or fight the overwhelming impulse to yawn, 
when they see other people yawning; it is virtually everyone. I call this somatic 
mimesis: the almost instantaneous mimicking of other people’s body states in 
our own, which serves to “infect” us with other people’s feelings.1
 For example, in Pedersen’s reconstruction of the somatic exchange in her 
client’s department-store experience, the client walks in hesitant, holding 
back, neither casually shopping nor stepping forward properly to attract a 
clerk’s attention. Her body language is picked up by the clerks, unconsciously 
mimicked and experienced inwardly as reticence, and ultimately interpreted 
by them as an unreadiness to shop; politely, not wanting to force themselves 
on a hesitant customer, they turn their attention to other shoppers. From the 
clerks’ point of view, which Pedersen supports, their behavior is normal and 
normative; they have done nothing wrong, and indeed would doubtless be 
surprised and even shocked to learn that someone (but a refugee, of course 
she would!) had accused them of deviating from standard behavioral norms. 
This is, of course, not the “truth”; it is the clerks’ ideosomatic point of view as 
reconstructed by Pedersen, mimetically simulated and so first experienced 
inwardly by her from the client’s reports, and then built into a therapeutic 
interpretation.
 As I reconstruct the client’s presenting construction of the somatic 
exchange, based on my own somatomimetic simulation of her body state and 
interpretations of that body state from Pedersen’s report, she walks into the 
department store hesitant, timid, her heart pounding, her adrenalin pump-
ing, in a mild form of acute trauma, absolutely convinced in advance that 
she is not going to be able to handle the upcoming transaction, and hoping 
desperately that someone will step forward to help her, save her, come more 
than halfway to walk her through the purchase of a few items in a language of 
which she does not speak more than a few words. The clerks, seeing that she 
is not a Swede, that she is poorly dressed, perhaps that her skin and hair are 
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darker than theirs, perhaps hearing her stammer out some garbled request 
in words that they hardly even recognize as Swedish, recoil with disgust and 
indignation. From the woman’s point of view, which Pedersen rejects and cor-
rects, her hurt and anger at this rudeness are normal and normative; she has 
done nothing wrong, has broken no laws, and simply because she is a for-
eigner, a refugee, has been treated badly by these native Swedes. This is, again, 
not the “truth” but (my somatomimetic simulation and reinterpretation of) 
the woman’s somatomimetic simulation of their body states in her own, based 
on her unconscious mimicking of their outward body language (bodily pos-
ture—the turning away—and facial expression).
1.1.1.3 SomaTic markerS and SomaTic STorage
In Pedersen’s essay, one of the key features of her client’s “paranoid” response 
to her new life in Sweden is its persistence: not only can she not give up her 
paranoia, but she manages to transfer it to her daughter as well; it is only after 
she has begun to work consciously back through her own behavior and atti-
tudes that she is able to let it go, and at that point her daughter’s paranoia dis-
appears as well. My question is this: where and how is that “paranoia,” or what 
I would prefer to describe as her xenonormative (non-Swedish) ideosomatic 
regulation, stored? Why is her belief that a clerk turning away from a speaking 
customer is rude so persistent? Why does her ideosomatic regulation remain 
active in her behavioral response, even as it is increasingly cut off from group 
kinesic confirmation and thus depleted of the feel of reality? How is her “para-
noid” anger at Swedish behavior transferred to and stored in her daughter?
 The persistence of behavioral orientations is one of the phenomena least 
well explained by other models, and best explained by somatic theory. In 
Mimesis and Alterity, Michael Taussig asks this question insistently: “If life is 
constructed, how come it appears so immutable? How come culture appears 
so natural? If things coarse and subtle are constructed, then surely they can 
be reconstrued as well?” (xvi). If Pedersen’s client’s non-Swedish response to 
Swedish department-store clerks is so dysregulatory, and yet is a mere con-
struction, why doesn’t she simply reconstrue it? Why is it so difficult to change 
what we believe, and how we act on what we believe? Why do cultural con-
structs feel so solid, so natural, so biological, even, as to seem to reflect univer-
sal human nature? “Try to imagine,” Taussig goes on, “what would happen if 
we didn’t in daily practice thus conspire to actively forget what Saussure called 
‘the arbitrariness of the sign’? Or try the opposite experiment. Try to imagine 
living in a world whose signs were indeed ‘natural’” (xviii). The sign is actually 
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only arbitrary in an arbitrary universalizing perspective, in a violently abstract 
perspective that attempts to universalize individual cultural constructs and so 
forces them to appear in their relativistic guise; within a specific culture, by 
contrast, every sign feels perfectly natural, feels immutable. To the compara-
tive linguist, the use of the phonetic sequence [kæt] to refer to a furry feline 
domestic pet is arbitrary, but the monolingual English-speaker is unable to 
imagine calling a cat anything else—certainly not [ræt] or [bæt]—and while 
the polyglot knows that the use of that phonetic sequence is globally arbitrary, 
s/he also feels the necessity of each language’s word for cat within the structure 
of feeling of each language.
 Taussig’s answer to his own question involves what he calls the “mimetic 
faculty,” which “carries out its honest labor suturing nature to artifice and 
bringing sensuousness to sense by means of what was once called sympathetic 
magic, granting the copy the character and power of the original, the rep-
resentation the power of the represented” (xviii). The apparent convergence 
between this notion and somatic theory’s “somatic mimeticism” is striking; 
but the model Taussig borrows from Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno 
can’t explain how mimesis “bring[s] sensuousness to sense.” It just sort of hap-
pens. Taussig cites Adorno’s praise for Benjamin’s writing “as that in which 
‘thought presses close to its object, as if through touching, smelling, tasting, it 
wanted to transform itself,’ and Susan Buck-Morss indicates how this very sen-
suousness is indebted to and necessary for what is unforgettable in that writ-
ing, its unremitting attempt to create ‘exact fantasies,’ translating objects into 
words, maintaining the objectness of the object in language” (2). There is in 
this formulation some sort of powerful mediating experience that bridges the 
gap between thought and the object, an experience that Adorno specifically 
identifies as affective; but in Taussig, as in Benjamin and Adorno, that experi-
ence remains mysterious, and indeed in Taussig is explicitly associated with 
magic. Anyone can think a likeness, think a mimesis, mentally assign “the 
copy the character and power of the original, the representation the power of 
the represented,” and then feel that power drain out of it. No one can simply 
think that power and make it stick; some deeper magic is required to convert 
an object into a fetish object. Taussig devotes much of his first chapter to a 
study of a group of representational wooden figurines carved by the Cuna 
in the San Blas islands off Panama, figurines with magical curative powers 
that Taussig associates with their representational nature, with the fact that 
they are carved to resemble prominent Europeans and Americans, including 
Douglas MacArthur. The question he neglects to ask, however, is this: why 
do the figurines not have those magical curative powers for us—only for the 
Cuna? Why can I (or anyone else) not carve a Douglas MacArthur doll and 
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go around curing people with it? What is the social process that converts the 
doll into a powerful fetish object? The somatic theory on which I draw here 
suggests that it is a slow iterative process by which the object is gradually 
invested with power, affectively occupied, cathected, besetzt wird, through the 
projection of exosomatic feelings into it, typically by the group, who circulate 
amongst themselves the feelings they are projecting into the object so that the 
object seems to become a part of their somatic exchange. A lone individual 
can fetishize an object as well, or even an imaginary friend, a figment, a ghost, 
but slowly, and subrationally—and an object fetishized by a lone individual 
will possess that fetish power or exosoma only for that individual, not for 
others. Nor does this exosomatization of objects, mental images, places, and 
so on necessarily operate through mimesis: the collective granting of exoso-
matic power to a mountain or a tree or a body of water, to a house or a garden 
or a path, to a skin color, to a string of beads or an amulet, to an abstraction 
like “honor” or “diversity” or “family values” is not mimetic at all and yet still 
empowers the object or the idea or the place for the group.2 We will return 
to the concept of the exosoma below, in connection with the dysregulatory 
impact of the destruction of exosomatized objects and places in the refugee 
experience (§1.1.3.1) and the use of exosomatized dolls in an attempt to rereg-
ulate and resomatize the dysregulated self (§1.2.2.2).
 So how is a cultural construct or fetish object “empowered,” exosomatized, 
given the force and the feel of permanence and efficacy? One of the mainstays 
of somatic theory is the somatic-marker hypothesis developed in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s by Damasio’s team to explain the autonomic underpinnings of 
rational decision-making. Damasio’s model suggests that the ventral-tegmen-
tal area of the autonomic nervous system “marks” certain behavioral options 
“positively” or “negatively,” with tiny subliminal quanta of emotional pleasure 
or pain that are measurable with a skin-conductance test (like a polygraph), 
and that when we “feel” these markers—typically way below the level of con-
scious awareness—we are guided by them in our prerational orientations to 
the making of a decision:
The key components [in the decision we need to make] unfold in our minds 
instantly, sketchily, and virtually simultaneously, too fast for the details to 
be clearly defined. But now, imagine that before you apply any kind of cost/
benefit analysis to the premises, and before you reason toward the solution 
of the problem, something quite important happens: When the bad out-
come connected with a given response option comes into mind, however 
fleetingly, you experience an unpleasant gut feeling. Because the feeling is 
about the body, I gave the phenomenon the technical term somatic state 
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(“soma” is Greek for body); and because it “marks” an image, I called it a 
marker. Note again that I use somatic in the most general sense (that which 
pertains to the body) and I include both visceral and nonvisceral sensation 
when I refer to somatic markers.
 What does the somatic marker achieve? It forces attention on the nega-
tive outcome to which a given action may lead, and functions as an auto-
mated alarm signal which says: Beware of danger ahead if you choose the 
option which leads to this outcome. The signal may lead you to reject, 
immediately, the negative course of action and thus make you choose 
among other alternatives. The automated signal protects you against future 
losses, without further ado, and then allows you to choose from among 
fewer alternatives. There is still room for using a cost/benefit analysis and 
proper deductive competence, but only after the automated step drasti-
cally reduces the number of options. Somatic markers may not be suf-
ficient for normal human decision-making since a subsequent process of 
reasoning and final selection will still take place in many though not all 
instances. Somatic markers probably increase the accuracy and efficiency 
of the decision process. Their absence reduces them. This distinction is 
important and can easily be missed. The hypothesis does not concern the 
reasoning steps which follow the action of the somatic marker. In short, 
somatic markers are a special instance of feelings generated from secondary 
emotions. Those emotions and feelings have been connected, by learning, 
to predicted future outcomes of certain scenarios. When a somatic marker 
is juxtaposed to a particular future outcome the combination functions 
as an alarm bell. When a positive somatic marker is juxtaposed instead 
it becomes a beacon of incentive. (Descartes’ Error 173–74, emphasis in 
original)
 To test the learning and storage of these somatic markers in specific deci-
sion-making contexts, a postdoctoral student in Damasio’s program named 
Antoine Bechara invented a gambling experiment. In the first version of the 
experiment, subjects were given $2,000 in play money, placed in front of four 
decks of cards, labeled A, B, C, and D, and told that the object of the “game” 
was to end it with the maximum amount of money—to lose as little of the 
bankroll s/he had been given, and preferably to earn more. The player then 
picked up a card from any one of the four decks and followed the instruc-
tions printed on it—invariably either to take a certain amount of money from 
the experimenter, to give a certain amount of money to the experimenter, 
or to both give and take money. The player was not told how many draws 
s/he would be allowed, or anything else about the future play, including the 
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differentiation of the decks: decks A and B typically both paid out and col-
lected back higher sums, so that the risks were very high in drawing from 
them, and decks C and D both paid out and demanded back lower sums, mak-
ing the risks in drawing from them low. The most a player would ever have to 
pay in drawing from deck C or D was $100; the highest payment required on 
a card in deck A or B was $1,250. “There is no way for the Player to predict, 
at the outset,” as Damasio describes this experiment in Descartes’ Error, “what 
will happen, and no way to keep in mind a precise tally of gains and losses as 
the game proceeds. Just as in life, where much of the knowledge by which we 
live and by which we construct our adaptive future is doled out bit by bit, as 
experience accrues, uncertainty reigns” (213).
 The “players” or research subjects asked to play this experimental game 
included both Damasio’s patients with damage to their ventral-tegmental areas 
and normals. What the experimenters found was that the two different groups 
played very differently. Typically, the normals would draw randomly from all 
four decks at first, become briefly attracted by high payoffs from decks A and 
B, but gradually, “within the first thirty moves” (213), as they were hit by big 
penalties, begin to shy away from those two decks and to draw more conser-
vatively from decks C and D. As Damasio reports, “self-professed high-risk 
players may resample decks A and B occasionally, only to return to the appar-
ently more prudent course of action” (213) after a few big hits. The ventral-
tegmental patients, on the other hand, would draw systematically from decks 
A and B, and go bankrupt halfway through the game. One such ventral-teg-
mental-damaged player, whom Damasio calls Elliott, played this recklessly 
despite describing himself as a “conservative, low-risk person” (214)—and in 
fact despite knowing intellectually, by the end of the game, that decks A and B 
were the “dangerous” ones. “When the experiment was repeated a few months 
later, with different cards and different labels for the decks, Elliott behaved 
no differently from how he did in real-life situations, where his errors have 
persisted” (214). He was, Damasio writes, “engaged in the task, fully attentive, 
cooperative, and interested in the outcome. In fact, he wanted to win. What 
made him choose so disastrously?” (215).
 Early speculation within the team included the possibility that the fron-
tally damaged subjects had been somehow desensitized to punishment, and 
could be motivated only by reward; a closer look at their actual play, however, 
showed that “after making a penalty payment, the patients avoided the deck 
from which the bad card had come, just as normal subjects did, but then, 
unlike normals, they returned to the bad deck” (217). Almost certainly the 
ventral-tegmental patients were still sensitive to punishment, but the warning 
aftereffect of punishment did not last long—it seemed to wear off.
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 To test this hypothesis, Hanna Damasio developed a follow-up experi-
ment, in which the players’ skin-conductance responses were monitored with 
a polygraph machine. A spike would show that the player was experiencing a 
somatic marker, either warning the player against a given draw or encouraging 
one—in other words, the polygraph could not distinguish between positive 
and negative somatic markers but could indicate the presence of some learned 
(stored) somatic orientation, and thus could tell the experimenters when the 
decision was not made randomly.
 What they found was that in the seconds following the drawing of a card, 
both groups, the frontally damaged patients and the normals, generated skin-
conductance responses, or somatic markers. Both a high payoff and a high 
penalty generated these somatic markers—presumably a positive marker for 
a high payoff and a negative marker for a high penalty. The striking differ-
ence between the two groups lay in the fact that, after ten or twenty draws, 
the normals began showing a skin-conductance spike before drawing from 
one of the two “dangerous” decks, A or B: their autonomic nervous system 
had learned not only to respond negatively to those two decks, but to predict 
negative consequences of drawing from them, and thus to warn the subject 
to avoid them. In the normals, in other words, learned and stored somatic 
markers served an important anticipatory and cautionary function. In the 
frontally damaged patients, on the other hand, no such anticipatory somatic 
markers were ever registered. They would continue responding somatically 
to big payoffs and big penalties, but they would never feel a somatic marker 
warning them against drawing from deck A or B. Their damaged ventral-
tegmental area was either not storing learned patterns or not using stored 
patterns to warn them against disastrous courses of action—probably, in fact, 
both.
 What this suggests is that the group-sponsored and -supported ideoso-
matic orientations that we’ve seen at work both loconormatively (based on 
Swedish regulation) in Stefi Pedersen and the department-store clerks and 
xenonormatively (based on non-Swedish regulation) in Pedersen’s refugee 
client are autonomically stored (synapticized through axonal guidance and 
myelination) and contextually activated collections of somatic markers. So 
too would be the Cuna Indians’ fetishization of representational figurines—
their conviction that the figurines could magically cure the sick, a conviction 
that apparently did frequently cure people. By guiding each minute decision 
an individual makes along collectively organized lines, these markers allow 
groups to impose moment-to-moment coherence on its members’ reality. 
Because the learned somatic orientations that generate contextual markers are 
stored in that area—at least in those of us without brain damage in the ventral-
DiSPlaCemenT Of  PerSOnS |  17
tegmental area—group guidance or ideosomatic regulation possesses suffi-
cient stability to make that imposed moment-to-moment coherence seem like 
the fabric of reality itself, the “way things are.” That stability is an extremely 
useful thing in our ordinary lives; without it, we would be overwhelmed by 
the complexity of life. We could not hold a job or maintain a relationship—
Damasio’s ventral-tegmental patients do typically get fired and dumped, 
because they are unable to organize their reality around job tasks or relation-
ship continuity. Certainly we could not cure the sick with carved wooden 
figurines, or with placebos.3 But when our ordinary realities collapse, through 
what I’m calling the ideosomatic dysregulation of forced migration, that sta-
bility can also become a liability. As it becomes xenonormative, the somatic 
markers it generates for us become increasingly “unrealistic”—cut off from 
the loconormative group construction of reality—and therefore maladaptive. 
Like Damasio’s patient Elliott, who continued to draw from decks A and B 
because it felt right to do so, the isolated refugee continues to ideosomatize 
reality xenonormatively, continues to act as it feels right to act, even though 
the new group—all of them strangers speaking a strange language—fails to 
confirm those feelings, fails to provide the expected somatic support for “right 
action,” indeed often seems to act in utterly irrational and even insane ways. 
To the locals, the refugee acts equally irrationally and insanely, and may well 
be sent to a psychotherapist like Stefi Pedersen for treatment. This perceived 
irrationality on both sides of the loco-/xenonormative divide is one definitive 
sign of ideosomatic dysregulation.
1.1.1.4 SomaTic (dyS)regulaTion and alloSTaTic load
So what is ideosomatic dysregulation? The easy answer is that it is a break-
down in the circulation of regulatory/normative pressures through the somatic 
exchange; but what breaks it down, and what, behaviorally, attitudinally, and 
cognitively, is the result? In terms of the questions I asked of Pedersen earlier 
in the essay, is it really true that anxiety can dysregulate a somatic exchange? 
Is there a certain allostatic load of anxiety that becomes ideosomatically dys-
regulatory, or is even a very low level of anxiety minimally dysregulatory? Or 
is anxiety not dysregulatory at all, but simply one of the byproducts and there-
fore signs of dysregulation? Or both? If anxiety is both a dysregulatory input 
and a dysregulated output of the allostatically adjusted somatic exchange, how 
does that work? And finally, if intense ideosomatic dysregulation entails the 
kinds of extreme breakdowns in the collective construction of identity and 
reality that Pedersen found—depersonalization and dissociation, hallucina-
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tion and amnesia—how are those breakdowns triggered, or, in Pedersen’s 
term, “released”?
 The great integrator of psychological, psychoanalytical, and psychobio-
logical research on affect regulation in our time is Allan N. Schore, in a series 
of books entitled Affect Regulation and the Origin of the Self, Affect Regula-
tion and the Repair of the Self, and Affect Dysregulation and Disorders of the 
Self. In the emerging research model now being developed out of Bowlby’s 
attachment theory, Kohut’s self-psychology, and Damasio’s somatic-marker 
hypothesis, affect regulation and dysregulation are products of nonverbal and 
largely unconscious/preconscious right-brain-to-right-brain communication, 
and specifically the communicative synchronization of affect through the 
mirroring of body language. Initially this regulatory communication occurs 
between the primary caregiver (Schore says simply the mother) and the new-
born infant, and then in communicative dyads throughout the rest of the indi-
vidual’s life, especially the therapist–patient dyad. One of the weaknesses of 
Schore’s integrative approach from the perspective of somatic theory is that he 
completely ignores the synchronization of affect in larger groups, despite the 
attention paid to the mother-father-infant triad by Freud and his most radi-
cal followers, including Jacques Lacan and Julia Kristeva, who associate what 
Schore calls affective right-brain body-based communication with the mother 
and verbal left-brain symbolic communication with the father; and certainly 
Freud was increasingly fascinated, toward the end of his life, especially in Civi-
lization and its Discontents, with societal regulation of affect (the Unbeha-
gen or dysregulation caused by misattuned societal regulation of Behagen or 
pleasure).
 Schore writes in Affect Regulation and the Repair of the Self:
Mutual gaze interactions increase over the second and third quarters of 
the first year, and because they occur within the “split second world of the 
mother and infant” (Stern 1977) are therefore not easily visible. This dia-
logue is best studied by a frame-by-frame analysis of film, and in such work 
Beebe and Lachmann (1988a) observed synchronous rapid movements 
and fast changes in affective expressions within the dyad. . . . This affective 
mirroring is accomplished by a moment-by-moment matching of affective 
direction in which both partners increase together their degree of engage-
ment and facially expressed positive affect. The fact that the coordination 
of responses is so rapid suggests the existence of a bond of unconscious 
communication. . . .
 These mirroring exchanges generate much more than overt facial 
changes in the dyad; they represent a transformation of inner events. Beebe 
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and Lachmann (1988a) asserted that as the mother and the infant match 
each other’s temporal and affective patterns, each recreates an inner psy-
chophysiological state similar to the partner’s. In synchronized gaze the 
dyad creates a mutual regulatory system of arousal (Stern 1983) in which 
they both experience a state transition as they move together from a state 
of neutral affect and arousal to one of heightened positive emotion and 
high arousal. (8)
 Here “the child is using the output of the mother’s right cortex as a tem-
plate for the imprinting—the hard wiring of circuits in his/her own right cor-
tex that will come to mediate his/her expanding affective capacities. It has been 
said that in early infancy the mother is the child’s ‘auxiliary cortex’. . . . In these 
transactions she is ‘downloading programs’ from her brain into the infant’s 
brain” (Schore, Affect Regulation 13), so that “in dyadic, ‘symbiotic states’ the 
infant’s ‘open,’ immature, and developing internal homeostatic systems are 
interactively regulated by the caregiver’s more mature and differentiated ner-
vous system. Self-objects are thus external psychobiological regulators (Taylor 
1987) that facilitate the regulation of affective experience (Palombo 1992), and 
they act at nonverbal levels beneath conscious awareness to cocreate states of 
maximal cohesion and vitalization (Wolf 1988)” (14).
 This would be the ideal model of good parenting, based on the regulatory 
attunement of affective right-brain communication through facial mirroring; 
but of course it doesn’t always work, even in the best parents. “We know that 
the caregiver is not always attuned,” Schore notes; “indeed, developmental 
research shows frequent moments of misattunement in the dyad, ruptures of 
the attachment bond. . . . Reciprocal gaze, in addition to transmitting attune-
ment, can also act to transmit misattunement, as in shame experiences. The 
misattunement in shame, as in other negative affects, represents a regulatory 
failure and is phenomenologically experienced as a discontinuity in what 
Winnicott (1958) called the child’s need for ‘going-on-being’” (10–11). Unsur-
prisingly, then, dyadic attunement regulates, in the sense of modeling for the 
child a successful and pleasurable affect regulation, and misattunement dys-
regulates, causing interactive stress and, ultimately, if the stress state continues 
for too long without reattunement, the building of what Freud called “defense 
mechanisms” or allostatic reregulations that block attunement. “A body of 
clinical and experimental evidence indicates,” Schore writes, “that all forms 
of psychopathology have concomitant symptoms of emotional dysregulation, 
and that defense mechanisms are, in essence, forms of emotional regulation 
strategies for avoiding, minimizing, or converting affects that are too difficult 
to tolerate” (Cole, Michel, and O’Donnell 1994 [27–28]). “If attachment is 
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interactive synchrony,” Schore notes later, “stress is defined as an asynchrony 
in an interactional sequence, and, following this, a period of reestablished syn-
chrony allows for stress recovery” (39, emphasis in original).
 Schore’s interests lie almost exclusively in the mother–child dyad and its 
later reparative replications in the therapist–patient dyad; he does not discuss 
the effects on affect regulation of later severely traumatizing stress, such as we 
are concerned with here. It should be obvious, however, that brutal violence is 
not only an extreme form of asynchrony but also a dysregulatory transmission 
of radical misattunement, so that the victim of violence not only experiences 
a destructive breach of his or her defenses but also internalizes (somatizes) 
an affect-image of the victimizer’s brutality, of the brutal disregard for his or 
her affective regulation. Allostasis makes this violently dysregulatory intro-
ject extremely difficult to dislodge—a fact that explains the long persistence 
of PTSD symptomatologies. Refugees propelled into flight by the experience 
of this sort of violence—especially of course by suffering it in their own bod-
ies, but even by simply viewing or hearing about violence inflicted on neigh-
bors and relatives and friends—will be dealing with ideosomatic dysregulation 
for years, even decades to come, most, perhaps, for the rest of their lives. As 
Schore describes these dysregulated states:
Due to the impaired development of the right-cortical preconscious system 
that decodes emotional stimuli by actual felt emotional responses to stim-
uli, individuals with poor attachment histories display empathy disorders, 
the limited capacity to perceive the emotional states of others. An inability 
to read facial expressions leads to a misattribution of emotional states and 
a misinterpretation of the intentions of others. Thus, there are impairments 
in the processing of socioemotional information.
 In addition to this deficit in social cognition, the deficit in self-regula-
tion is manifest in a limited capacity to modulate the intensity and dura-
tion of affects, especially biologically primitive affects like shame, rage, 
excitement, elation, disgust, panic-terror, and hopelessness-despair. Under 
stress such individuals experience not discrete and differentiated affects, 
but diffuse, undifferentiated, chaotic states accompanied by overwhelm-
ing somatic and visceral sensations. The poor capacity for what Fonagy 
and Target (1997) called “mentalization” leads to a restricted ability to 
reflect upon one’s emotional states. Right-cortical dysfunction is specifi-
cally associated with alterations in body perception and disintegration of 
self-representation (Weinberg, 2000). Solms also described a mechanism 
by which disorganization of a damaged or developmentally deficient right 
hemisphere is associated with a “collapse of internalized representations 
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of the external world” in which “the patient regresses from whole to part 
object relationships” (1996, p. 347), a hallmark of early forming personality 
disorders. (Affect Regulation 47)
 I would add only two things: first, that the collapse of internalized repre-
sentations of the external world—what I call the ideosomatic dysregulation of 
collective reality constructs—is a hallmark of PTSD as well, or late-forming 
personality disorders; and second, because the victim of violence allostatically 
somatizes the dysregulatory effects of violence, this sort of collapse of empa-
thy, affect regulation, and a stable self tends to be viral, to be transmitted from 
individual to individual and from group to group, so that the individual disor-
ganized or dysregulated by violence tends to become a perpetrator of violence, 
and mobs beget mobs. The kinds of chaotic mob violence that in many cases 
propel whole populations into flight are themselves the viral products of ear-
lier mob violence, and will tend to ensure that a tendency to mob violence is 
perpetuated.
 But what about the ideosomatic dysregulation that ensues not from actual 
physical violence but simply from the disruption or destruction of the social 
and/or physical environment? What about the refugees who are traumatized 
by the scattering of their friends and family and the loss of their homes and 
other familiar places? Schore’s dyadic approach can easily explain the dysregu-
latory effects of one-on-one violence, but it is more at a loss with the interac-
tive stress caused by group disintegration and loss of familiar places. Somatic 
theory’s focus on the group rather than the dyad as the primary channel of 
affect regulation helps to explain both phenomena by insisting that affect-reg-
ulation is transferred to the individual not once, in infancy, by a good enough 
mother, but constantly, throughout each individual’s life, by the group—ren-
dering the scattering of the group, obviously, profoundly dysregulatory. (The 
dysregulatory effects of the loss or destruction of familiar things and places are 
related to this, but in complex ways that I want to return to in a few pages, in 
the context of Maria Pfister-Ammende’s study of Swiss refugee camps.)
 Stefi Pedersen’s first case study of the woman in the department store 
reminds us also that the dysregulatory effects of refugee trauma are gener-
ated not just by the destruction of the old group, at home, but also by the 
fraught transition to the formation of a new group, in the new host com-
munity. The divergence between Pedersen’s client’s early construction of the 
somatic exchange as signaling the unfair treatment of refugees in Sweden and 
Pedersen’s “therapeutic” construction of it as signaling her client’s maladapta-
tion to Swedish group norms, for example, is a clear sign of ideosomatic dys-
regulation: because the client and the therapist do not share the same culture, 
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have not been socialized into the same ideosomatic norms, their normative 
constructions of the somatic exchange in the same situation are centrifugal. 
Pedersen’s normatology, successfully adapted to local Swedish ideosomatic 
regulation, is loconormative; her client’s, still largely shaped by the foreign 
culture from which she came, is xenonormative. A radical unconscious clash 
between loco- and xenonormative regulation renders the group organi-
zation of behavior difficult or impossible and social interaction—and thus 
both identity and reality as socially regulated—potentially chaotic, which is 
to say, ideosomatically dysregulatory. The fact that Pedersen’s client manages 
to impose some sort of regulatory interpretation on the department-store 
interaction—takes it to signal Swedes’ unfair treatment of refugees—suggests 
that ideosomatic regulation has not broken down for her entirely, that she is 
not truly plunged into dysregulatory identity- and reality-threatening chaos 
and trauma; but the chronic stress that her repeated feeling of being treated 
unfairly generates in her constitutes an allostatic overload that dysregulates 
both her own life and her daughter’s.4
 A large part of the woman’s problem stems from the fact that the norma-
tive tendency of ideosomatic regulation to normativize itself not as normative 
at all but simply as natural, as human nature, remains functional only so long 
as it is loconormative. As it is separated in space or time from the group that 
maintains it—as it becomes nonhegemonically xenonormative, or what we 
may call “subaltern xenonormativity”—it becomes an ideosomatic orphan, 
still active in the individual’s behavioral response but no longer collectively 
supported, and therefore increasingly depleted of the (collectivized) feel of 
reality. For the isolated refugee, cut off from the home ethnos (“own” people, 
places, and things), subaltern xenonormativity is an internalized civilization 
parked over the abyss. It is a neurotechnology for making sense of things, for 
organizing sense-impressions, for imposing a coherent reality on the random 
bits and pieces flung at us by the world, that now labors on without those 
constant confirmatory pressures of the ideosomatic exchange—group body 
language, circulated iteronormatively through each individual—that made it 
seem truly functional, truly able to create a meaningful world.
 The other part of the problem is that the normal functioning of ideoso-
matic regulation normatively suppresses this sort of analysis—this awareness 
that the group exists to organize reality and identity for us, to create and stabi-
lize and naturalize a world for us, and that any extended absence from group 
pressures will therefore tend to decreate, destabilize, and denaturalize our 
world. The “background” functioning of homeostatic self-regulation, the fact 
that we do not need to be aware every moment of collective guidance in order 
DiSPlaCemenT Of  PerSOnS |  23
to be guided by it, has practical benefits—Hamlet is in some sense a play about 
the failure of that background functioning, the complex intellectual dither-
ing that ensues when we must make ethical decisions consciously, rationally, 
analytically—but those benefits collapse with the group that supports them. 
The normative naturalization of ideosomatic normativity therefore tends to 
render the individual ill-prepared for any breakdown in the group-normative 
construction of world.
 And indeed Pedersen’s client is severely handicapped by her inability 
to analyze her refugee situation relativistically, as a move from one norma-
tive organization of the world to another. Because she unconsciously (ideo-
somatically) universalizes her subaltern xenonormative orientation to social 
relations, she doesn’t even realize that it has broken down, become inopera-
tive, become an orphan technology; she believes that there is only one right 
way to behave, and she is conforming to that norm and the Swedes are not. 
She is conscious neither of the somatic exchange (bodily interactivity) nor 
of its divergent and therefore dysregulatory effects in her interactions with 
Swedes (loco-/xenonormative centrifugality). Pedersen’s therapeutic interven-
tion involves making her aware of both: teaching her both that she is sending 
somatic signals to Swedes too, not just passively receiving signals from them, 
and that she must now begin to reorganize her identity and reality around 
loconormative ideosomatic regulation.
 But Pedersen would almost certainly regard my description of her “thera-
peutic intervention” as tendentious, given that she herself presents it as some-
thing that her client did for herself, with Pedersen as neutral observer. My 
description, as I say, emerges out of my somatomimetic simulation of Peder-
sen’s body states, based on her report: I feel that she is not telling the whole 
truth about how she interacted with this refugee woman, that she is idealizing 
her somatic contribution to her client’s cure. In my reconstruction, Pedersen 
thematizes her client’s discovery of the somatic exchange so as to exculpate the 
Swedish clerks and blame the refugee woman not just for the clerks’ behav-
ior but for the misinterpretation of that behavior, suggesting that Pedersen 
is not the disinterested outside observer she would like us to think she is but 
a member of the local group, an ideosomatically invested participant in the 
normative circulation of Swedish social values. And in fact my reconstruc-
tive mimesis of Pedersen’s body language and simulation of her body states 
suggest that she is guiding her client to her therapeutic discovery at least as 
powerfully with her body language as with her verbal guidance: a smile, a 
friendly but almost imperceptible inclination of the head, a slight relaxation 
of posture whenever the client “discovers” some further evidence of her para-
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noid misconstructions of the Swedish clerks’ benevolence; a thoughtful frown, 
a raised eyebrow, a twisting of her upper body to quarter view whenever the 
client insists on her blamelessness, her helpless victimization by these Swedish 
xenophobes.
 What, though, is the hermeneutical status of my claim to be able to recon-
struct Pedersen’s participation in the somatic exchange with her client, based 
only on Pedersen’s written words? Does this mean I’m guessing? In somatic 
theory, somatomimetic simulation of body states is possible through both sen-
sory and verbal channels—both when we see, hear, and sense someone feel-
ing something and when we read or are told a story about someone feeling 
something. This is, in fact, intuitively correct: we are as powerfully moved by a 
scene in a movie or a novel as we are by a scene in real life, indeed often more 
moved by the artistic effect than by its real-life model, because in the artwork 
extraneous real-world elements that distract us from the simulation have been 
radically pared back. We have plenty of ordinary experiences of such com-
parisons as well: when we either see someone fall off a bicycle in shorts and a 
t-shirt, and watch bare skin slide along the asphalt, or hear or read the story 
of that happening, we cringe and shudder in sympathetic somatic response. 
Because the brain does not primarily distinguish between “real” and “nar-
rated” events, between “current” and “remembered” events, between things 
that happen to others and things that happen to us—those distinctions are 
secondary analytical constructs that we impose on somatic response after the 
fact—it doesn’t really matter whether I am Pedersen, or am present at her ses-
sions with this refugee woman, or simply read her report more than half a cen-
tury later: I am still going to respond somatomimetically to it, am still going to 
simulate her body states in my own.
 This does not mean, of course, that my simulations of her body states are 
necessarily accurate—any more than her simulations of the clerks’ and her 
client’s body states were necessarily accurate, or the clerks’ and refugee wom-
an’s simulations of each other’s body states were necessarily accurate. Somatic 
theory is not about objectivity; it’s about competing constructions, and the 
ideosomatic pressure brought to bear by the group on its members to unify 
those constructions artificially, to impose a political conformity on them. All I 
am claiming about my reconstructions of Pedersen’s body language and body 
states in the somatic exchange with this refugee client is that they feel per-
suasive to me—or, rather, I am using my claim that they feel persuasive to me 
as part of my attempt to make them persuasive to you, to set up my somatic 
exchange with you in such a way as to make you agree that I’m right about 
Pedersen.
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1.1.1.5 Summary
We might encapsulate this reading of what I’m calling the primal scene of ref-
ugee studies, then, by suggesting that refugeeism channels two distinct kinds 
of ideosomatic dysregulation, two distinct ruptures in the fabric of collective 
normativity: one for the refugees themselves (displacement as the breakdown 
of the group), the other for us as sedentary observers (displacement as the 
contamination of the group). For the displaced, refugeeness is a subtraction 
of ideosomatic regulation, the traumatic destruction of regulatory contexts; 
for us as observers, it is an addition to ideosomatic regulation, the unsettling 
introduction of an excess that disrupts regulatory contexts—as Liisa Malkki 
puts it, “in the national order of things, refugeeness is itself an aberration 
of categories, a zone of pollution” (7). Refugees find themselves thrust into 
situations that make no sense to them, because they have been expelled from 
the group contexts that impose order (reality and identity) on the world; for 
the sedentary, refugees are the senseless, the nonsensical, the unreal-because-
excluded somehow treacherously (re)included within reality, the “beyond 
the pale” (outside the paling fence that demarcates “home,” the familiar, the 
defined, the meaningful) somehow disturbingly discovered inside the pale. 
Refugeeism as a social phenomenon is the awkward encounter between these 
two dysregulations: the displaced find their way into a new regulatory group 
context, typically by adjusting their old ideosomatics to the regulatory norms 
of the undisplaced with whom they are resettled, who must somehow find 
room in their collective sense-making apparatuses for the inexplicable, the 
inscrutable. It is not surprising, then, that sociological refugee studies are by 
and large assimilation studies, since assimilation is the definitive contact zone 
between the two groups—or that psychological refugee studies consist almost 
exclusively of mental-health diagnoses designed to identify and fix what is 
wrong with refugees, preparatory to their assimilation.
1.1.2 the reregulation of the dysregulatory refugee
The advantage of an imagined primal scene, obviously, is focus: it constitutes a 
kind of ideal model from which all real-life messiness has been removed. Now 
it is time to introduce some messes. What I propose to do here in §1.1.2 is to 
take three closer looks at the reregulatory response to the refugee as dysregu-
latory force, as marshaled by the “therapist” side of the assimilative encounter, 
the first (§1.1.2.1) in a refugee camp, where the reregulators are the outsiders, 
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the xenonormative group; the second (§1.1.2.2) in the resettlement commu-
nity, where the reregulators (like Pedersen) are the loconormative group; the 
third (§1.1.2.3) in a comparison of the two. Then, in §1.1.3, I will return to the 
refugee’s experience of dysregulatory displacement.
1.1.2.1 xenonormaTive reregulaTion
In an important article from 1981, “Framing Refugees as Clients,” Dorsh 
Marie de Voe writes of the 85,000 Tibetans who followed the Dalai Lama in 
1959 in his flight out of the path of Chinese aggression into the neighboring 
countries of Nepal and India, from which some later moved on to Bhutan, Sik-
kim, Switzerland, Canada, the United States, and other countries. What makes 
the Tibetan refugees an interesting case study is that for the half-century after 
their uprooting they have continued consistently to refuse offers of citizen-
ship and chosen to retain refugee status, and as a result continue to receive 
considerable refugee aid from Western organizations. What interests de Voe 
is the “structure of thought” or “psychotopology”—Magorah Maruyama’s 
term, which de Voe borrows for what I would call “ideosomatic regulation”—
governing the group construction of specific travelers as either refugees or 
non-refugees, and thereby also the group organization of not just their living 
conditions but also their eventual social practices and orientations as well. 
She notes, for example, the “effective arbitrariness of who ‘becomes’ refugees” 
(91n7), citing the Indian government’s division of the Tibetan travelers into 
Buddhist “refugees” and Muslim “citizens”:
When the Indian Government was confronted with flood of Tibetans in 
1959, the refugees who were Muslim were detained. There has been, his-
torically, a rather small community of Tibetan Muslims in Lhasa, Tibet, 
called by Tibetans “Lhasa-kachi” or, Lhasa Muslims. India would not let 
the Muslims in under the same category as the Buddhists, even though 
they were both of the same experience necessitating, in their minds, flight. 
In 1960, the Indian Government agreed to allow the Lhasa-kachis exile. 
However, they were not allowed to enter as “refugees” but rather as Indian 
citizens. This group of about 1,000 people was sent to Strinagar, Kashmir, 
in northern India, and the center of Muslim activity. There, on the outskirts 
of the city, the Lhasa-kachi are nearly-forgotten people. Without refugee 
status, they were “unknown” to helping agencies—even in the initial reset-
tlement, and they were excluded from any rehabilitation schemes which 
were organized for a host of other Tibetan refugees. The Partition was not 
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so far in the past, and anti-Muslim sentiments combined with an historical 
distaste for Asian-looking people made India’s decision to accept Tibetan 
Muslims extremely difficult. (91n7)
This is part of a lengthy footnote to her general point about the large group of 
Buddhists who were quickly designated and remain today “Tibetan refugees,” 
namely, that
The professional initially frames the refugee as “client” through an agreed 
upon set of criteria. This initial prejudicial judgment establishes the need 
hierarchy which is then matched to the services and expectations offered 
by the agency. In this sense, experts take custody of the refugees by taking 
custody of what they, the experts, have identified as the refugee’s “problem.” 
Refugees cannot effect their own release from the situation; only others 
can.
 Like other people who are clients, refugees are categorized with an 
impersonal quality, like property. Then, institutions interested in absorbing 
or rehabilitating refugees impose an organization of relevant facts, needs 
and goals in a way that the institutional structures can handle them. Even 
the absorption of immigrants depends on the outcome of an interplay 
between their desires and expectations and the extent to which they can 
meet the demands of the organizations controlling them. (90–91)
 What I find initially interesting here for a study of the ideosomatic regula-
tion of refugeeism is that the Western aid organizations that define a group of 
people as refugees in terms of specific needs that can be met by their organi-
zational structures and resources are xenonormative, but now hegemonically 
xenonormative: they bring to the refugee groups their own foreign norms and 
values and the ideosomatic pressures that can regiment refugee experience in 
accordance with them and, unlike Pedersen’s timidly xenonormative client in 
the Swedish department store, are able to make their group construction of 
reality stick, make it become reality. The refugees are initially xenonormative 
too, but they do not assimilate to the local culture; instead as time goes on, 
they iterate their xenonormativity as new loconormative cultures (most nota-
bly in Dharamsala, India, where the Dalai Lama settled), in much larger num-
bers—the tens of thousands—than Pedersen’s client and her daughter. But as 
de Voe’s research shows, the numbers don’t really matter; they are still not 
large enough or powerful enough a group to take charge of the ideosomatic 
regulation of the aid-giving encounter, unable to import hegemonic xenonor-
mativity into the new context:
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Dependence begins when the refugees try to develop behaviors they per-
ceive as expected of them as clients in order to continue the flow of rewards 
or aid. This form of self-estrangement contributes to the refugee’s sense of 
powerlessness. There is the constant fear of being “summoned before a bar,” 
found guilty or inadequate. Indeed, the victim gets blamed for having the 
problem and not collaborating to solve it. So, the Tibetans, for instance, 
have learned to ask for sponsorship, to “see” their problem in the same way 
the helpers define it, and to seek the same solutions. After twenty years of 
such a relationship, Tibetans who do not “adapt” to the way things work 
in exile express a fear of personal failure in the new terms. Their young 
continually compete for the attention of aid organizations. To be connected 
with westerners has become a kind of status in itself, despite resentment of 
the foreignness it brings to the heart of the community. (93)
 Here again we have a loco-/xenonormative clash, and again one that is 
more or less stably resolved in favor of the more powerful group, the group 
with the superior financial and iterosomatic resources, the aid-givers. While 
in the Pedersen case the aid-givers were loconormative and the refugee xeno-
normative, however, in this case the aid-givers are (hegemonically) xeno-
normative and the refugees are (nonhegemonically) loconormative. As in 
the colonial situation, in fact—the topic properly of the Second Essay—the 
hegemonic xenonormative regime comes from Europe and the United States, 
and imposes an ideosomatic counterregulation, a new “corrective” ideoso-
matic exchange, on the Tibetan refugees from the outside, and so engenders 
in them not just willing and even eager conformity but “resentment of the 
foreignness it brings to the heart of the community.” Still, all the signs of suc-
cessful ideosomatic regulation are here: the attempt to conform behavior and 
self-understanding to group expectations, the definition of high status in the 
group in terms of successful conformity, the fear that failed conformity will 
bring unwanted consequences, and above all the circulation of somatic mark-
ers of approval (“the attention of aid organizations,” “a kind of status”) and dis-
approval (“found guilty or inadequate,” “get blamed,” “fear of personal failure”) 
as channels of normative reality-construction.
1.1.2.2  xenonormaTive-Becoming-loconormaTive reregulaTion
A more recent and explicitly Foucauldian study of this reregulatory construc-
tion of internees as “certified” refugees by Western aid organizations, immi-
gration officials, and mental health care providers is offered by Aihwa Ong 
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in her 1995 article “Making the Biopolitical Subject,” reprinted as chapter 4 
of her 2003 book Buddha is Hiding (I will follow along with the argument of 
the article, but will mostly quote from the book). “From the beginning,” she 
writes, “American service agencies, church groups, and immigration officials 
working with the refugees tended to view them as threats, both ideological 
and medical, to the American body politic where many were to be settled. The 
goals of refugee recruitment, processing, and resettlement programs were to 
socialize refugees to a category of newcomers defined as contagious to and 
dependent upon the civil society” (Buddha 93)—or, in my terms, to reregulate 
refugees perceived as ideosomatically dysregulatory.
Although there was overwhelming evidence that only a tiny percentage of 
refugees at KID [the Khao-I-Dang camp in Thailand] were Khmer Rouge 
members, a “Khmer Rouge screening process” rejected thousands on 
unsubstantiated suspicion that they participated in Khmer Rouge brutal-
ity or were affiliated with them. Stephen Golub has reported that the most 
circumstantial evidence, such as working involuntarily under the Angkar 
authorities or recounting stories that did not fit an assumed pattern of life 
in Khmer Rouge collective farms, was used to reject applicants. Transla-
tion problems and social differences such as the refugees’ body language— 
smiling even under stress, reporting the deaths of relatives with a dispas-
sionate face—made them Khmer Rouge suspects in the eyes of INS officers. 
(Buddha 58)
 Those chosen for resettlement in the US were then given “orientation” 
training designed to socialize them to life in America, much of it, Ong shows, 
aimed at sanitizing the foreignness of bodies and foods: washing themselves 
daily to prevent body odor, ventilating their kitchens to prevent cooking 
smells from bothering neighbors, not spitting or urinating in public,
because “Americans prefer clean public places.” (This statement does not 
take into account that most poor refugees were resettled in low-cost, gar-
bage-strewn neighborhoods.) They are also warned about sexually trans-
mitted diseases.
 The prominence of desensing and sanitary measures drove home the 
“cleanliness is next to godliness” message of cultural citizenship—good 
hygiene as a sign of democratic sensibility. Refugees have to erase the smells 
of their humanity, submitting to a civilizing process that can be measured 
out in daily mouthwashes and showers. I remember being greeted at a 
poor Cambodian home with a woman spraying scent from an aerosol can. 
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When I inquired why she was doing it, she said she had just been cooking 
Cambodian food, which, she had learned, “smelled bad to Americans.” 
(Buddha 97)
 Ong also deals at length with the reregulatory construction of refugee 
mental health by care providers:
Thus, although the health providers are well-meaning and sympathetic, 
the pressure to “do something” with patients often means in practice that 
“cultural sensitivity” is used in a limited, strategic fashion to win patients’ 
cooperation, facilitate diagnosis and buttress the doctors’ authority, rather 
than to give equal time or relativize biomedical knowledge [33]. Such 
health workers are often unable to take a critical view of their own profes-
sional role when clinic discourse defines them as ideal care providers for 
Asian immigrants. Indeed, stereotypical cultural concepts are deployed to 
construct an intersubjective reality that seeks to manipulate, incorporate 
and supplant Khmer notions of healing, body-care and knowledge. A main 
argument of this essay is that Khmer patients themselves learn to manipu-
late these expectations for their own ends. (“Making” 1248)
A main argument of this book is that both sides of assimilative encounter as 
analyzed by Ong here, both the care providers’ blindness to their own ideo-
somatic manipulations and the patients’ manipulative adaptations to the 
ideosomatics of the host community, are perfectly ordinary functions of the 
ideosomatic regulation of reality and identity. These are the normative somatic 
pressures humans use to create and maintain group conformity and cohesion. 
The tonal indignation that lurks just behind the surface of Ong’s rhetoric (in 
the article; it is edited out of the book) is partly a function, I suggest, of her 
unmasking strategies, her somewhat impatient demystifications of the ide-
alized faces that members of these groups put on what they are doing and 
why—demystificatory strategies that seem to me to take individuals’ submis-
sion to the ideosomatic regulation of knowledge, especially the knowledge 
of how knowledge is ideosomatically regulated, to be some kind of failing or 
weakness.
 Partly also, though, I think, there is a kind of vestigial identity essential-
ism at work in Ong’s approach, a belief that people should be and remain who 
they are, and not become something they’re not in response to a new regula-
tory ideosomatic. Thus “Khmer patients themselves learn to manipulate these 
expectations for their own ends” becomes an accusation, directed primarily, 
perhaps, against the mystified care providers who think they are encounter-
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ing “real” people shaped by a “real” culture but are in fact only encountering 
phantoms of their own normative group pressures. From the standpoint of 
somatic theory, encountering such phantoms is at once a symptom of, and 
a regulatory response to, ideosomatic dysregulation: both a reflection of the 
frustration the mental health care providers feel at not being able to orga-
nize the normative circulation of biomedical authority through these recalci-
trant foreign bodies (because the bodies do not respond properly, do not show 
somatic signs of responding conformatively to local group pressures), and a 
renewed attempt to effect that circulation.
1.1.2.3  Panicked loconormaTiviTy and coSmoPoliTan 
meTanormaTiviTy
In her book-length study of Hutu refugees in Tanzania, the Finnish anthro-
pologist Liisa H. Malkki reads “refugeeness” as a subversion of “the categori-
cal quality of the national order of things” (6), as a liminal phenomenon that 
is by definition “unclassified/unclassifiable” (7), so that refugees become an 
anthropological anomaly, “at once no longer classified and not yet classified. 
They are no longer unproblematically citizens or native informants. They can 
no longer satisfy as ‘representatives’ of a particular local culture. One might 
say they have lost a kind of imagined cultural authority to stand for ‘their 
kind’ or for the imagined ‘whole’ of which they are or were a part” (7). “At this 
level,” she adds, “they represent an attack on the categorical order of nations 
which so often ends up being perceived as natural and, therefore, as inher-
ently legitimate” (8, emphasis added). In response to this perceived threat to 
the naturalization of the nation-state as the primary political emblem of cat-
egorical order, and thus to the universalization of hegemonic loconormativity, 
refugee studies tend, she argues, both to interiorize the anomaly as a problem 
“within the bodies and minds of people classified as refugees” (8), as a psycho-
pathology, and to exteriorize “the refugee from the national (and, one might 
say, cosmological) order of things” (9).
 Similarly, Giorgio Agamben writes in Homo Sacer:
If refugees (whose number has continued to grow in our century, to the 
point of including a significant part of humanity today) represent such a 
disquieting element in the order of the modern nation-state, this is above 
all because by breaking the continuity between man and citizen, nativity 
and nationality, they put the originary fiction of modern sovereignty in 
crisis. Bringing to light the difference between birth and nation, the refu-
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gee causes the secret presupposition of the political domain—bare life—to 
appear for an instant within that domain. (131, emphasis in original)
This “crisis” might, I suggest, be thematized along lines mapped out by Judith 
Butler, as a form of “panicked loconormativity,” a desperate attempt to protect 
and police the ideal naturalization of loconormative ideosomatics through 
the analytical containment of the refugee—or, to quote Butler out of con-
text, as “an incessant and panicked imitation of its own naturalized idealiza-
tion” (“Imitation” 23, emphasis in original). Reading Butler through somatic 
theory, I would emend that formulation slightly to read “an incessant and 
panicked homeostatic circulation of somatic mimeses of its own naturalized 
idealization”—a somatic clarification of imitation as not just the production of 
mimetic images but also the circulatory dissemination through the group of 
loconormativizing somatomimetic pressures intended to stabilize the collec-
tive construction of identity and reality homeostatically. To the extent that the 
figure of the refugee introduces panic into this homeostatic group regulation, 
then, it might be seen as allostatic panic, a stress response to (perceived) desta-
bilizing change in the sociopolitical environment.
 If panicked loconormativity is quintessentially a sedentary phenomenon, 
normally found among the therapists and researchers and other authorities of 
refugees’ resettlement communities, it can also be found, as Malkki’s fieldwork 
with Hutu refugees suggests, among the displaced. She cites Paul Gilroy’s con-
cept of “ethnic absolutism,” “a reductive, essentialist understanding of ethnic 
and national difference which operates through an absolute sense of culture 
so powerful that it is capable of separating people off from each other and 
diverting them into social and historical locations that are understood to be 
mutually impermeable and incommensurable” (Gilroy 115, quoted in Malkki 
14–15, emphasis in original). Gilroy is primarily concerned with the expul-
sive operation of ethnic absolutism in sedentary loconormative contexts, for 
example the “contemporary politics of racial exclusion” (Gilroy 114, quoted in 
Malkki 15) that drives the British to exclude dark-skinned citizens from “the 
national body”—this would be a theorization of the impulse to ethnic cleans-
ing that drives populations into refugee flight. But Malkki notes that “not all 
displaced people are led to challenge ethnic absolutism—on the contrary, I 
will argue that some circumstances of exile may positively produce it” (15, 
emphasis in original):
The most unusual and prominent social fact about the camp [the Mishamo 
Refugee Settlement in western Tanzania] was that its inhabitants were  
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continually engaged in an impassioned construction and reconstruction of 
their history as “a people.” The narrative production of this history ranged 
from descriptions of the “autochthonous” origins of Burundi as a “nation” 
and of the primordial social harmony that prevailed among the originary 
inhabitants (the Twa and the Hutu), to the coming of the pastoral Tutsi 
“foreigners from the north,” to the Tutsi theft of power from the “natives” 
(Hutu and Twa) by ruse and trickery, and, finally, to the culminating mass 
killings of Hutu by Tutsi in 1972. These narratives, ubiquitous in the camp, 
formed an overarching historical trajectory that was fundamentally also a 
national story about the “rightful natives” of Burundi. The camp refugees 
saw themselves as a nation in exile, and defined exile, in turn, as a moral 
trajectory of trials and tribulations that would ultimately empower them to 
reclaim (or create anew) the “homeland” in Burundi. (2)
 Since the Hutu refugees in Tanzania have been driven out of that idealized 
homeland, their constructions of national unity constitute a kind of panicked 
xenonormativity that suppresses panic by reconstituting itself as loconorma-
tivity—“ironically,” as Malkki notes, “people there deployed their very refu-
geeness in an effort to achieve this!” (4), which is to say, they deployed their 
panicked xenonormativity in an effort to achieve the ideosomatized effect of 
serene loconormativity.
 Those Hutu refugees resettled in the small Kigoma township took a differ-
ent approach:
In contrast, the town refugees had not constructed such a categorically 
distinct, collective identity. Rather than defining themselves collectively 
as “the Hutu refugees” (or even just as “the Hutu”), they tended to seek 
ways of assimilating and of inhabiting multiple, shifting identities—identi-
ties derived or “borrowed” from the social context of the township. Here, 
identities were like “porous sieves” (Tambiah 1986:6) to move in and out 
of, and assimilation was always intricately situational. In the course of the 
everyday, those in town were creating not a heroized national identity, but 
rather a lively cosmopolitanism—a worldliness that led the camp refugees 
to see them as an impure, problematic element in the “total community” of 
the Hutu refugees heroized as a people in exile. (2)
 This is roughly the assimilative encounter that I have identified as the pri-
mal scene of refugee studies, but Malkki here insists that what the Hutu in 
town assimilate to is not local Tanzanian ideosomatic regulation but a situ-
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ationally disaggregated identity, a kind of identity versatility that ideosoma-
tizes not panicked loconormativity but what we might call metanormativity, 
the ability to perform multiple shifting normativities. Metanormativity might 
be seen as the equivalent in the refugee encounter of Judith Butler’s “camp” 
identities, another kind of camp, the “parodic or imitative effect of gay iden-
tities” (“Imitation” 21)—for while the Hutu in the township do not exactly 
parody the Tanzanians, their metanormative assimilation to Tanzanian iden-
tities some of the time serves the same mimetic function of undermining 
the panicked loconormativity that would naturalize and universalize itself as 
“pure national identity.” Because it is a performative act, a kind of “lively” 
cosmopolitan playacting, it undermines essentialist constructions of identity; 
but because that performativity is also ideosomatized, circulated somatically 
through the group as an approved construction of identity, it produces a col-
lective calm that stands in significant contrast to panicked loconormativity. 
(At least this is how Malkki presents it, perhaps romanticizingly: as “a sweep-
ing refusal to be categorized, a refusal to be fixed within one and only one 
national or categorical identity, and one and only one historical trajectory” 
[4], which sounds to me like it might be a heroized postmodern/postcolonial 
construct, one that deliberately obscures the dysregulatory pain and resulting 
panic of assimilation. But then, I wasn’t there.)
1.1.3 types of refugee dysregulation
In refugee studies, Malkki notes, refugees “are constituted . . . as an anomaly 
requiring specialized correctives and therapeutic interventions. It is strik-
ing how often the abundant literature claiming refugees as its object of study 
locates ‘the problem’ not first in the political oppression or violence that pro-
duces massive territorial displacements of people, but within the bodies and 
minds of people classified as refugees” (8). This therapeutic orientation, which 
we’ve seen Malkki calling “interiorization,” is a product of what I have been 
identifying as the assimilative primal scene of refugee studies. What I want 
to do here in §1.1.3 is to problematize that broad generalization with two 
examples of refugee studies that partly do and partly do not fit Malkki’s char-
acterization—Maria Pfister-Ammende’s taxonomy of refugee pathologies in 
“The Problem of Uprooting” and Mia Flores-Borquez’s tracing of her own 
trajectory through the four stages of refugee dysregulation in “A Journey to 
Regain My Identity”—followed by some reflections on the implications of 
these empirical findings for postcolonial studies.
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1.1.3.1  TyPeS of refugee rooTedneSS and uProoTedneSS in a 
SwiSS refugee camP, 1944
Maria Pfister-Ammende was a Swiss Freudian psychoanalyst; her study of 
refugee dysregulation should be read as part of the collective “therapeutic” 
effort by the Swiss government to reregulate the refugee hordes that had fled 
Nazi Germany into the safety of neutral Switzerland, via a massive research 
project (of which she was the director) funded by the Swiss Academy of Medi-
cal Sciences in 1944 to study “the psychological aspects of the refugee problem 
in Switzerland” (7, emphasis added). Her analysis, she tells us, is “based on 
the records of psychological interviews of 300 ‘normal’ refugees, 700 case his-
tories of refugees and Swiss repatriates suffering from mental disturbances as 
well as on socio-psychological observations among about 2000 Soviet-Russian 
refugees” (7).
 And yet, surprisingly, perhaps, given the general therapeutic tendency to 
pathologize the refugee, according to Pfister-Ammende “the overwhelming 
majority of the persons interviewed retained a sense of inner security and 
appeared to be rooted. They were held by: Natural, tangible ties to their real, 
still existing country of origin and to the relatives that remained there. These 
people regarded themselves as being away from home only temporarily. Their 
country was still a living reality, a social area of activity and spiritual shelter. 
Although the ties to their world had been cut outwardly, they were unim-
paired within” (9, emphasis in original). I assume what she means there by 
“natural” is “unforced, organic,” what I would describe with Derrida’s term 
“iterative,” so that what she calls “natural” ties would be ones formed slowly 
over time through group interaction; by “tangible” I assume she means “felt,” 
which is to say somatic, so that tangible ties would be indices of the somatic 
exchange. The ties these refugees seem to feel to their home country and rela-
tives, then—their “roots”—are iterosomatic impulses that they continue to 
circulate with remaining members of those original groups, or, if they are 
now completely cut off from those groups, circulate imaginatively, based on 
memory-images of the regulatory somatic exchange. Although that somatic 
exchange has now become xenonormative, they are—at least as viewed from 
without—still sustained by it, and “unimpaired within.”
 In other interviewees, these ties are more problematic. She describes the 
Zionists as sustained inwardly by ties to Israel, which they have never visited, 
to which they are simply hoping to emigrate—imaginary ties, in a way, in 
some sense just as imaginary as the remembered xenonormativity of those 
still rooted in a lost home, but somatically speaking the iterosomatic impulses 
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that both groups circulate, whether of a lost past home or of a desired future 
one, are equally tangible and equally sustaining. And she describes the nostal-
gic, whose continued rootedness in the lost home country tends to overwhelm 
all their present experiences and future plans with melancholy and bitter-
ness, and thus to destabilize their group identities. For them, the felt chasm 
between past rooted loconormativity and present uprooted xenonormativity, 
between the living feel of the circulation of iterosomatized values and norms 
through people, places, and things in an organic community and the waning 
regulatory efficacy of memory images of that somatic circulation in a refu-
gee camp, is too painful to be ignored. Religious faith, too, seems to be easy 
for some refugees to sustain, despite the scattering of the faithful from the 
iterosomatized ritual practices and spaces, from the organic community that 
makes gods and spirits and other imagined supernatural forces and processes 
feel real and present by circulating the body language and body states of belief 
in them, while for others their uprooting from that community and those 
spaces has the effect of rendering the iterosomatic basis of religion empty and 
inefficacious, and the religion itself therefore a sham.
 Significantly, Pfister-Ammende notes that “an intimate relationship with 
others present, whether friends or relatives, did not constitute as firm a hold 
as one would expect because the free flow of affection and the feeling of secu-
rity in such ties suffered from the mental and emotional strain due to cir-
cumstances and the uncertain future” (10, emphasis in original). Even when 
some significant segment of the organic community survives intact, in other 
words—especially a couple, or a family, nuclear or extended—the regulatory 
circulation of ideosomatic cohesiveness and security is disrupted by the loss of 
iterosomatized group associations with persons, places, and things in the past 
and the inability of the remaining group to impose reassuring ideosomatic 
regulation on an “uncertain future.”
 And here let us return to the question of the exosomatization of places 
and things that I raised in my discussion of the application of Allan Schore’s 
affect regulation theory to the refugee experience—the equally dysregulatory 
and traumatizing effects of scattering either familiar people (the regulatory 
group) or familiar places and things, suggesting a counterintuitive parallel 
between people (who can feel) and places and things (which cannot). I began 
to address this parallel in §1.1.1.3, in connection with Michael Taussig’s dis-
cussion of the magical curative powers of carved wooden fetish objects; but 
Pfister-Ammende’s vague references to “rootedness” seem to require a more 
thorough theorization of the group somatization of “home,” of familiar spaces 
and objects. Since somatic response is a function of the mammalian nervous 
system, the somatic exchange is primarily a circulation of regulatory body 
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language and body states through human groups—though it is also possi-
ble for humans to enter into a somatic exchange with other mammals, and 
people often do with their pets. It is also possible, however, for humans to 
exosomatize (put somatic roots down into) objects and spaces by circulating 
regulatory somatic responses to them through the human group: the way an 
object is touched or held or looked at, the way a space is walked through or 
paused in, the postural and gestural and other kinesic orientations to a thing 
or a place that a group circulates in the sense of picking them up from others 
mimetically and modeling them in turn for others’ mimetic appropriation, 
all make it seem to the group as if somatic response (the “exosoma”) were 
actually growing out of the objects and spaces in question. In the process, 
sense impressions—sights, sounds, smells, feels, tastes—are somatized as well, 
indeed often fetishized as the media through which exosomatic response is 
channeled between humans and objects and spaces (see Appadurai).
 When Pfister-Ammende talks about “roots,” therefore, and refers vaguely 
to “home” and the “existing country of origin,” or, more specifically, to “famil-
iar surroundings” or the “given environment” or a “maternal soil,” she is, I 
think, getting at something like this exosomatization of places and things: 
the sense of being at home in a specific dwelling and a specific neighborhood 
because you and the other members of your group live in them and work in 
them and walk through them and stop to talk in them, and have been doing 
so for years; the sense of being at home with certain objects, cooking uten-
sils, books, photos, pieces of furniture, because you and other members of 
your group handle them, use them. We know that it feels difficult to move 
from one house or apartment to another, even when we take our things with 
us, because at first everything feels different, feels alien, and it takes months, 
sometimes years, to exosomatize the new spaces so that they come to feel like 
our own, and to resomatize our old things in spatial realignment with the new 
spaces. The refugee is typically bereft of the old exosomatized places and the 
old exosomatized things, as well as the human group that originally helped 
exosomatize those places and things as familiar, as “own,” as real.5 And while 
some, especially the children, do begin quickly to exosomatize the new places 
and things, and to feel the group of refugees in a camp or other resettlement as 
the new relevant exosomatizing group, others, especially the older ones, take 
much longer to shift their somatic allegiances and alliances to the new group 
and the new places and things, and some never adjust at all.6
 Pfister-Ammende classifies the “uprooted” (or ideosomatically dysreg-
ulated) individuals she found in the Swiss refugee camps into seven types: 
“[1] isolated individuals from groups needing, but lacking leadership; [2] per-
sons with roots but suffering from severe trauma; [3] those identifying with 
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a social or professional class” (12); [4] drifters and escapists, who “have been 
drifting all their lives and have never entered into a genuine relationship,” and 
who “generally get along well in life, also as emigrants” (12); [5] neurotics, 
who may be temporarily liberated from their old fixationally somatized con-
flicts or may simply transfer “the object of their projections” (12) to the new 
surroundings; [6] egotists who take pleasure but “cannot give love or accept 
responsibility” (13); and [7] what she calls, in German, Problematiker, people 
who are “forever driven to deep and serious thinking about problematical 
questions” (13; bracketed numbering added). Pfister-Ammende says of types 
(4–7) that they are “rootless regardless of emigration,” and indeed “some of 
them chose emigration unconsciously because they preferred this form of life 
to the demands and obligations of an organized society” (14)—so I propose to 
set them aside as not dysregulated by sociopolitical upheavals that might be 
described as (post)colonial.
 The first group of ideosomatically dysregulated refugees are those whose 
at-homeness in ideosomatic regulation requires leadership—those for whom 
the kind of imperceptible somatic exchange that is typically found in a group 
of friends or other equals, where everyone acts unconsciously as both leader 
and led, where everyone circulates both authoritative and submissive somatic 
orientations, will not do. Pfister-Ammende finds this form of dysregulation 
“particularly in those individuals who had the chance to live in camps con-
ducted by competent leaders. If the leadership failed, however, because a good 
leader was replaced by an incapable one, dramatic anxiety and flight psycho-
ses of the entire group occurred” (10). She distinguishes between passive and 
active subtypes of this dysregulatory response:
The passively reacting individual freezes: either he will become ill and 
wither away like a wounded animal, or he remains outwardly adjusted 
to his environment, hiding his total inner upset (“Innere Totalirritation”) 
behind a perfect front. The inner chaos of such people is often masked by 
a semblance of indifference or amiability—their dreams or a Rorschach-
test will reveal their true mental and emotional state. The actively reacting 
person may show frank antisocial tendencies. Withdrawn from his social 
environment through lack of libidinous ties, he lives in a state of irritation, 
disarray and alienation. It is difficult to establish real contact with these 
people and to restore their inner calm. (10–11)
 The second group is so deeply traumatized as to be unable to marshal 
either xenonormative orientations (“people who have roots, but whose suffer-
ing has been so great that they cannot go on despite good will and great effort” 
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[11]) or new group membership (“the isolated individual who is unable to live 
outside his group” [11]—“his” group meaning the old group, now lost) as a 
regulatory foundation for a new life. “Such people frequently do not react at 
all and continue to exist in a state of living death . . . they were not in a state of 
inner upset but rather in one of silent hopeless surrender” (11).
 Perhaps the most interesting of Pfister-Ammende’s three dysregulated 
refugee types is the third, in whom the group affiliation destroyed by flight 
and resettlement is what Benedict Anderson calls an “imagined community,” 
or what Kurt Vonnegut in Cat’s Cradle calls a “granfalloon,” a group formed 
not “naturally” (in Pfister-Ammende’s term) or iterosomatically (in mine), 
through repeated iterations of a formative somatic exchange, but mentally, 
based on an unsomatized wish for connection. The imagined community is 
to the ideosomatically organized group as the Douglas MacArthur doll for 
the isolated Western artist is to the wooden carved Douglas MacArthur 
fetish object for the San Blas Cuna: an unsomatized simulacrum. Vonnegut’s 
examples of granfalloons include “the Communist Party, the Daughters of the 
American Revolution, the General Electric Company, the International Order 
of Odd Fellows—and any nation, anytime, anywhere” (82), reminding us that 
the nation is Anderson’s exemplary case of the imagined community, formed, 
he argues, around “national print-languages,” standardized and thus “univer-
salized” (nationalized) dialects that artificially unite speakers of regional dia-
lects, sociolects, genderlects, and so on. The fact that the loss of their nation 
can be profoundly dysregulative for these refugees suggests that they were 
previously regulated not so much by ideosomatic group pressures as by the 
unsomatized idea of such pressures.7 Pfister-Ammende also gives examples of 
“those who identified themselves with their social class or profession which had 
come to mean everything to them” (11, emphasis in original), and of middle-
aged women who drew all their emotional resources from a stereotyped idea 
or image of themselves as mothers and wives:
Not infrequently this type is unable to change or adjust, not for lacking 
activity but rather the ability for individual development and the creation 
of a life of her own. I have seen such women inaudibly break down after 
loss of home and husband. However they did continue to keep up appear-
ances and the front they presented to the outside world appeared intact. 
They adjusted and even clung to their given environment, the camp, for 
instance. Although possessing strong feelings they were passive by nature; 
the vitality deriving from their environment had vanished and they had 
succumbed to the forces sweeping away their social milieu; security and 
stability were gone along with their social environment. We are here deal-
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ing with a pseudo-rootedness (“Pseudoverwurzelung”) because identifica-
tion with and adherence to a social level have nothing in common with 
real security springing from a maternal soil, or with the vitality of those 
sustained by a universal idea for the common good. (11–12)
 I would emend two of Pfister-Ammende’s formulations there: first, by not-
ing that a woman’s “ability for individual development and the creation of a 
life of her own” is not a purely individual phenomenon; in order to feel right, 
to feel real, to feel authenticated or ontologized or even sociobiologized, “indi-
vidual development” and “a life of her own” must be circulated through the 
group, must receive group approval and support, must in the end be defined 
as those things via somatic exchange within the group. This suggests that “this 
type is unable to change or adjust” not so much for lack of “the ability for indi-
vidual development and the creation of a life of her own” but rather for lack of 
an ideosomatized group life of her own, a sense that she is somatically valued 
as an individual by a group. Her unsomatized stereotypes are not enough to 
sustain her. And second, “a universal idea for the common good” can quite 
obviously be just another unsomatized mentation that generates a granfal-
loon or a “pseudo-rootedness”: that sort of idea will sustain identity through 
upheavals only if it has been, and continues to be, in flight and resettlement, 
iterosomatized through significant interaction with a group.
1.1.3.2 The four STageS of refugee dySregulaTion
Refugee dysregulation can also be organized into chronological phases or 
stages (based loosely on Stein, and Vega, Kolody, and Valle):
1. dysregulation at home (invasion, ethnic cleansing, civil war, ruthless 
dictator, natural disaster);
2. dysregulation in flight (loss of home and community, hiding, march-
ing, refugee camps);
3. dysregulation of initial contact with new host community (pre-assimi-
lation);
4. dysregulation of continued contact with new host community, despite 
assimilation, due to traumatic memories.
We have already seen some of these in the essay so far: Pfister-Ammende’s 
study of the Swiss refugee camps gives us part of (2), and her first section, 
“Flight,” gives us the other part;8 Stefi Pedersen’s first case study, the woman 
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in the department store, gives us a single example of (3); and Dorsh Marie de 
Voe’s study of Tibetan refugees, Aihwa Ong’s study of Cambodian refugees, 
and Liisa Malkki’s study of Hutu refugees all situate us roughly in the time 
frame of (4). Very few refugee studies focus on dysregulation of the home situ-
ation or dysregulation during flight, not just because clinicians and researchers 
are typically found either in stable host communities (like Pedersen and Ong) 
or in refugee camps (like Pfister-Ammende and Malkki), not in the midst of 
civil wars or ethnic genocides or on long forced marches, but also because, as 
I suggested above, the assimilative encounter between refugees and their new 
hosts (including the researcher) is the organizing moment of refugee studies. 
Some researchers, like Ong in the first two chapters of Buddha, do provide 
accounts told them by the refugees they study of their traumatic experiences 
before, during, and after their departure from their homes; but these tend to 
be background material, early stages in the chronological sequences that lead 
up to their main focus, internment and (especially) assimilation.9
 Rather than theorize each stage in turn, I propose to take a quick look 
at a single first-person scholarly account that covers all four, a self-analyt-
ical refugee “memoir” entitled “A Journey to Regain My Identity” by Mia 
Flores-Borquez, who as a teenager in 1976 fled from Pinochet’s Chile with her 
mother. As the daughter of a prominent leftist activist (the mother), Flores-
Borquez was actively involved at a very early age in the election of Salvador 
Allende to the presidency in 1970, and, after his election, in various politi-
cal activities in the new regime: “During this time I became a student union 
leader and fought for the rights of indigenous Mapuche Indian students who 
were the subject of much discrimination. I also politicized the farmers close 
to the college where I lived, and in a highly right-wing community, I was for-
given for my political actions because I was also developing cultural activities 
that had not previously reached the locality” (96).
 The CIA-backed military coup in September 1973, then, which assassi-
nated Allende and installed Pinochet in his place, was for her the dysreg-
ulatory event in (1), the home situation. Mother and daughter were placed 
under surveillance, and their house was repeatedly searched; the mother was 
fired from her teaching job and became unemployable, and the daughter lost 
her scholarship and, in order to continue her schooling, was forced to move 
to Santiago and live with her father. Under cover of cultural activities, both 
mother and daughter continued to struggle clandestinely against the military 
government, until the mother was captured by the secret service and tortured, 
drugged, and brainwashed; finally she managed to escape her captors and, 
with the help of others in the underground, abducted Flores-Borquez and 
took her into hiding, where for six months—the dysregulation in (2), flight—
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fearing every moment for her life, the daughter cared for her mother and four 
other escaped torture victims, all of whom were severely traumatized. After 
many maneuverings, involving visas to four separate countries, they finally 
arrived in Britain, where she “experienced ignorance, rejection, hostility, vio-
lence, prejudice, and discrimination” (102)—the dysregulation in (3), initial 
contact.
 Still, Flores-Borquez’s intelligence and political activism helped her assim-
ilate—as Maria Pfister-Ammende noted in the Swiss refugee camps, politi-
cal convictions and activities help refugees remain rooted. She also attributes 
some of her assimilation to opportunism: “I have observed that in order to 
gain access to scarce resources, refugees with a political background inter-
nalize (Rycroft 1968) the values of the host community. This means that they 
are absorbed into the cultural orientation of ‘economic’ refugees. In order to 
survive (physically, socially, and psychologically) it would appear that refugees 
have to conform to the normative expectations of the culture that provides 
refuge. This is something that puts them in conflict with their own identity” 
(103)—their old identities, obviously, the ones shaped ideosomatically in the 
cultures they have left behind. This notion that an identity is a stable thing that 
is threatened by assimilation to another culture seems like it must have been 
one of the individualistic notions she picked up in the course of assimilating 
to British culture. She seems to want to portray her submission to British ideo-
somatic regulation as a refugee dysregulation; it is actually only an allostatic 
reregulation. She was well enough assimilated to attend Oxford, where she 
studied counseling; later worked at Oxford as a lecturer and research associate; 
and then became a research consultant at Oxford Brookes University, where 
she has been involved in international projects on forced migration, trauma, 
and refugee resettlement. Flores-Borquez is also the founder and director of 
Justicia, a charity organization dedicated to providing support for victims of 
human rights violations.
 And yet despite her assimilation and professional success, through-
out the nineteen years from her flight to her writing of this article in 1995 
Flores-Borquez was plagued by a PTSD symptomatology including “weepi-
ness, crying for no apparent reason, sleep disturbance, nightmares, loss of 
appetite, uncontrolled weight gain, cognitive impairment, anxiety, fear, sui-
cidal thoughts, and social withdrawal” (98), or what she calls, quoting Walter 
Benjamin, a “state of emergency” (104)—the dysregulation in (4), continued 
contact. She herself did not associate these symptoms with her refugee experi-
ence until 1994, when widespread media coverage of “the plight of detained 
asylum seekers in the United Kingdom who, failing in their attempts to obtain 
political asylum, were faced with deportation” (97), produced in her a series 
DiSPlaCemenT Of  PerSOnS |  43
of flashbacks from her previous experience, charged with intense identifica-
tory traumata. Television images of “resolute men and women inside a high 
security fenced compound” and of “video cameras, uniformed guards, and 
barbed wire .  .  . evoked my own feelings of helplessness, as well as of anger, 
at my own involuntary captivity with the group of escaped severely tortured 
political prisoners prior to leaving Chile” (98).
 In working through the impact that the 1994 media images of the detained 
asylum seekers had on her, Flores-Borquez realized that the most severely 
traumatizing moment in her past was her abduction by her mother—the dys-
regulation of (2), flight—and in fact that the trauma was worse because her 
abductor was her mother than it would have been had it been the secret ser-
vice: “Summerfield (1993) points out that individuals with a political back-
ground who have experienced the trauma of repression and persecution, can 
come to terms with their experience better when they view it as the conse-
quence of their political activities. As I recall now, I realize the feelings that 
I experienced then were that I had been abducted not by the secret service 
because of my activities in the underground resistance movement, but by 
my mother because of her activities” (99). “Thus,” she notes, “at that crucial 
moment my deep political sense of duty was denied and my own identity 
demolished” (100). (This same identity that at the moment of abduction is 
“demolished” later “comes into conflict” with British assimilative pressures, 
suggesting that perhaps “demolished” is too strong a descriptive term; that she 
is radically dysregulated, however, is clear.) Her mother’s assurances that she 
(Flores-Borquez) would sooner or later have been abducted as well did not 
help, especially since (a) her mother was convinced that the daughter would 
have been abducted as a way of putting pressure on the mother, and “even if I 
was raped and tortured in front of her, she would not reveal any information 
in order to save me” (100); and (b) she never felt loved by her mother, who was 
always more of a comrade than a nurturing mother. What’s more:
From the moment that I went into hiding, I became the voice of my 
mother. Due to the severity of the torture inflicted upon her, she lost the 
ability to walk and, once she had told me the details of her story, lost her 
ability to speak. I experienced, through her, the horrific nightmares that 
she suffered as well as witnessing by day her terror at any sound or move-
ment, fearing that the secret service were trying to reabduct her. My world 
for six months was one in which people—my mother and the other four 
escapees—spoke of torture, exhibited horrific physical evidence of torture, 
and at night relived in their dreams the atrocities that they had experienced 
and observed done to others. (100)
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 Through the somatic exchange, in other words, Flores-Borquez not only 
assumes the voice but simulates the body of her mother, not only talks but 
walks and feels for and with her, experiencing in her own body, through the 
circulatory power of somatic mimeticism, her mother’s pain and trauma and 
terror. Living in a somatic simulacrum of her mother’s tortured body, at the 
same time as she was living in the pain and powerlessness she felt at being 
abducted and spirited out of her life into hiding by her mother, created an 
extreme ideosomatic dysregulation (2) in her, a breakdown in the normal 
functioning of her physioemotional body; but what kept her weeping irra-
tionally, sleeping badly, eating little but gaining weight, living with constant 
anxieties, fears, and thoughts of suicide, and pulling away from other people 
for nineteen years was not so much that ideosomatic dysregulation but her 
allostatic adaptation to it, the building of her allostasis into a new (re)regula-
tory regime, the sublimation of trauma as a (new) normal state (4). This form 
of allostatic overload normalizes the adaptation to ideosomatic dysregulation 
into a kind of idiosomatic regulation, a “normality” that no one else around 
her experiences; but it is also an example of paleosomatic regulation, the sur-
vival of an old regulatory allostasis long after the era of its adaptiveness is 
past—the topic of the Third Essay.
 The fact that the dysregulations of home (1) and of initial contact (3) seem 
to have had very little traumatizing effect on Flores-Borquez does not, of 
course, mean that they are invariably minor factors in the dysregulatory refu-
gee experience: this is just one story, and there are tens of millions. Empirical 
studies (like Jensen or Vega, Kolody, and Valle) of refugee allostatic overload 
that attempt to establish which group is the most stressed, those dysregulated 
by (1) and (4), those regulated by (2) and (4), or those regulated by (3) and 
(4), are by their very nature inescapably inconclusive because no one could 
possibly study every refugee in the world, and no random sample could ever 
accurately represent an entire population.
1.1.3.3  on The SomaTic exchange in academic and liTerary 
diScourSe
The somatic exchange consists of the viral circulation of somatic response, 
not just through the members of a given group but also from group to group. 
In this case, Flores-Borquez’s mother and her fellow escapees form a group 
that shares the traumatizing experience of torture and imprisonment at least 
through the body language of physical pain, and probably also through soma-
tized spoken words. Their somatic exchange is communicated through body 
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language and spoken words to Flores-Borquez, somatically exchanged with 
her, primarily through the mother’s words (“once she had told me the details 
of her story”), but also through visual and perhaps tactile impressions of body 
language (“witnessing by day her terror at any sound or movement”) and 
bodily signs (“exhibited horrific physical evidence of torture”), so that she 
becomes a kind of outside member of the group herself, but more important 
so that mother and daughter constitute a new group, “infected” virally by the 
old. Flores-Borquez then becomes the new “carrier” who communicates that 
mother-daughter exchange through the medium of the written word, somati-
cally exchanging it with potentially thousands of readers, including me, so 
that now Flores-Borquez and (at least) I form a new somatic exchange virally 
infected with the somatic responses of the mother–daughter exchange. Finally 
I become the carrier that communicates it to you, again through the written 
word, creating a new somatic exchange and a new viral infection. Each new 
group, by simulating in their own individual bodies the circulated body states 
of the carrier, and circulating also those individual simulations, experiences 
(feels, senses) a somatomimetic construct of what the old group felt, and feels 
the anti-torture ideosomatic pressures brought to bear in and by each group 
in turn. (The viral circulation of somatic orientations is my model for inter-
generational trauma, the topic of the Third Essay.)
 To the extent that this somatomimetic virus is carried by words, the somat-
ics of language comes into play—the ways in which verbal language arises out 
of body language and never entirely detaches from it, the ways in which words 
are saturated with bodily orientations, inclinations, tonalizations, and other 
performances. If, as Shoshana Felman suggests, a speech act is “an enigmatic 
and problematic production of the speaking body, [it] destroys from its incep-
tion the metaphysical dichotomy between the domain of the ‘mental’ and the 
domain of the ‘physical,’ breaks down the opposition between body and spirit, 
between matter and language” (65, emphasis in original). The “enigmatic and 
problematic production” of Flores-Borquez’s mother’s speaking body in hid-
ing, just barely able to produce a verbalization of pain before losing the capac-
ity for speech altogether, is a powerful example of the somatics of language; 
as Flores-Borquez makes clear, the fully embodied speech acts her battered 
mother performs before falling silent are the primary carrier of her pain into 
her daughter’s body.10 In §1.2, §2.1.3.3, §2.2.2.4, and §3.2, I offer readings of 
postcolonial literary texts in terms of precisely this infectious power, this viral 
contagion of somatic response.
 But what of academic discourse? In the somatic exchange Flores-Borquez 
sets up with her academic readers, including me (and through me, you), the 
medium of somatomimetic response is the academic written word, which 
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reduces sensory and emotional detail and so retards and obstructs the somatic 
transfer, in order to give the somatic impression of a desomatized mind at 
work purely intellectually on a problem. Because the events she is describing 
actually happened to her, however, and because—I’m guessing—she assumes 
that her reader’s understanding of her intellectual argument will depend to 
a certain degree on a felt sympathetic response to political victimization, 
she refuses to abstract her account as far as, say, Pfister-Ammende, down to 
nameless numbered typologies. She not only tells her own story in the first 
person, a narrative strategy whose somatic power is familiar to us from both 
conversational and literary storytelling; she constructs emotionally charged 
scenes that might in some academic contexts be considered inflammatory, 
because they so flagrantly invite emotional identification (“even if I was raped 
and tortured in front of her, she would not reveal any information in order 
to save me”). At the same time, she works hard to minimize the sensory and 
emotional specificity of her descriptions, for the most part reducing expe-
riences to events, events to event-types, event-types to lists, and wherever 
possible inserting parenthetical indices of the out-of-body distancing effects 
of scholarly authorities: “Thus, according to a psychoanalytic explanation, 
it is because of the relationship I had with my mother—lack of a sufficiently 
nurturing environment—that I sublimated (Rycroft 1968) my own needs and 
shaped my identity by attempting to help and do things for others” (100).
 No matter how rigorously it reduces felt experience to mental abstraction, 
however, academic discourse cannot completely obstruct the somatic transfer, 
because that transfer is never initiated by the “sender” (s/he does not send any-
thing) and so cannot be controlled by the “sender” either. The somatic transfer 
is a mimetic body response built in and by the body of the listener or viewer, 
based on that body’s sympathetic projection of feeling into the other person’s 
words—or, for that matter, into anything else in the world, including the sway-
ing of trees or the staccato buzz of a jackhammer or the blinking of a cursor on 
a computer screen. Anything we see or hear may seem to us to have feelings 
that it wants to share with us, because we have been socialized to construct 
meaningful communication by entering into somatic exchanges with humans, 
with pets, with computers, with cars, with Douglas MacArthur figurines, with 
anything at all, even if that means doing all the work ourselves. (The thing is, 
in mimicking other people’s body language and simulating their body states 
we typically don’t feel ourselves doing any work at all: it’s mostly unconscious. 
So it seems like no problem to us to construct a somatic exchange with a cloud 
or a tree. We scarcely notice ourselves doing that either.)
 Still, it does make a difference how we as writers and speakers build ver-
bal edifices as media for readers’ and listeners’ somatomimetic response. The 
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writer or speaker of verbal discourse may not be able to control the somatic 
exchange that ensues from it, but s/he can shape it. The six women whose 
written words we have been reading in this essay thus far have all used more 
or less the same academic discourse, some (Pedersen, Flores-Borquez) more 
personally, others (de Voe, Ong, Malkki, Pfister-Ammende) more imperson-
ally, but all offering their readers abstract images of refugees designed to bring 
those readers into the somatic vicinity of the refugee encounter but not too 
close—not as close as, say, Edwidge Danticat does in the literary accounts of 
Haitian refugees that we’ll be reading next in §1.2.
1.2  literary rePreSentationS: 
  edwidge danticat leaving haiti
Edwidge Danticat was born in Haiti in 1969. When she was four, her parents 
Rose and André Danticat, fleeing Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier’s terror 
by immigrating to the United States, left her and her little brother Eliab André 
in the care of relatives in Port-au-Prince and could not bring them to Amer-
ica until Edwidge was twelve, by which time she had two new brothers, Karl 
and Kelly. Danticat incorporated the rough outlines of this childhood refugee 
story into her first novel, Breath, Eyes, Memory, which she submitted as her 
M.F.A. thesis at Brown and then, in 1994, published with Random House/ 
Vintage: in the novel, Sophie Caco is left with her mother’s sister Tante Atie vir-
tually at birth, because her sixteen-year-old mother Martine has been severely 
traumatized by the rape in which Sophie was conceived, and Martine flees to 
the U.S. when Sophie is four and brings Sophie to live with her in Brooklyn 
when she is twelve. Like the viral somaticity of the mother–daughter relation 
in Mia Flores-Borquez’s story, Martine’s rape trauma soon “infects” Sophie 
as well, and the novel tells the story of both women’s painful and frightening 
attempts to deal with the dysregulatory aftermath of sexual violence.
 This first novel of Danticat’s, then, covers roughly the third and fourth 
stages of the schematized “refugee experience” that I outlined in §1.1.3.2: 
the dysregulatory impact of initial contact with the foreign (new host) cul-
ture, the twelve-year-old Sophie in America, and the continuing dysregula-
tory effects of earlier trauma, suffered in stage (1), at home in Haiti, on later 
assimilation.
 Danticat’s second book, Krik? Krak! (1995), is a story collection; the first 
story in it is “Children of the Sea,” an alternating series of letters between two 
teenaged lovers in the early 1990s, a boy who is fleeing the terror of the “new 
president” (Raoul Cedras) in a boat to Miami and a girl who is left behind 
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with her parents, trying to escape Port-au-Prince and the savagery of the Ton-
ton Macoutes, the militia (named for the Haitian bogeyman) that Baby Doc’s 
father Papa Doc (François Duvalier) created to terrorize the Haitian populace 
into submission.11 This story covers stages (1) and (2) of the schema, dysregu-
lation at home and in flight; what I propose to do in this section is to read first 
the story as a fictional exploration of the ideosomatic dysregulation at home 
(1) that drives people into flight (2), and then the novel as a fictional explo-
ration of the ideosomatic dysregulation that awaits them at the end of their 
flight (3) and that they carry with them into their new homes (4).
 Danticat is also the author of The Farming of Bones (1998), about the 1937 
genocide of Haitians in the Dominican Republic, and of The Dew Breaker 
(2005), about a Tonton Macoute who has moved to the United States and 
tried to put his own criminal past behind him, but who finds himself driven to 
confess to his American-born daughter what he did—but I will be referring to 
those books only in passing.
1.2.1 home (1) and flight (2): “children of the Sea”
Let me begin with three remarks that Danticat has made in interviews about 
how she writes, for whom, and with what models:
My models were oral, were storytellers. Like my grandmothers and my 
aunts. It’s true, a lot of people in my life were not literate in a formal sense, 
but they were storytellers. So I had this experience of just watching some-
body spin a tale off the top of her head. I loved that. She would engage an 
audience, and she would read people’s faces to see if what she was saying 
was captivating them. If it was boring, she would speed up, and if it was 
too fast, she would slow down. So that whole interaction between the sto-
ryteller and the listeners had a very powerful influence on me. (Barsamian 
33)
I have always been fascinated by history, but the kind of history that’s told 
by ordinary people; that to me is the biggest story of history/herstory—
the personal narrative. That’s why I wanted to recreate an event through 
one voice [in The Farming of Bones]. For example, I remember in high 
school reading The Diary of Anne Frank and feeling that through that one 
young woman’s voice, we grasp the horror and the fear of her experience 
so strongly because we’re not only getting a report of what’s happening, but 
individual reactions to it. I’ve always been fascinated by these individual 
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voices in history and the fact that one person’s voice adds to another and 
that creates a chorus. (Anglesey 36)
I have this mental split because I wonder, am I the one to write this story 
[The Farming of Bones]? Maybe someone who went through it should write 
it. In some ways I feel presumptuous, as though I were taking their place, 
but in some ways to be able to write it, you have to feel as though someone 
is lending you their voice, their story, and you’re the mediator. (Shea 50)
Storytelling is not a solo art; it is a group performance, grounded in the 
somatic interaction between teller and listeners (“engage,” “captivating,” “bor-
ing,” “speed up,” “slow down”). Stories are told by a succession of such group 
performances, a series of single voices telling personal stories to listeners, 
and the series of “reports” and “reactions” themselves form a kind of iterative 
group or “chorus.” And stories are “lent” from one teller to another, retold, so 
that each successive teller mediates the story to a new audience, a new group.
 If we take this collective conception of storytelling to be Danticat’s utopian 
ideal, the narrative situation in “Children of the Sea” signals the dystopian 
disruption of that ideal: the boy in the boat and the girl in Port-au-Prince tell 
their stories to each other in the form of letters that their respective addressees 
will never see:
Your father will probably marry you off now, since I am gone. Whatever 
you do, please don’t marry a soldier. They’re almost not human. (4)
i don’t sketch butterflies anymore because i don’t even like seeing the 
sun. besides, manman says that butterflies can bring news. the bright 
ones bring happy news and the black ones warn us of deaths. we have our 
whole lives ahead of us. you used to say that, remember? but then again 
things were so very different then. (5)
In that sense, in fact, the story’s narrative structure reperforms the refugee 
tale it tells: if group storytelling in Danticat’s utopian model is both the ideal 
image and the verbal channel of ideosomatic regulation, the destruction of the 
storytelling group becomes not only a powerful poetic image of but the ideal 
narrative strategy for ideosomatic dysregulation. The book’s title, Krik? Krak!, 
alludes to the utopian ideal, but in this very first story in the collection Dan-
ticat specifically contextualizes the traditional Haitian storytelling exchange 
in terms of its collapse, its inability to reregulate the refugees on the boat as 
a cohesive group: “We spent most of yesterday telling stories. Someone says, 
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Krik? You answer, Krak! And they say, I have many stories I could tell you, 
and then they go on and tell these stories to you, but mostly to themselves” 
(14). The boy’s ideal addressee, the girl he loves and has had to leave behind 
in order to flee Duvalier’s repression—he has been involved in a radio show 
that opposed the dictator—is physically absent, making it impossible for him 
to tell her his stories; the other people on the boat are physically present and 
therefore potential story-listeners, but their fear and despondency prevents 
even their stories from reaching the others, so that they end up telling them 
“mostly to themselves.” Their fear and despondency are born not just from the 
very real danger that their boat will sink and they will all drown—this does in 
fact happen—but from their social and political isolation, their awareness that 
they have been banished from the human community:
I feel like we are sailing for Africa. Maybe we will go to Guinin, to live with 
the spirits, to be with everyone who has come and has died before us. They 
would probably turn us away from there too. Someone has a transistor and 
sometimes we listen to radio from the Bahamas. They treat Haitians like 
dogs in the Bahamas, a woman says. To them, we are not human. Even 
though their music sounds like ours. Their people look like ours. Even 
though we had the same African fathers who probably crossed these same 
seas together. (14)
Social isolation breeds social isolation: because they know they are unlikely 
to be granted asylum anywhere they happen to land, they find it difficult to 
bond together in the boat. The dysregulatory somatic exchange of refugee 
flight is viral. Its virality is not unstoppable—as Pfister-Ammende’s research 
showed, some refugee groups do manage to resist the dysregulatory impulse—
but fighting it requires massive ideosomatic resources that traumatized groups 
typically cannot marshal.
 But the virality of a dysregulatory somatic exchange does not stop at the 
peripheries of a refugee group, at the gunwales of a leaky boat, at the shifting 
boundaries of the “Third World.” One of the reasons that we non-refugees 
typically put up defenses against refugee stories is that we are all too uncom-
fortably aware of their power to infect and dysregulate us as well. In this case, 
as Angelia Poon notes, “Since this exchange of letters cannot occur, only the 
reader is in a privileged position to read both sides of the correspondence” 
(par. 10). Each letter-writer writes to “you,” the boy to the girl, the girl to the 
boy, but the only “you” who is actually “there” to receive the letters and hear 
the stories is the reader, who thus becomes the mediatory third party in their 
group, not only the mail carrier but the somatic go-between, the channel by 
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which each one’s love should make its way to the other. This places a heavy 
burden on the reader’s shoulders: s/he is shaped somatically by the group (of 
three, the boy, the girl, and the reader, or of four, including Danticat herself) 
not simply to desire their happy reunion but to effect it. That becomes our job 
in the story: to bring the two lovers back together, to plug the leaks in the 
boat, to melt the hearts of the Bahamanian or Miamian authorities so the boy 
and his fellow boat people will be allowed into the country, to keep the Tonton 
Macoutes from killing or raping or otherwise traumatizing the girl, to help 
her escape Port-au-Prince and ultimately Haiti itself, across the Caribbean to 
the United States. But of course we can’t do it. We aren’t up to it.
they start to pound at her. you can hear it. you can hear the guns coming 
down on her head. it sounds like they are cracking all the bones in her 
body. manman whispers to papa, you can’t just let them kill her. go and 
give them some money like you gave them for your daughter. papa says, 
the only money I have left is to get us out of here tomorrow. manman 
whispers, we cannot just stay here and let them kill her. manman starts 
moving like she is going out the door. papa grabs her neck and pins her in 
the latrine wall. tomorrow we are going to ville rose, he says. you will not 
spoil that for the family. you will not put us in that situation. you will not 
get us killed. going out there will be like trying to raise the dead. she is 
not dead yet, manman says, maybe we can help her. i will make you stay if 
i have to, he says to her. my mother buries her face in the latrine wall. she 
starts to cry. you can here madan roger screaming. they are beating her, 
pounding on her until you don’t hear anything else. manman tells papa, 
you cannot let them kill somebody just because you are afraid. papa says, 
oh yes, you can let them kill somebody because you are afraid. they are 
the law. it is their right. we are just being good citizens, following the law 
of the land. it has happened before all over this country and tonight it 
will happen again and there is nothing we can do. (16–17)
Célianne is lying with her head against the side of the boat. The baby still 
will not cry. They both look very peaceful in all this chaos. Célianne is 
holding her baby tight against her chest. She just cannot seem to let herself 
throw it in the ocean. I asked her about the baby’s father. She keeps repeat-
ing the story now with her eyes closed, her lips barely moving.
 She was home one night with her mother and brother Lionel when 
some ten or twelve soldiers burst into the house. The soldiers held a gun to 
Lionel’s head and ordered him to lie down and become intimate with his 
mother. Lionel refused. Their mother told him to go ahead and obey the 
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soldiers because she was afraid that they would kill Lionel on the spot if 
he put up more of a fight. Lionel did as his mother told him, crying as the 
soldiers laughed at him, pressing the gun barrels farther and farther into 
his neck.
 Afterwards, the soldiers tied up Lionel and their mother, then they 
each took turns raping Célianne. When they were done, they arrested Lio-
nel, accusing him of moral crimes. After that night, Célianne never heard 
from Lionel again.
 The same night, Célianne cut her face with a razor so that no one 
would know who she was. Then as facial scars were healing, she started 
throwing up and getting rashes. Next thing she knew, she was getting big. 
She found out about the boat and got on. She is fifteen. (23–24)
Want it as we might, we find ourselves powerless to save the two, to protect 
them from harm. As the story progresses, they get farther and farther apart, 
the reader’s somatic mediation is stretched thinner and thinner as the boy’s 
situation becomes more and more desperate and the girl’s stories of Macoute 
brutality become more and more traumatizing, until the boy is dying and 
the girl is seeing black butterflies, and it’s the reader’s fault, the reader is the 
one who can’t stop the violence of the Tonton Macoutes, can’t keep the boat 
seaworthy, can’t prevent the boy from throwing his notebook overboard, 
can’t protect these two young lovers, can’t make a safe haven for love. The 
characters exosomatize objects in a last-ditch effort to save something from 
destruction, but their exosomata too are destroyed, lost, the boy’s notebook, 
Célianne’s dead baby (and her own tormented fifteen-year-old body), and the 
butterflies:
i am getting used to ville rose. there are butterflies here, tons of butter-
flies. so far none has landed on my hand, which means they have no news 
for me. i cannot always bathe in the stream near the house because the 
water is freezing cold. the only time it feels just right as at noon, and then 
there are a dozen eyes who might see me bathing. i solved that by getting 
a bucket of water in the morning and leaving it in the sun and then bath-
ing myself once it is night under the banyan tree. the banyan tree is now 
my most trusted friend. they say banyans can last hundreds of years. even 
the branches that lean down from them become like trees themselves. a 
banyan could become a forest, manman says, if it were given a chance. 
from the spot where I stand under the banyan, i see the mountains, and 
behind those are more mountains still. so many mountains that are bare 
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like rocks. i feel like all those mountains are pushing me farther and far-
ther away from you. (25–26)
She threw it overboard. I watched her face knot up like a thread, and then 
she let go. It fell in a splash, floated for a while, and then sank. And quickly 
after that she jumped in too. And just as the baby’s head sank, so did hers. 
They went together like two bottles beneath a waterfall. The shock only 
lasts so long. There was no time to even try and save her. There was no 
question of it. The sea in that spot is like the sharks that live there. It has 
no mercy.
 They say I have to throw my notebook out. The old man has to throw 
out his hat and his pipe. The water is rising again and they are scooping it 
out. I asked for a few seconds to write this last page and then promised that 
I would let it go. I know you will probably never see this, but it was nice 
imagining that I had you here to talk to. (26–27)
 Both letter-writers speak of magic, the boy of the Protestants who “are 
hoping something will plunge down from the sky and part the sea for us” 
(7), the girl, a few lines later, “if I knew some good wanga magic, I could 
wipe them off the face of the earth” (7), meaning the Tonton Macoutes. The 
reader feels these as indirect speech acts, indirect requests to wield that kind 
of performative magic on behalf of these two young lovers, speak the words 
and the sea will be parted and the Tonton Macoutes will be killed and the two 
lovers will be reunited in Miami.12 But it doesn’t happen, because the reader 
isn’t as powerful as s/he wants to be, doesn’t have that performative magic. 
By this point in the story Danticat is circulating both impossible hopes and 
a crushing hopelessness through the group that includes the two storytellers 
and the reader, letting the boy and the girl put desperate somatic pressures 
on the reader to help that only underscore the reader’s (like their own) help-
lessness. The notebook as the magic talisman or fetish object that, by storing 
story, will unite the lovers created by story; the butterflies exosomatized as 
messengers from him to her, wordless story-tellers who will tell her that he is 
all right, he has survived, he is in Miami waiting for her: these exosomata are 
offered the reader too as tools of redemption, but they don’t work. Like the 
girl’s mother in the latrine, prevented by her husband and by her own terrible 
knowledge that he is right, that nothing they could do would save Madan 
Roger, and they would die horrible deaths as well or be raped and brutalized, 
the reader too is caught up in collective emotional currents that cannot issue 
forth into action, that can only keep generating frustration and desperation 
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and desolation, and can ultimately be released only in tears. As Bob Corbett 
reports in his online review of Krik? Krak!, when he read the story out loud 
to a group of university students, “there wasn’t a dry eye in the room when 
I finished, including mine.” Personally, I don’t know how he finished. I can’t 
even whisper the story to myself without choking up and becoming unable to 
go on.
now there are always butterflies around me, black ones that i refuse to 
let find my hand. i throw big rocks at them, but they are always too fast. 
last night on the radio, i heard that another boat sank off the coast of the 
bahamas. i can’t think about you being in there in the waves. my hair 
shivers. from here, i cannot even see the sea. behind these mountains are 
more mountains and more black butterflies and a sea that is endless like 
my love for you. (28–29)
1.2.2 doubled assimilation (3/4): Breath, Eyes, Memory
1.2.2.1 ouTward diSPlacemenT
In Breath, Eyes, Memory, Danticat also creates a group identification that 
includes the reader, but a far more problematic one, one that tends first toward 
the exclusion of others and the suppression and outward displacement of 
shared feelings, and only gradually opens up as the novel proceeds. When 
Tante Atie tells Sophie that her mother has sent for her, has arranged for a 
plane ticket so Sophie can fly to New York and live with her in Brooklyn, she 
is desolate, as Tante Atie is the only mother she has ever known: “I only knew 
my mother from the picture on the night table by Tante Atie’s pillow” (8). But 
Tante Atie convinces her not to cry:
She squeezed my hand and whispered, “Remember that we are going to be 
like mountains and mountains don’t cry.”
 “Unless it rains,” I said.
 “When it rains, it is the sky that is crying.” (28)
The socially acceptable way to deal with painful emotions is simply not to feel 
them—to become as unfeeling as a mountain. Tante Atie gives Sophie another 
object lesson in how to feel when you feel bad about something: fake it.
I picked up the spoon and began to eat. Tante Atie’s lips spread into a little 
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grin as she watched me. Her laughter prefaced the start of what was going 
to be a funny story.
 There were many stories that Tante Atie liked to tell. There were mostly 
sad stories, but every once in a while, there was a funny one. . . .
 Whether something was funny or not depended on the way Tante Atie 
told it. That morning, she could not bring the laughter out of me like she 
had in the past. It was even hard for her to force it out of herself. (19)
Don’t feel the bad things; only feel the good things. If you feel like crying, be 
a mountain, but a laughing mountain. At the airport, Tante Atie can’t help 
herself—she cries—but Sophie has already learned her lesson, and is stoic, 
calm, because depersonalized. When she lands in New York and her mother is 
thrilled to see her, she is still a mountain, for many months. Her depersonali-
zation is the allostatic overload with which she adapts to her radically trans-
formed situation: new country, new language, new mother (see also Braziel, 
N’Zengou-Tayo).
 What is interesting about Danticat’s literary portrayal of Sophie’s deper-
sonalization, though, is that her allostatic response to geographical displace-
ment is imaged through Freudian displacement. For example, Sophie is almost 
late for her plane because, as the cab takes her and Tante Atie through Port-
au-Prince to the airport, riots break out all around them: the inner turmoil she 
is suppressing is displaced onto the social scene.
We stopped in front of the main entrance. The smoke had been coming 
from across the street. Army trucks surrounded a car in flames. A group of 
students were standing on top of a hill, throwing rocks at the burning car. 
They scurried to avoid the tear gas and the round of bullets that the soldiers 
shot back at them.
 Some of the students fell and rolled down the hill. They screamed 
at the soldiers that they were once again betraying the people. One girl 
rushed down the hill and grabbed one of the soldiers by the arm. He raised 
his pistol and pounded it on top of her head. She fell to the ground, her face 
covered with her own blood.
 Tante Atie grabbed my shoulder and shoved me quickly inside the 
airport gate.
 “Do you see what you are leaving?” she said.
 “I know I am leaving you.” (34)
No hysterics: just the facts, just the bare knowledge of whom she is leaving. 
She doesn’t need hysterics, because hysteria has exploded all around her.
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 On the plane, she remains calm as a woman brings a little boy in, “crying 
and stomping his feet, trying to wiggle out of her grasp. She cornered him 
against the seats and pressed him into the chair. She held him down with both 
her hands. He stopped fighting, slid upward in the seat, raised his head, and 
spat in her face” (36–37). Sophie reaches out a hand to him:
He grabbed my hand and dug his teeth into my fingers. I hit his arm and 
tried to get him to release my fingers. He bit even harder. I smacked his 
shoulder. He let go of my fingers and began to scream.
 The woman rushed over. She pulled him from the seat, raised him 
up to her chest, and rocked him in her arms. He clung to her body for a 
moment then pulled away, digging his fingers into her neck. She stumbled 
backwards and nearly fell. He slipped out of her arms and ran out of her 
reach. She dashed down the aisle after him. (37)
 It turns out that the boy’s father, a corrupt government official, has just 
been killed in the rioting, and the boy is being flown to New York to live with 
relatives—into the unknown, just like Sophie. Sophie, who does not want to 
go either, could have resisted her displacement with the same kind of desper-
ate emotional violence as the boy displays, but doesn’t, perhaps because she 
doesn’t need to: he expresses her suppressed feelings for her.
 What am I suggesting, here—that Sophie has the power to displace her 
feelings onto other people? That she makes Port-au-Prince explode in riots, 
she inserts her suppressed resistance into the boy’s unruly body? No. Danti-
cat does it, of course. But Danticat does it not merely to “symbolize” Sophie’s 
suppressed emotions, but rather to draw her readers into those emotions, to 
enable us to share Sophie’s feelings, to circulate through us not only Sophie’s 
dysregulatory trauma at being torn away from her home but also her expul-
sive reregulation of that trauma as well. She is able to displace Sophie’s feelings 
onto other people because, of course, she is creating the group that feels those 
feelings, Sophie, Tante Atie, the boy, the rioters, and us as her own imaginary 
other, and can circulate whatever feelings she likes through that group, by 
whatever route—by obstructing or damming up feelings of angry resistance in 
Sophie, for example, and rerouting them through the rioters and the little boy 
to us. That way Sophie can detach herself, dissociate from her pain, and (as it 
were) bond with us as the witnesses and certifiers of her calm, create with us 
an everything’s-fine-nothing-bad-is-happening-here somatic exchange, as if 
to say, “See? Over there’s the problem; not in here.”
 I say “as it were” because Sophie is of course not a living, breathing sub-
ject but a somatomimetic projection that we generate in our own bodies; but 
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such is the power of somatic mimeticism that we seem to feel her feelings as 
powerfully as we do the body states we simulate in somatic exchanges with 
flesh-and-blood friends, with “real people.” Our friends’ feelings too are a 
somatomimetic projection that we generate in our own bodies: there is no sig-
nificant phenomenological difference for us between the imagined “reality” of 
a friend’s feelings and the imagined “reality” of a literary character’s feelings. 
Both are simulations that, because they are channeled through our limbic 
system and therefore map real emotions that our bodies are experiencing, feel 
real.
1.2.2.2 dollS
When Sophie arrives at her mother’s apartment in Brooklyn she finds an odd 
thing: her mother has a doll that she cares for like a daughter.
“If you don’t like the room,” my mother said, “we can always change it.”
 She glanced at the picture as she picked up a small brush and combed 
the doll’s hair into a ponytail.
 “I like the room fine,” I stuttered.
 She tied a rubber band around the doll’s ponytail, then reached under 
the bed for a small trunk.
 She unbuttoned the back of the doll’s dress and changed her into a 
pajama set.
 “You won’t resent sharing your room, will you?” She stroked the doll’s 
back. “She is like a friend to me. She kept me company while we were apart. 
It seems crazy, I know. A grown woman like me with a doll. I am giving her 
to you now. You take good care of her.” (45)
 It does seem a bit crazy—it is the first somewhat disturbing discovery 
Sophie makes about her mother—but in an important sense the displacement 
of Sophie’s feelings onto surrogates in her departure from Haiti has prepared 
us for it. The doll is (at least) Martine’s Sophie-surrogate, just as the rioters and 
the angry little boy were Sophie’s Sophie-surrogates. “She kept me company 
while we were apart,” Martine says: we don’t know yet why they were apart, 
but we now know that for eight years Martine has replaced her absent daugh-
ter with a doll, a thing, a fetish object, perhaps, a thing somatized as a real little 
girl who could keep her company. The significant point to note here is not 
simply that Martine’s Sophie-surrogate is an inanimate object, a thing without 
subjectivity or agency, but that it is an inanimate object that feels to her like a 
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living person, feels like a friend, someone who can keep her company. Martine 
now surrenders the doll to Sophie, and that is the last we hear of it: another 
interesting fact.
 In The Second Sex Simone de Beauvoir famously theorizes that the doll to 
the little girl serves more or less the same identity-organizational function as 
the penis does to the little boy:
But even if the young girl has no serious penis envy, the absence of the 
organ will certainly play an important role in her destiny. The major ben-
efit obtained from it by the boy is that, having an organ that can be seen 
and grasped, he can at least partially identify himself with it. He projects 
the mystery of his body, its threats, outside of himself, which enables him 
to keep them at a distance. True enough, he does scent danger in con-
nection with his penis, he fears its being cut off; but this is a fright easier 
to overcome than the diffuse apprehension felt by the little girl in regard 
to her ‘insides,’ an apprehension that will often be retained for life. She is 
extremely concerned about everything that happens inside her, she is from 
the start much more opaque to her own eyes, more profoundly immersed 
in the obscure mystery of life, than is the male. . . . [T]he little girl cannot 
incarnate herself in any part of herself. To compensate for this and to serve 
her as alter ego, she is given a foreign object: a doll. It should be noted that 
in French the word poupée (doll) is also applied to the bandage around 
a wounded finger: a dressed-up finger, distinguished from the others, is 
regarded with amusement and a kind of pride, the child shows signs of the 
process of identification by his talk to it. But it is a statuette with a human 
face—or, that lacking, an ear of corn, even a piece of wood—which will 
most satisfyingly serve the girl as substitute for that double, that natural 
plaything: the penis. (278)13
 This analysis suggests that Martine’s doll is not just a Sophie-surrogate 
but a Martine-surrogate as well: that what mother is handing to daughter is 
not just the objectified daughter but the objectified mother, not just inani-
mate other but inanimate self. Like the bandaged finger, like Célianne’s self in 
“Children of the Sea,” Martine’s self is wounded, dysregulated; the doll is the 
reregulatory deanimation of that wounded self, a projection of the wounded 
self outwards onto a safely unfeeling thing, which is then imaginatively rean-
imated as safely unfeeling self/other. (This reregulation does not work for 
Célianne: having thrown her dead baby into the sea—having drowned her 
deanimated doll—she cannot but jump in after it and drown herself.)
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 A few pages later, in a Haitian store, Sophie sees “small statues of the beau-
tiful mulâtresse, the goddess and loa Erzulie” (52), a powerful vodou figure 
based on an actual African slave named Erzulie Danto who, according to the 
folklore, was mutilated by her own people during the Haitian slave revolution 
in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century: the other slaves cut out her 
tongue to prevent her from divulging dangerous secrets. As Donette A. Fran-
cis notes in her excellent reading of the novel’s sexual violence, “Erzulie Danto 
is mute and must speak through body language” (87), which connects her 
implicitly with Sophie, who at this point in the novel is hardly communicating 
at all, verbally or kinesically, except through the mute written word with the 
reader (see also Braziel, Jurney). But Sophie tells us that Erzulie was her child-
hood image of her absent and silent mother:
As a child, the mother I had imagined for myself was like Erzulie, the lavish 
Virgin Mother. She was the healer of all women and the desire of all men. 
She had gorgeous dresses in satin, silk, and lace, necklaces, pendants, ear-
rings, bracelets, anklets, and lots and lots of French perfume. She never had 
to work for anything because the rainbow and the stars did her work for 
her. Even though she was far away, she was always with me. I could always 
count on her, like one counts on the sun coming out at dawn. (59)
 The beautiful and glamorous but absent mother is depicted as virgin and 
healer, but above all as imaginary, a projection of desire as spirit. Sophie’s 
grandmother will later give her a statue of Erzulie, as consolation “for the pain 
we have caused you” (157), and Sophie will let the mountain cry: “I held the 
statue against my chest as I cried in the night. I thought I heard my grand-
mother crying too, but it was the rain slowing down to a mere drizzle, tap-
ping on the roof ” (157). At the end, when Martine dies, Sophie dresses her 
for her funeral in a bright red dress, so “she would look like a Jezebel, hot-
blooded Erzulie who feared no men, but rather made them her slaves, raped 
them, and killed them” (227, emphasis in original). Like Martine dressing the 
Sophie-doll, Sophie here dresses the Martine-doll, an inanimate object that 
she somatizes as alive, as powerful, as a comfort, as healing. It is not, in other 
words, just that Erzulie is a strong spiritual image of woman that can be used 
analogically to attribute greater but still imaginary power to a weak (or in this 
case dead) woman, as Francis suggests in her reading of this scene: “In call-
ing on Erzulie, a symbol of bodily survival and resistance and the protector of 
women who are suffering from abuse, Sophie conjures these defiant charac-
teristics for her own mother” (87). It is also that Erzulie is a doll, a dead object, 
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now the dead body of her mother, which the living can somatize or fetishize 
as superalive, magically alive, more living than the living. To put it in the 
terms I offered in §1.1.3.1, the living can circulate among themselves power-
fully somatized images of the object-as-alive, of life-embedded-in-the-object, 
until the object seems to be circulating those somatomimetic impulses as well, 
seems to be a living member of the somatic exchange.
 Shortly after Sophie tells us that she used to imagine her absent mother as 
Erzulie, back when she was twelve, Martine tells her a dissociated version of 
the story of her conception: at sixteen Martine was grabbed by a man, prob-
ably a Tonton Macoute, dragged into the cane field, and brutally beaten and 
raped. “She did not sound hurt or angry,” Sophie tells us, “just like someone 
who was stating a fact. Like naming a color or calling a name. Something 
that already existed and could not be changed” (61). Flat affect, like a moun-
tain or a doll: the ultimate somatic defense against (or allostatic response to) 
severe trauma. We later learn that Martine did not dissociate immediately: 
she lived in terror for months, “terrified that he [the faceless Macoute who 
raped her] would come and tear out the child growing inside her. At night, she 
tore her sheets and bit off pieces of her own flesh when she had nightmares” 
(139). Dissociation from the dysregulatory pain of that rape is for Martine a 
hard-won victory, an allostatic adaptation—but as allostasis it is also a sur-
render to the dysregulation, a surrender not only of control but of conscious-
ness as well to the dysregulatory somatomimesis of the violence that “she” 
(or some inchoate mapping function in her nervous system) internalized in 
the rape. By dissociating from it, she lets it run and ruin not only her life 
but also her daughter’s: “It took me twelve years to piece together my moth-
er’s entire story,” Sophie tells us. “By then, it was already too late” (61). Like 
Mia Flores-Borquez, Sophie has already internalized her mother, the raped 
mother, the suffering mother, the dissociated mother: “Some nights I woke up 
in a cold sweat wondering if my mother’s anxiety was somehow hereditary or 
if it was something that I had ‘caught’ from living with her. Her nightmares 
had somehow become my own, so much so that I would wake up some morn-
ings wondering if we hadn’t both spent the night dreaming about the same 
thing: a man with no face, pounding a life into a helpless young girl” (193). 
The displacement of unsafe feelings onto a safely external object, like a doll 
or a daughter’s body, like a riot or an unruly child, like a religious object or a 
dead mother, brings relief from the trauma that dysregulates the dissociated 
body, but it also circulates that displacement to others, and so perpetuates the 
violence.
 Sophie was once an internal part of Martine, a living simulacrum of the 
violent act, man, and penis that put her there and therefore a dysregulatory 
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being, something that Martine had first to expel from her body and then dis-
tance from her life, leave behind in Haiti when she fled to America. Both 
childbirth and refugee flight were acts of dissociation, depersonalization, and 
desomatization for Martine. Having installed the newborn child with her sis-
ter in Haiti and her own body in America, Martine found a new object as 
a further repository for her dysregulatory feelings, the doll. As de Beauvoir 
writes, “The main difference [between the penis and the doll] is that, on the 
one hand, the doll represents the whole body, and, on the other, it is a passive 
object. On this account the little girl will be led to identify her whole per-
son and to regard this as an inert given object” (306). De Beauvoir’s analysis 
moves from here to the socialization of the (untraumatized) little girl as like a 
doll, pretty and passive; but her symbol of the process, the doll, works equally 
well as a symbol of Martine’s dissociative response to rape. When Martine has 
finally projected enough of her inner dysregulation out onto the world, and 
so achieved a deadened simulacrum of inner regulation, she brings Sophie to 
New York and gives her the doll—and the circle is complete. The story is over. 
Or so Martine evidently hopes. As it turns out, of course, she’s dead wrong.
1.2.2.3 douBling
Six years later, at eighteen, Sophie tells Martine that she is in love with a man, 
and Martine begins “testing” her, inserting a finger into her vagina weekly to 
feel for her hymen. “Testing,” which Sophie describes as part of a Haitian vir-
ginity cult (154), is passed on from mother to daughter: her grandmother did 
it to her mother and Tante Atie; her mother does it to her. All of them hate it; 
so far, all of them have passed the pain and the humiliation of the practice on 
to the next generation.
 In her discussion of the practice, Francis writes: “Even after the death of 
Atie and Martine’s father, the women of the Caco family still desired this patri-
archal romance, which would confer legitimacy and respectability. Once this 
romance became unrealizable for Martine because of her rape, and unreal-
izable for Atie because she did not have the proper level of education, they 
transferred this desire onto Sophie” (82). But I wonder: what does Atie’s level 
of education have to do with it? And why does Francis assume that “this 
romance” can only be vested in a single female offspring at a time? Viewed 
somatically, the quest for purity isn’t a single “desire” that is “transferred” 
from one female family member to another; in this ideosomatic regime all 
unmarried women’s bodies are fetishized by the group as pure or corrupt, 
virgin or whore, marriageable or unmarriageable. This is a process akin to 
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the fetishization of dolls or statues or carved wooden figurines as possess-
ing magical healing powers: the girl’s intersubjective power to circulate group 
somatic response, feelings and thoughts, is collectively suppressed so that her 
body might be objectified as an inert thing, as a telltale collection of physical 
signs, the tightness or looseness of the vaginal opening (“She would put her 
finger in our very private parts and see if it would go inside” [60]) or the thin-
ness or thickness of a stream of urine (“If you pee loud, it means you’ve got big 
spaces between your legs” [136–37]). This suppression and this objectification 
and the proper physical signs and the purity that they establish are circulated 
ideosomatically through the group as intensely positive feelings; any discov-
ery of signs pointing either to pollution or to the girl’s somaticity, her dis-
turbing ability to feel and circulate pain, shame, humiliation (Tante Atie, for 
example, “used to scream like a pig in a slaughterhouse” [60]), is powerfully 
dysregulatory, and thus smothered under an overwhelming iterosomatics of 
disapproval.
 To facilitate this objectification and thus to avoid disapproval—to escape 
both feeling the physical pain and the emotional humiliation of “testing” 
and causing the dysregulatory effects on her mother of her own somatic 
response—the girl dissociates, vacates her body, a psychic strategy that Dan-
ticat associates explicitly with the vodou act of “doubling,” splitting the body 
into physical and spiritual doubles and leaving the physical body behind in 
order to travel in the spirit world14: “I had learned to double while being tested. 
I would close my eyes and imagine all the pleasant things that I had known. 
The lukewarm noon breeze blowing over a field of daffodils” (155, empha-
sis in original). “After my marriage,” she adds, “whenever Joseph and I were 
together, I doubled” (156). Somatically speaking, what she is doing is deper-
sonalizing the body, desomatizing it—withdrawing somatization from the 
body as iterosomatically identified and realized by the group, splitting somatic 
response off from the collectivized fetish object of the virginity cult, and thus 
from the ideosomatic exchange that is inflicting these wounds on her, so that 
the wounds are inflicted not on “her” but on a split-off thing, the doll of her 
own objectified body. As I say, the danger in this doubling is that it facilitates 
the objectification not only of the girl’s and later the woman’s own body, but 
in time of her daughter’s as well: dissociation dynasticizes the violation. The 
traumatization inflicted on the physical body persists as a body memory, an 
ideosomatized muscle memory that continues to impel action not only despite 
but through desomatization, through the failure of idiosomatic response to 
identify and realize the circulatory power of the trauma, and block it, at least, 
perhaps even to rechannel it, so that it does not issue forth into traumatization 
of the next generation.
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1.2.2.4 Self-raPe, Self-aBorTion
The weekly vaginal tests that Martine inflicts on Sophie are intended, obvi-
ously, to identify the watershed moment at which Sophie moves from virgin-
ity to whoredom, from purity to impurity. As Sophie comes to understand 
the testing dynamic, however, the tests become a mere obstruction, a bar-
rier to her future happiness with Joseph, her older boyfriend, a black Creole 
from Louisiana who loves her and wants to marry her and is willing to wait 
to have sex with her until Sophie is ready. More than that: they objectify the 
vagina as that obstruction. This introduces an important twist on de Beau-
voir’s theorization of penises and dolls: in her quasi-Freudian reading, girls 
identify with dolls because they lack an easily objectifiable sexual organ that 
might be somatized as a symbol of the self. For Sophie, Martine’s testing per-
forms something like this genital objectification, somatizes the vagina as a 
sexual synecdoche for her whole person, for the person who wants to marry 
and have sex with Joseph. After testing commences, Sophie no longer needs 
dolls, external projections of self: she has her own vagina, as a boy has his 
penis. But where boys are taught to somatize their penises as self-projections 
of “autonomy, of transcendence, of power” (de Beauvoir 306), Sophie is taught 
by virginity testing to somatize her vagina as blockage, as an obstruction to 
the flows of her power, as negation.
 And so, when it becomes clear to her that she cannot simply marry Joseph 
and have “legal” sex with him—he is older, Martine’s age, sixteen years older 
than Sophie, and not Haitian, and what Martine calls a “vagabond” (78), a 
musician, and therefore from Martine’s traditional Haitian point of view not 
an appropriate husband for her daughter—she smashes the obstruction, the 
negative symbol of her whole person. She takes the pestle from the kitchen 
and breaks her own hymen with it. In this way she frees herself from the 
virginity cult, violates it, transgresses it, performs herself as “impure” and 
therefore beyond testing, beyond the reach of the ideosomatic regulation that 
controls virgin girls; but she also severely damages her vaginal opening and 
the part of her somatized self that was identified with her vagina. Her mother, 
hurt and angry at her “betrayal” (“You would leave me for an old man who 
you didn’t know the year before” [85]), releases her: “You just go to him and 
see what he can do for you” (88). But as a result Martine cuts Sophie out of 
her life completely for several years, even after Sophie is married to Joseph 
and gives birth to a little girl, Brigitte: the first loss. The second is sexual plea-
sure: she tears her vagina badly, has to have stitches, and comes to think of sex 
as intrinsically not only painful but evil (123). “Joseph,” Sophie tells us, “could 
never understand why I had done something so horrible to myself. I could 
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not explain to him that it was like breaking manacles, an act of freedom” 
(130).
 Joseph, who is not the daughter of a rape victim, presumably wonders 
why she didn’t just elope with him, or, if she felt she had to break her hymen 
in order to be free of the virginity cult, let him do it with his penis. There is no 
way he can understand that her self-rape with the pestle frees Sophie to be like 
her mother, another rape victim, sexually brutalized by an inanimate object. 
Just as Martine somatized the doll as both her child and her dissociated self, 
just as Sophie somatized first the Erzulie statue as her mother and then her 
mother’s dead body as Erzulie, and just as Sophie, tested by Martine, soma-
tized her vagina as her dissociated self, so too does Sophie here somatize the 
pestle as alive, as “a man with no face, pounding a life into a helpless young 
girl” (193). Four weeks later, Sophie and Joseph are married, and Sophie—
feeling “it was my duty as a wife” (130)—lets him have intercourse with her, 
despite intense pain. “That first very painful time gave us the child” (130)—
just as “that first very painful time” with the Tonton Macoute gave Martine 
Sophie.
 After a couple of years of marriage, Sophie flees Joseph to Haiti—fleeing 
not so much Joseph, who is a good man, but her own pain in the marriage, 
in life—and Martine comes also, to bring her back. After they return to New 
York, Martine tells her that she is pregnant—shamefacedly admitting that she 
has been having sex out of wedlock with her Haitian lover Marc. Marc wants 
to marry her, wants her to have the baby, but Martine can’t stand the idea, 
wants to abort it: “The nightmares. I thought they would fade with age, but 
no, it’s like getting raped every night. I can’t keep this baby” (190). Sophie 
tries to talk her into getting therapy, but Martine refuses: “I am afraid it will 
become even more real if I see a psychiatrist and he starts telling me to face 
it. God help me, what if they want to hypnotize me and take me back to that 
day? I’ll kill myself ” (190). As Donette Francis writes, “Martine’s relationship 
to her sexuality is shaped during this violent scene of subjection [the rape]. In 
addition to breaking her will to speak, this perpetrator engenders a traumatic 
body memory so that Martine subsequently equates the sex act with pain and 
violation. Paradoxically, while her silence probably saved her life, in the final 
analysis, Martine’s inability to speak this trauma results in her death. Martine 
literally becomes subsumed by the traumatic after-effects of her rape because 
she never confronts nor revises the trauma. Instead she attempts to live as if 
the trauma has not irrevocably altered her subjectivity—her mind and body” 
(81–82).
 Sophie also tries to get her mother to compare this pregnancy, two decades 
after the rape, the father a man she loves, with the one that brought her into 
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the world: “It must have been harder then but you kept me,” but her mother 
is adamant: “When I was pregnant with you, Manman made me drink all 
kinds of herbs, vervain, quinine, and verbena, baby poisons. I tried beating 
my stomach with wooden spoons. I tried to destroy you, but you wouldn’t 
go away” (190). Just as Sophie penetrates her vagina with a pestle, Martine 
pounds her pregnant belly with wooden spoons, inanimate cooking utensils 
as implements of rape and murder—not just to free the two women from their 
“manacles” but to repeat the traumatic effect of those manacles, to recirculate 
the internalized somatomimesis of the rapist’s violence. Because this mimetic 
violence reenacts the initial violation desomatizingly, dissociatively, however, 
rather than resomatizingly, it just keeps circulating the old somatic response, 
and thus “frees” the women only to the minimal control over trauma that 
Freud identifies as the death drive, the desire to deanimate the traumatized 
body slowly, repetitively, on their own terms.15
 Martine’s self-directed violence becomes ever harsher when she begins to 
hear the fetus talking in the rapist’s voice:
“Yes, I am sure, it spoke to me. It has a man’s voice, so now I know it’s not 
a girl. I am going to get it out of me. I am going to get it out of me, as the 
stars are my witness.”
 “Don’t do anything rash.”
 “Everywhere I go, I hear it. I hear him saying things to me. You tintin, 
malpròp. He calls me a filthy whore. I never want to see this child’s face. 
Your child looks like Manman. This child, I will never look into its face.”
 “But it’s Marc’s child.”
 “What if there is something left in me and when the child comes out it 
has that other face?”
 “You mean what if it looks like me?”
 “No, that is not what I mean.” (217)
Sophie has never looked like her mother; Martine believes that that is because 
“a child out of wedlock always looks like its father” (61). Since the rapist’s face 
was covered, Martine does not know what he looked like, but takes Sophie’s 
face to be a genetic representation of it. Now, though, she is afraid that the 
new baby (also conceived out of wedlock) will look not like its father but like 
the rapist—that “there is something left in me,” some genetic material that 
will reproduce the rapist one more time. And in a sense she’s right, though 
the material that keeps reproducing the rapist in her and for her and through 
her is not genetic but somatic: her somatomimetic reproduction of the rape, 
which her dissociation has left to its own devices. Here it reproduces the 
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rapist’s voice, which, coming from inside her body, must to Martine’s mind be 
the voice of the fetus; surely it will reproduce the rapist’s face as well, perhaps 
his whole body, like an evil clone, an avatar. Martine has spent her entire adult 
life trying to escape this man; now, she thinks, he has been reborn inside her.
 So she stabs herself in the belly, seventeen times, with an “old rusty knife” 
(224), and dies of a massive hemorrhage. Her self-abortion kills the rapist-
somatomimesis by killing the body that is its host: she aborts her self, the 
self that she could never quite dissociate from the body that could never stop 
remembering the rape.
 The complete dysregulatory cycle experienced by Martine and Sophie, 
then, begins with the rape in the cane field, in Haiti, in the home situation 
(1), and continues in Martine’s flight from that rape (2), first through wild, 
frantic attempts to abort the fetus while in hiding from the Tonton Macoutes, 
then, in migration to America (3), through dissociation, desomatization, 
the displacement of somatic response onto safe inanimate objects, like the 
Sophie doll. In a sense, America is another Sophie doll, another safely inani-
mate object or collection of objects and spaces onto which Martine can dis-
place her Haitian somatic dysregulation. Bringing Sophie to America is the 
next step in this desomatizing process, as Martine is then able to displace her 
trauma onto Sophie as a living-but-desomatized doll, through “testing” (4). 
From Sophie’s point of view, and thus for the novel’s narrative, (1–3) here is 
backstory, prehistory, her attempt to understand what has happened to her 
own feelings by tracking their origins in her mother’s life; her own (1–3) is a 
byproduct of Martine’s (4). Sophie is uprooted from the only home and the 
only mother she has ever known (1–2) in order to live in America with a trau-
matized stranger who happens to be her birth mother. Like her mother, she 
responds to the traumatic effects of uprootal through dissociation, desomati-
zation, displacement of somatic response onto external objects and events (3), 
which facilitates the internalization of Martine’s dysregulatory somatomime-
ses of the rape, through the mimetic contagion of nightmares and “testing”; 
these somatomimeses continue to impel Sophie too into mimetic violence (4), 
especially the self-rape with the pestle. As Sophie begins to work back through 
the dysregulation therapeutically, attempting in a sexual phobia group and 
in one-on-one therapy to resomatize her trauma, Martine gets pregnant and 
finds herself unable to deal with the antidissociative resurgence of somatic 
mimeses of the rape, especially the apparent emanation of the rapist’s voice 
from her fetus, so she brings the repetitive mimetic cycle to a close by vio-
lently deanimating both the fetus and her own body, finishing the job that the 
rapist started.
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1.2.2.5 reSomaTizaTion
Sophie’s narrative has a pugilistic, largely pessimistic feel to it, because for 
most of the novel both women’s primary response to somatic dysregulation is 
desomatization, trying not to feel the pain, which only repeats the dysregula-
tion thanatotically, in Freud’s sense. Indeed it may not be too much to say that 
the novel mostly seems mired in hopelessness because it is steeped in Freud’s 
death drive, the “Nirvana principle” whose “aim is to conduct the restlessness 
of life into the stability of the inorganic state” (“Masochism” 160)—and, per-
haps, because it is steeped inchoately in Freudian psychoanalytical models in 
general, whose only alternatives to the repetition-compulsions of the death 
drive are the infantile pleasure principle and the jaded adaptations of pleasure 
to the reality principle.
 Toward the end of the novel, however, Danticat begins to introduce new 
therapeutic pressures on Sophie, through her sexual phobia group in Chap-
ter 31 and one-on-one therapy in Chapter 32. Both are explicitly somatic, 
based on therapeutic resomatization, the reliving or replaying of traumatic 
scenes from the past in a transformative group context that circulates new 
and life-affirming somatomimeses through the sufferer’s body response. 
Sophie’s sexual phobia group consists of just three women, herself and Buki, 
an Ethiopian woman dealing with the trauma of clitoridectomy, and Davina, 
a Chicana incest survivor; their group rituals seek to rechannel the nega-
tive thanatotic repetition-compulsions that have been blighting their lives in 
positive ways:
“I am a beautiful woman with a strong body,” Davina led the affirmations.
 “We are beautiful women with strong bodies.” We echoed her uncer-
tain voice.
 “Because of my distress, I am able to understand when others are in 
deep pain.”
 “Because of our distress, we are able to understand when others are in 
deep pain.”
 I heard my voice rise above the others.
 “Since I have survived this, I can survive anything.” (202)
They write letters to their abusers and read them aloud. They write and burn 
the names of their abusers. Sophie tells us that “I felt broken at the end of the 
meeting, but a little closer to being free” (203)—but her optimism rings a bit 
hollow, as if the group’s resomatization exercises were just another panacea 
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that could not possibly transform how she actually felt. And indeed she ear-
lier responds to her husband’s encouraging noises about how much therapy 
is helping that it isn’t, really (185). We cannot simply begin to feel differently 
about ourselves and others and things and places—cannot simply resomatize 
reality and identity—because the somatic markers our autonomic nervous 
systems create to remind us of what we’ve learned are actually “soft-wired” 
into our brains. They travel along whole networks of myelinated axons and 
dedicated synapses that have been generated specifically to send us these 
learned signals. They are designed permanently to protect us from harm, per-
sistently to remind us not to do the things that have endangered us in the past. 
They are so firmly entrenched in our somatic orientations to word and deed 
that they typically seem to us to be not somatic constructs at all but “person-
ality,” even “human nature”: they constantly tempt us to essentialize somatic 
phenomenology as ontology. Groups are powerful resomatizing forces in our 
lives, and in many ways Sophie is in the right place, circulating somatic affir-
mations with other sexually traumatized women; but the group that chants 
“We are beautiful women with strong bodies,” much as they really want and 
need to believe it, is ultimately powerless against trauma.
 Sophie’s therapy session with Rena, the “initiated Santeria priestess” (206), 
in the next chapter explains why the group affirmations aren’t working: she 
has to relive the original trauma, the rape. She has to resomatize not just her 
own body, but her father:
“I would rather not call him my father.”
 “We will have to address him soon. When we do address him, I’ll have 
to ask you to confront your feelings about him in some way, give him a 
face.”
 “It’s hard enough to deal with, without giving him a face.”
 “Your mother never gave him a face. That’s why he’s a shadow. That’s 
why he can control her. I’m not surprised she’s having nightmares. This 
pregnancy is bringing feelings to the surface that she had never completely 
dealt with. You will never be able to connect with your husband until you 
say good-bye to your father.” (209)
 The process of first saying hello to the father, to the father’s face, and then 
goodbye to that face, is intended to resomatize the rape: to bring Sophie’s vio-
lent origins to consciousness, not as an abstraction but as a physical face in a 
physical place, so that the traumatic feelings of pain and humiliation and loss 
can be refelt, somatically reprocessed.
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“During your visit [to Haiti], did you go to the spot where your mother was 
raped?” Rena asked. “In the thick of the cane field. Did you go to the spot?”
 “No, not really.”
 “What does that mean?”
 “I ran past it.”
 “You and your mother should both go there again and see that you can 
walk away from it. Even if you can never face the man who is your father, 
there are things that you can say to the spot where it happened. I think 
you’ll be free once you have your confrontation. There will be no more 
ghosts.” (210–11)
And in a sense Sophie does do this with her mother; as the others are throw-
ing dirt on her mother’s coffin she tears herself away and runs down to the 
cane field:
There were only a few men working in the cane fields. I ran through the 
field, attacking the cane. I took off my shoes and began to beat a cane 
stalk. I pounded it until it began to lean over. I pushed over the cane stalk. 
It snapped back, striking my shoulder. I pulled at it, yanking it from the 
ground. My palm was bleeding.
 The cane cutters stared at me as though I was possessed. The funeral 
crowd was now standing between the stalks, watching me beat and pound 
the cane. My grandmother held back the priest as he tried to come for me.
 From where she was standing, my grandmother shouted like the 
women from the market place, “Ou libéré?” Are you free?
 Tante Atie echoed her cry, her voice quivering with her sobs.
 “Ou libéré!” (233)
 Sophie’s attack on the cane field is again mimetic violence, but this time 
directed outward, not against her own body, and against an inanimate sur-
rogate for her rapist-father, a thing, a phallic doll that, because it fights back, 
can be somatized as alive, superalive, as a magical avatar of the original perpe-
trator of the violence. “Importantly here, however,” as Donette Francis writes, 
“the violence is enacted on the canefields rather than on her own physical 
body. In this way, she frees herself from the debilitating subjection implicit in 
the previous scenes. Sophie’s actions here must be understood as her willful 
re-membering of devastations enacted upon the bodies of her family mem-
bers” (87). But note that the cane stalk is not a random surrogate for the rapist-
father, chosen just because it happens to spring back at her when she pushes 
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it over: it is part of the scene of the original rape of Sophie’s mother, the scene 
of Sophie’s violent conception, part of a place in fact that for the Caco women 
was somatized with terror even before the rape. Sophie’s grandfather died of 
heatstroke while working in that same field. Every time Sophie goes near it, she 
is given some reminder of death and mutilation: “The hammering echoed in 
my head until I reached the cane fields. The men were singing about a woman 
who flew without her skin at night, and when she came back home, she found 
her skin peppered and could not put it back on. Her husband had done it to 
teach her a lesson. He ended up killing her” (150). Flying without your skin 
is called doubling. Later, while Joseph is pounding away at her in sex, Sophie 
doubles and imagines herself flying in the spirit to her mother: “I would visit 
her every night in my doubling and, from my place as a shadow on the wall, I 
would look after her and wake her up as soon as the nightmares started, just 
like I did when I was home” (200). At the cane field it seems even that flight 
from pain is denied her. At the cane field, doubling would get her killed.
 By fighting the cane stalk, therefore, Sophie not only does somatic battle 
with her rapist father: she reengages the dysregulatory ideosomatic regime 
that keeps her in thrall. By uprooting the cane stalk Sophie resomatizes her 
own traumatic uprooting—from Haiti, from her own body—and is free.
1.3  theoretical SPinS: 
  metaPhorical migrantS
When Sophie is eighteen and first getting to know her next-door neighbor in 
Brooklyn, the older black Creole musician from New Orleans who becomes 
her husband, Joseph, she tells him that she is going to college in the fall, and he 
asks what she is going to study. She doesn’t know, but says medicine, because 
her mother wants her to be a doctor; but she says it with a hesitant body lan-
guage that Joseph understands immediately as signaling an unvoiced tension 
that she feels between the positivity of family plans and the negativity of her 
own dreams (“I had never really dared to dream on my own” [72]). He sug-
gests cautiously that it’s important to have a passion for what you do and to 
stay open to experience, but Sophie counters with the ideology of family loy-
alty, of doing what the family decides is best:
“It is okay not to have your future on a map,” he said. “That way you can 
flow wherever life takes you.”
 “That is not Haitian,” I said. “That’s very American.”
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 “What is?”
 “Being a wanderer. The very idea.” (72)
 Sophie herself has “wandered” from Haiti to New York, but she is not a 
wanderer. Haitians in New York are called “boat people” by the Americans, 
but they are not wanderers. What prevents them from becoming wanderers 
is their attachment to the group, to the ideosomatic organization of lives, of 
selves, of individualities by families and communities. She here identifies the 
individualistic idealization of isolation from the group, the transformation of 
the inevitable disjunctures in ideosomatic identities into a new idiosomatic 
principle, a freedom from group determination, as a “very American” idea—
one that is still alien to her.
 In a sense what Sophie is doing here is refusing to metaphorize her expe-
rience of geographical displacement as a kind of anti-road-map road map 
of postcolonial identity, a blanket carte blanche to a romantically becoming-
displaced future. This “very American” idea, though, is one that has caught 
the imaginations of postcolonialist and other radical theorists since the 
publication of L’Anti-Oedipe in 1972: metaphorical readings of migrancy, of 
nomadism, of the refugee, readings of people on the move as tropes for a 
fragmented postmodern postcoloniality, or for the counterhegemonic intel-
lectual as a shadowy mystical hero hip-deep in pomo/poco fragments and 
fractals but supremely undaunted by them. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari 
write of “nomad thought,” Rosi Braidotti of “nomadic subjectivities”; Homi 
Bhabha writes of “migratory identities,” Carole Boyce Davies of “migratory 
subjectivities”; Edward Said suggests somewhat more cautiously in Culture 
and Imperialism that, “while it would be the rankest Panglossian dishonesty 
to say that the bravura performances of the intellectual exile and the miser-
ies of the displaced person or refugee are the same, it is possible, I think, to 
regard the intellectual as first distilling then articulating the predicaments that 
disfigure modernity—mass deportation, imprisonment, population transfer, 
collective dispossession, and forced immigrations” (333)—or, more accurately, 
as first distilling, then idealizing, then metaphorizing those predicaments. Not 
that postcolonial idealizations of the migrant or the refugee are conventionally 
idealized, which is to say, patently Panglossian; they are often quite dark. But 
a romanticizing impulse can nevertheless typically be found at work in them 
just beneath the surface, a determination to assign utopian value to any meta-
phor that infects sedentary order with disorder, stasis with movement, collec-
tive conventions with iconoclasm, ideosomatic regulation with idiosomatic 
deregulation.
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1.3.1 Schizzes and flows: nomad thought
The Anti-Oedipus of Deleuze and Guattari precedes Said’s Orientalism (1978), 
considered by many to be the founding text of postcolonial theory, by six 
years; their third part there, “Savages, Barbarians, Civilized Men,” begins with 
the notion that “to code desire—and the fear, the anguish of decoded flows—is 
the business of the socius” (139), and rings the changes in that model through 
a series of epochal “machines.” The first is what they call the “primitive territo-
rial machine,” in which “the great nomad hunter follows the flows, exhausts 
them in place, and moves on with them to another place” (148):
Such are the two characteristics of the hunter, the great paranoiac of the 
bush or the forest: real displacement with the flows and direct filiation with 
the god. It has to do with the nature of nomadic space, where the full body 
of the socius is as if adjacent to production; it has not yet brought produc-
tion under its sway. The space of the encampment remains adjacent to that 
of the forest; it is constantly reproduced in the process of production, but 
has not yet appropriated this process. The apparent objective movement of 
inscription has not suppressed the real movement of nomadism. But a pure 
nomad does not exist; there is always and already an encampment where it 
is a matter of stocking—however little—and where it is a matter of inscrib-
ing and allocating, of marrying, and of feeding oneself. (148)
But the nomad is still a largely empirical figure for them here: not yet a meta-
phor. Three chapters later, they analyze colonization as oedipalization, or oedi-
palization as a kind of colonization, looking at a “cure among the Ndembu” 
(167) as reported by Victor Turner as only seemingly Oedipal, to us, who 
are “conditioned to say Oedipus every time someone speaks to us of father, 
mother, grandfather”:
In fact, the Ndembu analysis was never Oedipal: it was directly plugged 
into social organization and disorganization; sexuality itself, through the 
women and the marriages, was just such an investment of desire; the par-
ents played the role of stimuli in it, and not the role of group organizers (or 
disorganizers)—the role held by the chief and his personages. Rather than 
everything being reduced to the name of the father, or that of the maternal 
grandfather, the latter opened onto all the names of history. Instead of 
everything being projected onto a grotesque hiatus of castration, every-
thing was scattered in the thousand breaks-flows of the chieftanships, the 
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lineages, the relations of colonization. The whole interplay of races, clans, 
alliances, and filiations, this entire historical and collective drift: exactly the 
opposite of the Oedipal analysis, when it stubbornly crushes the content of 
a delirium, when it stuffs it with all its might into “the symbolic void of the 
father.” Or rather, if it is true that the analysis doesn’t even begin as Oedi-
pal, except to our way of seeing, doesn’t it become Oedipal nevertheless, in 
a certain way—and in what way? Yes, it becomes Oedipal in part, under the 
effect of colonization.  .  .  . Both are true: the colonized resists oedipaliza-
tion, and oedipalization tends to close around him again. (168–69)
 “The thousand breaks-flows”: there is no attempt here, as there will be in A 
Thousand Plateaus eight years later, to metaphorize these complex filiational 
turbulences as intrinsically nomadic. “It would seem,” Deleuze and Guattari 
write in that latter book, “that a whole nomad science develops eccentrically, 
one that is very different from the royal or imperial sciences. Furthermore, this 
nomad science is continually ‘barred,’ inhibited, or banned by the demands 
and conditions of State science. .  .  . The fact is that the two kinds of science 
have different modes of formalization, and State science continually imposes 
its form of sovereignty on the inventions of nomad science” (362). “The great 
State mathematicians did their best to improve its status, but precisely on the 
condition that all the dynamic, nomadic notions—such as becoming, hetero-
geneity, infinitesimal, passage to the limit, continuous variation—be elimi-
nated and civil, static, and ordinal rules be imposed upon it” (363). Nomad 
thought in A Thousand Plateaus is a hydraulic science of turbulence in flows, 
one that “produc[es] a movement that holds space and simultaneously affects 
all of its points, instead of being held by space in a local movement from one 
specified point to another” (363).
 As Caren Kaplan notes about a parallel binary in Thousand Plateaus, how-
ever, major and minor language (“For the majority, insofar as it is analytically 
included in the abstract standard, is never anybody, is always Nobody—
Ulysses—whereas the minority is the becoming of everybody, one’s poten-
tial becoming to the extent that one deviates from the model” [Thousand 
105]), becoming-minor, like becoming-nomad, is a choice. While it is by defi-
nition something that happens to minorities, foreigners, nomads, migrants, 
and refugees, for the First-World artist or intellectual, living in the colonial 
center—Deleuze and Guattari in Paris, Sophie’s Joseph in New York—it is an 
alternative lifestyle. “For example,” Kaplan writes, “I would have to pay atten-
tion to whether or not it is possible for me to choose deterritorialization or 
whether deterritorialization has chosen me”:
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For if I choose deterritorialization, I go into literary/linguistic exile with all 
my cultural baggage intact. If deterritorialization has chosen me—that is, 
if I have been cast out of home or language without forethought or permis-
sion, then my point of view will be more complicated. Both positions are 
constructed by the world system but they are not equal. Of course, Deleuze 
and Guattari are suggesting that we are all deterritorialized on some level 
in the process of language itself and that this is a point of contact between 
“us all.”16 Yet we have different privileges and different compensations for 
our positions in the field of power relations. My caution is against a form 
of theoretical tourism on the part of the first world critic, where the mar-
gin becomes a linguistic or critical vacation, a new poetics of the exotic. 
One can also read Deleuze and Guattari’s resistance to this romantic trope 
in their refusal to recognize a point of origin. Theirs is a poetics of travel 
where there is no return ticket and we all meet, therefore, en train. Reter-
ritorialization without imperialism? Can language provide a model of this 
process? Who dares let go of their respective representations and systems 
of meaning, their identity politics and theoretical homes, when it is, as 
Kafka rightly noted, “a matter of life and death here?” (“Deterritorializa-
tions” 191)17
 This is an important corrective to Deleuze and Guattari’s mystique of the 
nomad. There is a significant difference between the traumatized refugee, 
involuntarily cast out of home and community, fleeing dysregulatory violence 
at home into the dysregulations of long marches (hunger, physical exhaustion, 
loss of familiar social and physical structures), internment (forced inactivity 
and helplessness, rape, theft, and other predations), and assimilation into a 
new culture (the waning power of xenonormativity), and the oppositional 
intellectual sitting in his or her study at home, surrounded by familiar books 
and other objects, the spouse and kids in the next room, imagining and ideal-
izing the refugee’s drift away from xenonormativity as a trope of oppositional 
thought.
 But note that Kaplan’s corrective is itself no less problematic, no less a form 
of “theoretical tourism on the part of the first world critic,” no less a “poetics of 
the exotic.” Kaplan imagines and idealizes the refugee too, simply in a dysto-
pian rather than utopian direction. She too sits in her study (as I do in mine), 
surrounded by her familiar books and other objects, imagining herself hav-
ing “been cast out of home or language without forethought or permission.” 
She fails to note that the tidy binary she sets up between the sedentary First 
World intellectual (choice, stable home and language, power) and the refugee 
(no choice, destabilized living conditions, powerlessness) is a binary between 
DiSPlaCemenT Of  PerSOnS |  75
the Me and the Not-Me, between self and other, between “what I have” and 
others defined in terms of a lack of “what I have,” an abstract mathematical 
subtraction of my possessions (choice, stability, home, friends, work, books, 
power) that renders the refugee a kind of negative image of Me, an othered 
and peripheralized negation of sedentary intellectual life here in the center. (I 
too, for that matter, binarize ideosomatic regulation here at home and ideoso-
matic dysregulation in the refugee experience, so that refugeeness becomes a 
deviation from and thus theoretical limitation on my somatic norm.)
 But, then, what is a scholar to do? It’s not just that we’re trapped in our 
own skins; we’re also trapped in our own groups, in the limitations our iter-
osomatic histories with certain specific groups tend to place on our know-
ing and saying and doing. For humanities scholars, those limitations tend 
to include not only a sedentary lifestyle but a heavy reliance on the printed 
word—we are not anthropologists, ethnologists, or sociologists expected to do 
fieldwork (say, in a refugee camp, like Pfister-Ammende, or in an immigrant 
community, like Ong); we read books and articles. Deleuze and Guattari were 
never nomads, or Ndembu, or actually met any member of either group: they 
read about them. Kaplan has never been a refugee, and most likely has never 
met one either: she’s read about them. We read, and construct ideosomati-
cally regulated images of otherness, ideosomatically regulated relationships 
between self and other: we objectify (we do what Deleuze and Guattari call 
“State science,” reduce the other to inert facts, numbers, structures, and cat-
egories taken to be ideally distant and different from ourselves); we identify, 
we project (we do what Deleuze and Guattari and Kaplan all do in imagining 
themselves mobile, organize thought around an imagined affinity between self 
and other).
 But in fact Deleuze and Guattari push hard on this subject–object binary, 
this conventionally regulatory notion that we can either isolate subject and 
object or build bridges between them, in their articulation of a radically col-
lectivist theory of human being-in-the-world: “The social machine, in con-
trast, has men for its parts, even if we view them with their machines, and 
integrate them, internalize them in an institutional model at every stage of 
action, transmission, and motricity. Hence the social machine fashions a 
memory without which there would be no synergy of man and his (technical) 
machines” (Anti-Oedipus 141). Motricity is motor operations; the motricity 
of the social machine would include such shared motor activities as danc-
ing, singing, cheering, applauding, marching, parading, drumming, having 
sex, exercising, and playing team sports. What is transmitted through shared 
motricity is regulatory feeling or homeostatic synergy, which is circulated 
not just through humans but through the human-machine (or cyborg) inter-
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face as well, and, as I’ve been suggesting, through the group–place interface 
that exosomatizes places and things as “home,” “holy,” “powerful,” and so on. 
The “memory” that Deleuze and Guattari describe as fashioned by the social 
machine—what I call iterosomatics—is borrowed from Nietzsche (“A thing is 
branded on the memory to make it stay there; only what goes on hurting will 
stick” [Genealogy II.3]), and thus from protosomatic theory: “Cruelty,” they 
write, “has nothing to do with some ill-defined or natural violence that might 
be commissioned to explain the history of mankind; cruelty is the movement 
of culture that is realized in bodies and inscribed on them, belaboring them” 
(145). Cruelty as the movement of culture through bodies is a Nietzschean 
(anti)idealization, of course: it is really only a movement of culture through 
bodies. But it is a powerful one, one that transmits both regulatory and dys-
regulatory synergies, the internalization of mastery both for conformity to 
group norms (as in Nietzsche’s Germans) and for the viral spread of disruptive 
violence (as in Danticat’s Haitian Tonton Macoutes).
 Their incipient somatics of language is also implicitly Nietzschean: “And 
if one wants to call this inscription in naked flesh ‘writing,’ then it must be 
said that speech in fact presupposes writing, and that it is this cruel system of 
inscribed signs that renders man capable of language, and gives him a mem-
ory of the spoken word” (145)—a somatic memory, clearly: a felt memory, felt 
by the individual as a part of the social machine, which circulates the synergis-
tic flows of desire (including cruelty) through “men or their organs” (145).18
 In this somatic conception of “machinic” social regulation, any stray 
impulse that cannot be harnessed to normative group synergy will be felt as 
idiosomatic, divergent, deviant, individualizing in a collectivist regime and 
therefore, perhaps, “nomadic” in a sedentary regime. To theorize such stray 
idiosomatic impulses as “nomad thought” or “nomad science” is to imag-
ine a counterregime, a deregulatory regime that intensively and extensively 
minoritizes the major, reassembles the systematic, sends turbulences through 
dammed and locked waters.
 To the extent that deregulation becomes a group norm, of course, it too cir-
culates regulatory pressures that organize the thoughts and words and beliefs 
and actions of, say, postmodern/postcolonial thinkers. In this new “deregula-
tory” group, it becomes possible to be perceived as “not nomadic enough,” not 
deregulatory enough, too sedentary, too traditional, too regressively attached 
to the old ideosomatic paradigms, stable binary realities and identities, stable 
analytical categories and typologies. Idiosomatic deregulation is only idioso-
matic and only deregulatory as a moment of perceived resistance to or devi-
ation from ideosomatic regulation; as soon as a new group begins to form 
around a new normativity associated with that resistance, resistance becomes 
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ideosomatically regulatory, and lingering traces of the ancien régime in each 
group member’s somatic response come to be perceived as the new idioso-
matic deregulation. The postmodern/postcolonial thinker then feels pressure 
to police his or her inner and outer life for stray idiosomatic impulses toward 
reactionary analytical order, and weed them out before they become visible to 
other members of the “nomadic” group. Only the fully regulated group mem-
ber will be perceived as properly nomadic.
 That the historical nomad, migrant, and refugee are only allegorical figures 
of this counterregime, exemplary cases chosen by the sedentary deregulatory 
theorist to focus and organize resistance metaphorically, may make this idio-
somatic deregulation seem callous or opportunistic or even exploitative to 
members of other groups, especially, perhaps, First World intellectual groups 
whose (de)regulatory strategies involve the pious objectification or subjecti-
fication of the refugee as traumatized and suffering. But then the assumption 
that it is possible to avoid reducing others to constructs—that anyone ever 
apprehends anyone else as more than a somatized construct—is just more 
piety.
1.3.2 migrancy and identity
The somatic tensions that this postmodern/postcolonial normativization of 
metaphorical “nomadism” or “migrancy” generates in members of the group 
might be explored by reading along for a page or two with Iain Chambers in 
the opening pages of his 1994 book Migrancy, Culture, Identity: “For recent 
apertures in critical thought instigated by certain internal displacements in the 
hearth of the West (feminism, deconstructionism, psychoanalysis, post-meta-
physical thought),” Chambers writes, “have been increasingly augmented by 
the persistent question of a presence that no longer lies elsewhere: the return 
of the repressed, the subordinate and the forgotten in ‘Third World’ musics, 
literatures, poverties and populations as they come to occupy the economies, 
cities, institutions, media and leisure time of the First World” (3). This is a 
nice image: the stable sedentary “hearth of the West” undergoes “internal dis-
placements” and out of those displacements generates various differential dis-
courses that bring about a return of the repressed, so that the “Third World,” 
initially a ghost of our own Western repressions, turns out to be very real, and 
to occupy “subordinate and forgotten” spaces within the “First World.” This 
is the transformation of various idiosomatic/deregulatory pressures within 
the old “hearth of the West” ideosomatic regulation into a new (re-/counter-)
regulatory regime based on the metaphorical return of the refugee repressed, 
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the normativization of the previously excluded periphery as the allegorical 
core, the symbolic center.
 Note, though, that in Chambers’s formulations this transformation is 
effected not by the group, somatically, but abstractly, discursively, by “differen-
tial discourses,” and specifically by the act of discursive displacement, which 
increasingly becomes a kind of romantic hero in the passages that follow, a 
stand-in for the social machine that iterosomatizes (memorializes) utopian 
theorizations of migrancy: “The belief in the transparency of truth and the 
power of origins to define the finality of our passage,” Chambers writes, “is 
dispersed by this perpetual movement of transmutation and transformation. 
History is harvested and collected, to be assembled, made to speak, re-mem-
bered, re-read and rewritten, and language comes alive in transit, in inter-
pretation” (3)—harvested, collected, assembled, made to speak, and so on by 
differential discourse, by discursive transmutation and transformation. And: 
“For the nomadic experience of language, wandering without a fixed home, 
dwelling at the crossroads of the world, bearing our sense of being and dif-
ference, is no longer the expression of a unique tradition or history, even if 
it pretends to carry a single name. Thought wanders. It migrates, requires 
translation. Here reason runs the risk of opening out on to the world, of find-
ing itself in a passage without a reassuring foundation or finality: a passage 
open to the changing skies of existence and terrestrial illumination” (4). Lan-
guage, thought, and reason are the definitive nomads here, the wanderers, 
the migrants. “This inevitably means another sense of ‘home,’ of being in the 
world. It means to conceive of dwelling as a mobile habitat, as a mode of 
inhabiting time and space not as though they were fixed and closed structures, 
but as providing the critical provocation of an opening whose questioning 
presence reverberates in the movement of the languages that constitute our 
sense of identity, place and belonging. There is no one place, language or tra-
dition that can claim this role” (4). This does not mean, I’m guessing, another 
material way of living in the world; it is just another subliminal sense of being 
in the world. It does not mean giving up our sedentary lifestyles and actually 
becoming displaced persons; “it means to conceive of dwelling as a mobile 
habitat,” as a mode of inhabiting the concepts “time” and “space” as “providing 
the critical provocation of an opening whose questioning presence reverber-
ates in the movement of the languages that constitute our sense of identity, 
place and belonging.” As the keywords in that wonderfully pomo/poco clause 
suggest, it’s all discursive: critical, provocation, opening, questioning, pres-
ence, reverberates, movement of languages, constitute, sense of identity, place, 
and belonging.
 This is not (just) obfuscation on Chambers’s part; in assigning agency to 
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abstract differential discourse rather than the somatic synergy of the social 
machine he is conforming his own discursive behavior to felt collective (post-
structuralist) norms that privilege thought and deprivilege feeling, privilege 
verbal language and deprivilege body language, and above all enforce these 
binaries as mystifications of group pressures to conform. He is obeying the 
rules. He is doing what he knows (feels) he must do not merely in order to get 
published but also to win group approval.
 The telling regulatory/mystificatory moment in these early pages of Cham-
bers’s book is telling. He first warns us:
The accumulated diasporas of modernity, set in train by “modernisation,” 
the growing global economy, and the induced, often brutally enforced, 
migrations of individuals and whole populations from the “peripheries” 
towards Euro-American metropolises and “Third World” cities, are of 
a magnitude and intensity that dramatically dwarf any direct compari-
son with the secondary and largely metaphorical journeys of intellectual 
thought. Analogy is risky. There is always the obvious allure of the roman-
tic domestication and intellectual homecoming that the poetic figures of 
travel and exile promise. (5–6)
This is the standard cautionary note, signaling the acute pomo/poco aware-
ness that human beings are suffering out there, in contradistinction to our 
own comfortable lives. But then Chambers adds: “Still, it is a risk to be run. 
For the modern migrations of thought and people are phenomena that are 
deeply implicated in each other’s trajectories and futures” (6). This seems to 
suggest that we have to go ahead and theorize migrancy anyway, whatever the 
risks, because refugees and other migrants are as deeply implicated in the tra-
jectories of our theorizations of migrancy as we are in the refugee experience 
and other real-world forms of migrancy. Problematic as that notion is—impli-
cated how, exactly?—the deeper problem I find in Chambers’s formulation has 
to do with the elided agents behind his passive verbs. Even if we allow him 
the questionable notion that there is some sort of mutuality between migrants 
and theorists of migrancy, who exactly is implicating us in the refugee expe-
rience? Who exactly is implicating refugees in poco theory? That seems like 
an impertinent question, somehow—as if there isn’t, and doesn’t need to be, 
any individual or group desire fueling this implication; as if “implicated” is a 
simple impersonal ontological claim (don’t think depersonalized: think the 
static objectivism of impersonality), a participial passive whose absented agent 
is the universe, the omnipresent Ontos itself. But isn’t that precisely the kind 
of question a theorist should be asking of his own formulations?
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 Something like this same mystifying grammar is at work in “it is a risk to 
be run” as well: it’s not that I want to run this risk, or that I feel impelled to 
run it by pressures from my group; the risk is simply there to be run. The pres-
sure to run the risk comes somehow impersonally from the risk itself, from its 
thereness. And what is the risk that is to be run? The risk of analogy, of com-
paring the migrancy of poststructuralist thought with the migratory plight of 
millions. But why is that risky? It just is. No specific risk: just risky. Chambers’s 
explanation of that risk is another grammatical mystification: “There is always 
the obvious allure of the romantic domestication and intellectual homecom-
ing that the poetic figures of travel and exile promise.” Figurative language 
promises things, alluring things, the allure of home, the allure of the roman-
tic nostos. But why is this a risk? Given that “the allure” has an impersonal 
promiser and no grammatical promisee at all, it can’t be a risk to people; it’s 
just a risk. Tellingly, in fact, the only people in that quotation are the millions 
of refugees to whose suffering Chambers is paying passing lip service: the 
“migrations of individuals and whole populations.” Note that those migra-
tions are “set in train” not by specific Western modernizers but by “moderni-
sation”; that “induced” and “brutally enforced” are more participial passives 
with absent agents as well; and that it is the migrations themselves that “dwarf 
any direct comparison,” not the migrants or the Western intellectuals invoking 
the migrations in order to facilitate their direct comparisons.
 A cynical translation of Chambers’s mystificatory rhetoric here into 
somatic terms would be that he is under ideosomatic pressure from Western 
poststructuralist intellectuals since Deleuze and Guattari simultaneously to 
romanticize language, thought, culture, and identity by analogy with forced 
migration—to find a way to feel “forced” by the sociopolitical and economic 
facts of the displacement of millions to cut his mental images of language, 
thought, culture, and identity loose from the sedentary habits of two millennia 
of stabilizing Western objectivism—and to avoid trivializing forced migration 
and the suffering of the refugee as mere fodder for postmodern/poststructur-
alist/postcolonial tropes. Because the new regulatory discourse figures the ref-
ugee as both the return of the repressed and the return of the repressed, as both 
something alien and distant and half-forgotten and as something present and 
unforgettably pressing, normative figurations of the refugee must (will inevita-
bly) partake of both what Kaplan calls “theoretical tourism” and the stern con-
demnation of theoretical tourism, both the casual Western exploitation of the 
refugee experience as a trope for oppositional thought and pious expressions 
of sympathy and solidarity for refugee suffering. And if this pair of polarized 
pressures corresponds to the first two opposed commands of Gregory Bate-
son’s theorization of the double-bind—(1) romanticize/trivialize the refugee, 
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(2) sympathize with the refugee—the third command traps the thinker in the 
bind by mystifying it as no bind at all, as no one’s commands, as not really 
happening. Hence the depersonalizing rhetoric, which situates agency in some 
abstract parallax realm for which Chambers need not take responsibility.
 This translation would recontextualize all of Chambers’s null-context 
claims in terms of two group regulations, both virtual but with real conse-
quences for Chambers’s professional and perhaps even emotional life: the 
group of Western postcolonialist intellectuals who attend conferences and 
write and read books and articles on migrancy, culture, and identity, and the 
group of actual refugees whose cultures and identities are at risk of migratory 
dysregulation. Both groups are virtual in the context of Chambers’s writing 
because they are not physically present as he writes: they have to be imagined, 
their ideosomatic pressures (approval, disapproval) imaginatively prefelt or 
transfelt. The former group is made up of a loose conglomeration of people 
he has met at conferences and guest lecturing gigs and people he has cor-
responded with (especially perhaps Stuart Hall’s group at the University of 
Birmingham, where he did his doctoral work), as well as anonymous readers 
of his books and articles either for presses and journals or, like me, as part of 
the circulation of pomo/poco images and ideas and tonalizations and attitudi-
nalizations through the group. It is essential to yield to this group’s pressures 
in order to get published, invited to deliver guest lectures, and appointed to 
university posts (Chambers is Professor in the History of English Culture at 
the Istituto Universitario Orientale in Naples); professional success in that 
group also circulates respect, admiration, and self-esteem. The latter group, 
the migrants, is unlikely ever to read Chambers’s work, but they have powerful 
proxies in and around the former group, who frown on (express ideosomatic 
disapproval of) the trivialization of Third World suffering in order to score 
points with Western intellectuals.
 But of course the cynicism of this translation is manifestly unfair, espe-
cially insofar as I seem hypocritically to be exempting myself from my own 
critique. We are all ideosomatically regulated to conform to our own group’s 
norms, and the relevant group for both Chambers and me is Western intel-
lectuals of a certain stripe, nourished on poststructuralist and postmodern 
discourses, interested more in language, culture, and identity than in the brute 
material facts of geographical displacement, economic exploitation, political 
persecution, internment, the distribution of foodstuffs, and the like. Because 
our group has of late grown increasingly interested in those brute facts, we 
have had to find ways to shift our thematizations of our linguistic and cultural 
interests so as to seem to include “the refugee experience” in them—and this 
book is no more exempt from that analysis than Chambers’s is. And while I do 
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think that Chambers’s depersonalizing rhetoric is mystificatory, and that he 
is conditioned ideosomatically to those rhetorical mystifications by the post-
structuralist postcolonialists in the group, I also recognize that Chambers is 
struggling to problematize and personalize those mystifications, for example 
in passages like this one:
Does this all mean I have nothing to say, that every gesture that begins 
in the West is inherently imperialist, merely the latest move in the exten-
sion of my power regarding the others? It is perhaps here that the political 
and ethical implications of the arguments advanced in this book can be 
most clearly grasped as an attempt to fracture the vicious circle between 
speakers and the spoken for. For, in breaking into my own body of speech, 
opening up the gaps and listening to the silences in my own inheritance, I 
perhaps learn to tread lightly along the limits of where I am speaking from. 
I begin to comprehend that where there are limits there also exist other 
voices, bodies, worlds, on the other side, beyond my particular boundaries. 
In the pursuit of my desires across such frontiers I am paradoxically forced 
to face my confines, together with that excess that seeks to sustain the dia-
logues across them. Transported some way into this border country, I look 
into a potentially further space: the possibility of another place, another 
world, another future. (5)
 What Chambers is saying here is that his book is basically about Western 
discourses of otherness, Western discourses of “other voices, bodies, worlds,” 
of “the possibility of another place, another world, another future.” In other 
words, he is writing about us, about our interactions with non-Western oth-
ers—which is, I suggest, the only honest way to write anything: to admit 
frankly that we cannot step outside of our own skins and the groups that give 
those skins socioemotional and political definition.
 Still, let me note the Whitmanesque grandiosity of Chambers’s “I”-rhet-
oric there: “in breaking into my own body of speech, opening up the gaps 
and listening to the silences in my own inheritance, I perhaps learn to tread 
lightly along the limits of where I am speaking from. I begin to comprehend 
that where there are limits there also exist other voices,” and so on. Chambers 
stands alone, a kosmos, containing not only his “own body of speech” but his 
“own inheritance” as well, presumably the voices of those who have shaped 
him, but they aren’t other voices to him, they’re simply his inheritance, that 
which has accrued to him over the years of his life, his listening and speaking, 
his reading and writing. He has a place from which he speaks: it is his alone. 
And in interrogating it, “opening up the gaps and listening to the silences” 
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in that place, that inheritance, he discovers its limits, and begins to “compre-
hend”—read: to “imagine”—that “other voices, bodies, worlds” exist in the 
interstices of those limits, in the “excess that seeks to sustain the dialogues 
across them.” Somewhere outside Chambers’s song of himself there are other 
people, but his “I” is so large a kosmos that he can only imagine them as an 
“excess” to his own peripheries and a concomitant potential for dialogue, an 
abstract seeking to sustain dialogue.
 What he is forgetting, then, is the group construction of the self: the extent 
to which his “I” has been shaped collectively by the many groups to which he 
has belonged in his life—the extent to which other people are not just a deper-
sonalized (past) “inheritance” or (future) “excess” but the enabling condition 
of his social being. In this ideosomatic conception, Chambers does not have a 
“body of speech” all on his own; he is a part of, and is dynamically and shift-
ingly shaped by, a dialogue within each of the groups to which he belongs, a 
dialogue charged with regulatory impulses that circulate normative pressures 
through him. The sum total of those dialogues and those pressures constitutes 
not only his “body of speech” but also his world, the world as seen and spoken 
through his eyes and lips, from within his skin; and it is that body, that col-
lectivizing/individualizing body, that he needs to “break into,” open up gaps 
in, in the sense of entering into dialogues with “other voices, bodies, worlds,” 
not so much “on the other side” (since there is no one “this” side or “that” side 
but numerous fictitious sides constituted collectively as part of in-group/out-
group policing) but instead from outside all the current dialogues that shape 
him. 
To The exTenT that postcolonial studies may be said to have a “center” or 
“core,” this is it: the study of colonization and decolonization. By comparison, 
refugee studies is marginal, centrifugal, ancillary, supplementary, shunted out 
of the realm of the paradigmatic colonial encounter into the borderlands or 
hinterlands of postcoloniality, and therefore far more attractive to poststruc-
turalist migrancy theorists: refugees, as I noted in the preface, can be driven 
out of their homes and homelands not only by colonial and postcolonial forces 
like wars of liberation and ethnic cleansing but also by natural disasters, which 
may only occasionally and only by a stretch of the imagination be blamed on 
the colonial encounter. And intergenerational trauma studies is more mar-
ginal still, which is why I defer it till the Third Essay. The center of the field, 
and the center of this book, is the cultural displacement—or what I call the 
ideosomatic counterregulation—of the native by the colonizer, followed by the 
dream, or the myth, conditioned by the original colonial counterregulation, of 
the cultural displacement of the colonized by the decolonizer.
 By the same token, of course, I risk boring you by treading well-worn 
ground. If discussions of C. L. R. James, Albert Memmi, Frantz Fanon, Homi 
Bhabha, and Gayatri Spivak are virtually obligatory in a study of postcolo-
niality, that expectation alone might potentially make this entire essay stale 
goods, banal, trite. The fact that Bhabha and Spivak broke new ground in the 
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field by theorizing postcolonial affect obviously makes them important focal 
points in a somatic study of postcoloniality; but their pioneering efforts along 
these lines were noticed back in 1998 by Elizabeth Jane Bellamy. And if those 
efforts have largely been forgotten and ignored in the decade and a half since, 
is that perhaps a sign that no one really wants to be bothered with such mat-
ters anymore?
 My pressing concerns throughout this Second Essay, and thus the grounds 
for my insistence that these iconic thinkers are worth another look, lie some-
where in the excluded and vacated middle between postmodern/poststruc-
turalist discursivism and Marxist/(inter)nationalist activism. Not only can a 
more theoretically complex new look at postcolonial affect turn Bhabha’s and 
Spivak’s early (and rather tentative) interventions into a methodological plat-
form for mediations between the opposing camps that still divide the field; 
I believe that somatic readings of James on violence and Nietzschean slave 
morality, Memmi on the failures of decolonization, and Fanon on the social 
construction of race can help us radically rethink some key issues in postcolo-
nial studies.
 In §2.1.3 I will be reading Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks, which he 
describes as an empirical study, “a clinical study”: “The attitudes that I pro-
pose to describe are real. I have encountered them innumerable times” (12). 
He also, at least at the outset, explicitly situates his empiricism in terms of 
his own experience: “Since I was born in the Antilles, my observations and 
my conclusions are valid only for the Antilles—at least concerning the black 
man at home. Another book could be dedicated to explaining the differences 
that separate the Negro of the Antilles from the Negro of Africa” (14, empha-
sis in original). Of course he can’t help himself; once he gets going he begins 
generalizing freely about “the Negro,” theorizing “the black man,” and freely 
admitting that objections to such generalizations are valid and apply to him as 
well: “In the beginning I wanted to confine myself to the Antilles. But, regard-
less of consequences, dialectic took the upper hand and I was compelled to 
see that the Antillean is first of all a Negro” (172–73, emphasis in original). 
Here in the Second Essay I’m going to try to stretch myself, to mix a metaphor, 
across the horns of the same dialectic: to treat three exemplary early analyses 
of (de)colonization both as empirical case studies, limited to specific (post)
colonial experiences—James on Haiti, Memmi on the Maghreb, and Fanon on 
the Antilles—and as exemplary theorizations of (de)colonizing ideosomatic 
counterregulation that are generally applicable to “postcolonial culture.” What 
I gain from this double vision is economy: it allows me to use James, Memmi, 
and Fanon to set up a series of sample somatic theorizations of (de)coloniza-
tion without having to (pretend to) cover the whole field.
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 I’ll also be bringing other, more theoretical perspectives to bear on each 
exemplary postcolonial critic in the first three sections: Friedrich Nietzsche 
on James, Arif Dirlik on Memmi, Hélène Cixous and Robert Young on Fanon. 
In §2.1.3.3 I’ll also be reading the 2004 UNICEF-sponsored Spanish short 
Binta y la gran idea as a neocolonizing representation of decolonizing coun-
terregulation; and in §2.2.2.4, after my somatic exfoliations of Bhabha and 
Spivak on postcolonial affect, I conclude with a look at Spivak’s reading of 
“Douloti the Bountiful” by Mahasweta Devi.
2.1 emPirical StudieS
2.1.1 c. l. r. James
The difficulty was that though one could trap them like animals, transport 
them in pens, work them alongside an ass or a horse and beat both with the 
same stick, stable them and starve them, they remained, despite their black 
skins and curly hair, quite invincibly human beings; with the intelligence and 
resentments of human beings. To cow them into the necessary docility and 
acceptance necessitated a régime of calculated brutality and terrorism, and it is 
this that explains the unusual spectacle of property-owners apparently careless 
of preserving their property: they had first to ensure their own safety.
These slaves were being used for the opening up of new lands. There was no 
time to allow for the period of acclimatization, known as the seasoning, and 
they died like flies. from the earliest days of the colony towards the middle of 
the eighteenth century, there had been some improvement in the treatment of 
the slaves, but this enormous number of newcomers who had to be broken and 
terrorized into labour and submission caused an increase in fear and adversity.
—C. l. r. James, The Black Jacobins (11, 56)
C. L. R. James was born in 1901 in the British Crown colony of Trinidad, 
attended the Queen’s Royal College in Port of Spain, and upon graduation 
taught school for six years (one of his students was the young Eric Williams, 
Trinidad and Tobago’s first prime minister and “Father of the Nation”), dur-
ing which time he also wrote cricket journalism, short stories, and a novel 
(Minty Alley, not published until 1936). He also got involved with the Beacon 
anticolonialist group and began to write books (The Life of Captain Cipri-
ani: An Account of the British Government in the West Indies, 1932) and pam-
phlets (The Case for West-Indian Self Government, 1933) against colonialism. 
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In 1932 he moved to England, where he expanded his involvement in the West 
Indian independence movement to pan-African agitation, becoming chair 
of the International African Friends of Abyssinia; along with his childhood 
friend George Padmore he also became an influential member of the Interna-
tional African Service Bureau, through which he met later Ghanaian president 
Kwame Nkrumah, of whom he would later write Kwame Nkrumah and the 
Ghana Revolution (1977). During these years in England he also spent time 
in France researching his history of the 1791 Haitian revolution, The Black 
Jacobins (1938), which remains his best-known book today; the research also 
inspired a play, Toussaint L’Ouverture, which was produced in the West End in 
1936, starring Paul Robeson.
 In England James also joined the Trotskyist movement and published 
three books of Marxist theory, and when he moved to the United States in 
1938, he visited Lev Trotsky in exile in Mexico, went on a speaking tour 
to promote the movement, and engaged in a series of published dialogues 
with Trotsky himself. He also became very active in Marxist politics, first in 
the Socialist Workers’ Party, then helping found the Workers’ Party (WP), 
where he (cadre name “J. R. Johnson”) and Trotsky’s former secretary Raya 
Dunayevskaya (cadre name “Freddie Forrest”) formed the Johnson-Forrest 
(JF) Tendency. Dunayevskaya, the founder of what was then called Marxist 
Humanism and later became known as the “New Left,” was doing the first 
English translation of Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 
(one of the foundations of Marxist Humanism), and she and James cotrans-
lated the “Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole.” In 
1939 James followed Dunayevskaya in splitting with Trotsky over the nature of 
the Soviet Union: where Trotsky saw it as a degenerated workers’ state, and the 
WP saw it as bureaucratic-collectivist, the JF Tendency saw it as state-capitalist 
and disinclined to support the liberation movements of oppressed minorities. 
In 1952 James was detained by the U.S. government for overstaying his visa 
by ten years, and, while waiting on Ellis Island to be deported, wrote a study 
of Melville entitled Mariners, Renegades and Castaways: The Story of Herman 
Melville and the World We Live In, had it privately published, and sent a copy 
to every member of the U.S. Senate, hoping (in vain) to convince them to let 
him stay.
 After a few years in England, he returned in 1958 to Trinidad, where his 
old student Dr. Eric Williams offered him the job of editing The Nation for the 
pro-independence People’s National Movement; his advocacy of a West Indies 
Federation led to a falling-out with Williams and resignation of the editorship, 
however, and he spent the remaining years of his life in the U.S., where he 
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taught at Federal City College (1968–80), and England, where he died in 1989. 
His best-known book from this period is Beyond a Boundary (1963), a kind of 
cricket memoir that is also a study of decolonization.
 Most of my remarks, however, will be devoted to a reading of James’s early 
history of the Haitian Revolution, The Black Jacobins, from which my epi-
graphs are taken. In an era of colonial discourse analysis, it is worth remem-
bering that people were physically and culturally displaced in the colonial 
context not only with discourse, but also with brute physical force. Of course 
brute physical force too can be troped as discourse, especially, perhaps, com-
ing out of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish by way of Kafka’s “In the Penal 
Colony,” as the “inscription on bodies” of discipline and punishment. Since 
in Kafka’s story the actual punitive speech acts of the judges are etched on the 
skins of the convicts,1 it is possible to think of what James calls the “régime 
of calculated brutality and terrorism” that the French colonizers of Saint-
Domingue (renamed Haiti in 18042) launched against their slaves in order to 
“cow them into the necessary docility and acceptance” as essentially a discur-
sive regime. And this is a useful trope: it helps us think about physical pain 
more complexly than simply as an overwhelming bodily experience that shuts 
down thought. But it is also important not to naturalize this trope as reality—
not to let it iterosomatically shut down thought about the bodily experience 
that in turn shuts down thought.
 It’s ironic, in fact, that poststructuralist theorists, whose intellectual tra-
dition was powerfully shaped by Friedrich Nietzsche, should be so eager to 
iterosomatize physical pain as a discursive formation. In On the Genealogy of 
Morals, after all, Foucault’s direct model for Discipline and Punish, Nietzsche 
specifically theorized physical pain as the primary “mnemotechnic” channel 
of “civilizing” discipline:
“How does one create a memory for the human animal? How does one go 
about to impress anything on that partly dull, partly flighty human intel-
ligence—that incarnation of forgetfulness—so as to make it stick?” As we 
might well imagine, the means used in solving this age-old problem have 
been far from delicate: in fact, there is perhaps nothing more terrible in 
man’s earliest history than his mnemotechnics. “A thing is branded on the 
memory to make it stay there; only what goes on hurting will stick”—this 
is one of the oldest and, unfortunately, one of the most enduring psycho-
logical axioms. In fact, one might say that wherever on earth one still finds 
solemnity, gravity, secrecy, somber hues in the life of an individual or a 
nation, one also senses a residuum of that terror with which men must for-
merly have promised, pledged, vouched. It is the past—the longest, deep-
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est, hardest of pasts—that seems to surge up whenever we turn serious. 
Whenever man has thought it necessary to create a memory for himself, 
his effort has been attended with torture, blood sacrifice. The ghastliest 
sacrifices and pledges, including the sacrifice of the first-born; the most 
repulsive mutilations, such as castration; the cruelest rituals in every reli-
gious cult (and all religions are at bottom systems of cruelty)—all these 
have their origin in that instinct which divined pain to be the strongest aid 
to mnemonics. (II:3, 192–93)
 This is not a discursive theory. Physical pain here is not “inscribed” on the 
body in signs or symbols—though of course it can be metaphorically retheo-
rized along those lines. What Nietzsche offers us in the Second Essay of the 
Genealogy is a protoneurological3 theory of the counterregulatory effect pain 
has on the human nervous system. He has just postulated in the human ani-
mal a “faculty of oblivion,” “an active screening device, responsible for the fact 
that what we experience and digest psychologically does not, in the stage of 
digestion, emerge into consciousness any more than what we ingest physically 
does” (II:1, 189). This faculty of oblivion, precursor of Freud’s unconscious, 
has for Nietzsche a specifically homeostatic neurophysiological function: “to 
shut temporarily the doors and windows of consciousness; to protect us from 
the noise and agitation with which our lower organs work for or against one 
another; to introduce a little quiet into our consciousness so as to make room 
for the nobler functions and functionaries of our organism which do the gov-
erning and planning” (II:1, 189). “There can,” Nietzsche insists, “be no hap-
piness, no serenity, no hope, no pride, no present, without oblivion. A man 
in whom this screen is damaged and inoperative is like a dyspeptic (and not 
merely like one): he can’t be done with anything . . .” (II:1, 189). Nietzsche, 
himself a dyspeptic whose gastrointestinal disorders frequently shut down his 
ability to think,4 positively longs for the homeostatic screen that would protect 
him from the “noise and agitation with which our lower organs work for or 
against one another.”
 And yet, he says, that faculty of oblivion also tends to block our ability to 
make and keep promises, and thus to retard the civilizing process—and pain, 
he says, especially brutal punitive pain, has been our regime for remembering, 
for imposing a memory on a “naturally forgetful” nervous system:
Now this naturally forgetful animal, for whom oblivion represents a power, 
a form of strong health, has created for himself an opposite power, that of 
remembering, by whose aid, in certain cases, oblivion may be suspended—
specifically in cases where it is a question of promises. By this I do not 
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mean a purely passive succumbing to past impressions, the indigestion of 
being unable to be done with a pledge once made, but rather an active not 
wishing to be done with it, a continuing to will what has once been willed, 
a veritable “memory of the will”; so that, between the original determina-
tion and the actual performance of the thing willed, a whole world of new 
things, conditions, even volitional acts, can be interposed without snap-
ping the long chain of the will. But how much all this presupposes! A man 
who wishes to dispose of his future in this manner must first have learned 
to separate necessary from accidental acts; to think causally; to see distant 
things as though they were near at hand; to distinguish means from ends. 
In short, he must have become not only calculating but himself calculable 
[berechenbar], regular even to his own perception, if he is to stand pledge 
for his own future as a guarantor does. (II:1, 189–90)
 This is as good an encapsulation of the European counterregulatory colo-
nizing ideal as we have: to take the “naturally forgetful animal” of Africa or 
Asia or the Americas and force him or her through physical pain and other 
disciplinary regimes (education, religion, law) to remember, to “continue to 
will what has once been willed,” to “become not only calculating but himself 
calculable.” By creating a “muscle memory” or somatic marker, disciplinary 
pain goes on hurting after the whipping or the torture has physically ended, 
and so becomes the internalized agent of the colonizer’s discipline (“only 
what goes on hurting will stick”), the exosomatized calculus or Rechenstein 
(lit. calculating stone) inside the colonized’s organism that makes him or 
her calculable. In this sense disciplinary pain is simply an intense channel 
of social disapproval—or else the body language of disapproval is simply a 
milder channel of disciplinary pain. Pain is used to establish in the indi-
vidual the authority of the group; once that authority has been established, 
the somatomimetic circulation of body language and body states through 
the somatic exchange will ideally suffice to stabilize social regulation. It may 
also not suffice, of course, leading to idiosomatic deregulation and either 
ostracism, if the idiosomatic deregulators are in a small enough minority or, 
if they become a strong enough power within the group, counterregulatory 
revolt.
 Of course Nietzsche is specifically interested in how “we”—“Westerners” 
from the ancient Greeks and Hebrews to the Germans—have civilized “our-
selves,” but parallel quotations from his Second Essay and the opening pages 
of The Black Jacobins make it clear that colonization entailed the exporta-
tion of exosomatized European self-torture to the “primitives” that Europeans 
found abroad:
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It needs only a glance at our ancient penal codes to impress on us what 
labor it takes to create a nation of thinkers. . . . Germans have resorted to 
ghastly means in order to triumph over their plebeian instincts and brutal 
coarseness. We need only recount some of our ancient forms of punish-
ment: stoning (even in earliest legend millstones are dropped on the heads 
of culprits); breaking on the wheel (Germany’s own contribution to the 
techniques of punishment); piercing with stakes, drawing and quartering, 
trampling to death with horses, boiling in oil or wine (these were still in use 
in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries), the popular flaying alive, cutting 
out of flesh from the chest, smearing the victim with honey and leaving 
him in the sun, a prey to flies. By such methods the individual was finally 
taught to remember five or six “I won’ts” which entitled him to participate 
in the benefits of society; and indeed, with the aid of this sort of memory, 
people eventually “came to their senses.” What an enormous price man 
had to pay for reason, seriousness, control over his emotions—those grand 
human prerogatives and cultural showpieces! How much blood and horror 
lies behind all “good things”! (Nietzsche II:3, 193–94)
But there was no ingenuity that fear or a depraved imagination could 
devise which was not employed to break their [the African slaves’] spirit 
and satisfy the lusts and resentment of their owners and guardians—irons 
on the hands and feet, blocks of wood that the slaves had to drag behind 
them wherever they went, the tin-plate mask designed to prevent the slaves 
eating the sugar-cane, the iron collar. Whipping was interrupted in order 
to pass a piece of hot wood on the buttocks of the victim; salt, pepper, 
citron, cinders, aloes, and hot ashes were poured on the bleeding wounds. 
Mutilations were common, limbs, ears, and sometimes the private parts, 
to deprive them of the pleasures which they could indulge in without 
expense. Their masters poured burning wax on their arms and hands and 
shoulders, emptied the boiling cane sugar over their heads, burned them 
alive, roasted them on slow fires, filled them with gunpowder and blew 
them up with a match; buried them up to the neck and smeared their heads 
with sugar that the flies might devour them; fastened them near to nests of 
ants or wasps; made them eat their excrement, drink their urine, and lick 
the saliva of other slaves. One colonist was known in moments of anger to 
throw himself on his slaves and stick his teeth into their flesh. (James, Black 
Jacobins 12–13)
 The only real difference between these “ancient” German tortures, found 
in Germany as “recently” as the fifteenth century, and the more “modern” 
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colonialist tortures found in Haiti and other slave-owning colonies in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, is that Nietzsche and James—both of 
them products of such “civilizing” regimes, centuries later—attribute different 
motivations to them. For Nietzsche, they are intended to teach the individual 
“to remember five or six ‘I won’ts’ which entitled him to participate in the ben-
efits of society”; for James they are motivated by fear and “a depraved imagi-
nation,” by “the lusts and resentment of [the slaves’] owners and guardians.” 
Also, of course, the German victims of this regime “come to their senses”: the 
result in the individual is “reason, seriousness, control over his emotions.” 
James writes that “the majority of the slaves accommodated themselves to 
this unceasing brutality by a profound fatalism and a wooden stupidity before 
their masters” (15).
 This difference is partly due to the different time scales in Nietzsche and 
James: Nietzsche is looking back on the millennia of Western civilization lead-
ing up to his own time, while James (at this point in his book) is looking at the 
early weeks and months of enslavement, perhaps at most years, the “season-
ing” of slaves. At a deeper level, though, it is also conditioned by the difference 
that Nietzsche is interested in the Western civilization of other Westerners, 
the German civilization of other Germans, while James is studying the French 
“civilization”—the breaking, cowing, and terrorizing—of African slaves, who 
are not so much fellow humans to be civilized as they are dangerous chattel, 
animal enough to be chattel and human enough to be dangerous. But then 
Nietzsche does not entirely ignore the colonial applications of his genealogy:
By way of comfort to the milksops, I would also venture the suggestion that 
in those days pain did not hurt as much as it does today; at all events, such 
is the opinion of a doctor who has treated Negroes for complicated inter-
nal inflammations which would have driven the most stoical European 
to distraction—the assumption being that the negro represents an earlier 
phase of human development. (It appears, in fact, that the curve of human 
susceptibility to pain drops abruptly the moment we go below the top layer 
of culture comprising ten thousand or ten million individuals. For my part, 
I am convinced that, compared with one night’s pain endured by a hysteri-
cal bluestocking, all the suffering of all the animals that have been used for 
scientific experiments is as nothing.) (II:7, 199–200)
 Nietzsche’s genealogical argument seems essentializing here—with “ani-
mals” and “Negroes” not only culturally but also physiologically early and low 
and Europeans culturally and physiologically late and high, and with educated 
liberal European women even later and higher on the genealogical hierar-
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chy of civilization than European men, indeed absurdly so—but his apparent 
essentialism is in fact a mapping of what he is theorizing as the counter-
regulatory transformation of physiology over the last thousand years or so. 
It’s not just that Europeans today (and especially “hysterical bluestockings”) 
are more susceptible to pain than Europeans were seven or eight centuries 
ago, or than dark-skinned people are today; it’s that people whose ancestors 
were brutalized for centuries are more susceptible to pain than people whose 
ancestry is relatively new to the brutality of the “civilizing” process. Pain has a 
kind of intergenerationally cumulative effect, Nietzsche is suggesting, so that 
the more “civilized” we become, the less pain is needed to regulate us: the tini-
est twinge or threat of pain and we yield, we conform. “Perhaps,” he writes, 
“it is even legitimate to allow the possibility that pleasure in cruelty is not 
really extinct today; only, given our greater delicacy, that pleasure has had to 
undergo a certain sublimation and subtilization, to be translated into imagi-
native and psychological terms in order to pass muster before even the ten-
derest hypocritical conscience” (II:7, 200). Racist and sexist as Nietzsche’s 
genealogical hierarchy here unquestionably is, therefore, it is a constructivist 
rather than an essentialist form of racism and sexism: what would make “hys-
terical bluestockings” more susceptible to pain and “Negroes” less would not 
be any kind of innate physiological difference but the relative duration in the 
two groups of the intergenerational transmission of punitive pain-based ideo-
somatic counterregulation.
 The two constructions of the motivations behind that counterregulation—
Nietzsche’s that it was designed, however horrifically, to civilize its targets, 
and James’s that it was a repressive reaction-formation born out of the Hai-
tian colonizers’ fear, resentment, lust, and depravity—also represent two radi-
cally opposed constructions of the colonizing ideosomatic exchange. At one 
end, Nietzsche’s internalization of mastery, it seems that the group imposes 
a painful counterregulatory regime on its members in order to discipline 
them to conformity, to make them iterosomatize punitive pain as introjected 
master(y), “self-mastery” as submission to group normativity. At the other 
end, James’s description of the “seasoning” of slaves, it seems that the group is 
defined in terms of the circulation of potentially dysregulatory feelings—that 
everyone, slave-owner and slave alike, feels at least fear and resentment, that 
the slaves are afraid of the slave-owners’ resentment and the slave-owners are 
afraid of the slaves’ resentment—and that each side harbors and sooner or 
later expresses violent impulses as an outward channel for those feelings. In 
this latter construction the somatic exchange serves no “civilizing” function at 
all: it may be designed to terrorize the slaves into docility and submission, but 
it becomes instead a kind of ideosomatic pressure-cooker for fear, resentment, 
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and brutal reaction. The “cultural” legacy of that pressure-cooker in Haiti, of 
course, can still be all too viscerally felt two centuries later in (§1.2) the work 
of Edwidge Danticat.
 From Nietzsche’s point of view, James’s construction of the colonial 
somatic exchange would have to be seen as still circulating that same fear, that 
same resentment, and thus as a textbook case of what he calls “slave morality”:
The slave revolt in morals begins by rancor turning creative and giving 
birth to values—the rancor of beings who, deprived of the direct outlet of 
action, compensate by an imaginary vengeance. All truly noble morality 
grows out of triumphant self-affirmation. Slave ethics, on the other hand, 
begins by saying no to an “outside,” an “other,” a non-self, and that no is its 
creative act. This reversal of direction of the evaluating look, this invari-
able looking outward instead of inward, is a fundamental feature of rancor. 
Slave ethics requires for its inception a sphere different from and hostile to 
its own. Physiologically speaking, it requires an outside stimulus in order to 
act at all; all its action is reaction. The opposite is true of aristocratic valua-
tions: such values grow and act spontaneously, seeking out their contraries 
only in order to affirm themselves even more gratefully and delightedly. . . .
 All this stands in utter contrast to what is called happiness among the 
impotent and oppressed, who are full of bottled-up aggressions. Their hap-
piness is purely passive and takes the form of drugged tranquility, stretch-
ing and yawning, peace, “Sabbath,” emotional slackness. Whereas the noble 
lives before his own conscience with confidence and frankness (gennaios 
“nobly bred” emphasizes the nuance “truth” and perhaps also “ingenu-
ous”), the rancorous person is neither truthful nor ingenuous nor honest 
and forthright with himself. His soul squints; his mind loves hide-outs, 
secret paths, and back doors; everything that is hidden seems to him his 
own world, his security, his comfort; he is expert in silence, in long mem-
ory, in waiting, in provisional self-depreciation, and in self-humiliation. 
(I:10, 170–72)
One obvious question to ask Nietzsche here is where his own rancor at “slave 
morality” comes from—why he seems to be accusing slaves and their descen-
dants of compensating by imaginary vengeance, saying no to an outside Other, 
or, “full of bottled-up aggressions,” finding happiness in doing nothing, as if 
all that were somehow a base and shameful response to enslavement. The 
obvious answer is that the morality he is most interested in demystifying as 
slave morality is that of his own now powerful group, that of Western philoso-
phers (Socrates, Mark Migotti argues, is for Nietzsche the first “Thersites of 
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genius” (758) who shames the nobles with his slave morality), of Christians, of 
German Lutherans—and he is the son of a Lutheran pastor. His romanticized 
conception of “noble morality” as “grow[ing] out of triumphant self-affirma-
tion,” then, would be his projection of a utopian ideal into the past and pres-
ent as a kind of hopeful prefiguration of his own future freedom from his own 
slave rancor against the old slaves become new masters, the ascetic priests 
among both the Jews and the Christians.
 Despite his aggressive dysphemizing of slaves and euphemizing of their 
masters, however, Nietzsche’s analysis of slave morality is acute, and antici-
pates much colonial discourse analysis of the decolonization process5—which 
in fact suggests, as I’ll be arguing in §2.1.2.2, that decolonization is not the 
reversal but rather the next stage of colonization. The image of “rancor turn-
ing creative and giving birth to values” explains not only Christianity but also 
the politically volatile value systems of many former colonies today, always 
ready to “compensate by an imaginary vengeance” or, in ethnic cleansing and 
other forms of seemingly excessive violence, actual vengeance for imaginary 
(transferential) crimes. His notion that slave morality says “no to an ‘out-
side,’ an ‘other,’ a non-self, and that no is its creative act,” that “slave ethics 
requires for its inception a sphere different from and hostile to its own,” feeds 
Freud’s conception of negation, which has been extraordinarily influential in 
the shaping of our understanding of colonial and postcolonial discourse. His 
suggestion that slave morality or decolonization is grounded at base in the 
“reversal of direction of the evaluating look” anticipates not only the contem-
porary understanding that decolonization involves the reversal of the energies 
of colonization but also the somatic notion that body language, or rather the 
transformative circulation of body states through somatic mimeses of body 
language, is the primary channel of social regulation. Nietzsche’s notion that 
slave morality survives as body-becoming-mind (susceptibility to pain cre-
atively mapped as a value system) in cultures that have not been enslaved 
for centuries also introduces, under the rubric of “genealogy,” the concept 
of the intergenerational somatic transmission of trauma, to which we will 
be returning in the Third Essay. And the last lines in that quotation clearly 
adumbrate early analyses of the impact of colonization on the colonized by 
Albert Memmi in The Colonizer and the Colonized (§2.1.2) and Frantz Fanon 
in Black Skin, White Masks (§2.1.3): “the rancorous person is neither truthful 
nor ingenuous nor honest and forthright with himself. His soul squints; his 
mind loves hide-outs, secret paths, and back doors; everything that is hid-
den seems to him his own world, his security, his comfort; he is expert in 
silence, in long memory, in waiting, in provisional self-depreciation, and in 
self-humiliation.”
96 |  SeCOnD eSSay
 Again, in The Black Jacobins James describes only the initial stages of this 
reversal:
The slaves destroyed tirelessly. Like the peasants in the Jacquerie or the 
Luddite wreckers, they were seeking their salvation in the most obvious 
way, the destruction of what they knew was the cause of their sufferings; 
and if they destroyed much it was because they had suffered much. They 
knew that as long as these plantations stood their lot would be to labour on 
them until they dropped. The only thing was to destroy them. From their 
masters they had known rape, torture, degradation, and, at the slightest 
provocation, death. They returned in kind. For two centuries the higher 
civilization [what Nietzsche would call “noble morality”] had shown them 
that power was used for wreaking your will on those whom you controlled. 
Now that they held power they did as they had been taught. In the frenzy 
of the first encounters they killed all, yet they spared the priests whom they 
feared and the surgeons who had been kind to them. They, whose women 
had undergone countless violations, violated all the women who fell into 
their hands, often on the bodies of their still bleeding husbands, fathers 
and brothers. “Vengeance! Vengeance!” was their war-cry, and one of them 
carried a white child on a pike as a standard. (88)
For James, clearly, this is “compensation,” but not quite as “imaginary ven-
geance”: they were returning violation for violation, torture for torture, death 
for death. In a sense, though, there was an imaginary component to their ven-
geance as well: no white woman they raped had ever raped a black woman, 
rendering vengeance-rapes the infliction of compensatory violence on sym-
bolic or imaginary targets. Of course the white wives and daughters of planta-
tion owners had enjoyed the fruits of their husbands’ and fathers’ exploitations 
of slaves, and were therefore complicit in the colonial system for the degrada-
tion of human beings; but this too is a symbolic or imaginary complicity.
 In his next paragraph, however, James does begin to convert his justified 
rancor into a value system, into what Nietzsche calls slave morality:
And yet they were surprisingly moderate [he adds in a footnote: “This 
statement has been criticized. I stand by it”], then and afterwards, far 
more humane than their masters had been or would ever be to them. They 
did not maintain this revengeful spirit for long. The cruelties of property 
and privilege are always more ferocious than the revenges of poverty and 
oppression. For the one aims at perpetuating resented injustice, the other 
is merely a momentary passion soon appeased. As the revolution gained 
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territory they spared many of the men, women, and children whom they 
surprised on plantations. To prisoners of war alone they remained merci-
less. They tore out their flesh with red-hot pincers, they roasted them on 
slow fires, they sawed a carpenter between two of his boards. Yet in all the 
records of that time there is no single instance of such fiendish tortures as 
burying white men up to the neck and smearing the holes in their faces to 
attract insects, or blowing them up with gun-powder, or any of the thou-
sand and one bestialities to which they had been subjected. Compared 
with what their masters had done to them in cold blood, what they did was 
negligible, and they were spurred on by the ferocity with which the whites 
in Le Cap treated all slave prisoners who fell into their hands. (88–89)
The rebelling slaves were more “humane” than their “bestial” masters: this is 
the reversal of the evaluating look of which Nietzsche wrote, the transvalua-
tion of value that seizes the moral high ground out of the ashes of the master’s 
one-time vaunted superiority, now “revealed” (reconstructed) as criminal and 
subhuman. “The cruelties of property and privilege are always more ferocious 
than the revenges of poverty and oppression. For the one aims at perpetuating 
resented injustice, the other is merely a momentary passion soon appeased.” 
This, it should be clear, is not simply journalistic reportage; it is a new moral-
ity, a decolonizing morality that justifies the excessive violence of rebelling 
slaves as “a momentary passion”—an understandable lapse from their true 
inner moral superiority—and condemns the excessive violence of the masters 
as systemic injustice.
 Of course, this is not to join Nietzsche in condemning slave morality; it 
is rather to apply his analysis of slave morality without the condemnation. 
Indeed the classic analyses of the social psychology of the formerly colonized 
are quintessentially attempts to understand the dysregulatory impulses in 
decolonizing cultures in the specific explanatory context of the colonizations 
that conditioned those dysregulations, and thus in a very real sense to extend 
and consolidate Nietzsche’s genealogical analysis of slave morality, to explain 
the persistence of slave morality in a decolonizing context genealogically, 
as something produced—and intergenerationally reproduced—rather than 
innate.
 As a Marxist, in fact, James does not indulge much in this sort of psycho-
analytical or other slave-moralizing of decolonization. His later discussions of 
decolonization, Modern Politics and Party Politics in the West Indies, as well as 
“Black Sansculottes,” his 1964 updating of his history of postcolonial Haiti to 
Papa Doc Duvalier and the Tonton Macoutes, by and large focus on the politi-
cal ramifications of economic issues like land reform and the nationalization 
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of industry. He comes closer to an analysis of what Nietzsche calls slave moral-
ity in his 1963 memoir of cricket (and generally the culture of decolonization), 
Beyond a Boundary, or in his 1964 review of Orlando Patterson’s Jamaican 
Rastafari novel The Children of Sisyphus:
The Rastafari are one example of the contemporary rejection of the life to 
which we are all submitted. The Mau-Mau of Kenya do the same. The Black 
Muslims of the United States are of the same brand. . . .
 But Rastafari and Mr Patterson are West Indian. They are both new. 
Their world is just beginning. They do not suffer from any form of angst. 
They have no deep-seated consciousness of failure, no fear of defeat. That 
is not in their history. Mr Patterson does not, cannot, convince the reader 
that the life he is describing is absurd. Horrible, horrible, most horrible 
it is. But it is not absurd. The prostitute who tries to lift herself out of the 
squalor, the filth of the Jungle is consciously impelled by “ambition.” The 
other prostitute whose pathetic destiny equals the horrors of her existence 
is impelled by her passionate wish to give her daughter a secondary educa-
tion. The colossal stupidities, the insanities of the Rastafari are consciously 
motivated by their acute consciousness of the filth in which they live, their 
conscious refusal to accept the fictions that pour in upon them from every 
side. It is the determination to get out of it that leads them to their imagi-
native fantasies of escape to Africa. These passions and forces are the “clas-
sic human virtues.” As long as they express themselves, the form may be 
absurd, but the life itself is not absurd. The fate of Rastafari and Mr Pat-
terson himself are very closely linked. And this book is one proof of their 
common distress and common destiny. (164)
Here, clearly, the genealogical analysis of Nietzsche (and later of Freud and 
Foucault) is not very hard at work: “They are both new. Their world is just 
beginning. They do not suffer from any form of angst. They have no deep-
seated consciousness of failure, no fear of defeat. That is not in their history.” 
The Rastafari simply reject “the life to which we are all submitted,” refuse “to 
accept the fictions that pour in upon them from every side.” And, to James’s 
mind, fictions are precisely what they are: not the iterosomatic traces of colo-
nialism that are now circulated by their own group and so feel like realities, 
like human nature; just patent lies and propaganda pouring in upon them 
from the outside, and so easy to resist. “The colossal stupidities, the insanities 
of the Rastafari are consciously motivated by their acute consciousness of the 
filth in which they live,” but that filth has no history, no genealogy, certainly 
no genealogy of the body-becoming-mind, no history of the evaluative look. I 
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assume that James’s denial of the impact of colonial history on Jamaican pov-
erty is ironic, a kind of satirical double-voicing of Rastafari idealism; but the 
fact that James does not analyze that history, does not genealogize the emer-
gence of “the colossal stupidities, the insanities of the Rastafari” out of the bru-
talizing experience of colonization and slavery, renders this too a very sketchy 
critique of decolonizing slave morality. In what ways is Rastafarian religion 
a counterregulatory revision of the “colossal stupidities” and “insanities” of 
colonial culture? Presumably for the Marxist James one thing that makes the 
Rastafari movement stupid and insane is that it is a religion; another, perhaps, 
that it is more a Judeo-Christian “heresy” than an African syncretic religion 
like vodou or candomblé. But James does not raise these questions; again, he 
is more interested in the political and economic issues:
But neither the economic masters nor the political inheritors (the coloured 
middle classes) want to have in their midst anything or anybody disturb-
ing their precarious peace. The freedom which would enable the Rastafari 
to build their new Jerusalem in Jamaica’s green and pleasant land would 
enable the Pattersons to steel and temper their weapons upon some dark 
and satanic mills. Their walls may appear to be very solid. But they are 
no more than the walls of Jericho. They would tumble at the sound of 
trumpets. But the trumpets must sound in Kingston, in Port of Spain, in 
Bridgetown and in Georgetown. From London (and in London) they are 
horns from an elf-land, blowing only faintly. (165)
2.1.2 albert memmi
So goes the drama of the man who is a product and victim of colonization. he 
almost never succeeds in corresponding with himself.
—albert memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized (140)
The decolonized experiences a form of stationary dismemberment, torn and 
pulled from every side.
—albert memmi, Decolonization and the Decolonized (57)
Albert Memmi was born to Arabic-speaking Jewish parents in the French 
colony of Tunisia in 1921, studied philosophy at the University of Algiers and 
the Sorbonne, and after university took a teaching job back at his old high 
school in Tunis. In 1953 he published his first novel, La statue de sel (The Pillar 
of Salt), a semiautobiographical tale about a young Jew from the Tunis ghetto 
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who breaks with his family tradition to become an intellectual and a fiction-
writer but is paralyzed throughout, like Lot’s wife, by his solitude. He was an 
ardent supporter of the anticolonial liberation movement, but upon indepen-
dence in 1956 he found himself ostracized from the new nationalistic Muslim 
society, and moved permanently to France, where he taught high school and 
eventually, in 1970, accepted a post at the University of Nanterre. His most 
famous book, Portrait du colonisé, précédé du Portrait du colonisateur (The 
Colonizer and the Colonized), was published in 1957, with a preface by Jean-
Paul Sartre; its sequel, Portrait du décolonisé (Decolonization and the Decolo-
nized), appeared nearly fifty years later, in 2004, when Memmi was in his early 
eighties. His other novels include Agar (Strangers), Le Scorpion ou la confession 
imaginaire (The Scorpion), and Le Désert ou la vie et les aventures de Jubaür 
Ouali el Mammi (The Desert); his other nonfiction works include L’Homme 
dominé (Dominated Man), La Dépendance (Dependence), Le Racisme (Rac-
ism), Le Nomade immobile (“The Immobile Nomad,” not yet translated), and 
several works on Judaism, Portrait d’un juif (Portrait of a Jew), La libération du 
Juif (Liberation of the Jew), and Juifs et Arabes (Jews and Arabs).
 What I want to do in §2.1.2.1 is to read The Colonizer and the Colonized 
and Decolonization and the Decolonized intertextually, beginning with the lat-
ter, which blames the patent failure of decolonization almost entirely on the 
decolonized themselves, on the greed and corruption and violence of their 
leaders. This constitutes a radical rethinking of Colonized, perhaps even a rue-
ful recantation in the light of subsequent history—but also, I want to argue, a 
forgetting. In §2.1.2.2, then, I will build on a few passing remarks in Decolo-
nized and recent work by Arif Dirlik and others to show that what Memmi 
takes to be the failure of decolonization is in fact the illusion of decolonization, 
the hegemonic myth that decolonization as the counterregulatory “reversal” 
of colonization is a viable project—an illusion that, Dirlik argues persuasively, 
is actually a phantom projection of colonialism in its ongoing evolution from 
military and economic occupation into neocolonialist globalization, or what 
I propose to call the colonialist metanarrative of development. In §2.1.2.3, 
finally, I will take a look back at Memmi’s discussion of “the colonizer who 
refuses” from Colonized as an autocritical perspective on my own project here.
2.1.2.1 The failure of decolonizaTion
There is a certain cognitive slippage between Memmi’s two books on coloniza-
tion and decolonization that I find particularly telling, as it seems to reflect his 
confusion about the five-decade persistence of what I would call colonial ideo-
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somatic regulation: because he lacks a model that would adequately explain 
that persistence, it seems to him as if there must be none, as if the belief that 
decolonization continues to be regulated by (slightly displaced) colonial ideo-
somatics must be sheer illusion, a flimsy excuse apologists invent to let the 
young nations off the hook.
 For example, he describes the poor blacks’ hostility toward the Italian and 
Korean business owners in their neighborhood in Spike Lee’s Do the Right 
Thing, and comments:
My friends asked me why they didn’t do what the Asians or Italians did. 
My pained response was that these immigrant groups obviously help 
one another. As soon as they arrive in the country, they are taken in by 
their extended family, assisted by various civic associations. Why don’t 
the blacks have their own associations? The explanation given is that this 
is contrary to their “mentality,” that they dislike associations, and so on. 
When the questioner insists, the real reason is given: “Because they were 
slaves!” “But,” he responds in astonishment, “that was a long time ago!”
 Black Americans are not a decolonized people [why not?6], although 
they have certain traits in common with them, just as they have certain 
traits in common with the colonized. But their evasive responses are the 
same. It is the fault of history, it is always the fault of the whites. Dolor-
ism is a natural tendency to exaggerate one’s pains and attribute them to 
another. Like the decolonized, as long as blacks have not freed themselves 
of dolorism, they will be unable to correctly analyze their condition and act 
accordingly. (Decolonized 18–19)
 This is a complaint that he recurs to over and over in the book: “If the 
decolonized are still not free citizens in a free country, it is because they 
remain the powerless playthings of some ancient fate. If the economy fails, 
it’s always the fault of the ex-colonizer, not the systematic bloodletting of the 
economy by the new masters, not the viscosity of their culture, which fails to 
address its present and the future” (20), and “Apologists go out of their way 
to learnedly explain that what can be criticized today in Islam are merely the 
remnants of an anti-Islamic period, overlooking the fact that we might have 
done away with such remnants since then” (33). Yes, we might have, but that 
isn’t exactly a fact that might be overlooked; it’s a potential that hasn’t been 
realized. The interesting question that Memmi wants to address, and can’t, is 
why it hasn’t been realized. His only hesitant explanation is the greed and the 
corruption of the leaders of the new nations, but he himself recognizes that 
these are just more symptoms of the problem, not its cause.
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 Or again:
Why such continued desperate violence? The embarrassed historians 
among the formerly colonized have not failed to look for explanations. 
They claim this is simply a bad habit inherited from the colonial period, an 
additional wound. They note that there was considerably less of an emo-
tional outpouring when the colonized suffered at the hands of the colo-
nizers. So be it. We try to relieve our sense of guilt any way we can. But 
now the violence occurs among the formerly colonized, against their own 
people. In spite of the passage of time, the situation has not only endured, 
it has gotten worse. (52–53)
 It’s easy enough to point out that he himself predicted something very like 
this enduring recourse to violence in his earlier book, a half century before: 
Uncertain of himself, he [the ex-colonized] gives in to the intoxication of 
fury and violence. In fact, he asserts himself vigorously. Uncertain of being 
able to convince others, he provokes them. Simultaneously provocative and 
sensitive, he now makes a display of his contrasts, refuses to let himself be 
forgotten as such, and becomes indignant when they are mentioned. Auto-
matically distrustful, he assumes hostile intentions in those with whom he 
converses and reacts accordingly. He demands endless approval from his 
best friends, of even that which he doubts and himself condemns. (Colo-
nized 135–36)
 It’s harder to recognize that Memmi has in both books the conceptual or 
at least imagistic tools with which to work through this problem to an expla-
nation, but doesn’t quite know what to do with them: “Obviously,” he sighs in 
Decolonized, “nothing comes of nothing; the actual face of the world’s young 
nations bears the imprint of their colonial past along with their own history” 
(21). After all his complaining about ex-colonized historians using the colo-
nial legacy as a lame excuse for their country’s lack of decolonizing progress, 
Memmi here (briefly) adopts the same position—but what I’m most interested 
in there is the facial trope for that lingering legacy. What kind of imprint is 
left by the colonizer on the colonized’s face? If this were James’s history of 
Haitian slavery, it might be a scar left by a whip; but Memmi’s own argumen-
tative history suggests that what he means here is the imprint left by somatic 
mimeticism, the assimilative effect empathetic mimicry has on body language, 
and through body language both outward appearance (“the actual face of the 
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world’s young nations”) and inward body states. In Colonized, for example, he 
wrote extensively of the colonized’s imperfect but powerfully transformative 
attempts to assimilate his or her behavior, posture, gestures, accent, and tone 
of voice to that of the colonizer: “At the height of his revolt, the colonized still 
bears the traces and lessons of prolonged cohabitation (just as the smile or 
movements of a wife, even during divorce proceedings, remind one strangely 
of those of her husband)” (129). Those traces of prolonged cohabitation are 
not just kinesic but somatic, which is to say, not just outwardly mimetic but 
inwardly evaluative and thus collectively regulatory, and not just a passing 
physiological tropism but persistent over time (“still bears the traces”), which 
is to say, stored as somatic markers.
 By the time he comes to write Decolonized, however, Memmi has forgot-
ten his earlier protosomatic insistence on this lasting mimetic transforma-
tion of the colonized: “Like buffalo that follow their leader,” he writes, “even 
when he leads them into a ravine, human animals display a kind of gregarious 
mimicry” (19); “The presidents of the new republics generally mimic what 
is most arbitrary about the colonial power” (60). Mimicry is not purpose-
ful, not transformed by or transformative of the (post)colonial encounter; it 
is “gregarious” and “arbitrary,” sheer superficial mammalian behavior (which 
is not to suggest that mammalian behavior is actually this superficial). In the 
earlier book the accusation that “the colonized is an ape” is attributed to the 
colonizer: “The shrewder the ape, the better he imitates, and the more the 
colonizer becomes irritated” (124). Now, after long somatic training in colo-
nial mimesis and even longer exile in France, Memmi has himself assimilated 
to the colonizer’s irritation, and no longer remembers what he knew in Colo-
nized, that somatic mimesis is assimilative, counterregulatory, and that the 
assimilation is extremely difficult to reverse.
 His analysis of the colonial counterregulation in Colonized is, in fact, one 
of the most powerfully insightful sections of the book. I mean the “Mythi-
cal portrait of the colonized” and “Situations of the colonized” chapters of 
Part Two. He begins there by defining the colonizer’s “mythical portrait of 
the colonized” as a “series of negations,” a definition that seems to anticipate 
poststructuralist readings of postcolonial identities as the emptying-out of the 
plenitude of idealized colonizer identities: “The point is,” he writes, “that the 
colonized means little to the colonizer. Far from wanting to understand him 
as he really is, the colonizer is preoccupied with making him undergo this 
urgent change. The mechanism of this remolding of the colonized is revealing 
in itself. It consists, in the first place, of a series of negations. The colonized is 
not this, is not that. He is never considered in a positive light; or if he is, the 
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quality which is conceded is the result of a psychological or ethical failing” 
(83–84). He seems even more like a protopoststructuralist colonial discourse 
analyst a couple of pages later: “What is left of the colonized at the end of this 
stubborn effort to dehumanize him? He is surely no longer an alter ego of the 
colonizer. He is hardly a human being. He tends rapidly toward becoming an 
object. As an end, in the colonizer’s supreme ambition, he should exist only as 
a function of the needs of the colonizer, i.e., be transformed into a pure colo-
nized” (86).
 But the abstract differentiality (subalternity) of this image-analysis, the 
sense in which the dehumanized object-ideal of the “pure colonized” is at once 
the infinitely deferred cancellation of subjectivity and the iterative negation of 
the colonizer’s alter ego-ideal, is everywhere in these chapters resaturated with 
evaluative affect. Even in that first apparently protopoststructuralist formula-
tion above, for example, Memmi tendentiously somatizes his abstract equa-
tions with pathos: “means little” and “far from wanting to understand him as 
he really is” both surge with the hurt anger of the child led to expect love from 
his or her neglectful parents. Memmi’s depiction of the colonizer’s objectifica-
tion of the colonized is not so much an analytical proposition as it is a fully 
embodied speech act, less abstract or discursive than inflammatory, intended 
to incite rebellion against it: the colonizer’s counterregulatory ideal resoma-
tized as the colonized’s revolutionary anti-ideal.
 And indeed on the very next page he gives us a powerful account of what 
I call the somatic exchange, troping it this time not with sight (mimicry) but 
with hearing (echo), once again suggesting that colonial counterregulation 
works by being circulated as evaluative affect through the colonized:
More surprising, more harmful perhaps, is the echo that it excites in the 
colonized himself. Constantly confronted with this image of himself, set 
forth and imposed on all institutions and in every human contact, how 
could the colonized help reacting to his portrait? It cannot leave him indif-
ferent and remain a veneer which, like an insult, blows with the wind. 
He ends up recognizing it as one would a detested nickname which has 
become a familiar description. The accusation disturbs him and worries 
him even more because he admires and fears his powerful accuser. “Is 
he not partially right?” he mutters. “Are we not all a little guilty after all? 
Lazy, because we have so many idlers? Timid, because we let ourselves be 
oppressed.” Willfully created and spread by the colonizer, this mythical and 
degrading portrait ends up by being accepted and lived with to a certain 
extent by the colonized. It thus acquires a certain amount of reality and 
contributes to the true portrait of the colonized. (Colonized 87–88)
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This is an almost letter-perfect description of the iteronormative effects of 
ideosomatic regulation: the colonizer circulates a negative or accusatory 
image of the colonized through “all institutions and in every human contact,” 
till it “excites” a harmful “echo” in the colonized’s own somatization of the 
world. This is no mere superficial mimicry, no ephemeral echo, no “veneer 
which, like an insult, blows with the wind”: it sticks. “The accusation disturbs 
him and worries him even more because he admires and fears his powerful 
accuser”: the ideosomatic hierarchy in the colonial encounter circulates not 
just “mythical and degrading portraits” but the evaluative affects that accom-
pany and confirm those portraits, admiration and fear for the colonizer, worry 
and disturbing self-loathing for the colonized. And so, gradually, the colonial 
ideosomatic counterregulates the colonized’s group construction of reality and 
identity: “It thus acquires a certain amount of reality and contributes to the 
true portrait of the colonized.” This counterregulated reality/identity, Memmi 
notes, anticipating Foucault, is institutionalized (note here again the image of 
facial mimesis):
This conduct, which is common to colonizers as a group, thus becomes 
what can be called a social institution. In other words, it defines and estab-
lishes concrete situations which close in on the colonized, weigh on him 
until they bend his conduct and leave their marks on his face. Generally 
speaking, these are situations of inadequacy. The ideological aggression 
which tends to dehumanize and then deceive the colonized finally corre-
sponds to concrete situations which lead to the same result. To be deceived 
to some extent already, to endorse the myth and then adapt to it, is to 
be acted upon by it. That myth is furthermore supported by a very solid 
organization; a government and a judicial system fed and renewed by the 
colonizer’s historic, economic and cultural needs. Even if he were insensi-
tive to calumny and scorn, even if he shrugged his shoulders at insults and 
jostling, how could the colonized escape the low wages, the agony of his 
culture, the law which rules him from birth until death? (91)
What begins as an apparently discursive formulation, the “series of negations,” 
is expanded first to the intersubjectivity of the social economy of value, and 
then to economic, cultural, and legal institutions that govern every aspect of 
the colonized’s life—and each stage of the expansion is saturated with affect: 
the indignation at neglect in the “series of negations”; the detestation, distur-
bance, worry, admiration, and fear in the “echo that it excites in the colonized 
himself ”; the calumny and the scorn and the agony that run like a bass note 
through the low wages and other legal depredations.
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 The final stage in this process is the breaking point, at which revolution 
becomes possible:
Now, into what kind of life and social dynamic do we emerge? The colony’s 
life is frozen; its structure is both corseted and hardened. No new role is 
open to the young man, no invention is possible. The colonizer admits 
this with a new classical euphemism: He respects, he proclaims, the ways 
and customs of the colonized. And, to be sure, he cannot help respect-
ing them, be it by force. Since any change would have to be made against 
colonization, the colonizer is led to favor the least progressive features. He 
is not solely responsible for this mummification of the colonized society; 
he demonstrates relatively good faith when he maintains that it is indepen-
dent by its own will. It derives largely, however, from the colonial situation. 
Not being master of its destiny, not being its own legislator, not controlling 
its organization, colonized society can no longer adapt its institutions to its 
grievous needs. But it is those needs which practically shape the organiza-
tional face of every normal society.  .  .  . However, if the discord becomes 
too sharp, and harmony becomes impossible to attain under existing legal 
forms, the result is either to revolt or to be calcified. (98)
Or, more commonly, both: to be calcified and then to revolt, and to carry the 
calcification over into the revolution and the decolonization. “Colonized soci-
ety,” Memmi writes, “is a diseased society in which internal dynamics no lon-
ger succeed in creating new structures. Its century-hardened face has become 
nothing more than a mask under which it slowly smothers and dies. Such a 
society cannot dissolve the conflicts of generations, for it is unable to be trans-
formed” (98–99).
 And then, nearly half a century later, we find him shaking his head at the 
fulfillment of his own predictions, accusing the former colonies of not dissolv-
ing those untransformable conflicts: “For lack of anything better, governments 
promote folklore, arts and crafts, and tourism. As for tourism, it’s better to be a 
servant than to go hungry. Even in Tunisia, which is often cited as an example 
for its recent success against poverty, at least a third of its revenue comes from 
the tourist industry. But these are dead ends. For they perpetuate the artificial 
character of the economy of these nations and maintain their dependence 
on the developed world, whose obsequious or rebellious clients they have 
become, instead of moving toward relative independence, which demands the 
courage of breaking with established structures and moving resolutely toward 
the future” (Decolonized 11–12).
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 And we find him accusing the Arab-Muslim nations of the Maghreb of 
not pluralizing the (post)colonial somatic exchange: “To restore some sense 
of balance Arab-Muslim intellectuals would have to make use of a tradition 
other than the submission to dogma and power, of siding with opinion. How-
ever, there no longer exists, if there ever did in the Arab-Muslim world, that 
great public tribunal characteristic of democracy, where everyone can publicly 
give his opinion without unnecessary risk. True controversies are rare, except 
possibly for unimportant details, where disagreements occur against a back-
ground of underlying unity. As a result, any condemnation of wrongdoing 
and scandal always comes from the exterior, from those outside the commu-
nity, leading to suspicions of bias or perversity” (33). “There no longer exists, 
if there ever did”: what exactly is the charge here? That Muslim Arabs have 
banished democracy, or that they never had it? “[I]sn’t it astonishing,” he com-
plains, “that there are no discordant voices, even if they are wrong?” (33). How 
could this possibly be astonishing to the man who at 36 so brilliantly theo-
rized the ways in which the colonized were locked into that somatic exchange 
of aggressive insecurity, the institutionalized circulation of calcified/inflamed 
self-loathing? Is this the fifty-years-after hangover of revolutionary idealism, 
the rueful aftermath of the impossibly hopeful belief back then that the revo-
lution would once and for all toss the colonizer’s mythical portrait on the 
bonfire?
2.1.2.2 The caPiTaliST meTanarraTive of develoPmenT
Decolonization and the Decolonized may not be a particularly cogently argued 
book, but it is full of trenchant observations. Here is one: “The situation is not 
one in which, as has been repeated so complacently, several civilizations clash. 
There is now a single, global, civilization that affects everyone, including fun-
damentalists, who seem to have no qualms about using cell phones, the Inter-
net, the banking system, automobiles, and planes, and may one day just as 
easily embrace rockets and sophisticated weapons—technologies they did not 
invent. It is far from clear that they are entirely sincere in claiming to defend 
values that have become increasingly unsustainable” (44). There is, in other 
words, no clash between Christian and Islamic civilizations, or between West-
ern democracy and Muslim theocracy: there is only one global civilization. 
On the face of it, this is naïve: of course there is a civilizational clash between 
the Euro-American and Arab-Muslim worlds! What is naïve about Memmi’s 
remark, though, is really only its absolutism, his radical binary insistence that 
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“the situation is not one in which . .  . several civilizations clash.” Actually, it 
is both one in which several civilizations clash and one increasingly domi-
nated by a single global civilization—which is to say that the clash between 
the Christians and the Muslims, or between democracy and theocracy, or 
between the “First World” and the “Third World,” or whatever names we want 
to put on the two camps, is itself at least partly conditioned and regulated 
by the emerging global civilization. But what is globalization but the latest 
economic and cultural guise assumed by colonialism—or, more broadly, the 
latest colonialist guise assumed by capitalism? And if Memmi is right both 
that the Arab-Muslim world was conditioned by colonialism to its current 
jihadist fervor and that this new global phase of capitalist/colonialist culture 
(still) dominates it, then the lack of progress toward true independence that 
he laments in the “decolonization” of the Maghreb is in fact not a failed coun-
terregulation of colonial ideosomatics but a displaced function of continuing 
(neo)colonial regulation.
 In a 2002 article entitled “Rethinking Colonialism,” Arif Dirlik argues 
persuasively that postcolonial criticism orients itself to the study of the lega-
cies of the colonial past through “assumptions that derive their plausibility 
from its context in globalization,” and that, viewed from this new context, 
“colonialism no longer appears as ‘the highest stage of capitalism,’ as Lenin 
wrote of imperialism (1969), but a stage on the way to globalization—the 
most recent phase in the spatialization of the world by a capitalism that has 
yet to live out its history” (429–30). The main burden of Dirlik’s argument, 
following Partha Chatterjee in Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World 
and Ania Loomba in Colonialism/Postcolonialism (215–31) on the replication 
of colonial discourses and practices in decolonization, is that both coloniza-
tion and decolonization were products of that earlier stage, which all three 
scholars associate with nation-building:
For all the retroactive readings of the nation back into the past, nations in 
the colonial world were products of colonialism, if inadvertently. While 
colonial policy and its effects varied widely, it is arguable nevertheless that, 
in contrast to nation building in Europe, European colonizers had little 
interest in the political integration of colonial territories into national enti-
ties, or the homogenization of their cultures into national cultures—which 
for obvious reasons were contrary to their interests. We may recall here the 
violence with which movements for national liberation and sovereignty 
were met with across the colonial world and the ideological efforts to dis-
credit national liberation movements by identifying them with a global 
Communist conspiracy. Nevertheless, to realize their own interests in the 
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colonies European colonizers had little choice but to establish adminis-
trative boundaries in accordance with their needs and abilities, to seek 
to impose uniform rules on the colonies that took account, in varying 
tdegrees in different places, of local practices, and to create functionaries 
recruited from the local population to facilitate colonial rule. (Dirlik 436)
They also, of course, replicated in the colonies what Dirlik describes in earlier 
European nation-building as “the erasure (at least in intention) of local cul-
tures and the promotion of a homogeneous national culture that would endow 
the nation with cultural identity” (436), as when the Spaniards chose the Taga-
logs as the principal ethnic group in the Philippines and made la lengua tagala 
the indigenous lingua franca for the islands—a status it continues to enjoy 
in an independent Filipino nation today—or when the Belgians organized 
the cultural identity of colonial Ruanda-Urundi around the Tutsi, “promot-
ing the Tutsi within the colonial administration and economy” while “legal 
and bureaucratic barriers preventing Hutu upward mobility were cemented” 
(Johnson 160), leading to ongoing tension and violence between the two 
groups, most horrifically of course the Hutu genocide of 800,000 Tutsi in the 
spring of 1994. “Anticolonial nationalism,” Dirlik notes, “would emerge in the 
end out of the ranks of the native functionaries of colonial rule, who were both 
of the new structure of power and shut out from its rewards, and who were 
keenly aware by virtue of their colonial education of the fundamental differ-
ences that distinguished colonial rule from national politics in Europe” (436).
 What I want to pick out of Dirlik’s article for particular emphasis, however, 
is his discussion of the Three Worlds model, which he identifies as the primary 
casualty of postcolonial theory’s rejection of metanarratives in favor of “‘bor-
derlands’ conditions, where the domination of one by the other yields before 
boundary crossings, hybridities, mutual appropriations, and, especially, the 
everyday resistance of the colonized to the colonizer” (433):
The “Third World,” the location for neo- and postcolonialisms, was a 
product of a systemic understanding of the world in terms of capital-
ism and socialism—the “First” and the “Second” Worlds understood in 
developmental terms—which showed the Third World alternative paths 
to its future. Politically, the idea of the Third World pointed to the neces-
sity of a common politics that derived from a common positioning in the 
system (rather than some homogeneous essentialized common quality, 
as is erroneously assumed these days in much postcolonial criticism). As 
colonialism had preceded the emergence of a Second World, the world of 
socialism, the Third World had historical priority to the Second, which 
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points also to the priority of capitalism in the systematic shaping of the 
world, to which socialism was a response (which also made socialism into 
an attractive goal in the liberation from colonialism). (433)
 In an era of globalization, Dirlik argues, this model, focused as it was on 
the developmental trajectories of nations, is no longer relevant:
Nevertheless, the present world is a world that is radically different from 
the world of decolonization in the immediate aftermath of World War II. 
Capitalism has reinvented itself and opened up to the formerly colonized, 
who are now participants in its global operations. Former colonials are 
in the process of colonizing the “mother” countries, bringing the earlier 
“contact zones” of the colonies into the heart of formerly colonialist soci-
eties. These motions of people force a redefinition both of nations and 
national cultures. Postcolonial intellectuals, having arrived in the First 
World, call into question cherished ideals of Eurocentric notions of prog-
ress and knowledge, for which they are rewarded by widespread acknowl-
edgment of the vanguard role they play in the production of knowledge. 
New entrants into the ranks of capitalism revive cultural legacies erased by 
Eurocentrism to claim alternative paths to the future. As the former three 
worlds are configured so that it is possible to find Third Worlds in the First 
and First Worlds in the Second, so are class relations globally, so that it is 
now possible to find in the global ruling class representatives from all the 
former three worlds. (439)7
 But if that’s the case—or rather, since clearly it’s at least partly the case, if 
that’s the whole case—what are we to make of chestnuts like this, taken from 
an earlier (1994) Dirlik essay but virtually ubiquitous as a nonce problem in 
postcolonial studies: “Taking the term literally as postcolonial, some practi-
tioners of postcolonial criticism describe former settler colonies—such as the 
United States and Australia—as postcolonial, regardless of their status as First 
World societies and colonizers themselves of their indigenous populations. 
(Though to be fair, the latter could also be said of many Third World societ-
ies)” (“Postcolonial Aura” 336)? Is this slippage further evidence of the hybrid-
ization of the Three Worlds in a globalized economy and culture? Or is it 
evidence that the old Three Worlds metanarrative continues to circulate ideo-
somatically in the midst of widespread hybridization? I suggest it’s the latter, 
in fact: if some former colonies become Second World colonizers (the People’s 
Republic of China colonizing Tibet) and others become First World neoco-
lonizers of vast tracts of the Third World (the United States, which is also 
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still involved in the old colonial project, in Afghanistan and Iraq), isn’t that 
a prime example of the First and Second Worlds showing “the Third World 
alternative paths to its future”? I would argue, in fact, that Dirlik’s “fairness” 
should be extended to a recognition that, in turning successful decolonization 
into supremely exploitative neocolonizing First World status, the United States 
is not at all an anomaly in the capitalist/colonialist Three Worlds model, but 
rather an exemplary case of it.
 Still very much at work in our mythological thinking about development, 
in other words, even in the midst of the global hybridization celebrated by 
postcolonial theorists, is an idealized nation-centered movement “up” the 
Three Worlds, from the Third to the Second to the First, or even—the ideal 
case is again of course the United States—from the Third directly to the First. 
That’s where all postcolonial nations are ideologically supposed to want to go. 
Some, barred from the First, take great oppositional pride in their rise to the 
Second: Cuba, North Korea, Venezuela, arguably even Iran, if we’re willing to 
shift our definition of the Second World from socialist anticapitalism to any 
anticapitalist or anti-First World opposition. This vision of the Second World 
is Frantz Fanon’s clarion call in The Wretched of the Earth: “Two centuries ago, 
a former European colony decided to catch up with Europe. It succeeded so 
well that the United States of America became a monster, in which the taints, 
the sickness, and the inhumanity of Europe have grown to appalling dimen-
sions. Comrades, have we not other work to do than to create a third Europe?” 
(313). At least one Second World superpower, the People’s Republic of China, 
is arguably positioning itself either to dominate the First World or to become a 
new First World of its own: Third to Second to First. The reports of the Second 
World’s death, in fact, are greatly exaggerated.
 I would go further. Since the late 1970s or early 1980s, some historians 
have been speaking of a Fourth World,8 comprising the indigenous popula-
tions colonized by (among others) Third World former colonies: the Karen 
by Burma and Thailand; the Meo, Akha, Lahn, and others by Thailand; the 
Naga by India; the East Timorese by Indonesia; the Tamils by Sri Lanka; the 
Tibetans by the People’s Republic of China; the Ainu by Japan; the Kurds by 
Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey; the Maori by New Zealand; the Pitjantjatjara, 
Yirrkala, Gurindji, and Warlpiri by Australia; the Quinault, Hopi, Navajo, 
Lakota, Iroquois, Inuit Athapaskans, and Aleuts by the United States; the 
Maymara and Quechua-speaking peoples by Peru; the Miskito, Sumo, and 
Rama by Nicaragua; the Baruca, Cabecares, and Bribris by Costa Rica; the 
Zapotec, Mixe, and Mayans by Mexico; the Shaba, Luba, and Kasai by Zaire; 
and many others. This “fourth-worldization” of indigenous populations by 
Worlds One through Three is generally considered a tragic irony; I am sug-
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gesting it is endemic to the capitalist/colonialist metanarrative of develop-
ment, which directs development up the worlds, Fourth to Third to Second 
to First, the counterregulatory displacement of groups (language groups, eth-
nic groups, settler groups, refugee groups), first as Fourth World colonies or 
other dominated entities, then through wars of national liberation as “decolo-
nized” Third World nations, and finally as Second and First World powers 
ready to dominate and exploit others in a colonial and eventually globalizing 
neocolonial mode.
 But Fourth World activists and theorists would dispute that last formu-
lation: for them the indigenous peoples, tribes, language groups, and ethnic 
groups of the Fourth World are nations too, “imaginary communities,” cer-
tainly, in Benedict Anderson’s term, but in that no different from the nations 
of Worlds One through Three. What distinguishes First, Second, and Third 
World nations from Fourth World nations for them is simply international 
recognition:
With but very few exceptions, authorities have shied away from describ-
ing the nation as a kinship group and have usually explicitly denied that 
the notion of shared blood is a factor. Such denials are supported by data 
illustrating that most groups claiming nationhood do in fact incorporate 
several genetic strains. But such an approach ignores the wisdom of the 
old saw that when analyzing sociopolitical situations, what ultimately mat-
ters is not what is but what people believe is. And a subconscious belief 
in the group’s separate origin and evolution is an important ingredient 
of national psychology.  .  .  . Since the nation is a self-defined rather than 
an other-defined grouping, the broadly held conviction concerning the 
group’s singular origin need not and seldom will accord with factual data. 
(Connor 380)
Fourth World nations for these scholars are self-defined nations whose 
national status is (as yet) systematically denied by the self- and other-defined 
nations of Worlds One through Three. This suggests that in a (post)colonial 
context the nation is not just an imaginary community, but an imaginary 
community first ideosomatized as a directionality, as an impetus toward geo-
political upward mobility. The nation was the invention of the “First World” 
before it was called that, Europe during the era of the trizygotic birth of capi-
talism, the nation state, and the colonial project; it is the convergence of the 
latter two under the aegis of the first that iterosomatizes nation-thinking with 
the aspiration to improved collective status. The anticolonial wars of national 
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liberation beginning with the United States in the 1770s and Haiti in the 1790s 
and continuing through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to today have 
been essentially wars designed to “upgrade” colonized peoples to the status 
of nations, which is to say—anachronistically in some cases, since the Three 
Worlds model was not invented until the mid-twentieth century—to “raise” 
them on the capitalist or colonialist metanarrative of development from the 
Fourth to the Third World. For a Fourth World group to call itself a nation is 
thus to organize itself for the next step up, to iterosomatize images of its future 
as a nation-state. A newly liberated people is internationally recognized as a 
nation, which is to say that the group that circulates ideosomatized images 
of this people’s nationhood grows exponentially; once it has thus “become” 
internationally what it has long felt it is locally, a nation, a Third World entity, 
it begins positioning itself for either the colonizing Second World or the neo-
colonizing/globalizing First World. In this sense the significant difference 
between neocolonizing former colonies like the United States and tradition-
ally colonizing former colonies like Ethiopia (which colonized Eritrea from 
1961 to 1991) is that the neocolonizers are more “successful”—which is to say 
that they have advanced further along the capitalist/colonialist metanarrative 
of development.
 But of course it’s also important to remember that decolonization has not 
been the only historical path to the Third World:
But, then, there have been other countries—such as Turkey which has 
not been colonised, or Iran and Egypt, whose occupation had not led to 
colonization of the kind that India suffered—where the onset of capitalist 
modernity and their incorporation in the world capitalist system brought 
about state apparatuses as well as social and cultural configurations that 
were, nevertheless, remarkably similar to the ones in India, which was fully 
colonized. In this context, we should speak not so much of colonialism or 
postcolonialism but of capitalist modernity, which takes the colonial form 
in particular places and at particular times. After all, the United States 
was also once a colony, or a cluster of colonies; so was Latin America to 
the south of the US, Canada in the north, not to speak of the Caribbean 
islands. But later history has taken in each case a very different turn. When 
applied too widely, powerful terms of this kind simply lose their analytic 
power, becoming mere jargon. (Ahmad, “Politics” 7)
 Another nation with state apparatuses and social and cultural configura-
tions that are remarkably similar to those in Turkey, Iran, Egypt, and India is 
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the Russian Federation, which as the Soviet Union was until the last day of 
1991 the definitive Second World anticapitalist empire. Never colonized, it 
has undergone considerable economic turmoil throughout the 1990s and into 
the new millennium that would not count as decolonization either, though 
its cronyist fire-sale privatization of national industries in the years after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the initial near-collapse of its political infra-
structure, combined with continued high rates of poverty and unemployment 
two decades into the new regime, make post-Soviet Russia strikingly resemble 
Third World countries emerging from the oppression of Fourth World colo-
nization; its weak struggles against the old Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist counter-
regulation also resemble the inertia of decolonization as Memmi describes it, 
and its gradual return to autocracy under Vladimir Putin signals the tenacity 
of the old ideosomatic regulation even in the midst of rapid capitalization and 
globalization; and the greatest cultural and ideological division in the coun-
try today is between the nationalistic Russophiles who envision a restoration 
of Russia’s imperial might as the leader of the Second World and the global-
minded Westernizers who envision the assimilation of the Russian Federation 
into the Euro-American First World. At the same time, having granted inde-
pendence to many of its former colonies, both internal (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Estonia, the Republic of Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan) and 
external (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Roma-
nia), Russia continues to dominate 29 colonized “autonomous” (their auton-
omy has been severely reduced under Putin) republics, oblasts, and okrugs, 
each consisting of one or more Fourth World “titular nationalities” and several 
other Fourth World “indigenous nationalities” as well; and since 1999 it has 
been fighting a “separatist movement”—a war of national liberation—in the 
Autonomous Republic of Chechnya.
 With the complexity of this history in mind, then, I have titled this sub-
section the capitalist (rather than colonialist) metanarrative of development—
and take the various colonial and postcolonial histories organized by that 
metanarrative to be only one channel that capitalist modernity has taken. (By 
“metanarrative,” of course, I mean not what actually happens, but a homeo-
static mapping of group responses to cultural displacement, a story that is iter-
osomatized as the true meaning or pattern governing displacement. “Meta” in 
metanarrative signifies the additive quality of bodily-becoming-mental map-
ping, the building of an explanatory regime out of allostatic somatic response 
to displacement.) It would not be difficult, either, to trace the anticapitalist 
trajectories of the Second World as partial deregulations or counterregulations 
of capitalism—but that’s another story.
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2.1.2.3 The colonizer who refuSeS
If decolonization is ideosomatically normativized (affectively narrativized) 
not as a deidealized reversal of the colonial ideosomatic counterregulation, 
then, but rather as an idealized displacement of that regulatory regime, the 
most successful forms of decolonization will involve the pursuit of radically 
transformed colonial ends. These days, of course, those ends entail globaliza-
tion not only as transnational economic interests and free trade but also as the 
creation of prestigious university chairs and departments for the theorization 
of transnational postcoloniality. This book too would thus stand revealed as a 
decolonized and anticolonial but still neocolonizing study of the global “free 
trade” of shared evaluative affect—the work, to put it in Memmi’s terms from 
Colonized, of a “colonizer who refuses,” an anticolonial member of a group 
that continues to benefit from colonialism: “He may openly protest, or sign a 
petition, or join a group which is not automatically hostile to the colonized. 
This already suffices for him to recognize that he has simply changed difficul-
ties and discomfort. It is not easy to escape mentally from a concrete situation, 
to refuse its ideology while continuing to live with its actual relationships. 
From now on, he lives his life under the sign of a contradiction which looms 
at every step, depriving him of all coherence and all tranquility” (20). Memmi 
is writing here in the mid-1950s, of course, of an anticolonial colonizer living 
in a colony—a proliberation Frenchman living in colonial Tunisia, say—hence 
his insistence on the “difficulties and discomfort” of this hypothetical per-
son’s situation, the living of his life “under the sign of a contradiction which 
looms at every step, depriving him of all coherence and all tranquility.” The 
situation is rather different for an anticolonial American intellectual, descen-
dant of white settlers, living two centuries after independence—but in fact 
not radically different. The difference rather involves what Nietzsche would 
call the sublimation and subtilization of “difficulties and discomfort”: as an 
anticolonial intellectual I am aware that the relative material comfort in which 
I live is in large part generated by my country’s neocolonial exploitation of 
the Third World; my greatest source of discomfort is my uneasy awareness 
of just how easy it is not to be discomforted by this fact. In order to feel the 
leftist colonizer’s discomfort of which Memmi writes, I have to produce it not 
only intellectually but also idiosomatically, “rebelliously,” refusing and in part 
deregulating the ideosomatics of United-Statesian triumphalism (“America is 
the greatest/richest/most powerful country on earth”) through the collective 
exosomatization of images of Third World sweatshops, child labor, poverty, 
widespread unemployment, local economies run by remote control from the 
boardrooms of multinational corporations, and so on. Memmi writes that 
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“The intellectual or the progressive bourgeois might want the barriers between 
himself and the colonized to fade; those are class characteristics which he 
would gladly renounce. But no one seriously aspires toward changing lan-
guage, customs, religious affiliation, etc., even to ease his conscience, nor even 
for his material security” (37)—and while I would disagree with him superfi-
cially, at a deeper level he is still quite right. People do “seriously aspire toward 
changing language, customs, religious affiliation”: I did it myself when I was 
16, moving to Finland; women marrying into foreign cultures have done it for 
millennia; translators, interpreters, and other intercultural subjects are typi-
cally the products of such serious aspirations; and, of course, Memmi neglects 
to mention here what is implicit in his argument, that it is fairly rare for peo-
ple to want to assimilate to a culture lower on the developmental four-world 
metanarrative but quite common for people to aspire seriously to assimilate 
to a higher-status culture.9 (What he means but does not spell out here is that 
the French do not seriously aspire to become Arabs. But that happens too.) 
The deeper question, though, is this: would I give up my middle-class income 
and lifestyle, my intellectual work, to show solidarity with the Third World 
on whose exploitation I indirectly live? “Thus,” Memmi writes, “while refus-
ing the sinister, the benevolent colonizer can never attain the good, for his 
only choice is not between good and evil, but between evil and uneasiness” 
(42–43).
 His final conclusion on the colonizer who refuses is also mostly true: “He 
will slowly realize that the only thing for him to do is to remain silent. Is it 
necessary to say that this silence is probably not such a terrible anguish to 
him? That he was rather forcing himself to fight in the name of theoretical 
justice for interests which are not his own; often even incompatible with his 
own?” (43). Probably most antineocolonial Western intellectuals do feel more 
comfortable remaining silent about their own indirect complicity in the neo-
colonial exploitation of the Third World. And even those of us who do talk 
and write about that complicity find ways of silencing our own uneasy voices 
of self-accusation, typically by raising those voices just slightly, intensifying 
the unease into a careful public self-condemnation designed to impress others 
with our sincerity—as I’ve been doing in this subsection.
2.1.3 frantz fanon
The black is a black man; that is, as the result of a series of aberrations of 
affect, he is rooted at the core of a universe from which he must be extricated.
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 The problem is important. i propose nothing short of the liberation of 
the man of color from himself. 
in other words, the black man should no longer be confronted by the dilemma, 
turn white or disappear; but he should be able to take cognizance of a possibility 
of existence. in still other words, if society makes difficulties for him because of 
his color, if in his dreams i [as his psychoanalyst] establish the expression of an 
unconscious desire to change color, my objective will not be that of dissuading 
him from it by advising him to “keep his place”; on the contrary, my objective, 
once his motivations have been brought into consciousness, will be to put him 
in a position to choose action (or passivity) with respect to the real source of the 
conflict—that is, toward the social structure.
—frantz fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (8, 100)
Frantz Fanon was born in 1925 on the island of Martinique, then a French 
colony; his hatred for colonialism was sharpened early by the Vichy French 
naval troops who were blockaded on Martinique in 1940 and who vented their 
racism openly on the Martinican people. He joined the French Free Forces 
and fought the Germans in France, was wounded and received the Croix de 
Guerre. In 1945 he returned briefly to Martinique, long enough to work on the 
parliamentary campaign of his friend and former teacher Aimé Césaire (run-
ning on the communist ticket) and complete his bachelor’s degree; he then 
went to France to study medicine and psychiatry as well as literature, drama, 
and philosophy (he sat in on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s lectures). Qualifying 
as a psychiatrist in 1951, he did a residency with François de Tosquelles, who 
insisted on the shaping power of culture in psychopathology, practiced psy-
chiatry in France for a year and a half, and wrote Peau noire, masques blancs 
(1952, translated into English as Black Skin, White Masks, 1967). In 1953 he 
accepted the chef de service post at the Blida-Joinville Psychiatric Hospital in 
Algeria, where he introduced the radical methods of sociotherapy; after the 
outbreak of the Algerian revolution in 1954, he joined the Front de Libéra-
tion Nationale and began to study Algerian culture closely, later applying his 
experiences to the writing of both ecstatic revolutionary books like L’an cinq 
de la révolution algérienne (1959, translated into English as A Dying Colo-
nialism, 1965) and Les damnés de la terre (1961, translated into English as 
The Wretched of the Earth, 1965), and psychology-of-culture studies like “The 
Marabout of Si Slimane” (the manuscript of which was lost). In 1956 he pub-
licly resigned his post at the hospital, in his letter of resignation forswearing 
his French assimilationist background; expelled from Algeria, he returned to 
France and secretly traveled to Tunis, where he wrote for El Moudjahid, his 
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writings for which were collected posthumously in Pour la révolution africaine 
(1964, translated into English as Toward the African Revolution, 1967). Diag-
nosed with leukemia, he refused to rest, dictating The Wretched of the Earth 
in ten months; he received treatment in both the Soviet Union and, later, with 
the help of the CIA, the United States, where he died in 1961.
 As the two sentences/paragraphs of the first epigraph above suggest, 
Fanon’s decolonizing project was at least in part protosomatic: “the result of a 
series of aberrations of affect” would be the result of an iterosomatic counter-
regulation, so that “the liberation of the man of color from himself ” that he 
proposes would actually be not from the “self ” but from that colonial iteroso-
matization of self that seems real, seems like a true self, but is in fact only “aber-
rant.” Of course, “aberration” there implies a universalized or transcendentally 
stabilized normativity that is alien to somatic theory, which would rather posit 
in the colonized population’s becoming-counterregulated a polynormativity 
generated by the clash of two or more regulatory groups; but something like 
this relativized conception of normativity is at least implicit in the functional 
identity Fanon posits between “universe” and “himself,” his two tropes for the 
ideosomatic prison from which the “black man” must be extricated/liberated. 
If his self is a universe in which he has been rooted and must (and can) be 
uprooted, if there are many selves and many universes in which it is possible to 
root or radicate a black body, then there is no transcendental norm that might 
be used to thematize a single (colonial) radication as “aberrant.” It is therefore 
only possible to label a colonizing radication or ideosomatic regulation as 
a “series of aberrations of affect” from a tendentious stance of decolonizing 
eradication, a postcolonial attempt to counterregulate the colonial “self ” or 
“universe”—once again, as in Memmi, an inflammatory speech act.
 There is, in fact, a radical sociogenic fuzzy logic to Fanon’s psychoana-
lytical take on postcolonial identities, a sense that for him subjectivities are 
always in a state of becoming, becoming-white, becoming-black, becoming-
rooted, becoming-unrooted—and that these becomings are the minute fractal 
byproducts of massive somatotectonic shifts, the affective grinding together 
of hugely complex social, political, economic, cultural, and ideological affect-
circulatory regimes. There is also the sense, only passingly adumbrated in 
Black Skin, White Masks and fully developed in A Dying Colonialism and The 
Wretched of the Earth, that these grinding pressures are ultimately too much 
for “the black man,” and issue finally into revolutionary violence: “The Negro 
is a toy in the white man’s hands; so, in order to shatter the hellish cycle, he 
explodes” (Black 140).
 My remarks in this section will focus mostly on Black Skin, White Masks, 
in terms first of  the exosomatic imagination of becoming black or white, and 
DiSPlaCemenT Of  CUlTUreS  |  119
then of the paralyzing power of the Hegelian dialectic as applied to black dis-
alienation by Jean-Paul Sartre.
2.1.3.1 colonizaTion aS Becoming-whiTe/Becoming-Black
As Fanon’s title Black Skin, White Masks suggests, his analysis of coloniza-
tion in the book is almost exclusively devoted to race, to counterregulatory 
somatizations of skin color. He does occasionally digress from his main 
theme, however, into more general postcolonial reflections on colonial 
counter regulations:
To understand something new requires that we make ourselves ready for 
it, that we prepare ourselves for it; it entails the shaping of a new form. It is 
utopian to expect the Negro or the Arab to exert the effort of embedding 
abstract values into his outlook on the world when he has barely enough 
food to keep alive. To ask a Negro of the Upper Niger to wear shoes, to 
say of him that he will never be a Schubert, is no less ridiculous than to 
be surprised that a worker in the Berliet truck factory does not spend his 
evenings studying lyricism in Hindu literature or to say that he will never 
be an Einstein.
 Actually, in the absolute sense, nothing stands in the way of such 
things. Nothing—except that the people in question lack the opportuni-
ties. (95–96)
Of course it’s not just that the people lack the opportunities; nor is it just that 
they are denied the opportunities. It is that they are constructed in terms of the 
lack of opportunities. They are regulatorily somatized to that lack. Their lack 
of opportunities is circulated iterosomatically through the groups that deter-
mine their realities and their identities. The “new form” that the colonized are 
expected first and foremost to shape is the counterregulatory form of colonial-
ism, European “civilization” not as Schubert or Einstein but as submission to 
the colonizer’s authority, submission to labor with little or no remuneration, 
submission to a racialized hierarchy of human worth, and submission to a 
prescribed lack of opportunities. Implicit in Fanon’s polemic here, however, 
is also an answer to those who imagine the colonized as incapable of becom-
ing a Schubert or an Einstein, of “embedding abstract values into his outlook 
on the world,” and therefore as in need of the colonial regime that keeps them 
down, keeps them effectively enslaved to the life of the body by providing 
them “barely enough food to keep alive.” If by “[the] embedding [of] abstract 
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values” we take Fanon to be referring to the body-becoming-mind, that men-
tal mapping of body states by which an organism or group of organisms 
homeostatically regulates its internal and external environment, then clearly 
the core problem is not just that the colonized don’t have enough to eat but 
that they don’t have (are constructed as lacking) the power to regulate their 
own internal or external environments—what happens to them, and even how 
they feel about what happens to them. Obviously, it is an extremely sophisti-
cated form of colonial counterregulation that can extend its regulatory reach 
into the colonized’s ability to feel, say, anger at oppression, or even a wistful 
disappointment at not being able to do what s/he wants—a sophistication that 
is specifically made possible by the somatic exchange, by the circulation of 
normative/evaluative affect through the bodies of a population. “When the 
Negro makes contact with the white world,” Fanon writes, “a certain sensitiz-
ing action takes place. If his psychic structure is weak, one observes a collapse 
of the ego. The black man stops behaving as an actional person. The goal of 
his behavior will be The Other (in the guise of the white man), for The Other 
alone can give him worth. That is on the ethical level: self-esteem” (154). Here, 
clearly, “the Negro” and “the black man” are Antillean code for “the colonized” 
of any color and any gender, “the white man” for “the colonizer”: despite his 
racialized terms, Fanon is not really addressing race here. The “sensitizing 
action” he describes is the conformation of the colonized’s somatic response 
to the colonizer’s counterregulatory regime, which is “The Other” in both 
the external (other person) and the (Hegelian/Lacanian) internal sense, the 
colonizer-introject that takes over the colonized’s affective economy and man-
ages its circulatory flows. “If his psychic structure is weak, one observes a col-
lapse of the ego” is sheer Freudian individualism, focused on the individual’s 
“psychic structure” and “ego” as autonomous fortresses that may be destroyed 
by the white invaders; the rest of that formulation, however, is more amenable 
to somatic paraphrase. The Other, after all, is the counterregulatory voice of 
the (colonizing) group inside the (colonized) individual’s head, the actional 
orientation of the group in the individual’s behavior, and, most tellingly, the 
constitutive force of external group approval reconstituted as self-esteem, the 
(white colonizing) ethnos reconfigured as the (black colonized) ethos.
 By far the most interesting focus of Fanon’s analysis of colonization, how-
ever, has to do with the iterosomatics of race, becoming-white and becoming-
black: “Then I will quite simply try to make myself white: that is, I will compel 
the white man to acknowledge that I am human” (98). If the white colonizer 
defines “to be human” in terms of his or her own whiteness, then to be human 
the black colonized must become white. Or:
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The black schoolboy in the Antilles, who in his lessons is forever talking 
about “our ancestors, the Gauls,” identifies himself with the explorer, the 
bringer of civilization, the white man who carries truth to savages—an all-
white truth. There is identification—that is, the young Negro subjectively 
adopts a white man’s attitude. He invests the hero, who is white, with all his 
own aggression. . . . Little by little, one can observe in the young Antillean 
the formation and crystallization of an attitude and a way of thinking and 
seeing that are essentially white. When in school he has to read stories of 
savages told by white men, he always thinks of the Senegalese. . . . Subjec-
tively, intellectually, the Antillean conducts himself like a white man. But 
he is a Negro. That he will learn once he goes to Europe; and when he hears 
Negroes mentioned he will recognize that the word includes himself as well 
as the Senegalese. (147–48)
The black schoolboy becomes white, “conducts himself like a white man,” until 
he goes to Europe and becomes black. The mutability of skin color in this for-
mulation suggests that “racial” skin pigmentation is not so much a physiologi-
cal as it is an exosomatic phenomenon—that not just the white mask but the 
black skin “itself ” as well are exosomata, ideosomatized images of skin that 
are circulated through the somatic exchange as naturalized realities. The “is” 
in “But he is a Negro” would thus be a descriptor not so much of an ontologi-
cal fact as of an ontologizing process, the group iterosomatic stabilization of a 
becoming or a flux:
If there is an inferiority complex, it is the outcome of a double process:
—primarily, economic;
—subsequently, the internalization—or, better, the epidermaliza-
tion—of this inferiority. (11)
The inferiority complex circulated iterosomatically by white colonizers 
through the black colonized population is simultaneously internalized as feel-
ing and epidermalized as skin color, which is to say exosomatized as constitu-
tive feeling about skin color.
 Or, in one of the most telling formulations of this process:
Out of the blackest part of my soul, across the zebra striping of my mind, 
surges this desire to be suddenly white.
 I wish to be acknowledged not as black but as white.
 Now—and this is a form of recognition that Hegel had not envisaged—
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who but a white woman can do this for me? By loving me she proves that I 
am worthy of white love. I am loved like a white man.
 I am a white man. (63)
 Here her white skin functions as my white mask: the desire to simulate 
somatomimetically, through the body language of her love, the exosoma of 
her skin color, to “borrow” or “share” her positively somatized pigmentation 
and overlay it on top of my negatively somatized pigmentation, an exosomatic 
upgrade, as it were, renormativization upwards of the exosomatic value collec-
tively assigned the color of my skin. Henry Louis Gates Jr. says that race “pre-
tends to be an objective term of classification, when in fact it is a dangerous 
trope” (5), so that saying “he’s black” is like saying (to use Ngũgĩ’s example) 
“he’s a wild animal” (133), and Gates is right, of course, except that race-tro-
ping is not just a discursive phenomenon: the race-trope is exosomatized as 
reality, as identity, and therefore becomes reality, shapes identity. Exosomati-
cally repigmentizing black skin as white is exactly like taking over the magical 
power of a fetish object, internalizing its healing force, possessing the exoso-
matic charge that has been iterosomatized into or onto it by the group—except 
that the exosoma of a fetish object can be transferred to any given member of 
the group only by a person vested by the group with the authority to make the 
transfer, a shaman or a priest. The object’s taboo power is too strong for ordi-
nary people; it would kill them; they would profane it. For the black man, in 
Fanon’s formulation, the white woman is that shaman, that priest. Only she, by 
loving him, can transfer the exosomatic fetish power of white skin, indeed its 
taboo power: “desire for that white flesh that has been forbidden to us Negroes 
as long as white men have ruled the world” (René Maran, Un homme pareil 
aux autres, quoted in Fanon, Black Skins 70). To paraphrase Fanon, the black 
man wants to reexosomatize his skin color positively, to upgrade the negative 
exosoma projected onto dark skin, and fantasizes that this would involve the 
transfer not just of the exosoma attached to light skin but also of the actual 
skin color.
 Interestingly, though, as a black man Fanon seems unable to resist inflect-
ing his verbal critiques of this fantasy with the exosomata of his group: his 
deconstructions of black men desiring white women in Chapter 3 (“The Man 
of Color and the White Woman”) are themselves saturated with that desire, 
with an almost ecstatic longing10 for what he is seeking to banish from black 
men’s somatic exchange, while his deconstructions of black women desiring 
white men in Chapter 2 (“The Woman of Color and the White Man”) are 
overwhelmingly somatized with disgust, the typical revulsion toward the exo-
somata of an out-grouper:
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For after all we have a right to be perturbed when we read, in [Mayotte 
Capécia’s] Je suis Martiniquaise: “I should have liked to be married, but to a 
white man. But a woman of color is never altogether respectable in a white 
man’s eyes. Even when he loves her. I knew that.” This passage, which serves 
in a way as the conclusion of a vast delusion, prods one’s brain. One day 
a woman named Mayotte Capécia, obeying a motivation whose elements 
are difficult to detect, sat down to write 202 pages—her life—in which the 
most ridiculous ideas proliferated at random. (42)
 He presents the black man desiring white women in the first person with 
only implicit quotation marks, not quite identifying with the “I” of those 
opening lines (“I am a white man”) but not entirely repelled by it, either; he 
presents the black woman desiring white men in the first person with explicit 
quotation marks, and recoils from identification with that “I” as from vermin 
(“perturbed,” “vast delusion,” “most ridiculous ideas proliferated at random”). 
The black man’s fantasy of becoming white through sexual love for a white 
woman is presented as “a purely subjective conflict” (70); the black woman’s 
fantasy of becoming white through sexual love for a white man is “a vast delu-
sion.” The black man’s motivations in desiring white women are obvious to 
him, because they are circulated through his (male) group; the black woman’s 
motivations in writing a book about her desire for white men are an utter mys-
tery to him (“whose elements are difficult to detect”), because they are alien to 
his group. In his specific verbal formulations, Fanon expresses solidarity with 
blacks of either gender; in the somatic charge that powers those formulations, 
he expresses solidarity with black men desiring white women and scorning 
black women.11
 Fanon offers a more nuanced discussion of what it means—what it has 
been made to mean in the colonial context—to be “black” in the long “Negro 
and Psychopathology” chapter:
To come back to psychopathology, let us say that the Negro lives an ambi-
guity that is extraordinarily neurotic. At the age of twenty . . . the Antillean 
recognizes that he is living an error. Why is that? Quite simply because—
and this is very important—the Antillean has recognized himself as a 
Negro, but, by virtue of an ethical transit, he also feels (collective uncon-
scious) that one is a Negro to the degree to which one is wicked, sloppy, 
malicious, instinctual. Everything that is the opposite of these Negro modes 
of behavior is white. This must be recognized as the source of Negrophobia 
in the Antillean. In the collective unconscious, black = ugliness, sin, dark-
ness, immorality. In other words, he is Negro who is immoral. If I order my 
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life like that of a moral man, I simply am not a Negro. Whence the Martini-
can custom of saying of a worthless white man that he has a “nigger soul.” 
Color is nothing, I do not even notice it, I know only one thing, which is 
the purity of my conscience and the whiteness of my soul. “Me white like 
snow,” the other said. (192–93)
I’m white, because moral, and immoral, because black; color is nothing and 
color is everything; my soul is white and pure, and “unconsciously I distrust 
what is black in me, that is, the whole of my being” (191): all this is the neu-
rosis Fanon describes as sociogenically produced by the colonial “collective 
unconscious,” which he has just been arguing, contra Jung, “is cultural, which 
means acquired” (188), “the result of what I shall call the unreflected impo-
sition of a culture,” so that “the Antillean has taken over all the archetypes 
belonging to the European” (191).
 This “unreflected imposition of a culture” is of course Fanon’s term for 
what I call ideosomatic counterregulation, the circulation through a popula-
tion of new “corrective” regulatory pressures, designed to displace and replace 
the existing culture. It is unreflected in the sense that one does not notice it 
happening, does not reflect on it consciously or analytically; it is indeed a “col-
lective unconscious,” or what Fredric Jameson calls a “political unconscious”—
a term that helps mitigate the universalizing connotations of Jung’s archetypal 
conception, but does little to help us understand the “ethical transit” by which 
one unreflected culture or political unconscious is imposed on or in place of 
another. For that we need not just the negativity of the unconscious but also 
the positive action of the somatic exchange.
 For the individual born into a colonized condition, of course, like Fanon, 
the “unreflected imposition of a culture” is simply socialization, ideosomatic 
regulation, not counterregulation: the counterregulatory regime is already in 
place when he is born and he simply must be iterosomatized to it. “When I 
am at home,” he writes, describing his early childhood in the present tense, 
“my mother sings me French love songs in which there is never a word about 
Negroes. When I disobey, when I make too much noise, I am told to ‘stop act-
ing like a nigger’” (191). These are the embodied speech acts by which a regu-
latory ideosomatic is passed from generation to generation: Fanon’s mother 
has so effectively conformed her thoughts and feelings and behavior to the 
counterregulatory colonialist regime that she unreflectingly channels that 
regime to her son through the powerfully somatized vehicles of romantic song 
and parental anger. “Somewhat later,” he adds, exosomatizing books by white 
authors as themselves “white,” “I read white books and little by little I take 
DiSPlaCemenT Of  CUlTUreS  |  125
into myself the prejudices, the myths, the folklore that have come to me from 
Europe” (191–92). This is, again, an “unreflected” internalization not just of 
conscious belief structures but of the ideosomatization of those structures, the 
felt evaluative orientations, the iterosomatic inclination to value “the preju-
dices, the myths, the folklore that have come to me from Europe” as truths, as 
realities, as the way things are. These ideosomatic orientations and inclinations 
cannot be easily identified as coming from any particular person or group, or 
even easily brought to consciousness; they are diffusely disseminated through 
the entire population as felt binary valuations, white good, black bad, white 
strong, black weak, white smart, black dumb, white cultured, black primitive, 
white moral, black immoral, white spiritual, black sexual, white yes, black no. 
These simple binaries are stored in each member of the colonized population 
as somatic markers unconsciously guiding all internal and external decision-
making. And, as Fanon writes, “cultural imposition is easily accomplished in 
Martinique. The ethical transit encounters no obstacle. But the real white man 
is waiting for me. As soon as possible he will tell me that it is not enough to 
try to be white, but that a white totality must be achieved. It is only then that I 
shall recognize the betrayal” (193).
 This betrayal places at the “ontological” core of each colonized individual 
a relational “flaw,” an introject of the “Manichean”12 colonizer–colonized rela-
tion that makes it impossible to describe that individual in purely individual 
terms:
As long as the black man is among his own, he will have no occasion, 
except in minor internal conflicts, to experience his being through oth-
ers. There is of course the moment of “being for others” of which Hegel 
speaks, but every ontology is made unattainable in a colonized and civi-
lized society. It would seem that this fact has not been given sufficient 
attention by those who have discussed the question. In the Weltanschau-
ung of a colonized people there is an impurity, a flaw that outlaws any 
ontological explanation. Someone may object that this is the case with 
every individual, but such an objection merely conceals a basic problem. 
Ontology—once it is finally admitted as leaving existence by the way-
side—does not permit us to understand the being of the black man. For 
not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the 
white man. (109–10)
I read that first sentence as Fanon’s groping toward a formulation: obviously 
everyone experiences his or her being through others, as he recognizes imme-
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diately in the next sentence (“There is of course the moment of ‘being for 
others’ of which Hegel speaks”), but there is something different about the 
being-for-others of the colonized, which Fanon wants to thematize in terms 
of the distorting presence of the colonizer, so that the “black man . . . must be 
black in relation to the white man.” But he recognizes that even among other 
blacks, “the black man” will have occasion to experience his being through 
others “in minor internal conflicts”—which is to say that any flare-up of idio-
somaticity will make “the black man” aware of “his being through others.” 
“Experience” in that first sentence thus comes to reflect the body-becoming-
mind, the movement of social feeling toward a mental mapping, so that even 
if our being is always shaped by others through the circulation of social feel-
ings, we experience that shaping only when ideosomatic regulation is dis-
rupted, either through idiosomatic deregulation (“minor internal conflicts”) 
or ideosomatic counterregulation (“black in relation to the white man”).
 Note that Fanon’s discussion here might be taken as a ground-zero for-
mulation for the postcolonial theory offered by Gayatri Spivak in 1988 that 
the subaltern cannot speak, to which we’ll be returning in §2.2.2.3. Spivak’s 
contention that the subaltern cannot speak as the subaltern, cannot be heard 
in the voice of the subaltern, must always assimilate herself to the dominant 
colonialist discourse in order to be heard and thus to be understood as speak-
ing, is aptly summed up (though with a predictable gender shift) in Fanon’s 
pithy notion that the black man “must be black in relation to the white man.” 
What Fanon gives us that Spivak does not, however, is the subaltern’s phe-
nomenology: the experience of that “flaw,” somatic trace of that “betrayal,” 
the sense of not being able to get around the counterregulatory and in some 
sense paralyzing introject of the colonizer–colonized relation, which forces 
the subaltern not only to be subaltern in relation to the colonizer (that much 
is implicit in the differentiality of Gramsci’s definition of subalternity, which 
forms the core of Spivak’s argument), but also to feel subaltern in relation 
to the colonizer even as s/he begins to “speak” (and be heard), even as s/he 
masters the colonizer’s language and enters into the xenonormativity of the 
counterregulatory regime. Not only that; because he approaches subalternity 
at least partly phenomenologically, Fanon recognizes that the subaltern can 
speak with other subalterns: “As long as the black man is among his own, he 
will have no occasion, except in minor internal conflicts, to experience his 
being through others,” which is to say, in Spivak’s terms, to experience her 
speaking as a being-heard by others. As we’ve seen, Fanon himself realizes 
that this is not quite true: not only are there those “minor internal conflicts” 
that open up a gap or rupture in the “pure” experience of equality among 
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the colonized, but the colonial “flaw” or the colonizer–colonized relational 
introject through and by which the colonized structures his or her reality and 
identity circulates colonial power differentials through the community of sub-
altern “equals” as well. Still, the fact that no perfect or pure equals exist to vali-
date the subaltern’s speaking or being only invalidates Fanon’s insight in the 
abstract (anti)binary world of poststructuralist thought, where the subaltern 
is not a person or a group but a “space of difference” (Spivak, “Subaltern Talk” 
293).
2.1.3.2 decolonizaTion aS failed diSalienaTion
In Chapter 5 of Black Skin, White Masks, “The Fact of Blackness,” Fanon out-
lines for us a four-step Hegelian dialectic of decolonization as what he calls the 
“disalienation of the black man”:
1. Black self-loathing: “The black man among his own in the twentieth 
century does not know at what moment his inferiority complex comes 
into being through the other” (110).
2. Negritude or black pride: “So here we have the Negro rehabilitated, 
‘standing before the bar,’ ruling the world with his intuition, the Negro 
recognized, set on his feet again, sought after, taken up, and he is 
a Negro—no, he is not a Negro but the Negro, exciting the fecund 
antennae of the world, placed in the foreground of the world, raining 
his poetic power on the world, ‘open to all the breaths of the world.’ I 
embrace the world! I am the world!” (127).
3. Confoundation: Sartre’s insistence in Black Orpheus that white suprem-
acy is the thesis, negritude is the antithesis: “But this negative moment 
is insufficient by itself, and the Negroes who employ it know this very 
well; they know that it is intended to prepare the synthesis or realiza-
tion of the human in a society without races. Thus negritude is the root 
of its own destruction, it is a transition and not a conclusion, a means 
and not an ultimate end” (quoted in Fanon, Black Skin 133).
4. Violent revolution: “The Negro is a toy in the white man’s hands; so, in 
order to shatter the hellish cycle, he explodes” (140).13
The “hellish cycle” of the Hegelian dialectic traps the “black man” in thetic 
recurrences, repetitions, replications: everything always comes back to the 
other-generated inferiority complex. “The elements that I used,” Fanon writes 
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of the construction of his own corporeal schema, “had been provided for me 
not by ‘residual sensations and perceptions primarily of a tactile, vestibular, 
kinesthetic, and visual character,’ but by the other, the white man, who had 
woven me out of a thousand details, anecdotes, stories” (111)—and this weav-
ing continues even in the romantic mythologies of negritude, certainly in Sar-
tre’s snapping shut of the dialectic on the “black man’s” neck. And while in 
his later books, A Dying Colonialism and The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon 
romanticized revolution as a truly liberating purgation of that inferiorizing 
otherness,14 the history that Albert Memmi traces in Decolonization and the 
Decolonized would suggest that the white colonizer continues to weave the 
body of the black (former) colonized even in nationalist revolution, even in 
decolonization, even in independence.
 We have important deconstructions of the Hegelian dialectic as colonialist 
prison, notably Hélène Cixous’s in The Newly Born Woman:
With the dreadful simplicity that orders the movement Hegel erected as a 
system, society trots along before my eyes reproducing to perfection the 
mechanism of the death struggle: the reduction of a “person” to a “nobody” 
to the position of “other”—the inexorable plot of racism. There has to be 
some “other”—no master without a slave, no economico-political power 
without exploitation, no dominant class without cattle under the yoke, no 
“Frenchmen” without wogs, no Nazis without Jews, no property without 
exclusion—an exclusion that has its limits and is part of the dialectic. (71)
“But why,” Robert Young asks in his commentary on this passage in the intro-
ductory chapter of White Mythologies, “this emphasis on Hegel?” His answer 
has to do with “the dominance of Hegelian Marxism from the thirties to the 
fifties” as “the particular context for the French poststructuralist assault”—the 
sense French intellectuals had in the 1960s and 1970s that “the dominant force 
of opposition to capitalism, Marxism, as a body of knowledge remains com-
plicit with, and even extends, the system to which it is opposed. Hegel artic-
ulates a philosophical structure of the appropriation of the other as a form 
of knowledge which uncannily simulates the project of nineteenth-century 
imperialism . . .” (3).
 But then, to continue Young’s why-questioning, why “simulates”? Why 
“uncannily”? What is the specific relationship between Hegel’s philosophical 
articulation and nineteenth-century imperialism that makes it seem to Young a 
simulation, and what is the relationship between this simulation and our post-
structuralist response to it that makes it seem uncanny? In “On the Psychol-
ogy of the Uncanny” (1906), the study with which Freud begins his 1925 essay 
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on the uncanny, Ernst Jentsch situates the uncanny in ontological judgments 
suspended aporetically between the living and the lifeless, or between the real 
and the artificial: “doubt as to whether an apparently living being is animate 
and, conversely, doubt as to whether an apparently lifeless object may not be 
in fact be animate” (11). If we take Young to be referring to something like 
this ontological aporia in our response to Hegel, then “uncannily simulates” 
would suggest that Hegel’s dialectic is a mimetic iteration of the imperialism 
and racism of his day whose mimesis is aporetically constitutive of “reality” as 
we understand it, so enmeshed with the group construction of reality that it 
becomes impossible for us to distinguish between “history” and “Hegel,” or, 
by extension for Fanon, between “history” and “Sartre,” between one white 
Frenchman’s opinion and historical inevitability. But note that Jentsch specifi-
cally describes the aporetic effect of the uncanny as a group affective phenom-
enon: he wants to study “how the affective excitement of the uncanny arises in 
psychological terms” (8) and then explores those “psychological terms” along 
lines that seem predictive of object-relations psychology, where “objects” are 
not merely inert things but people and things as exosomata that seem to play 
an active role in the circulation of ideosomatic constructions of the familiar 
and the strange. Our “mistrust, unease, and even hostility” toward unfamil-
iar things, Jentsch writes, “can be explained to a great extent by the difficulty 
of establishing quickly and completely the conceptual connections that the 
object strives to make with the previous ideational sphere of the individual” 
(8, emphasis added).15 And so if what makes Hegel’s simulation uncanny is 
that it feels both real and strange—if “society” doesn’t just “trot along before 
my eyes reproducing to perfection the mechanism of the death struggle” but 
reproduces that mechanism in and through my own felt response to the world, 
my emotional and behavioral orientation to other people and to the “histori-
cal” events I read about in books—then the uncanny simulation is precisely a 
regulatory somatic exchange among Hegel-reading intellectuals, a circulation 
of somatic mimeses that blur the lines between Hegel and history because that 
somatomimetic circulation of Hegel is so thoroughly constitutive of history as 
we “know” it.16
 This somatic exchange is much closer to the rhetorical surface in Fanon’s 
map of failed disalienation, which is explicitly grounded in a regulatory 
somatic exchange not just between Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre but also 
between black and white intellectuals in Fanon and Sartre’s day and after—
between Fanon and Sartre, to put that differently, not just as individuals but 
as exemplary exosomatizations17 of the decolonizing stage of the Manichean 
colonizer-colonized encounter. Actually, Fanon explicitly identifies his reac-
tion to Sartre’s book as part of a larger response among black intellectuals, 
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specifically the black zealots of negritude—“Jean-Paul Sartre, in this work, has 
destroyed black zeal” (135)—and leaves Sartre’s uncanny simulation or circu-
lation of the ideosomatics of colonial racism in and through white intellectuals 
implicit. But how else but through such a white-(anti)colonizing-intellectual 
ideosomatic exchange do we explain the powerful effect that Sartre’s book had 
on Fanon, or on “black zeal”? Reading Sartre, Fanon feels discouraged, and 
“black zeal” in the world outside his head is thereby destroyed? “In all truth,” 
he writes, “in all truth I tell you, my shoulders slipped out of the framework 
of the world, my feet could no longer feel the touch of the ground. Without 
a Negro past, without a Negro future, it was impossible for me to live my 
Negrohood. Not yet white, no longer wholly black, I was damned. Jean-Paul 
Sartre had forgotten that the Negro suffers in his body quite differently from 
the white man. Between the white man and me the connection was irrevoca-
bly one of transcendence” (138). What gives Jean-Paul Sartre this power over 
Fanon’s feeling of “the touch of the ground”? What makes that feeling-loss so 
viral that it spreads instantly and/or constantly to all “black men,” all former 
possessors of “black zeal”? Surely it is not a transcendent connection, unless 
by transcendent Fanon means simply transpersonal: it is a felt connection, a 
somatic exchange. Sartre has this power over Fanon because he is the (anti)
colonialist, the colonizer who refuses, the French Marxist intellectual who 
makes a powerful ally and role model because he hates colonialism and rac-
ism but who remains nevertheless a colonizer, a regulatory channel of the 
ideosomatics of colonial inferiorization. But this also means that Fanon can 
assume, by the virality of somatic mimeticism, that Sartre’s de/recolonizing 
impact on him is circulated also through other black intellectuals—and, push-
ing Fanon’s reading to the next level, I can assume that this re/decolonizing 
somatic exchange is circulated through other white anticolonial intellectuals 
as well, me at least, perhaps (depending on your background and inclinations) 
you too. “And so it is not I who make a meaning for myself,” Fanon writes, 
“but it is the meaning that was already there, pre-existing, waiting for me” 
(134): somatic theory suggests that the “meaning that was already there” is 
the inferiorizing/imprisoning colonial dialectic, and the “there” is the somatic 
exchange, which constantly circulates that meaning through the group, ren-
dering it always tangibly and pressingly there, near, under the skin.
2.1.3.3 cinemaTic rePreSenTaTion: Binta and the Great idea
For a recent cinematic representation of that dialectic, let’s watch the 2004 film 
about a small rural village in southern Senegal, Binta and the Great Idea.
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 The film opens on a lake scene, with a Senegalese fisherman paddling 
toward shore in a dugout canoe. Binta (Zeynavou Diallo à Bignona), the six-
year-old narrator, introduces him in a voiceover as her father Sabu Diatta 
(Agnile Sambou à Mampalago). As Sabu’s canoe approaches the shore another 
man, Souleyman (Ismaila Hercule Diédhoiu à Bignona), rides up on his bike 
and helps him beach his canoe, and asks him how the fishing was. Sabu says 
(I will cite the English subtitles provided by Amparo Benedicto of La Luna 
Titra, a Madrid-based film-subtitling firm), “Can’t complain, good fishing,” 
but Souleyman looks in the catch basket and sees only seven or eight tiny 
fish, and makes a little speech: “I don’t know if I can handle so much weight. 
That’s a lot of basket for so few fish. In Europe they can catch tons of fish with 
a lot less effort. In one day a single tubab [European] can catch more fish than 
you could eat in your whole life. God gave them the brains and technique 
to build great inventions. Those people know what they’re doing. We should 
learn from them.” Then his watch alarm goes off, signaling noon, and he starts 
bragging about it, saying it’s Swiss. As they walk back to the village, he tells 
Sabu about how Europeans fish with cranes, gigantic nets, and fish-finders.
 On their way they pass a group of women working in a ricefield; in her 
voiceover Binta points out her mother Aminata Kamara (Fatua Drámé à 
Mampalago) and says she works in the ricefields “with the other mothers. 
Each one has a piece of land but they work together because they like to help 
each other and they like being together.”
 Then we cut to the School Teacher (Alphousseyni Gassama à Bignona) 
teaching the kids tolerance in groups, saying that they have to mix the black 
with the white, the big with the small, the girls with the boys, because “we 
respect each other, we accept our differences”: “That’s how we’ll make our 
school. And when you grow up, that’s how you’ll make the world of tomorrow.”
 Next, as a girl rings the recess bell and the kids run outside, Binta intro-
duces us to her cousin Soda (Aminata Sané à Oulampane), who isn’t allowed 
to go to school. Soda walks up to the outside of the school fence with a load 
of firewood on her head and looks sad. And now the staging becomes compli-
cated: we cut to a woman identified as Soda’s mother Fatu (Diariétou Sané à 
Ziguinchor) and her little brother out on a mat in the yard, the mother sorting 
through some grains in a basket, the little brother sitting cross-legged reading 
something; but when Soda arrives, fake-crying, she is now played by a dif-
ferent actress (Annette Tida Sambou à Ziguinchor), and is wearing different 
clothes. We only gradually realize that some villagers (mostly children) have 
been organized to stage a key generational conflict in Soda’s family for the 
whole village, Soda begging to go to school, her father refusing to let her; this 
is a rehearsal, but all through the film we cut back and forth between rehears-
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als and the “real thing.” Soda’s mother-in-the-play says to Soda-in-the-play in 
a loud monotone: “Soda! Soda! Why did you take so long to bring the wood?” 
Soda throws down the wood and declaims: “Mother! I’m very tired! Very, very 
tired! Let me go to school like my little brother! I want to learn what is written 
in books,” and starts fake-crying again. The mother-in-the-play says, in the 
same loud monotone: “Soda! You know your father will never agree!”
 And now the metacinematic intervention is escalated, the irruption of 
European postmodernity in the “primitive” world of the Senegalese village 
expanded: saying “All right, all right,” a man identified in the cast credits as 
“el Profesor del Teatro,” the Theater Teacher (Moustapha Coly à Ziguinchor), 
comes onscreen and tells them how to play the scene. “Acting means putting 
yourself in someone else’s skin,” he says, “to understand them better. You are 
in mother’s skin. You must understand how all mothers . . . how all mothers 
understand their children. She suffers. You must understand her. When you 
talk to her, you must speak with love and affection. Love and affection, you 
understand?” Mother: “Yes.” Theater teacher: “Okay? This works.” He walks 
off-screen. Mother to Soda: “We’ll wait till he comes.” An adolescent boy 
(Mohamed Sagna à Diabir) comes on bent over with a walking stick, made 
up as Soda’s father, saying: “Knock knock knock.” Mother to Soda: “It’s your 
father.” Father: “Knock knock knock.” Mother: “Yes, come in.” Father: “What’s 
going on here?” Cut to the Theater Teacher, who is wearing a brown shirt with 
a Caterpillar corporate logo on it and looking decidedly skeptical.
 Cut to Binta’s mother Aminata nursing her baby, sitting next to Binta’s 
father Sabu on an outdoor bench. Aminata: “That’s not a good idea.” Sabu: “I 
can’t think of any other.” Aminata: “You’re crazy.” Sabu: “For thinking of the 
future?” Sabu sees Binta, picks her up, hugs her: “Binta, will you help me with 
my idea?” Binta’s voiceover: “My mommy says my daddy has birds in his head. 
I think that’s why he is so nice.” Cut to Sabu dictating to Binta: “Write: Thanks 
to my friend Souleyman, I heard about the amazing events happening in the 
world of the tubabs. Period. I am referring to, for example, the great geniuses 
that permit us to extract the maximum that the land has to offer. Period.”
 Cut to Soda’s “real” mother (Awa Kéhé à Mampalago) first picking some 
fruit, then sitting with her basket of fruit by the side of the road. A truck-
driver stops and blatantly cheats her, confusing her with simple multiplication 
and then giving her much less than he promises. Binta’s voiceover: “My aunt 
never went to school.”
 Cut back to the rehearsal scene in the yard that we left earlier. Soda’s 
mother-in-the-play tells her Soda’s father-in-the-play that she got cheated 
because she doesn’t know math, begs him to let Soda go to school. Father: 
“This is Africa. Women must stay at home. When she grows up she will marry. 
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No school.” Another girl comes in, moving her fist as if knocking, saying hesi-
tantly: “Knock knock knock.” Theater Teacher: “Stop. Stop. Open the door 
before you enter.” Girl: “There is no door.” Theater Teacher: “It’s true there is 
no door, but it’s unnecessary. With a little imagination, everything is possible.” 
Father: “Not everything. Fireworks, for example. Tell us how to make them 
without rockets.” Theater Teacher: “Of course you can make fireworks without 
rockets. What matters is having something to celebrate.”
 Cut to some children dancing, first Binta, then a little girl with a metal peg 
for her left leg.
 Cut to Sabu sealing the envelope of the letter Binta has been writing for 
him. Binta’s voiceover: “My daddy also heard from his friend Souleyman that 
apparently the tubabs, thanks to the incredible quantities of fish that they are 
able to catch, make so much profit that they don’t need to worry about each 
other.” Sabu gets in a donkey cart and rides away.
 Cut to a sick old woman coughing in bed; “real” Soda is sweeping in the 
room when she sees a woman’s silhouette setting something down just outside 
the door-curtain; she goes out to find a basket of grain. The implication is that 
while Europeans don’t care for each other, Africans do.
 After a montage of Sabu riding in the donkey cart and arriving at the Lieu-
tenant Governor’s office, we see the Lieutenant Governor (Idrissa Diandy à 
Niaguls) laughing at the letter, but sending Sabu to the Civil Governor anyway.
 Cut to Soda-in-the-play sweeping in the yard; she finds two colorful 
books, picks them up, looks at them; her mother sees her, asks her whether 
she’s done sweeping, Soda says she wants to go to school, Fatu says I’ll go tell 
your father. Cut to Soda’s “real” mother talking to Soda’s “real” father (Fanding 
Diandy à Niaguis). As they argue, “real” Soda edges up to the door to listen to 
them, and starts crying.
 Cut to Sabu catching a bus. Binta’s voiceover: “There was a third thing that 
Souleyman told my father about the progress in the world of the tubabs.” Cut 
to Souleyman and Sabu sitting on a bench under a tree. Souleyman: “And all 
that wealth permits them to have the guns to fight against fear and losing their 
wealth. Take France, for example. They have the atomic bomb! More progress 
is impossible.” Sabu: “I think we should do something similar.” Binta says she 
thinks this was the precise moment when her father got his great idea.
 After a montage of the bus driving along with its door open, with Binta’s 
voiceover telling us that Sabu is taking his letter to the Prefecture of Bignona, 
the capital of their province, we see the Civil Governor (Abdoulaye Coly à 
Bignona) reading aloud from his letter: “Therefore, and keeping in mind that 
if we follow the path shown to us by the First World, we risk that the children 
of our children will have no fish, no trees, no air . . . that the desire to acquire 
134 |  SeCOnD eSSay
wealth will make us lose from [sic] our sense of solidarity and our fear of los-
ing our wealth . . .” Sabu finishes: “. . . will lead us to destroy each other.” Binta 
tells us in a voiceover that the Civil Governor sends Sabu to the Governor in 
Ziguinchor, the capital of the region.
 Cut to the whole village gathered around a makeshift stage, where the girl 
and boy playing Soda and her father now finally perform the scene they have 
been rehearsing throughout, where she begs him to let her go to school and he 
refuses. Three more child actors playing Binta’s family arrive and talk to them. 
Binta and Soda are in the audience watching. Soda’s “real” parents are also 
watching, and laughing at the funny moments. As the other actors come up 
with reason after reason why Soda’s father should let her go to school, Soda’s 
“real” father in the audience begins to look troubled, and “real” Soda looks 
resentful.
 After a montage of Sabu arriving in Ziguinchor, waiting and waiting to 
see the governor, we cut back to the makeshift stage and see a boy come out 
in Western clothes, with a backpack, looking like a university student: “A few 
years later. Let’s see what has become of the children.” Soda’s little brother is 
a French teacher; Binta is a doctor. Nobody has seen Soda in ages. We keep 
cutting to close-ups “real” Soda’s face, which shows more and more anger. 
Her “real” father cuts his eyes uneasily at her. Then Soda-in-the-play says she 
was married at 15 and has three children; she cries at this, and “real” Soda in 
the audience wipes her eyes: her surrogate’s tears on stage are contagious. The 
actors all line up to face the audience. Binta’s mother-in-the-play says to Soda’s 
father-in-the-play, look, my daughter’s a doctor, if you get sick she can cure 
you. Soda’s father-in-the-play comes out with his back to the audience, faces 
Soda on stage, and mumbles: “I’m very sorry. I didn’t understand.” A boy car-
rying a backpack steps forward and says: “Dear parents. Let your children go 
to school.” Soda-in-the-play steps forward and, while the others hum behind 
her, addresses the audience as “mother and father,” asking them why they 
didn’t let her go to school. As she goes on, “real” Soda stands angrily, trying 
to control herself. Finally she walks over in front of her “real” father, covering 
her teary eyes with her arm: “Father, I want to go to school. I don’t want to 
be ignorant like you.” Soda’s “real” father by now is very uneasy, almost fran-
tic, but he says and does nothing, only half-shakes his head. “I want to go to 
school. You have no right to deny me my future. I want to be someone.” She 
walks away, and the audience explodes: “Let her go to school!” The boy play-
ing Soda’s father walks up to Soda’s “real” father and shouts, pointing angrily: 
“Let her go to school! Who ever told you that in Africa women have to stay at 
home? Where is it written? This isn’t the Africa we want for ourselves. Let her 
go to school!” The whole audience is yelling at him, pointing at him, gesticu-
DiSPlaCemenT Of  CUlTUreS  |  135
lating angrily—the movie’s most overwhelmingly obvious instance of ideoso-
matic counterregulation.
 Cut to a secretary (Virginie Manga) coming out of the Governor’s office 
and asking if she can help Sabu. She lets him in, and the Governor (Yaya Mané 
à Ziguinchor) reads the letter while Binta’s voiceover reads the letter aloud: 
“This is why I’d like to request permission to adopt a tubab child. Already 
weaned, if possible, so that here he may develop as a person and acquire the 
knowledge necessary to be happy in our humble community.” Sabu chimes in, 
finishing his letter: “That way this boy, when he becomes a man, will be able 
to contribute to the development of humanity, which is of concern to us all.” 
The governor agrees, and we cut to a man pretending to throw fireworks up 
into the sky; the camera pans up the palm trees rapidly, suggesting imagined 
rockets shooting up into the sky, and as we see their fronds we hear explo-
sions. The kids dance and laugh. Binta’s voiceover: “My daddy says that all 
the children in the world have the right to educate themselves in the spirit of 
friendship, tolerance, peace, and fraternity. All the children. Even tubab chil-
dren. My daddy says we must learn from the behavior of birds. Birds are so 
intelligent that they take the best of the north and the best of the south.”
 The credits roll, telling us in Spanish that the film was written and directed 
by Javier Fesser and produced by Luis Manso, and was “basada en una inqui-
etud personal de Javier Fesser y Luis Manso”—based in a personal inquietude 
of its Spanish screenwriter/director and Spanish producer. We are also told 
that the film was made in collaboration with UNICEF Spain and UNICEF Sen-
egal, the Senegalese Ministry of the Interior, and the Senegalese Ministry of 
Information and Pan-African Cooperation, and that its corporate sponsors 
include Panasonic, ICO Global Communications, Renfe (Spanish rail), TVE 
(Televisión Española), Comité Trust (a Madrid-based advertising agency), 
Madrid Film (the distributor), and others.
 So the question is this: who is trying to do what to whom in and with this 
film? It seems clear that the film is a counterregulatory cluster: the School 
Teacher trying to infect his charges with a counterregulatory regime that 
sounds remarkably like Euro-American multiculturalist tolerance for diver-
sity; the Theater Teacher trying to teach his actors a theatrical regime that 
will incite the village ideosomatically to counterregulate Soda’s father’s “Afri-
can conservatism,” the rigid paternalism that would keep girls and women 
at home; Sabu and Souleyman developing between them an ad hoc Euro-
African eclecticism that would “take the best of the north and the best of the 
south.” Unsurprisingly, given the film’s Spanish makers and corporate spon-
sors, the counterregulatory impulses that drive its message are by and large 
the best of the north: the multiculturalism, the feminism, the postmodern 
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metadrama, the veneration of European technology. The best of the south in 
Fesser’s imagination is a romanticized “moral authority of the primitive”—the 
image of a rural Senegalese village as more communally caring and supportive 
than the wealthy and technologically advanced Europeans. Even this romanti-
cism is couched in explicitly developmental terms, albeit at once personalized 
and universalized: Sabu wants the European child he adopts to be “already 
weaned, if possible, so that here he may develop as a person and acquire the 
knowledge necessary to be happy in our humble community. . . . That way this 
boy, when he becomes a man, will be able to contribute to the development of 
humanity, which is of concern to us all.”
 But who exactly is the target of this counterregulation? Almost certainly 
not African villages like Oulampane in southern Senegal, where the film was 
set and shot; among the “genius” gadgetry the villagers would need to watch 
it would be a DVD player and a TV set, not to mention electricity. The film 
stages a counterregulatory intervention in rural village life in Africa, but for 
whom? The “relevant constituencies” of the Senegalese Ministry of the Inte-
rior—i.e., the Senegalese elite? Spaniards, who watched the film on TVE, one 
of its sponsors? Americans, whose Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sci-
ences nominated the film for its Best Live-Action Short Film Oscar in 2007? 
These all seem like far likelier target audiences for the film than “the former 
colonized,” or “the subaltern”—but what do they get out of it?
 The only plausible answer, it seems to me, is that they get the satisfaction 
of a sham counterregulation: the illusion of a decolonization that will bring 
Africans and other former colonized subjects out of postcolonial poverty and 
into conformity with First World norms—but idealized First World norms, 
romanticized First World norms, which is to say not capitalist rapacity but 
“the spirit of friendship, tolerance, peace, and fraternity” (that last a telling 
reminder of a bloody French Revolution). Counterregulated Africans will also 
have access to European technology, but will not use it to fight bloody civil 
wars; the technology will somehow have been rendered benign, technology 
that “will be able to contribute to the development of humanity, which is of 
concern to us all.”
 Another way of saying this is that the sham counterregulation staged in 
the film is intended to reassure its First World audiences, to “show” them 
that “development” is working, is truly developing the Third World: that the 
“primitivism” that remains in Africa is an unfortunate legacy of precolonial 
cultures, not of colonialism, of African tribal patriarchy rather than French 
Revolutionary liberté, égalité, fraternité (which continues to be presented as 
the counterregulatory solution); that this primitivism is now being success-
fully rooted out, and the former colonies are moving up the ladder toward the 
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First World ideal; and that this geopolitical upward mobility is transpiring in 
an ideally cooperative rather than competitive spirit, so as not to challenge 
First World economic and cultural hegemony in any way. It is, after all, only an 
idealized development, one that creates an illusory amelioration, the impres-
sion of amelioration in the First World viewer’s eye. The illusion, we might say, 
is of a Noble Savage First World: romanticized primitives with Swiss watches 
on their wrists and contentment in their hearts, celebrating the fulfillment of 
their developmental dreams with imaginary fireworks. Presumably they then 
go home and watch this film on imaginary TVs and DVD players, and feel 
good about the interactive balance between the north and the south.
 If we were to generalize from the Binta and the Great Idea model to all 
decolonizing pressures, we would want to say that the counterregulatory 
impact of colonization on both the colonizer and the colonized has been 
ideosomatically stabilized in both populations and in their relationships, and 
continues to generate such ideosomatic stabilizations long after the political 
end of colonial rule—and that such stabilizations entail both pressures not to 
change and reassuring exosomatic images of change in which the former colo-
nized seem to become more like the former colonizer’s idealized self-image 
while nothing substantive actually changes. In this light, decolonization might 
be defined as the ideosomatic manipulation of counterregulatory exosomata 
as part of a continuing need to stabilize the old colonial regulatory regimes—
or, with a French colonial sigh: plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.
2.2  theoretical SPinS: 
  PoStcolonial affect in BhaBha and SPivak
Contemporary postcolonial criticism, whatever its virtues, is also an elite affair, 
an expression of cultural conflict and contention within a global elite; former 
colonials who are integrated into the system no longer have any interest in 
criticism of the system of which they are part, but rather assert their new-found 
power through varieties of cultural nationalism. On the other hand, there is 
also an embarrassment or even pain in keeping alive memories of colonialism, 
or awareness of its legacies, as memories are likely to create cultural and psy-
chological obstacles to assimilation into the system, while forgetting makes for 
easier assimilation—and acceptance.
—arif Dirlik, “rethinking Colonialism” (439–40)
In a note positioned at the end of the first sentence of that epigraph, Dirlik 
says he is thinking of critics like Leo Ou-fan Lee, whose 1999 book Shanghai 
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Modern to Dirlik’s mind embodies the “cultural nationalism” and the “forget-
ting” he describes. He does not mention in his essay either Homi K. Bhabha 
or Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, the two most famous and influential post-
structuralists among the global elite that contend for the production of post-
colonial knowledge;18 and indeed, elitist as both theorists unquestionably are, 
persistently as both have been attacked as “forgetters” of the painful legacies 
of colonialism, I want to argue in this final section of the Second Essay that 
both ultimately escape Dirlik’s critique. Bhabha and Spivak may be abstract 
poststructuralist theorists, but they are also the two postcolonial theorists 
who are most determined to open up a space within the (anti)binary abstrac-
tions of their own poststructuralist thought for a phenomenological economy 
of affect; as such they are perhaps the most somatic of living postcolonial 
theorists, and thus the significant ground-breakers for my interventions in 
this book. To a large extent their tentative passing theorizations of affective 
economies are influenced by Deleuze and Guattari on the social machine as 
a body-without-organs, and by the Foucault of The History of Sexuality Vol-
ume One, both powerfully Nietzschean theoretical orientations that inform 
somatic theory as well, and that chart a radically different course for postcolo-
nial theory from that abstract poststructuralist differentiality that would, say, 
thematize the subaltern as a “space of difference” (see §2.2.2.3).
 While I will show in this section that the phenomenology of affective 
“economies” or “value-coding” is almost entirely buried in Bhabha and Spivak, 
however—almost crushed under the immaterial burden of poststructuralist 
abstraction—I do want to present my careful reading of their fairly rudimen-
tary stabs at a somatics of postcoloniality as a contribution to somatic theory. 
Under no circumstances should my discussion of their thoughts be read as in 
any way dismissive.
2.2.1 homi k. Bhabha
Homi K. Bhabha was born in 1949 to a Parsi family in Mumbai (formerly 
Bombay), India, and took his B.A. at the University of Mumbai before moving 
to the United Kingdom to take his M.A., M.Phil., and D.Phil. at Christ Church, 
Oxford. After working as a lecturer in the English department at Sussex Uni-
versity for ten years, he accepted a fellowship at Princeton and remained in 
the United States, doing visiting professorships at Princeton and the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, then accepting the Chester D. Tripp Professorship in the 
Humanities at the University of Chicago in 1997 and the Anne F. Rothenberg 
Professorship of English and American Literature at Harvard in 2001.
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 Bhabha’s two essay collections of the 1990s, Nation and Narration (1990) 
and especially The Location of Culture (1994), secured his reputation in the 
top tier of postcolonial intellectuals worldwide; his densely brilliant poststruc-
turalist rhetoric has helped establish hybridity as the critical slippage or leak-
age across key postcolonial binaries like the colonizer and the colonized, as 
indeed across any other cultural or linguistic barriers that previous postcolo-
nial critics had tended to stabilize as well. In my discussion of Bhabha’s explo-
rations of postcolonial affect below, I’ll be looking primarily at two essays 
from The Location of Culture, “The Postcolonial and the Postmodern” and “Sly 
Civility.”
2.2.1.1 affecT on The marginS
In his 1994 essay “The Postcolonial and the Postmodern: The Question of 
Agency,” Bhabha famously sets up postcolonial cultures, especially what he 
calls “the transnational dimension of cultural transformation—migration, 
diaspora, displacement, relocation” (172)—as a hybrid marginal check on uni-
versalizing and naturalizing myths of cultural unity. “In this salutary sense,” 
he argues, “a range of contemporary critical theories suggest that it is from 
those who have suffered the sentence of history—subjugation, domination, 
diaspora, displacement—that we learn our most enduring lessons for living 
and thinking.  .  .  . The natural(ized), unifying discourse of ‘nation,’ ‘peoples,’ 
or authentic ‘folk’ tradition, those embedded myths of culture’s particularity, 
cannot be readily referenced. The great, though unsettling, advantage of this 
position is that it makes you increasingly aware of the construction of culture 
and the invention of tradition” (172).
 This is, of course, the same kind of utopian spin on cultural displace-
ment that we saw Deleuze and Guattari and others placing on nomadism and 
migrancy in the First Essay (§1.3.1): yes, it’s “unsettling” to be torn from home 
and community, to lose almost every communal and locational prop for iden-
tity and reality, to be physically and emotionally brutalized, or, in the colonial 
context, to suffer occupation and enslavement, marginalization and priva-
tion—but there’s an upside to all that too, an “advantage.” It makes you aware 
that what seemed so natural was only naturalized, that what seemed universal 
was only universalized. Bhabha does not elaborate on why and for whom this 
awareness is an advantage—whether it is only advantageous for the postcolo-
nial intellectual (“It is from this hybrid location of cultural value—the trans-
national or the translational—that the postcolonial intellectual attempts to 
elaborate a historical and literary project” [173]) or whether there are also 
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advantages for the displaced themselves, the refugees, the colonized, the trau-
matized. A case could be made for the cognitive advantages to be gained by 
non-intellectuals from the denaturalizing of their loconormativities, advan-
tages stemming from increased versatility or metanormativity in their allo-
static responses to cultural displacement; one of the reasons Bhabha’s utopian 
theory has been so heavily criticized is that he doesn’t seem to be particularly 
interested in making that case, and so seems to be reveling in the intellec-
tual advantages to him of other people’s suffering, in the object lesson to be 
derived from postcolonial marginality against hegemonic Western construc-
tions of sociopolitical reality.19
 What I am suggesting, however, is that there is more going on in Bhab-
ha’s approach to postcolonial marginality than just this elitist theorizing—that 
nearly hidden in his abstract poststructuralist discourse is an extremely cau-
tious, even nervous, move toward something vaguely approximating somatic 
theory. He hints at this move briefly in the opening lines of “The Postcolo-
nial and the Postmodern,” the passage I quoted as an epigraph to my Preface: 
“There is even a growing conviction that the affective experience of social 
marginality—as it emerges in non-canonical cultural forms—transforms our 
cultural strategies” (172). There is, in other words, a circulatory or economic 
effect to affect: feelings, felt experience, can be socially, politically, and cul-
turally transformative; what the marginalized feel and experience in being 
marginalized can be felt transformatively by “us” as well. Bhabha does not 
theorize any of this in his essay (or elsewhere), and so does not explore just 
how “the affective experience of social marginality” is transferred to “us,” leav-
ing it entirely possible that the “transfer” is purely intellectual, of the object-
lesson sort: we study “this hybrid location of cultural value” and draw the 
analytical implications from it for our “historical and literary project.” It is this 
“catachrestic” reading-between-the-lines of Bhabha’s vague hints at a transfer 
of affective experience, obviously, that leads to the accusation that he is using 
other people’s suffering as fodder for high-flown poststructuralist theory. The 
other reading, the somatic reading, that “we” feel “their” affect, that the soma-
ticity of marginalization is not so much studied as circulated, would obviate 
the accusation of coldly intellectual opportunism; but it would presumably 
also leave Bhabha open to another kind of accusation, of imposing a univer-
salizing and consensualizing “liberal vision of togetherness” (190) on the mar-
ginalized, of naively assuming that we’re somehow “all in this together,” that 
“we” feel “their” pain because we’re all one. That is the accusation I’m courting 
in this book, obviously—and Bhabha’s reluctance to leave himself open to that 
accusation surely has something to do with his gigantic stature in the field. 
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Poststructuralist “differential” or “disjunctive” theories are much hipper than 
potentially liberal somatic ones.
 It should be clear by this stage of my argument, however, that actually 
theorizing (rather than merely hinting at) the somatics of postcolonial cul-
ture opens up a counterhegemonic critique of liberal affective universalism; 
and perhaps I am projecting here, but it seems to me that Bhabha senses the 
same, at least as an inchoate theoretical directionality. He constructs his argu-
ment in “The Postcolonial and the Postmodern” negatively, of course, first 
theorizing discursive approaches to postcoloniality as a differential/disjunc-
tive negation of unified myths of nation, culture, and identity,20 and then argu-
ing that this “language metaphor” itself “opens up a space where a theoretical 
disclosure is used to move beyond theory,” used to construct a “liminal form 
of signification that creates a space for the contingent, indeterminate articula-
tion of social ‘experience’ that is particularly important for envisaging emer-
gent cultural identities” (179). The scare-quoted word “experience” there is 
a back-reference to the “affective experience” broached in the opening lines 
of the essay; now that he is contingently and indeterminately attempting to 
articulate or theorize that experience, Bhabha has air-brushed affect out of 
the formulation and set articulations of experience up as a double negation of 
hegemonic unities, discursive theorizations arising on the negative margins 
of unity myths and liminal articulations of experience arising on the negative 
margins of poststructuralist discursivity. Because poststructuralist theory has 
rigged a thousand alarm bells around pre- or post-discursive concepts like 
“experience,” Bhabha instantly hedges—“But it is a representation of ‘experi-
ence’ without the transparent reality of empiricism and outside the intentional 
mastery of the ‘author’” (179)—and yet insists, finally dropping the scare 
quotes around “experience,” that “it is a representation of social experience 
as the contingency of history—the indeterminacy that makes subversion and 
revision possible—that is profoundly concerned with questions of cultural 
‘authorization’” (179).
 Bhabha’s examples of this “beyond theory” are taken from protosomatic 
thinkers like Roland Barthes and Mikhail Bakhtin, Barthes writing in The 
Pleasure of the Text of “the pulsional incidents [in a text], the language lined 
with flesh, a text where we can hear the grain of the throat, the patina of con-
sonants, the voluptuousness of vowels, a whole carnal stereophony: the articu-
lation of the body, of the tongue, not that of meaning, of language” (66–67, 
quoted in Bhabha, “Postcolonial” 18021), Bakhtin noting that “the utterance 
appears to be furrowed with distant and barely audible echoes of changes of 
speech subjects and dialogic overtones, greatly weakened utterance bound-
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aries that are completely permeable to the author’s expression” (quoted in 
Bhabha, 189). Tellingly, however, Bhabha almost exclusively cordons these 
hints at shared evaluative affect off into the quotations themselves, takes 
from Barthes and Bakhtin only the abstract binaries that will feed his post-
structuralist habit and ignores the rest—ignores (and indeed tacitly affirms) 
Barthes’s exoticization or orientalization of the “eternal East,”22 for example, 
and neglects to mention that for Bakhtin those “barely audible echoes” are 
barely audible because mostly felt, that the “dialogic overtones” are affective 
(re)tonalizations and (re)attitudinalizations of voice that carry complexly col-
lectivized saturations of evaluative accent. What remains of the Barthesian 
and Bakhtinian somatics of language are the “liminal forms of signification” 
that point binarily/negatively “beyond theory” and “outside the sentence,” 
with no special inclination to explore that beyond and that outside:
To evoke this “beyond theory,” I turn to Roland Barthes’s exploration of 
the cultural space “outside the sentence.” In The Pleasure of the Text I find 
a subtle suggestion that beyond theory you do not simply encounter its 
opposition, theory/practice, but an “outside” that places the articulation of 
the two—theory and practice, language and politics—in a productive rela-
tion similar to Derrida’s notion of supplementarity. (179)
Barthes’s daydream is supplementary, not alternative, to acting in the real 
world, Freud reminds us; the structure of fantasy narrates the subject 
of daydream as the articulation of incommensurable temporalities, dis-
avowed wishes, and discontinuous scenarios. The meaning of fantasy does 
not emerge in the predicative or propositional value we might attach to 
being outside the sentence. Rather, the performative structure of the text 
reveals a temporality of discourse that I believe is significant. It opens up 
a narrative strategy for the emergence and negotiation of those agencies 
of the marginal, minority, subaltern, or diasporic that incite us to think 
through—and beyond—theory. (181)
Because “social experience” or “affective experience” is (figured as) a plea-
surable daydream on the supplementary margins of symbolically structured 
sententiality, it functions in Bhabha’s theory as a rupture in hegemonic struc-
turing through which “those agencies of the marginal, minority, subaltern, or 
diasporic” can be made to seem—retroactively—to emerge. It is not a positiv-
ity that might be explored in its own right—that would smack of essential-
ization, perhaps—but a space of negativity that Bhabha labors to thematize 
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as a site of liberating retheorization. The “moment of displacement” that for 
Bhabha effects this emergence is not overtly affective or otherwise corporeal, 
but discursive, and so abstract:
The individuation of the agent occurs in a moment of displacement. It is 
a pulsional incident, the split-second movement when the process of the 
subject’s designation—its fixity—opens up beside it, uncannily abseits, a 
supplementary space of contingency. In this “return” of the subject, thrown 
back across the distance of the signified, outside the sentence, the agent 
emerges as a form of retroactivity, Nachträglichkeit. It is not agency as itself 
(transcendent, transparent) or in itself (unitary, organic, autonomous). As 
a result of its own splitting in the time-lag of signification, the moment of 
the subject’s individuation emerges as an effect of the intersubjective—as 
the return of the subject as agent. (185)
 Note there that the pulses in Barthes’s “pulsional incidents,” which he asso-
ciated with “language lined with flesh, where we can hear the grain of the 
throat”—the meaty metabolic pulses of the body, of partially verbalized body 
language, of blood circulation and respiration, of chewing and swallowing 
and digesting, “their materiality, their sensuality, the breath, the gutturals, the 
fleshiness of the lips, a whole presence of the human muzzle” (Barthes 67)—
have now become “the split-second movement when the process of the sub-
ject’s designation—its fixity—opens up beside it,” “splitting in the time-lag 
of signification.” The pulsionality of signification is not, obviously, a materi-
ality or a sensuality that can be corporeally felt; it can only be discursively 
theorized.
 In his one attempt to work out the operation of his Lacanian theory of 
the time-lagged and therefore retroactive emergence of agency in a specific 
historical situation, however—his discussion of Ranajit Guha’s analysis of 
Sunil Sen’s remarks on the Tebhaga movement in Dinajpur—Bhabha tips his 
discursive hand more overtly toward a somatics of postcolonial agency, or 
what he calls “ambivalence at the point of ‘individuation’ as an intersubjec-
tive affect” (187). I take intersubjective affect there to mean shared feeling, 
but specifically the regulatory regime(s) of the somatomimetic exchange, the 
circulation of normative pressures and resistant counterpressures through a 
group; as we’ve been seeing, somatic theory does conceive individual identity 
and agency as group constructs, collective attributions circulated intersub-
jectively not only through each individual so constituted but also through 
the constitutive (initiating/ratifying) somatic economy of the group. And 
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as we saw in §2.1, in (post)colonial contexts of radical ideosomatic coun-
terregulation we are obviously going to find “ambivalence” and “hybridity” 
in the collective somatization of identities, agencies, and realities: “In the 
face of hostile propaganda of the Muslim League and the provocation of the 
newly-formed Muslim National Guard, the Muslim peasants came to the 
Kisan Sabha, sometimes inscribing a hammer and a sickle on the Muslim 
League flag. Young maulavis addressed village meetings. Reciting melodi-
ous verse from the Koran they condemned the jotedari system and the prac-
tice of charging high interest rates’” (Sen 49, quoted by Guha, 39, quoted 
by Bhabha, “Postcolonial” 187). Jostling here for leverage in the regulation 
of rebel behavior are several overlapping ideosomatic regimes, including at 
least traditional Muslim piety (the Koranic chanting), Islamic political activ-
ism (the Muslim League and its militant splinter group the Muslim National 
Guard), and Marxist agit-prop (the hammer and sickle, the economic pro-
tests).23 Ranajit Guha thematizes this confluential competition among ideo-
somatic regimes as the “contradictions which are indeed the stuff history is 
made of ” and rebel consciousness as therefore “self-alienated” (39), suggest-
ing that overlapping ideosomatic regimes jostle for leverage in his theoretical 
imagination as well, postcolonial idealizations of indeterminacy not quite 
counterregulating an older nostalgic idealization of the pre-contradictory 
(foundational) truth and the pre-alienated (integrated) self. (Why else the-
matize polynormativity as “contradiction” and “alienation”?) Bhabha reads 
Guha’s thematization of the scene as very close to his own, indeed as “an 
emblem of my notion of agency in the apparatus of contingency—its hybrid 
figuring of space and time” (187), by which he means contingency as both 
“contiguity, metonymy, the touching of spatial boundaries at a tangent, and, 
at the same time, [as] the temporality of the indeterminate and the undecid-
able” (186). Bhabha insists that “representing social contradiction or antago-
nism in this doubling discourse of contingency  .  .  . cannot be dismissed as 
the arcane practice of the undecidable or aporetic”—a weak protest against 
those who accuse him of celebrating the postmodern fractalization of the self 
and so militating against identity-political activism—because, he says, his 
model “enables us to conceive of strategic closure and control for the agent” 
(186). The only problem there is that by “closure and control for the agent” he 
means no agentive phenomenology, no practical organizational orientation 
to the world and to self shaped in individuals by groups, but the philosophical 
constitution of the “historically or contextually specific subject” (186), and 
thus once again a discursive formulation concluded and controlled not by the 
subject but by the theorist.
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2.2.1.2 Sly civiliTy
Bhabha takes up the topic of “affective ambivalence and discursive distur-
bance” (97) in an earlier chapter in The Location of Culture as well, “Sly Civility,” 
a 1985 essay devoted to a deconstruction of the rhetoric of liberal universal-
ism in John Stuart Mill and other nineteenth-century British imperialists who 
preach liberty and democracy for all times and places—except, of course, the 
colonies, where “a vigorous despotism is in itself the best mode of government 
for training the people in what is specifically wanting to render them capa-
ble of a higher civilization” (Mill, quoted in Bhabha, “Sly” 96). The resulting 
“affective ambivalence and discursive disturbance” is obviously an example of 
the polynormative somatics of counterregulatory “colonizerization.”
 The moment in Bhabha’s essay that I want to focus on, however, appears 
in his title and late in his argument, the concept of “sly civility,” which Bhabha 
borrows from an 1818 sermon by Archdeacon Potts: “If you urge them with 
their gross and unworthy misconceptions of the nature and the will of God, 
or the monstrous follies of their fabulous theology, they will turn it off with a 
sly civility perhaps, or with a popular and careless proverb” (quoted in Bhabha 
99, emphasis in original). Bhabha thematizes this “off-turning” response as 
“the native refusal to satisfy the colonizer’s narrative demand,” noting that 
“the natives’ resistance represents a frustration of that nineteenth-century 
strategy of surveillance, the confession, which seems to dominate the ‘calcu-
lable’ individual by positing the truth that the subject has but does not know” 
(99, emphasis in original). But “sly civility” (or what African-Americans call 
“tomming”) is patently not just a “refusal to satisfy the colonizer’s narrative 
demand”: it is a refusal in the outward (kinesic) form of compliance, both 
“civility” (submission to the colonizer’s kinesic regime) and “slyness” (resis-
tance to the colonizer’s narrative regime). Somatically speaking, Archdea-
con Potts attempts to counterregulate the pagan colonized as/into Christians 
not just by “positing the truth that the subject has but does not know” but 
by “urging them with their gross and unworthy misconceptions,” etc., put-
ting ideosomatic pressure on them to reject their own religion and convert to 
Christianity—and the colonized exert a surreptitious counterpressure, kine-
sically performing their indirect speech act of evasion or passive resistance 
under the cover of a direct speech act of acquiescence.
 Indeed, the passage from Freud’s “Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, 
Paranoia and Homosexuality” that Bhabha takes as his epigraph and uses to 
interrogate native sly civility is equally saturated with somaticity, with obses-
sive paranoid readings of the somatic exchange:
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They [the paranoid], too, cannot regard anything in other people as indif-
ferent, and they, too, take up minute indications with which these other, 
unknown, people present them, and use them in their “delusions of refer-
ence.” The meaning of their delusions of reference is that they expect from 
all strangers something like love. But these people show them nothing of 
the kind; they laugh to themselves, flourish their sticks, even spit on the 
ground as they go by—and one really does not do such things while a 
person in whom one takes a friendly interest is near. One does them only 
when one feels quite indifferent to the passer-by, when one can treat him 
like air; and, considering, too, the fundamental kinship of the concepts of 
“stranger” and “enemy,” the paranoiac is not so far wrong in regarding this 
indifference as hate, in contrast to his claim for love. (quoted in Bhabha  
93)
 Those “minute indications” are, of course, body language—laughter, ges-
tures (flourishing their sticks), spitting—read and felt (correctly, Freud says) 
as signs of inner body states, as emotional indifference and thus as the oppo-
site of the love the paranoiac needs and expects. Similarly, Bhabha argues, the 
native “urged” by the “paranoid” colonizing missionary indifferently refuses 
“to unify the authoritarian, colonialist address within the terms of civil engage-
ment[, which] gives the subject of colonial authority—father and oppressor—
another turn” (100). As I’ve been suggesting, the native in this encounter both 
agrees and refuses “to unify the authoritarian, colonialist address within the 
terms of civil engagement,” which gives the subject of colonization—child and 
victim—yet another turn. Bhabha writes:
The authoritarian demand can now only be justified if it is contained in 
the language of paranoia. The refusal to return and restore the image of 
authority to the eye of power has to be reinscribed as implacable aggres-
sion, assertively coming from without: He hates me. Such justification fol-
lows the familiar conjugation of persecutory paranoia. The frustrated wish 
“I want him to love me,” turns into its opposite “I hate him” and thence 
through projection and the exclusion of the first person, “He hates me.”
 Projection is never a self-fulfilling prophecy; never a simple “scapegoat” 
fantasy. The other’s aggressivity from without, that justifies the subject of 
authority, makes that very subject a frontier station of joint occupation, as 
the psychoanalyst Robert Waelder has written. Projection may compel the 
native to address the master, but it can never produce those effects of “love” 
or “truth” that would center the confessional demand. If, through projec-
tion, the native is partially aligned or reformed in discourse, the fixed hate 
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which refuses to circulate or reconjugate, produces the repeated fantasy of 
the native as in-between legality and illegality, endangering the boundaries 
of truth itself. (100)
 Obviously, yes, in diagnosing what he takes to be the “sly civility” of the 
natives Archdeacon Potts is reading their body language; and it may well be 
that Bhabha’s mapping of Freud on paranoia onto the cleric’s construction of 
that body language is, if not accurate (for how would we ever know?), at least 
useful. On the surface, all the Archdeacon wants to do is to convert the native 
to Christianity; how do we then go about constructing what he wants below 
that surface? We read his body language—and because he is physically absent 
to us, long dead, in fact, that means reconstructing his kinesic body somato-
mimetically, and reading our reconstruction. We see him urging the natives, 
pressing them, seeking to overwhelm their resistance with a swarm of partially 
verbalized somatic aggression; and we see his frustration when they do not 
respond as he expects, when they respond with incomplete conformity to his 
counterregulatory pressures. Bhabha wants to push past this level of somato-
mimetic reconstruction, into the realm marked off by Freud in his remarks 
on paranoia—wants to feel in the Archdeacon’s initial body state a paranoid 
desire for love that, thwarted, is converted to hatred and projected outward 
onto the “refusenik” native. This seems extreme to me—surely what the Arch-
deacon wants from the natives is more submission than love?—but there’s 
really no arguing here, as Bhabha and I both base our readings of the Arch-
deacon’s body states on our own competing somatomimetic reconstructions.
 Where I think there is ground for argument, however, is Bhabha’s read-
ing of the “frontier station of joint occupation.” If that frontier station is the 
somatic exchange, the circulation of somatomimeses, then it is not so much 
projection that compels the native to address the master as it is the circulation 
of ideosomatic power, sociopolitical power channeled somatically through 
the Archdeacon’s body language into the native, who feels the power and 
responds accordingly, civilly: reproduces the Archdeacon’s English Christian 
civility-pressures in his or her own body and displays them outwardly in the 
body language of submissive politeness. This is a partial alignment or refor-
mation of the native not only in discourse, but in outward kinesic behavior as 
well.
 What bothers me about Bhabha’s reconstruction of this encounter, how-
ever, is that the native doesn’t participate in it, except to refuse. Bhabha’s native 
is a mere picture of “refusal,” not a subject or an agent at all. Bhabha maps out 
a similar reading, in fact, in “Articulating the Archaic”: “In these instances of 
social and discursive alienation there is no recognition of master and slave, 
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there is only the matter of the enslaved master, the unmastered slave” (131). 
Here too Bhabha presents the enslavement of the master as a positivity that 
can be theorized and the slave’s subjectivity as a simple blank negativity: 
unmastered. Ironically enough, what Bhabha is doing in denying the post-
colonial applicability of the Hegelian master–slave dialectic is recuperating 
that dialectic for the master, for the master’s need for recognition from the 
slave, in tacit rejection of Fanon’s insistence in Black Skin, White Masks that 
Hegel was wrong: “I hope I have shown that here the master differs basically 
from the master described by Hegel. For Hegel there is reciprocity; here the 
master laughs at the consciousness of the slave. What he wants from the slave 
is not recognition but work” (220n8). And, of course, he is completely ignor-
ing Hegel’s master–slave dialectic for the slave, the topic of Fanon’s seventh 
chapter.24
 It seems to me a relatively uncontroversial assumption that the colo-
nized’s partial kinesic alignment with the colonizer’s ideosomatic pressures 
displaces him, counterregulates her—that in fact it is impossible to remain 
as blank and somatically unavailable as Bhabha seems to want to make these 
natives. The frontier station of joint occupation transforms not just the colo-
nizer, as Bhabha seems to want to see it, but what Abdul JanMohamed calls 
the Manichean relationship between the colonizer and the colonized, and thus 
the identities, agencies, realities of both. And for any kind of discussion of 
the counterregulatory pressures channeled into decolonization, it would seem 
indispensable to me to theorize that key word “sly”: the telling deregulatory 
pressures with which the native idiosomatizes his or her civility, the strategic 
contamination of submissive civility not just with refusal but with a counter-
ideosomatic response aimed at minutely but significantly decolonizing (coun-
terregulating) the frontier station of joint occupation.
 As Bhabha reads the encounter, both the “slyness” and the “civility” are 
the colonizer’s paranoid projections, love-and-hatred fantasies that situate the 
native “in-between legality and illegality, endangering the boundaries of truth 
itself.” And while it’s certainly true that we have no direct access to the native’s 
body states—that any reconstruction of the encounter we undertake will 
be based on the Archdeacon Potts’s verbal report—so what? We never have 
direct access to anyone’s body states, even our own; all we ever have is somato-
mimetic reconstructions. Bhabha’s strategy of restricting his analysis to the 
“paranoia” of the Archdeacon Potts and denying the reconstructed native even 
a vestige of somatomimetic agency is a choice, and in fact a choice that seems 
punitive to me, motivated less by a desire to open up a utopian decolonizing 
moment in the encounter than by an unrecognized somatic mimesis of what 
he takes to be the Archdeacon’s paranoid construction of the native, a projec-
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tion of Bhabha’s own postcolonial love-thwarted-into-hatred onto this long-
dead colonizer. But then, as Freud says, “the paranoiac is not so far wrong in 
regarding this indifference as hate, in contrast to his claim for love.”
2.2.2 gayatri chakravorty Spivak
Born Gayatri Chakravorty in 1942 to middle-class parents in Kolkata (Cal-
cutta), capital of West Bengal, India, Spivak took an undergraduate degree 
at the University of Kolkata in 1959 and then moved to the United States for 
graduate work, taking an M.A. in English at Cornell and then working on her 
Ph.D. (writing a dissertation on Yeats, directed by Paul de Man) while teach-
ing at the University of Iowa. Her 1976 English translation of Jacques Der-
rida’s Of Grammatology—and especially her brilliant 100-page introduction 
to that translation, which taught many English speakers, including me, how 
to read Derrida—brought her to national and international prominence; but 
it was her work with the Subaltern Studies group in the 1980s, especially her 
provocative 1985/1988 essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (see §2.2.2.3), that 
made her one of the most respected postcolonial intellectuals in the world. 
Her books include In Other Worlds (1987), Outside in the Teaching Machine 
(1993), A Critique of Postcolonial Reason (1999), Death of a Discipline (2005), 
Other Asias (2007), and the compilations The Post-Colonial Critic (1990) and 
The Spivak Reader (1995). She has continued to work as a translator in recent 
years as well, translating the contemporary Bengali writer Mahasweta Devi 
(Imaginary Maps [1994], Breast Stories [1997], Old Women, [1999], and Chotti 
Munda and His Arrow [2002] and the eighteenth-century Bengali poet-saint 
Ramproshad or Ramprasad Sen (Song for Kali [2000]); one of Mahasweta’s 
novellas will serve as this essay’s literary representation in §2.2.2.4.
 Spivak describes herself as a Marxist, feminist, and deconstructionist, and 
in many ways each of those three methodologies corrects and complicates the 
other two, her Marxism leading her to ground discussions of “woman” and 
“discursive formations” in economic and class contexts, her feminism prob-
lematizing the male-oriented narratives of Marxism and playful antinarratives 
of deconstruction, and her poststructuralism making her profoundly suspi-
cious of the (strategic) essentializing impulse that drives her identity politics 
as a Marxist and a feminist. Perhaps as a result, she is also always profoundly 
self-conscious about her own subject position as an elite postcolonial intellec-
tual, ensconced at a prestigious university (Columbia) in the most powerful 
and predatory neocolonial country on the planet, and repeatedly undercuts 
her own positionings by laying bare her own interpretive strategies.
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 Spivak’s interest in postcolonial affect seems to come out of something 
like this confluence of ideological and methodological orientations as well: 
out of her poststructuralist/Marxist interest in (but also profound skepticism 
toward) Deleuze and Guattari’s retheorization of Marx on value in terms of 
desire, on the one hand, and her feminist interest in the female subaltern’s 
body on the other. Like Bhabha, however, Spivak remains deconstructively 
wary of affect and extradiscursive “experience” in general, and her caution 
stunts her theoretical forays into affective value-coding, lets them languish in 
unexamined forms borrowed from liberal-humanist individualism, Cartesian 
mind-body dualism, and patriarchally hierarchized male–female divisions of 
psychosocial labor. I’ll be looking at her tentative explorations of postcolonial 
affect in four subsections: her discussions of affective value-coding in several 
key essays from the 1990s, her discussion of Kant’s “raw man” in his theoriza-
tion of the sublime in Critique of Judgment in her own 1999 book A Critique 
of Postcolonial Reason, the controversial essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” and 
her reading of Mahasweta Devi’s novella “Douloti the Bountiful” in “Woman 
in Difference.”
2.2.2.1 affecTive value-coding
In her 1992 autobiographical piece “Asked to Talk about Myself . . . ,” Spivak 
writes:
Experience is a staging of experience. One can only offer scrupulous and 
plausible accounts of the agencies or mechanics of staging. Chance and 
randomness are not to be ignored, yet cannot be accounted for. “What is 
it to stage?” “what is it to be staged?” are questions prior to, so to speak, 
broader, as it were, than “what is it to perform (being performed)?,” “what 
is it to act (acting out)?” Most thinking about action allows room for some 
thought of staging. Deconstruction radicalizes it, repeatedly failing to 
account for it in a place where success is hard to tell from failure.
 One of the most tenacious names as well as strongest accounts of 
the agency or mechanics of staging is ‘origin.’ I perform my life this way 
because my origin stages me so: national origin, ethnic origin. And, more 
pernicious, you act this way because your origin stages you so. The notion 
of origin is as broad and robust and full of affect as it is imprecise. History 
lurks in it somewhere. And, even when we have gone around the claim to 
identity or essence, the question of origin does not disappear, as witness 
ideas of class origin, where class is clearly seen as a social inscription rather 
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than a human essence. My remarks here will also suggest that the question 
of origin is merely displaced when we answer it to ascribe available ways of 
instantiation for the performance of our sexual staging. To feel one is from 
an origin is not a pathology. It belongs to the group of groundings, mis-
takes that enable us to make sense of our lives. But the only way to argue 
for origins is to look for institutions, inscriptions and then to surmise the 
mechanics by which such institutions and inscriptions can stage such a 
particular style of performance. (9)
In the repeated phrase “the agency or mechanics of staging,” I imagine that 
I understand what Spivak mean by the agency of staging, but wonder about 
the mechanics. Are we talking wires and pulleys? How do we get to those 
mechanics from the embodied staging of experience, sexuality, and feelings/
affects about origins? Is Spivak suggesting a machine-metaphorics of embod-
ied staging, along the lines of Deleuze and Guattari’s social machine as a body-
without-organs? Or is she differentiating between two orders or regimes of 
staging, one embodied, with agency, the other institutionalized, with mechan-
ics? “The agencies or the mechanics of staging”?
 In any case her insistence on “staging” here seems to adumbrate some-
thing like an ideosomatic perspective on performativity, on action as embod-
ied performativity: when we act, when we perform our sexuality or our 
feeling that we are “from an origin,” our performance is staged by someone 
or something else, some extrapersonal force that we do not understand, that 
may be partly “chance or randomness” but feels organized, directed, feels like 
a director’s guiding hand, and seems to flow dispositionally out of our past 
(“origins”) through our present into an organized future. Unlike Bhabha, Spi-
vak approaches these questions phenomenologically, from the point of view 
of one caught up in these flows, these apparent organizations or stagings of 
our performances, and from that point of view is unwilling to theorize the 
“institutions and inscriptions [that] can stage such a particular style of per-
formance”—indeed is eager to categorize our sense that our lives are being 
staged as grounding “mistakes,” mistakes presumably because she assumes 
there is no such staging force, but useful mistakes that are “not a pathology” 
because they “enable us to make sense of our lives.” That this sense-making is 
apparently individualistic, trapped in an isolated perspective from which col-
lective groundings or stagings look like “mistakes,” suggests that Spivak is not 
inclined to theorize embodiment, performativity, agency, affect, and staging 
ideosomatically—but clearly, here, she has an intimation of ideosomaticity.
 Later in that autobiographical essay, in fact, she restages a pivotal event 
in her life when, in 1981, a ten-year close friendship with a Roman Catholic 
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man came to an end and she went to a psychoanalyst to deal with her “deep 
sense of loss, not the least of which was a sense of myself as a violent per-
son” (13). Spivak and her analyst spent a good deal of time talking about the 
Hindu goddess Kali, “who punished with a violence that she enjoyed”; the 
analyst ended by asking her “how can a man brought up with the blessed vir-
gin be able to understand that there can be this model of female violence that 
is loved and honoured?” (14). At the time, Spivak found this staging of her 
Hindu origins “helpful,” consoling; later she began to chafe against it, “as if I 
too were a monotheist who had organized my self image” (15). In her attempts 
to work through the complexities that begin to emerge for her out of these 
conflicted stagings of her origins, Spivak repeatedly invokes group construc-
tions, cultural organizations of reality, sidles up to the shaping impact they 
may or may not have had on her orientations to the world, and then shies 
away—as in fact she does in presenting the analyst’s invocation of Kali and 
the Virgin. The apparent double-voicing of “there can be this model of female 
violence that is loved and honoured” is problematic in several ways, one of 
which is that by reporting the analyst’s words through free-indirect narration 
Spivak seems to collectivize the utterance, to make it emerge from what Julia 
Kristeva calls intersubjectivity or intertextuality and I would call the somatic 
exchange, but without theorizing (or apparently even noticing) the crucial 
Bakhtinian blurring of the lines between collective and individual agency. 
Another is that her polyphony grammatically elides or evades the question 
of the ontology and disseminatory channel of the model of Kali and the love 
and the honor attached to that model, in both the depersonalized existen-
tial construct “there can be” and the depersonalized passive construct “that is 
loved and honoured”: there can be where? Loved and honored by whom? Are 
the model and the love and the honor in her head and violent body only, or 
in her parents’ and siblings’ heads and bodies as well, or “in” “the culture” of 
Calcutta Hinduism? And what does it mean to be both “in” that culture and 
“in” the heads and embodied performative orientations of Calcutta Hindus? 
The notion of the somatic exchange offers one explanation of the circulation 
of ideosomatic approval responses like “love” and “honor” for a punishing 
goddess image through the group of Calcutta Hindus, including Spivak’s fam-
ily; Spivak’s “there can be” would appear to reflect an unwillingness to push 
her theorization in that direction. Her subsequent resistance to the analyst’s 
formulation, “as if I too were a monotheist who had organized my self image,” 
seems on the face of it to be an attempt to problematize the “I” and the “my” 
and the “self ” of “I . . . had organized my self image”—an attempt to explore 
the group organization of self-image—but as it turns out Spivak is really only 
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interested in the problematics of the “monotheist moment” which “is never far 
away, it does not supervene” (15).
 Spivak returns to the problematic of affect in several essays in Outside in 
the Teaching Machine (1993), but, with the exception of a single essay that I 
want to read more carefully in §2.2.2.4—“Woman in Difference”—she does 
not really develop it there either. In “Marginality in the Teaching Machine,” 
for example, she cites the extension of Marx’s argument from value to affect 
that Deleuze and Guattari made in Anti-Oedipus: “they called it ‘desire,’ a word 
fully as misleading as ‘value’” (62), misleading, as she tells us in A Critique of 
Postcolonial Reason (1999), “because of its paleonymic burden of an originary 
phenomenal passion” (105). “Their suggestion was that,” she explains in Out-
side in the Teaching Machine, “since capital decoded and deterritorialized the 
socius by releasing the abstract as such, capitalism must manage this crisis via 
many reterritorializations, among which the generalized, psychoanalytic mode 
of production of affective value operates by way of a generalized systemic 
institution of equivalence spectacular in its complexity and discontinuity” 
(62). By the Critique, the problem has become that Deleuzean desiring-pro-
duction is too diffuse to be of much analytical use: “By the time one gets 
to call the effects of all the desiring-machines everywhere anything—capital, 
or nature, or despot—a good deal of inaccessible coding has already taken 
place. To quote Derrida, this inaccessible is the undecidable through which 
all decisions must cut. For there is of course a tremendous political differ-
ence between the name being capital, or despot, or yet nature” (106). Because 
desire as “originary phenomenal passion” can be produced and channeled and 
organized (value-coded) in a wide variety of ways, or rather because desir-
ing-production can be named in terms of a wide variety of paraphenomenal 
effects, ultimately as anything anywhere, its coding is inaccessible to us, unde-
cidable, and nothing else needs to be said about it. But—really? This seems 
rather hastily dismissive. If desiring-production is value-coded as capital, it 
produces the capitalist body-without-organs; if it is value-coded as nature, as 
the environment, it produces the Earth or Gaia as body-without-organs. How 
is this coding inaccessible or undecidable? Spivak’s deflection of Deleuzean 
desiring-production into the analytical abyss seems like an avoidance reac-
tion to what I take to be the key question: what is affective value? How is it 
produced and disseminated, deterritorialized and reterritorialized? My own 
theorization of the somatic exchange is heavily influenced by Anti-Oedipus, 
which I read some time in the early 1980s, a few years before I began to theo-
rize somatic response, so I know how I would read the production and dis-
semination of affective value—the somatomimetic circulation of evaluative 
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(approval/disapproval) body language and body states within the group for 
purposes of the normative regulation of social behavior, identity, and reality—
but is this how Spivak understands it as well? It is impossible to tell, as she 
never comments on the term, never even uses it in a context specific enough 
to enable her reader to guess at how she’s using it. Later in “Marginality” she 
characterizes patriarchy as “traffic in affective value-coding,” and opposes that 
to neocolonialism, which unpacks as “traffic in epistemic-cognitive-politi-
cal-institutional value-coding” (76)—but does this imply that affective value-
coding does not circulate through epistemic-cognitive-political-institutional 
value-coding? Is patriarchy for Spivak all affect and neocolonialism all the 
cognitive coding of political and institutional epistemes? Does the affective 
value-coding of patriarchy not also create and alter conditions of economic 
exploitation? Does a neocolonial power like the United States not attempt to 
saturate epistemic-cognitive-political-institutional value-coding with positive 
affective value-coding? And do the opponents of neocolonialism not attempt 
to recode negatively the affective value of U.S. “interests” and the policies 
and activities designed to protect those interests? I’m assuming Spivak would 
agree that the middle ground between the two poles of her casual binary is 
awash with overflows from each side; but she doesn’t notice that there is a 
theoretical problem with her binary formulation, so she does not explore it 
further.
2.2.2.2 The raw man
The other significant discussion of postcolonial affect in A Critique of Post-
colonial Reason comes at the other end of her first chapter, “Philosophy,” the 
beginning, where Spivak walks us through a close reading of specific telling 
passages in Kant, Hegel, and Marx that invoke the figure of the colonized in 
passing as an early stage in a strategic teleologization. In Kant the first such 
passage is this one from the Critique of Judgment:
That the mind be attuned to feel the sublime [Die Stimmung des Gemüts 
zum Gefühl des Erhabenen] postulates a susceptibility of the mind for ideas. 
For in the very inadequacy of nature to these latter, and thus only by pre-
supposing them and by straining the imagination to use nature as a schema 
for them, is to be found that which is terrible to sensibility and yet is attrac-
tive. [It is attractive] because reason exerts a dominion over sensibility 
[Sinnlichkeit “sensuality, carnality, animality”] in order to extend it in con-
formity with its proper realm (the practical) and to make it look out into 
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the infinite, which is for it an abyss. In fact, without development of moral 
ideas, that which we, prepared by culture [Kultur], call sublime presents 
itself to the uneducated man [dem rohen Menschen] merely as terrible. In 
the indications of the dominion of nature in destruction, and in the great 
scale of its might, in comparison with his own is a vanishing quantity, he 
will only see the misery, danger, and distress which surround the man who 
is exposed to it. (§29; Judgment 104–5, Urteilskraft 111)
Der rohe Mensch is literally “the raw man,” “raw” as in “rude” or “rough” or 
“uncouth,” “man” in the old patriarchal sense, “man” as a normatively male 
and in German grammatically masculine “human being.” Spivak’s critique 
pushes Kant into the realm of subalternity by posing three questions: whether 
the raw man can ever be female, whether the raw man can ever be educated 
or cultured or “cooked,” and how the European conception of the raw man is 
shaped by colonialism. She writes:
Those who are cooked by culture can “denominate” nature sublime [erha-
ben nennen], although necessarily through a metalepsis [“that substitutes 
respect for the object for respect for humanity (in the subject)”]. To the 
raw man the abyss comes forth [erhaben vorkommen] as merely terrible. 
The raw man has not yet achieved or does not possess a subject whose 
Anlage or programming includes the structure of feeling for the moral. He 
is not yet the subject divided and perspectivized among the three critiques. 
In other words, he is not yet or simply not the subject as such [emphasis 
added], the hero of the Critiques, the only example of the concept of a 
natural yet rational being. This gap between the subject as such and the 
not-yet-subject can be bridged under propitious circumstances by culture. 
As Freud noted, the transformation of the abyss (of nature’s infinity) from 
fearful to sublime through the supplementing mediation of reason—a vio-
lent shuttling from Abgrund to Grund—bears more than a resemblance to 
the Oedipal scene. (Critique 14–15)
Spivak notes that the raw man for Kant includes “specifically the child and the 
poor [and] can accommodate the savage and the primitive” (13), and consti-
tutes in his normative maleness a not-yet-subjectivity that “under propitious 
circumstances” can be brought to full as-such-subjectification by culture—an 
ameliorative (“bring them up to our level”) or counterregulatory regime that 
is associated historically with liberalism in Europe and paternalism in the 
colonies. To the extent that the raw man is a woman, however, she is, Spivak 
says, foreclosed in Kant as “naturally uneducable,” irredeemably roh or raw—
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uncookable, as it were, or unculturable no matter how much you cook her. 
The raw man, therefore, is not yet the subject as such; the raw woman, and 
especially the female subaltern, is simply not the subject as such. That last, the 
female subaltern simply not, is the terminus ad quem of Spivak’s argument not 
just because she is a postcolonial feminist, but because she is a poststructural-
ist postcolonial feminist—because she needs the binary negation simply not in 
order to open up an aporetic break or rupture within Kant’s idealized subject 
of judgment through the exclusion of the colonial other: “The aporia between 
the discontinuous texts of the raw man and the subject as such should make 
Kant’s critique of judgment unreadable in the strictest sense. Its readability is 
bought by ignoring the aporia, passing through it by way of the axiomatics 
of imperialism” (34). It becomes possible to define (European male) culture 
as judgment only through the exclusion or abjection of the (non-European 
and ideally also non-male) subaltern—which, as Spivak suggests out of Der-
rida’s deconstruction of Kant in “Economimesis” (21), is to the body politic 
of reason and transcendental idealism as vomit is to its body organic. Vomit 
is never “not yet” the subject as such; it is always “simply not” the subject as 
such.
 The significant thing about Spivak’s argument from the standpoint of 
somatic theory is that the differential “simply not” that she denominates as 
subalternity is ideally abstracted out of the realm of affect, while Kant’s “not 
yet,” his notion that the raw man may one day be subjectified to judgment by 
culture, is saturated in affect. Kant insists that we will not be able to feel the 
sublime (“zum Gefühl des Erhabenen”) until our minds are “attuned” to it: he 
writes in German of “die Stimmung des Gemüts,” from die Stimme “voice,” in 
the sense of adjusting a musical instrument till it emits the right “voice” or 
sound. When he insists that the mind must be attuned to be susceptible or 
receptive to “ideas,” therefore, he means susceptibility not to der reine Ver-
nunft or pure reason but to imagistic mappings or schematizings of those feel-
ings. Nature, he says, is inadequate to these mappings: we only find our way 
to those specific blendings of pain and pleasure that we call the sublime by 
“straining the imagination to use nature as a schema for them.” Indeed he 
tells us in the previous section that subliminity “does not reside in anything 
of nature, but only in our mind, in so far as we can become conscious that we 
are superior to nature within, and therefore also to nature without us (so far 
as it influences us)” (104). This consciousness of “our” superiority to “nature 
within” is specifically not the “dominion” that reason exerts over “sensibil-
ity”—die Sinnlichkeit or sensuous experience, the world of feeling and sensa-
tion—but the feeling of reason’s dominion over feeling, a felt superiority, and in 
that sense, as we saw in connection with Ngũgĩ on racism in the Preface, not 
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necessarily (all that) conscious. Another way of putting this is that the feeling 
Kant is theorizing as the productive mental power that generates sublimity is 
a feeling of mind emerging out of body, a feeling of mental images and ideas 
struggling to be free of feelings—a movement in the body-becoming-mind to 
which “we” must be counterregulatorily attuned by “culture” (Kultur), which 
is to say, by the iterosomatizing pressures of the group. The raw man is regu-
lated by his or her own group to experience “the indications of the dominion 
of nature in destruction, and in the great scale of its might,” as danger, and 
thus to feel terror; the raw man becomes the cultured man or woman through 
a process of being iterosomatically “cooked,” gradually counterregulated to 
experience that terror metanormatively as attractive, as thrilling in her or his 
imagistic mastery of its somatic power, and therefore as sublime.
 What Kant offers us here, in other words, is a protosomatic theory of “real-
ity” as regulated (constructed and maintained) collectively by “culture,” by 
the ideosomatics of the group. His insistence that the “reality” of the sublime 
“does not reside in anything of nature, but only in our mind,” and specifically 
in the somatic body-becoming-mind, is one founding principle of social-con-
structivist somatic theory, that reality is an ideosomatically regulated group 
construct; his insistence that individuals must be “attuned” to this group real-
ity-construct is another, the philosophical basis of the notion that we are not 
subject(ifi)ed to regulatory group norms instantly but must undergo a long 
iterative somatization to them. In this context, the raw man is simply an out-
grouper, someone who has not yet been iterosomatized as a member of the 
dominant (“cultured” or “cooked”) group.
2.2.2.3 SPeaking (of) SuBalTerniTy
One way of reading Spivak’s recurring insistence on the abstract differential 
binary as the key to subalternity, in fact, is that she is attempting to protect 
the subaltern out-grouper against affect, against a certain specific patroniz-
ing (power-laden) affect, the shared evaluative affect of (neo-/de)colonizing 
Western ameliorative liberalism, which sets a high affective price for group 
membership: allow yourself to be ideosomatically counterregulated by us or 
be invisible and inaudible to us. Certainly Kant’s remark on the raw man is sat-
urated with a regulatory contempt that is redolent of the missionary school or 
the teacher’s college. Perhaps binary logic, given a poststructuralist spin, will 
provide a safe haven? If we reduce the argument between “not yet” and “simply 
not” to an affect/logic binary, so that the “yet” has evaluative/regulatory affect 
as its entelechy and the “simply” signals logical simplification as the exclusion 
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of affect, then the “not yet” becomes a form of group directional (counterregu-
latory) pressure, while the “simply not” marks out a reassuringly stable and 
indeed almost mathematical absence or lack—though of course (this is the 
poststructuralist spin) it is also an absence of absence, a lack of lack, an abyssal 
negation of the very binarizing instance that negates, and therefore ultimately 
not stable at all. Still, the desomatized subaltern would seem to be ideally pro-
tected from the counterregulatory designs of the neocolonizing First World, 
the colonizing Second World, and the decolonizing Third World.
 And indeed Spivak’s most famous essay, the 1983 lecture that was first 
published in 1985 as “Can the Subaltern Speak? Speculations on Widow Sac-
rifice,” reprinted in a longer and more complexly argued form in Cary Nel-
son and Lawrence Grossberg’s Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, and 
finally revised and reprinted in A Critique of Postcolonial Reason, does seem 
to emerge out of something like this protective gesture: Spivak was tired of 
postcolonial intellectuals pretending to speak for the subaltern and wanted 
somehow to situate the subaltern in a space ideally shielded from such appro-
priations. Such a protected space is of course the “space of difference” (Cri-
tique 271n118) that defines subalternity as the shifting negated opposite of 
whatever Western intellectuals want it to be, and specifically as an idealized 
instance of (post)colonial disenfranchisement that cannot be heard by power 
elites: “if the subaltern can speak,” Spivak writes in “The New Historicism,” 
“then, thank God, the subaltern is not the subaltern any more” (283); or, as 
she tells Howard Winant in a 1990 interview, “the subaltern is the name of 
the place which is so displaced .  .  . that to have it speak is like Godot arriv-
ing on a bus” (“On the Politics” 91). Being heard by the power elite instantly 
desubalternizes the subaltern—but so presumably does being heard by other 
members of the erstwhile “subaltern” group, who also cease to be subaltern the 
instant no member of a power group is around to not-hear them.
 To the extent that subaltern differentiality is intended or taken to work as 
a kind of epistemological guerilla theater, in which Laozi’s “the dao that can 
be spoken is not the dao” becomes a playful cloaking device or shell game 
designed to mislead and distract the hegemonic reader, Spivak is arguably 
engaged in a Derridean or Deleuzean project that privileges intellectual play 
over (say) the economics of oppression. But this is precisely the project against 
which Spivak warns us in her article (in its 1988 incarnation):
It is impossible for contemporary French intellectuals to imagine the kind 
of Power and Desire that would inhabit the unnamed subject of the Other 
of Europe. It is not only that everything they read, critical or uncritical, is 
caught within the debate of the production of that Other, supporting or 
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critiquing the constitution of the Subject as Europe. It is also that, in the 
constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the 
textual ingredients with which such a subject could cathect, could occupy 
(invest?) its itinerary—not only by ideological and scientific production, 
but also by institution of the law. However reductionistic an economic 
analysis might seem, the French intellectuals forget at their peril that this 
entire overdetermined enterprise was in the interest of a dynamic eco-
nomic situation requiring that interests, motives (desires), and power (of 
knowledge) be ruthlessly dislocated. To invoke that dislocation now as a 
radical discovery [“nomad thought”] that should make us diagnose the 
economic (conditions of existence that separate our “classes” descriptively) 
as a piece of dated analytic machinery may well be to continue the work of 
that dislocation and unwittingly help in securing “a new balance of hege-
monic relations.” (280)
She cannot, therefore, protect subalternity from Western counterregulation 
simply by hiding it discursively, by dislocating it trickily; she has to locate it, 
say something positive about it, essentialize it. But of course that essentializa-
tion is in turn precisely the appropriative project against which she reacted in 
the first place, so that she seems aporetically trapped between two polarized 
interpretive strategies that are both complicit in the neocolonial/decolonizing 
counterregulation—and aporetically trapped not in the “good” or “playful” 
sense valorized by Derrida’s North American followers, either, since that con-
struction of the aporia too would remain complicit with empire in its dislo-
catory (Deleuzean) mode. All she can do, then, as Walter Montag remarks of 
the piece, is display “a dazzling array of tactical devices designed to ward off 
or pre-emptively neutralize the attacks of critics. We might say of Spivak what 
Althusser said of Lacan—that the legendary difficulty of the essay is less a 
consequence of the profundity of its subject matter than its tactical objectives: 
‘to forestall the blows of critics . . . to feign a response to them before they are 
delivered’ and, above all, to resort to philosophies apparently foreign to the 
endeavor ‘as so many intimidating witnesses thrown in the faces of the audi-
ence to retain the respect’” (par. 2).
 Still, Spivak has clung to her original thesis with remarkable tenacity over 
the three decades since she first articulated it, revising her arguments substan-
tially but in her revisions and interviews only rarely and equivocably deviating 
from her central claim that the subaltern cannot speak, which suggests that 
even in its radical deconstructive negativity it is a positive or essentializing 
claim, something that she believes is true of the heterogeneous class of the 
poorest and most radically disempowered people on earth.
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 The problem is, of course, that thematizing the deconstructive negativ-
ity of the “space of difference” as an essentializing positivity exposes it to 
both the affective protests coming out of identity politics and decolonizing 
social work (Spivak’s claim would paralyze efforts to improve the subaltern’s 
socioeconomic lot—the central accusation hurled at her in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, beginning with Benita Parry’s “Problems”) and the counteraffec-
tive response of syllogistic logic.25 Spivak’s response to the former has been 
to express warm sympathy and political solidarity but not to budge on the 
default differential speechlessness of the subaltern, and her response to the lat-
ter has been to engage in more deconstructive dodging—which is to say that 
she has done the only thing that she can do in her situation, short of recanting 
the theory entirely: kept fine-tuning her original arguments in brilliantly eva-
sive and never less problematic ways.
 For example, at the end of the Critique version of the essay she responds 
in some detail to two early challenges, “Can the Subaltern Vote?” by Medo-
voi, Raman, and Robinson, and Abena Busia’s “Silencing Sycorax,” saying, for 
example, in response to Busia, that “I am not laying the blame for the muting 
[of the subaltern] on the colonial authorities” (308–9):
As I have been saying all along, I think it is important to acknowledge our 
complicity in the muting, in order precisely to be more effective in the long 
run. Our work cannot succeed if we always have a scapegoat. The postco-
lonial migrant investigator is touched by the colonial social formations. 
Busia strikes a positive note for further work when she points out that, after 
all, I am able to read Bhubaneswari’s case, and therefore she has spoken in 
some way. Busia is right, of course. All speaking, even seemingly the most 
immediate, entails a distanced decipherment by another, which is, at best, 
an interception. That is what speaking is.
 I acknowledge this theoretical point, and also acknowledge the practi-
cal importance, for oneself and others, of being upbeat about future work. 
Yet the moot decipherment by another in an academic institution (willy-
nilly a knowledge-production factory) many years later must not be too 
quickly identified with the “speaking” of the subaltern. It is not a mere 
tautology to say that the colonial or postcolonial subaltern is defined as the 
being on the other side of difference, or an epistemic fracture, even from 
other groupings among the colonized. What is at stake when we insist that 
the subaltern speaks? (309)
 I would submit, however, that Spivak does not in fact “acknowledge this 
theoretical point,” here—that when it comes right down to it she cannot bring 
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herself to accept the full implications of the notion that “all speaking . . . entails 
a distanced decipherment by another.” After all, if that is “what speaking is,” 
and that “distanced decipherment” that constructs speech as speech cannot 
construct Bhubaneswari Bhaduri’s posthumous text as speech because as the 
subaltern she is “on the other side of difference,” then no one can speak. If the 
subaltern cannot speak, this is Spivak’s true conclusion: when run through 
the filter of deconstructive discourse analysis, all speech becomes impossible, 
because as would-be speakers we are all on the other side of difference to 
someone. It is obviously true that in “even seemingly the most immediate” 
speaking, with my friends and loved ones, I am always imposing a distanced 
decipherment on their words, which come to me across the gap of difference, 
and that decipherment invariably distorts what they are saying, so that all I 
am left with is my interpretive or “interceptive” construct of what they are 
saying, so that they can never speak as themselves, but must be assigned a 
mental category of speaking and meaning in my head; if all this is to be the-
matized as “not being able to speak,” then no one can speak.
 Walter Montag makes something like this point as well:
Even more curious than this transcendental turn itself is the argumenta-
tion Spivak musters to support her declaration, against all appearances, 
that the subaltern cannot speak. And she has called forth some very intimi-
dating witnesses on her behalf, the primary one, of course, being Derrida. 
Who better than the translator of Of Grammatology to remind us of the rel-
evance of Derrida’s critique of Western logocentrism and phonocentrism 
to political life and to show the utter folly, if not the disingenuousness, of 
Foucault’s call to publish the writings of prisoners as an integral part of 
the movement against the prisons, or the attempt to set up and archive 
for the workers’ voices as part of the project of proletarian self-emancipa-
tion (a project which Spivak has already criticized in categorical terms)? It 
appears, however, that no one has thought to ask whether Derrida’s argu-
ments (especially in Grammatology, the work in which such questions are 
most extensively examined) lead to such conclusions. Is there anything in 
Derrida’s critique of logocentrism that would allow us to say the subaltern 
cannot speak but must be spoken for, that is, represented both discur-
sively and politically by those who can speak, those who are real subjects 
of speech? In fact, it would appear that Derrida’s argument leads in pre-
cisely the opposite direction. For if we accept Derrida’s arguments against 
the speaking subject as ideal origin of speech, present to its utterances as 
a guarantee of their truth and authenticity, that is, that speech is always 
already a kind of writing, material and irreducible, we are left only with 
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the fact that there is no pure, original working class or subaltern (or ruling 
class), possessing a consciousness expressed in its speech or for that matter 
its acts. There is speech and writing (although these are only modalities of 
action which are in no way privileged) always and everywhere. It is pre-
cisely in and through the struggles that traverse these fields of practice that 
collectivities are constituted. (par. 8)
In this light, Spivak’s repeated insistence that the subaltern cannot speak as 
him/her/itself to the power elites begins to seem fueled by an objectivist nos-
talgia for a true speaking, a speaking from the heart, a speaking full of the 
transcendental presence of intentionality, a speaking that is not merely a Kan-
tian construct, not merely someone’s “interception.” In the context of subal-
ternity, of course, this nostalgia is further charged with the liberal guilt of the 
postcolonial power elite, the longing for a “true understanding of those poor 
people,” and an uncomfortable recognition that no such “true” understanding 
is possible—precisely the stance that Spivak first invented the theory to com-
bat, but one that, this analysis would suggest, is recuperated in her theory in 
negated form.
 What Montag calls the “struggles that traverse these fields of practice” and 
are constitutive of collectivities are in somatic terms the regulatory turbulence 
of the somatic exchange. In somatic theory speaking is not so much a private 
act that is “deciphered” or “intercepted” at a “distance” by “another” as it is 
saturated with group evaluative affect from the start; speech is invented as 
possible and regulated as meaningful by the somatic exchange, which circu-
lates meaning through the group, in the sense of circulating the ideosomatized 
interpretive orientations that make meaningful communication a pragmatic 
possibility. It seems to Spivak that the subaltern cannot speak, at the sim-
plest level, because the subaltern is not a member of her group, and therefore 
does not circulate the same interpretive orientations to speech. By the same 
token, anyone who does not speak one of her languages will similarly seem 
not to be able to speak—or, more radically still, anyone who speaks her lan-
guage but speaks it in disturbingly out-group ways, like a white supremacist 
or a pathological misogynist, will likewise seem not to be able to speak. We 
often say about our undergraduate students that they can’t talk, can’t think, 
can’t read—can’t “speak”—because they can’t conform their speech to the 
ideosomatic norms we circulate in our professorial groups. What Spivak was 
reacting against in writing “Can the Subaltern Speak?” was the liberal (West-
ern modern) project that impels us to try to overcome these in-group/out-
group barriers and “truly communicate”—to speak and be heard by others, 
to hear the speaking of others—with out-groupers that have historically been 
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excluded from our middle-class groups, especially the socially, politically, and 
economically disenfranchised, and then—if we admit failure, perhaps even 
recognize the inevitability of failure—somehow to justify that failure intellec-
tually. Spivak’s essay is at the very least a radical insistence on the inevitability 
of this project’s failure; but as many critics have argued, it functions also as 
an intellectual justification that essentializes subalternity as restricted by that 
failure, that indeed projects the failure of a complex but historically situated 
in-group/out-group dynamic onto the default “speechlessness” of subalternity 
as such.
 In fact, the one alternative model that Spivak broaches to the cannot-speak 
negativity of the subaltern space of difference comes very close to this somatic 
conception. In “Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography,” she reads 
the subaltern not as a (dis)unified (non-)subject at all but as a heterogeneous 
group that speaks collectively and anonymously through rumor, which she 
assimilates to Derrida’s notion of writing from “Signature Event Context”:
If, then, ‘rumour is spoken utterance par excellence’ (EAP 256), it must be 
seen that its ‘functional immediacy’ is its non-belonging to any one voice-
consciousness. This is supposed to be the signal characteristic of writing. 
Any reader can ‘fill’ it with her ‘consciousness.’ Rumour evokes comrade-
ship because it belongs to every ‘reader’ or ‘transmitter.’ No one is its origin 
or source. Thus rumour is not error but primordially (originarily) errant, 
always in circulation with no assignable source. This illegitimacy makes it 
accessible to insurgency. (23)
“Supposed to be the signal characteristic of writing” is evasive there, of course: 
she means supposed by Derrida, and by poststructuralists like herself. But 
this is an interesting deflective strategy: the theorist who has been arguing 
that the subaltern cannot speak now admits that there is a kind of subaltern 
speaking that is actually more like writing, or more like writing as theorized 
by Jacques Derrida, as if her strongest reservation about the notion that the 
subaltern could speak had been all along that this claim would implicitly con-
struct the subaltern as self-present and self-expressive subject. The subaltern 
can “speak,” Spivak now seems to be saying, as long as her/his/its “speaking” 
is an oral form of “writing,” “always in circulation with no assignable source.” 
Most important for Spivak in this admission, it seems, is the reader-response 
constructivism of speaking-as-writing: “Any reader can ‘fill’ it with her ‘con-
sciousness.’” It’s not the source of speech in individual intention that lends this 
speech authority; it’s simply the being-heard and the being-circulated: “Let us 
also remember that the mind-set of the peasants is as much affected by the 
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phonocentrism of a tradition where śruti—that which is heard—has the great-
est authority, as is the mind-set of the historian by the phonocentrism of West-
ern linguistics” (23). (Note there too Spivak’s willingness to essentialize “the 
mind-set of the peasants,” which is to say, to speak for the subaltern. As I’ll be 
suggesting in a moment, this is inevitable. Speaking for others is a condition of 
being able to speak at all. But there is a strain of postcolonial guilt that would 
purify discourse of all such retrograde impulses.)
 Interestingly, Margaret Mills has an article taking Spivak to task for refus-
ing to hear the voices of the subaltern—Spivak’s infamous question “seems 
more indicative of high theory’s hearing problem than of any subaltern Philo-
mena syndrome” (174)—in which she offers something very like this same 
model for the study of subaltern folklore: “If you buy (as I do) Marta Wei-
gle’s idea that gossip-anecdote can speak (constitute and articulate) cosmic 
order(s) just as much as cosmotactic myths do, then our data—anecdotes, gos-
sip, incidents where we were present—are always already speaking ‘theory’—
somebody’s theory, theory in the everyday—and it’s our job to sort out whose 
theory” (174, emphasis in original). The difference, of course, is that Spivak is 
only able to entertain the possibility of the subaltern speaking if the speaking 
is done anonymously, by a heterogeneous group—and Mills’s insistence that 
we “sort out whose theory” vitiates this.
 Still, from the standpoint of somatic theory, it seems extreme to binarize 
the group’s anonymous voice in rumor and gossip and the individual’s named/
bodied voice, given that the latter is conditioned by and saturated with the 
former. Rumor and gossip are precisely the regulatory speaking of the somatic 
exchange, the verbalized circulation of group evaluative affect—a much more 
effective hedge against hegemonic appropriations of the subaltern’s voice, to 
my mind, than the twists and turns of deconstructive negativity—and any 
attempt anyone makes, from inside or outside the group, to identify the “origi-
nal source” of a rumor or piece of gossip will continue to be conditioned by 
group-circulatory attributions of identity and meaning. Indeed it is only pos-
sible to spread rumors and gossip if one enters into that circulation, becomes 
a conduit for identity- and meaning-attributions, and in that capacity helps 
the group both to “sort out whose theory” and to diffuse gossiper identities 
through the group. I can only “start a rumor” if I am willing simultaneously 
to surrender my personal authorship of the rumor to the group and to take 
the blame for starting the rumor if the group should decide that it is essen-
tial to “sort out whose theory.” A “rumor” that is not instantly collectivized, 
instantly disseminated through the somatic exchange as its group-speech 
(group-opinion, group-speculation), is by definition no rumor at all: it is mere 
deregulatory grumbling. On a higher level of generality this means that it 
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only becomes possible to speak at all, to say things that others can hear and 
understand, insofar as one is willing to channel the group mind, to circulate 
meanings and identities through the somatic exchange. But this individual 
surrender to the group mind also entails a surrender to being spoken for, to 
having someone else explain what you mean, what you’re trying to say, what 
your “mind-set” was in saying what you said, and in fact in some cases a sur-
render to having someone identify you as the speaker of what was spoken, the 
originator of a rumor or other verbal epidemic, the performer of the speech 
act that set the insurgency in motion, the one to be lionized in group his-
tory or handed over to the cops. In this sense Spivak has it exactly backwards 
when she insists that the subaltern cannot speak, but can only be spoken for: 
the capacity to be spoken for is the group condition of all speech. Speaking 
and being spoken for circulate the same communicative impulse through the 
somatic exchange. As for the puritanical stricture that the subaltern should not 
be spoken for—well, then no one should, and no one should spread rumors, 
and no one should belong to groups that regulate their behavior, and no one 
should ever say anything, etc.
 Spivak’s thinking throughout the “can the subaltern speak?” debate is 
hobbled, I suggest, by a certain binarizing orientation that she picks up from 
Derrida: either the subaltern is a fully self-present subject who speaks as the 
externalization of personal inward intention, or the subaltern cannot speak; 
either “speech is the immediate expression of the self ” (23), or it is ideally cut 
adrift from self-expression, and therefore a form of “writing”; the subaltern 
either speaks or is spoken for by postcolonial elites. The somatic retheorization 
of speech and writing as ideosomatically conditioned, spoken/written/heard/
read, and often individualized (attributed to individual speakers or writers as 
self-expression) by the group is itself steeped in Derridean thought, especially 
perhaps “Signature Event Context”; but it brings to the stark (anti)metaphys-
ics of Derridean (anti)binaries the as-if correctives of Kantian, Nietzschean, 
and Burkean constructivism, according to which it’s possible to recognize and 
analyze the ideosomatic constructedness of a speaking subject while still con-
tinuing to respond to the speaking of that subject as if it were fully ontolo-
gized. Of course the subaltern is a group construct. Of course the spoken-for 
construction of the subaltern by Western postcolonial intellectual groups will 
be complicit in neocolonialism. Of course I will never know what any given 
member of a subaltern group “really means.” But nor will I ever know what 
Spivak “really means,” or what I myself “really mean.” And yet, iterosomati-
cally guided by the various groups I belong to, I continue to live as if I could, 
continue to circulate (and act on) group attributions of meaning and iden-
tity to Spivak, myself, and the subaltern, flawed and incomplete and indeed 
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propagandistic as they no doubt are. And in fact I respond with a good deal 
of discomfort to that totalizing fetish of epistemic purity that would require 
my knowledge to be perfect before I can legitimately allow myself to act on it, 
because it is only my epistemic uncertainties that allow me to act at all—even 
though, I suspect, my pragmatic impatience conceals and enables complicity 
in neocolonialism and other power-ideologies. The rampant contradictions 
in Spivak’s theorization of the default speechlessness of the subaltern suggest 
to me that she is impatient also with that fetish—but, at least to date, perhaps 
because she is more determined than I am not to seem complicitous in power-
ideologies, she remains as much affected by it as she says Indian peasants are 
by śruti.
2.2.2.4 liTerary rePreSenTaTionS: “douloTi The BounTiful”
It may well be that the specific examples Spivak has chosen in order to inter-
rogate the concept of the subaltern have made it especially difficult for her to 
find her way out of abstract differentialities: the subaltern as sati and the sub-
altern as the Third World female other of Kant’s raw man, both in a sense the 
other of the colonizer’s other, seem to trap affect as a black hole traps light, so 
densely desomatized that it seems impossible to discuss them in terms of their 
affective response to communal pressures. Her one piece where this is not 
the case is “Woman in Difference,” the 1989/1990 essay originally published 
in Cultural Critique and reprinted in Outside in the Teaching Machine that 
reads Spivak’s own English translation of Mahasweta Devi’s Bengali novella 
“Douloti the Bountiful.” Because Mahasweta specifically subjectifies Douloti 
as a tribal girl sold into bonded prostitution, in reading this story Spivak is in 
a sense beginning at the other end, the self or subject or affect end of “subal-
ternity”; as a result the essay is Spivak’s most extensive analytical mobilization 
of affect in her work to date, and her most determined attempt to thematize 
the subaltern woman not just as a binary effect of discourse but as an affective 
subjectivity.
 I say “in a sense,” though, because Spivak does still begin with the space 
of difference: Mahasweta, she says, “lingers in postcoloniality in the space of 
difference, in decolonized terrain” (105, emphasis in original).26 The space of 
difference, not surprisingly, is the subaltern:
Especially in a critique of metropolitan culture, the event of political inde-
pendence can be automatically assumed to stand between colony and 
decolonization as an unexamined good that operates a reversal. But the 
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political goals of the new nation are supposedly determined by a regulative 
logic derived from the old colony, with its interest reversed: secularism, 
democracy, socialism, national identity, and capitalist development. What-
ever the fate of this supposition, it must be admitted that there is always 
a space in the new nation that cannot share in the energy of this reversal. 
This space had no established agency of traffic with the culture of imperial-
ism. Paradoxically, this space is also outside of organized labor, below the 
attempted reversals of capital logic. Conventionally, this space is described 
as the habitat of the subproletariat or the subaltern. Mahasweta’s fiction 
focuses on it as the space of the displacement of the colonization-decoloni-
zation reversal. This is the space that can become, for her, a representation 
of decolonization as such. (77–78)
The idea here is that the decolonizing reversal should by rights reverse the 
exclusion of the subaltern into an inclusion, reverse the lack of “established 
agency of traffic with the culture of imperialism” into an established agency of 
traffic with the decolonizing culture of organized labor and capital logic, but, 
paradoxically, it doesn’t: the exclusion remains an exclusion, the lack remains 
a lack, suggesting to Spivak that there is something in that subaltern “space” 
that by its very differential nature displaces or repels the reversal. This would 
make subalternity the negative or abyssal image of decolonization as positive 
ideal, and thus the perfect deconstructive “representation of decolonization 
as such.” Noting that the positive ideal of decolonization reverses “empire” 
as “nation,” Spivak asks: “(1) How does Mahasweta inscribe this space of dis-
placement, if not with the lineaments of the nation? (2) What does it mean to 
say ‘socially invested cartography of bonded labor?’ and (3) How does Mahas-
weta suggest, even within this space, that the woman’s body is the last instance, 
that it is elsewhere?” (78–79).
 Her answer to that first question is that Mahasweta names subaltern com-
munities, names and so “releases” them, allowing the reader “to grasp that 
the word ‘India’—signifier of ‘nation’—is sometimes a lid on an immense and 
equally unacknowledged subaltern heterogeneity” (79). Her answer to the sec-
ond is that the novella’s bond-slaves—all the central characters—are trans-
coded in the story into a “broad collectivity” or shomaj, the customary Bengali 
word for “society.” These two answers clear the ground for her sticking point, 
the third:
There is no avoiding this, even if the story is read by way of the broad-
est possible grid: in modern “India,” there is a “society” of bonded labor, 
where the only means of repaying a loan at extortionate rates of interest is 
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hereditary bond-slavery. Family life is still possible here, the affects taking 
the entire burden of survival. Below this is bonded prostitution, where 
the girls and women abducted from bonded labor or kamiya households 
[as the eponymous Douloti is] are thrust together as bodies for absolute 
sexual and economic exploitation. These bodies are connected to bond 
slavery but are yet apart.  .  .  . Woman’s body is thus the last instance in a 
system whose general regulator is still the loan: usurer’s capital, imbricated, 
level by level, in national industrial and transnational global capital. This, 
if you like, is the connection. But it is also the last instance on the chain of 
affective responsibility, and no third world-Gramscian rewriting of class 
as subaltern-in-culture has taken this into account in any but the most 
sentimental way: . . . (82)
 Here, finally, are affects as the sole carriers of the “burden of survival,” in 
the family life that is still possible in the next-to-last instance of bond-slavery, 
the life of Douloti’s mother and father, the life Douloti too leads until at four-
teen she is bought into kamiya prostitution. It is interesting that what does the 
heavy lifting here is “the affects,” a fairly nonspecific catch-all category that 
presumably includes familial love and support; and that on the previous page 
Spivak describes “the precariously manipulative function called ‘the nation-
state’” as “coded and reterritorialized with the heavy paleonymic (historically 
stuffed) baggage of reason and affect” (81), an even more nonspecific catch- 
all category that lumps emotional states in with mental mappings of those 
states as rationality. There is a metaleptic shift in these two tropes, the rational- 
affective burden carrying the burden of survival; how should we understand 
that shift? What makes affect heavy, and what equips it to carry the heavy 
burden of survival? By the paleonymic baggage of reason and affect Spivak 
apparently means that reason and affect are historically overcoded or over-
determined (“stuffed”); but what are they stuffed with? The paleonymic bag-
gage of reason and affect is heavy, because it is historically stuffed; survival is 
another heavy burden, but this time carried by affect. And what kind of sur-
vival? Does Spivak mean specifically affective survival—that affective survival 
is made possible by the familial circulation of supportive affect? Or would she 
include economic and physical survival as well, the entire burden of survival 
being taken by the affects?
 In any case, in “the last instance,” the extreme case of bond-slavery, 
kamiya-prostitution, the affective value-coding of life as family life is almost 
completely blocked: not only are daughters taken from parents and wives from 
husbands, but the children with whom the kamiya-prostitutes are impreg-
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nated by clients are taken from their mothers and sent into the streets to beg 
as well. This does not prevent the prostitute-mothers from feeling a maternal 
belonging to their children, but their feeling is not value-coded as “maternal” 
by the social machine, as the children do not legally belong to them—because 
they do not belong to themselves. They belong to the “god,” the master, the 
bond-holder. This affective value-decoding of their own bodies and their own 
intentionalities is reflected in Douloti’s depersonalization, her desomatizing 
withdrawal of all affect: “The social system that makes [her father] Crook 
Nagesia a kamiya is made by men. Therefore do Douloti, Somni, Reoti [the 
bond-prostitutes] have to quench the hunger of male flesh. Otherwise Para-
mananda [the bond-holder] does not get money. Why should Douloti be 
afraid? She has understood now that this is natural. Now she has no fear, no 
sorrow, no desire” (61).
 But it is here, I suggest, in her discussion of the affective value-(de)coding 
of mothering, that Spivak’s vagueness about affect begins to hurt her:
The affective coding of mothering extends from sociobiology all the way 
to reproductive rights. Before the mobilization of the reproductive rights 
debate began in the West, demanding the full coding of the woman’s body 
in constitutional abstractions, Simone de Beauvoir had suggested that, in 
the continuum of gestation, birthing, and child-rearing, the woman passes 
through and crosses over her inscription as an example of her species-body 
to the task of producing an intending subject. . . .
 Among the women of this fiction [“Douloti the Bountiful”], preg-
nancy as the result of copulation with clients allows the working out of the 
inscription of the female body in gestation to be economically rather than 
affectively coded. (89)
What she means by “economically rather than affectively coded” is reasonably 
clear in the terms given us by Mahasweta: what happens to the prostitute-
mother’s newborn infant is determined not by social ideals of maternity but 
by the bond-holder’s economic interests. Caring for an infant would take the 
mother away from servicing twenty to thirty clients a day and so cut into his 
profits; the infant must go, must be sent away.
Somni put her hand to her cheek and said, “See what a strange thing. I was 
married in childhood, and I stayed with my man for so long. I had only one 
son. And Latia made me the mother of three sons in a row.”
 —Those sons?
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 —They lie around the marketplace. They beg. They don’t let you live 
with your child, and clients come up to one month before birth. Then I 
can’t for three months.
 —Then?
 —The god lends money.
 —Doesn’t he let you keep them?
 —No no, would he? When I am burnt up, I go see them. Reoti’s son 
too is Latia’s son. And it was Latia’s truck that hit him and crippled him. As 
a cripple he gets more begging. He got a shirt too. (63)
Paramananda hasn’t given food and upkeep, Latia has impregnated her 
time after time. Still was it correct of Somni to let her body get so chewed 
up? (67)
Douloti shook her head. Said, “Uncle Bono, if a kamiya woman becomes a 
whore the boss makes a lot of profit. No clothing, no cosmetics, no medi-
cine. You have to borrow for everything and the boss adds all the loans to 
the first loan. No whore can repay that debt in her lifetime.” (73)
 So, okay: economics, not affect. But what conditions the economics? What 
makes not just the beneficiaries of this economic system but its victims as well 
cling tight to it, even desperately to it, like dying men to a float? The answer 
that Mahasweta has her characters give is tradition, religion:
It’s best to go by set rules [Munabar, Douloti’s father’s Rajput bond-holder, 
says to his son]. Rule breaking is not good. (43)
Paramananda [the brahman master or “god” who is trying to convince 
Crook to let him “marry” Douloti in return for paying off his bond to 
Munabar] gripped Crook hard. Crook filled the sky with his screams. 
“Truth is being destroyed, the Law is being destroyed! This brahman, this 
god, is holding me [Crook is an untouchable], please! He must be plumb 
crazy.” (46)
What word, what he should listen to, he didn’t think at all. He said “yes” to 
whatever he heard. Because if the Master says something the machine in 
Crook’s head stops working out of fear. He hears the Master’s bellows, but 
grasps nothing. To say “Yes Sir” to the proprietor is a very long-standing 
habit. (49)
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 Rampiyari said, “How will it end? Paramanandaji told me that it is 
written in the great epics Ramayana and Mahabharata that ending bonded 
labor is against religion.” (81)
—The boss can do what he likes with the person who becomes a bondslave 
[Paramananda’s son Baijnath says to the nationalist radicals who want to 
end bond-slavery, upon taking over the whorehouse after his father’s sud-
den death]. Yes or no?
 —The government will end bondslavery.
 —The big government officers in Palamu keep kamiyas and seokias. 
Who will stop bondslavery?
 —I’ll tell you, the big government. Delhi government.
 —It can’t be. Bondslavery is an ancient law. That is written in religious 
books.
 —What book?
 —I’ve heard. (84)
 Is this pure economic value-coding? At the very least, even if we take 
Rampiyari and Baijnath to be using religion cynically to justify their manipu-
lation of the bond-labor system to enhance their profits, by invoking religious 
books to defend a traditional injustice they value-code economics as divine 
law—something far greater and more powerful than sheer numbers. And 
Mahasweta gives us no indication that they are speaking cynically: they do 
seem to believe that the ancient religious books not only tolerate but demand 
bond-slavery. (Mahasweta tells us in the interview with Spivak that introduces 
the volume that “the bonded labor system was introduced by the British. They 
created a new class, which took away tribal land and converted the tribals 
into debt-bonded slaves. The present government of India had to introduce, 
in 1976, the Bonded Labor Abolition Act” [xii]. But the bond-holders in the 
novella don’t know this. For them the system is traditional, therefore affec-
tively crucial.) Munabar value-codes bond-labor economics as the rule of law, 
the law of rules, regulation as a guarantor of stability, protection against the 
insecurities of social change, which he tropes as the West Wind: is this simple 
cynical greed? Hasn’t Munabar been conditioned to believe in bond-slavery, 
conditioned to believe that it is the natural way of the world, conditioned fur-
ther to believe that bad things would happen not just to him but to everyone, 
to life itself, if it were abolished? In other words, isn’t there an affective/evalu-
ative (ideosomatic) conditioning that disposes these power-holders to hold 
onto their power? The fear that grips Crook Nagesia when the Master bellows 
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or Paramananda grips him is obviously an affective/evaluative body state that 
tells him how to behave, what to believe and what to say and what to do in the 
presence of his social superiors; the Rajput and Brahmin bond-holders defend 
their economic system with considerably more poise and self-possession—the 
calm somatics of authority—but they too are clearly “organized” by tradition 
and religion through affective channels.
 Of course it’s true that the Master’s ability to overlay his own nervous 
or anxious affect with the outward somatic display of authoritative “reason” 
would support Spivak’s claim that what is at work here is economic rather than 
affective value-coding27: value-coding is no ontology but a social semiotizing 
process that makes things be what the authorities want them to seem to be, 
and in capitalist patriarchy the authority of the wealthy male is normatively 
value-coded as “rational” rather than “emotional,” which is to say as the mind’s 
dominion over the body. In this sense Spivak’s insistence that “pregnancy as 
the result of copulation with clients allows the working out of the inscrip-
tion of the female body in gestation to be economically rather than affectively 
coded” supports capitalist patriarchy’s protective (re)ideosomatization of the 
authorities’ feelings as numbers, the Master’s body as thoroughly and calmly 
mastered by numeric mind. In this ideosomatic regime, only the lower orders 
are “value-coded” in terms of affect, the tears of powerless women and chil-
dren, the fears of powerless men.
 Indeed throughout her reading of the novella, Spivak repeatedly thema-
tizes affect as Douloti’s sentimental conservatism:
Her relationship to her mother, who is still in the village, is filled with 
affect. In terms of the critical implications of our argument, it has to be 
admitted that this affective production, fully sympathetic, is yet repre-
sented within rather than prior to an accepted code. . . . Like the affection 
between mother and daughter, Douloti’s affect for her village, again gently 
and beautifully written, is within a recognizable coding of sentiment. And 
indeed, as we see in the following passage, this unresisting nostalgia, dis-
missing planned resistance as futile, seems to rely on a conservative pre-
capitalist coding of the sexual division of labor. . . . Douloti’s affect for her 
home is thus staged carefully by Mahasweta as the “residual” bonding that 
works against social change and, ultimately, against the achievement of 
national social justice, a project in which the author is deeply involved as 
an activist. Mahasweta dismisses neither side, but presents Douloti’s affect 
and, ultimately, Douloti herself, as the site of a real aporia. You cannot give 
assent to both on the same register. (92–93, emphasis in original)
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This is all true; Spivak’s aporetic reading of the ending is powerful and persua-
sive. But by thematizing affect in the story as Douloti’s affect, and by implicit 
extension as the sanctioned body state of subaltern women, she also misses 
the more pervasive and more complex operation of affect in the men as well, 
not merely the tribals who have broken free of bond-slavery and joined the 
party of decolonizing nationalists—“Prasad roared out, ‘That’s enough, get out 
of here’” (84), “It is only Uncle Bono’s breast that’s bursting with an equal pain” 
(87)—but the stubbornly exploitative bond-holders as well, who are trapped 
by traditionalizing (iterosomatic) affect in the moils of their own destructive 
economic power. That this authoritarian male affect is another form of “‘resid-
ual’ [or, in the original article (126), ‘regressive’] bonding that works against 
social change and, ultimately, against the achievement of national social jus-
tice” should be obvious but isn’t, to Spivak, because she recuperates in her 
reading the patriarchal affective value-coding that assigns affect to women and 
reason to men.28
 Restricting her thematization of affect to Douloti’s nostalgic sentimental-
ism also numbs Spivak to the affective impact on the reader of the ending’s 
aporetic speech act: “You cannot give assent to both on the same register. I 
am also arguing that, in terms of the general rhetorical conduct of the story, 
you also cannot give assent, in the same register, to the evocation of a space 
prior to value-coding, on the one hand, and the sympathetic representation of 
Douloti as a character, recognizable within an earlier discursive formation, on 
the other” (93). I think this falls apart, in fact. You can give “assent” to these 
cognitive structures, evocations of spaces and sympathetic representations, 
even in the “same register,” since registers are just more cognitive structures 
that can quite easily tolerate this kind of dissonance. What Mahasweta does to 
us in portraying Douloti is not just to “evoke a space prior to value-coding” or 
to “represent” her sympathetically: rather, she gets us to identify with her, to 
simulate her body-becoming-mind states somatomimetically, and thus to feel 
with her as her body is progressively ravaged by venereal disease and finally 
she dies—but dies not angrily, not bitterly, not rebelliously, but gently, kindly, 
naively, acceptingly, infecting us not just with her death but with her senti-
mental acceptance of her death and of the system that caused it. The affective 
aporia Mahasweta is inflicting on us is nothing so statically representational 
as the evocation of a space, a space of difference or displacement or decolo-
nization or anything so abstract; it makes us feel the ponderous polynorma-
tivity of the decolonizing counterregulation, the slow inertial grinding of the 
nationalists’ decolonizing rage at injustice against everyone else’s conditioned 
acquiescence to that injustice. What Mahasweta infects us with, in fact, is not 
174 |  SeCOnD eSSay
just an aporia, an “undecidable in the face of which decisions must be risked” 
(Spivak 93), but radically opposed regulatory affects, social evaluative feelings 
that incline us to move in opposite directions, toward activism and toward 
quietism, toward the bringing about of a utopian world where Douloti would 
not have needed to die horribly at the age of thirty and toward a surrender 
to the status quo as not so bad after all. In this sense Spivak is quite right to 
say that for Mahasweta subalternity is “a representation of decolonization as 
such”: in Douloti she feels, and tries to get her reader to feel, the clash of decol-
onizing normativities.
We have explored  the dysregulatory effects of refugee trauma and 
the counterregulatory effects of colonization; it remains now to examine the 
paleoregulatory effects of both refugee trauma and various severely traumatiz-
ing colonial practices (genocide, enslavement, cultural subjugation) on later 
generations. Let’s begin by looking back at the passage from Nietzsche’s Gene-
alogy of Morals that I quoted in §2.1.1:
“How does one create a memory for the human animal? How does one go 
about to impress anything on that partly dull, partly flighty human intel-
ligence—that incarnation of forgetfulness—so as to make it stick?” As we 
might well imagine, the means used in solving this age-old problem have 
been far from delicate: in fact, there is perhaps nothing more terrible in 
man’s earliest history than his mnemotechnics. “A thing is branded on the 
memory to make it stay there; only what goes on hurting will stick”—this 
is one of the oldest and, unfortunately, one of the most enduring psycho-
logical axioms. In fact, one might say that wherever on earth one still finds 
solemnity, gravity, secrecy, somber hues in the life of an individual or a 
nation, one also senses a residuum of that terror with which men must for-
merly have promised, pledged, vouched. It is the past—the longest, deep-
est, hardest of pasts—that seems to surge up whenever we turn serious. 
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Whenever man has thought it necessary to create a memory for himself, 
his effort has been attended with torture, blood sacrifice. The ghastliest 
sacrifices and pledges, including the sacrifice of the first-born; the most 
repulsive mutilations, such as castration; the cruelest rituals in every reli-
gious cult (and all religions are at bottom systems of cruelty)—all these 
have their origin in that instinct which divined pain to be the strongest aid 
to mnemonics. (II:3, 192–93)
“The residuum of that terror,” “the past . . . that seems to surge up”: these are 
among the first theorizations we have of what has come to be called the mul-
tigenerational transmission of trauma, historical trauma, or intergenerational 
trauma. Nietzsche’s idea is that trauma is stored and repeatedly retrieved for 
what I am going to be calling the paleosomatic regulation not only of indi-
viduals but of whole civilizations: “only what goes on hurting” generation after 
generation “will stick” to a nation, to a civilization, or to “man.” We saw in the 
Second Essay that this is a powerfully ideosomatic formulation—the mne-
motechnics of pain involve the circulation of regulatory responses to pain 
through the somatic economy of the group—but Nietzsche does not theorize 
the somatics of the intergenerational transmission itself, the way in which 
traumatic pain conditions the memory not just of living people but of future 
generations as well. He just assumes it.
 It is crucial for Nietzsche’s later influence on Sigmund Freud that his 
explanatory strategy here is grounded in the medical metaphorics of dis-
ease and its symptomatologies, epidemiologies, and cures: he calls “the con-
stantly spreading ethics of pity . . . the most sinister symptom of our sinister 
European civilization” (Preface:5, 154); he writes of the “cures” developed by 
“priestly aristocracies” for various disease-like evils and insists that “humanity 
is still suffering from the after-effects of those priestly cures” (I:6, 165–66); he 
calls the “descendants of every European and extra-European slavedom” the 
“carriers of the leveling and retributive instincts” (I:11, 176). His most com-
plex exfoliations of this medical metaphor tend to be brief but suggestive lists 
of interpretive categories that he does not then pursue: “We need a critique of 
all moral values; the intrinsic worth of these values must, first of all, be called 
in question. To this end we need to know the conditions from which those 
values have sprung and how they have developed and changed: morality as 
consequence, symptom, mask, tartufferie, sickness, misunderstanding; but, 
also, morality as cause, remedy, stimulant, inhibition, poison” (Preface:6, 155).
 When Freud picks up this idea of the multigenerational transmission of 
trauma, in his revisiting of his “historical” theory of the primal scene from 
Totem and Taboo in Moses and Monotheism, he takes over not only the medi-
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cal metaphor but one telltale trope (“residuum of terror”  > “mental residue”); 
but Freud is as unable to explain the transmission of trauma as Nietzsche is:1
After the combination of brother clans, matriarchy, exogamy, and totemism 
had been established there began a development which may be described 
as a slow “return of the repressed.” The term “repressed” is here used not in 
its technical sense. Here I mean something past, vanished, and overcome in 
the life of a people, which I venture to treat as equivalent to repressed mate-
rial in the mental life of the individual. In what psychological form the past 
existed during its period of darkness we cannot as yet tell. It is not easy to 
translate the concepts of individual psychology into mass psychology, and I 
do not think that much is to be gained by introducing the concept of a “col-
lective” unconscious—the content of the unconscious is collective anyhow, 
a general possession of mankind. So in the meantime the use of analogies 
must help us out. The processes we study here in the life of a people are 
very similar to those we know from psychopathology, but still they are not 
quite the same. We must conclude that the mental residue of those prime-
val times has become a heritage which, with each new generation, needs 
only to be awakened, not to be reacquired. (Moses 169–70)
The “repressed” here is guilt over the murder of the father by the brothers, from 
Totem and Taboo—repressed, as Freud suggests, in a displaced or analogical 
sense, so that “something past, vanished, and overcome in the life of a people” 
returns, slowly, as the collective equivalent of the return of the repressed in 
“the mental life of the individual.” What the repressed and ever slowly return-
ing “mental residue” is in a civilization, how it was stored through its “period 
of darkness,” or how it is “awakened” in each new generation, he has no idea; 
these are the questions that Heinz Kohut and other protosomatic attachment 
theorists have attempted to answer. He can only trope the processes in ques-
tion in terms of the reemergence into the light of something that has been 
long relegated to the dark, the reawakening of something that has been put to 
sleep, or the rediscovery of the residue of some long-past chemical reaction.
 How then does the multigenerational transmission of trauma work? 
This is a question that began to be asked again in the 1970s, first by Holo-
caust scholars, specifically in the context of the lingering effects of Holocaust 
trauma on the children of Holocaust survivors, and then by scholars of other 
traumatic histories as well, especially the genocide and various forced reloca-
tions and reeducations of Native Americans and the genocide and subjuga-
tion of Africans in the slave trade. And indeed after focusing for most of this 
book on refugee and (de)colonized populations in other countries, in this last 
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essay I turn to intergenerational trauma in two groups in my own country: the 
paleoregulatory effects of genocide and cultural subjugation on Native Ameri-
cans, and of genocide, slavery, and cultural subjugation on African Ameri-
cans. As in the two previous essays, I will be following these empirical studies 
with a look at literary representations—James Welch’s The Death of Jim Loney 
(1979), Toni Morrison’s Beloved (1987), and Percival Everett’s “The Appropria-
tion of Cultures” (1996). Since there have not exactly been “theoretical spins” 
on intergenerational trauma, I will not provide a separate section for the post-
colonial theory of historical trauma; but I will, in §3.2.4, build my conclusion 
around Dominic LaCapra’s poststructuralist theorization of what he calls “his-
torical trauma” in Writing History, Writing Trauma (1999).
3.1 emPirical StudieS
The empirical study of what is variously called intergenerational trauma, his-
torical trauma, and the trans- or multigenerational transmission of trauma—
especially as massively anthologized in Yael Danieli’s 1998 book International 
Handbook of Multigenerational Legacies of Trauma—typically encompasses 
the following:
1. studies of the original traumatizing experience(s), such as the Ameri-
can or Nazi Holocaust or other genocides, the dropping of the atomic 
bomb on Nagasaki and Hiroshima, war and the POW experience, 
enslavement, forced relocation, repressive regimes, and domestic vio-
lence;
2. studies of the effects of trauma on its survivors;
3. studies of the effects of parenting by trauma survivors on their children 
(the “mechanism” of intergenerational transmission, and thus the pri-
mary problem that Nietzsche and Freud failed to address); and
4. studies of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptomatologies in 
populations who have not undergone trauma themselves and so can be 
assumed to have inherited some form of allostatic overload from some 
traumatized previous generation(s).
Some psychobiological studies of intergenerational trauma in humans and 
animals (Suomi and Levine, Yehuda et al., Krystal et al.) focus on (3) and (4), 
with background looks at (2); but the bulk of the work being done in the field 
seems prescriptively to require all four stages of the argument, for the per-
haps obvious reason that it is impossible to establish with any empirical cer-
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tainty that, say, disproportionately high rates of alcoholism, suicide, domestic 
violence, heart disease, and diabetes in Native American populations are the 
direct paleoregulatory endosomatic after-effects of the American Holocaust. 
By showing that trauma does radically counterregulate not only individuals 
but also the somatic economies that give their lives meaning and structure, 
that this counterregulation is demonstrably transferred virally from parents 
to children, and that populations who have not undergone severe trauma 
demonstrably suffer disproportionately high incidences of PTSD symptom-
atologies, intergenerational trauma scholars build a strong circumstantial case 
for the transgenerational transmission of trauma.
 In the first chapter of Danieli’s Handbook, “Intergenerational Memory of 
the Holocaust,” Nanette C. Auerhahn and Dori Laub begin with what they call 
“forms of traumatic memory” in trauma survivors [(2) in the previous para-
graph’s list], ten in number, from the least to the most “memorious”:
2a. not knowing, caused by “massive psychic trauma [that] breaks through 
the stimulus barrier and defies the individual’s ability to formulate 
experience” (23);
2b. screen memories, “the creation of an alternative, possibly false, self that 
screens over the absence of memory” (25);
2c. fugue states, “the intrusive appearance of split off, fragmented behav-
iors, cognitions, and affect, which are pieces of the traumatic memory 
or experience” (28, emphasis in original);
2d. the retention of decontextualized fragments of the trauma, in which 
“the individual has an image, sensation, or isolated thought, but does 
not know with what it is connected, what it means, or what to do with 
it” (29);
2e. transference phenomena, involving “the grafting of isolated fragments 
of the past on to current relationships and life situations that become 
colored by these ‘memories’” (30);
2f. overpowering narratives, in which some scene from the traumatizing 
experience is atemporally relived, so that “He or she is in the experi-
ence once again; he or she is the same age again” (31);
2g. life themes, in which the overpowering narratives are used to organize 
personality and behavior (“identity and striving”) thematically, which 
requires the establishment of “a degree of distance from the traumatic 
event” (32);
2h. witnessed narratives, “in which the observing ego remains present as a 
witness,” so that “knowing takes the form of true memory” (33);
2i. trauma as “metaphor and vehicle for developmental conflict” (33); and
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2j. “action knowledge, in which knowing becomes consciously conse-
quential and thus determines subsequent action” (35).
 Like most psychoanalytically oriented scholars of intergenerational 
trauma, Auerhahn and Laub tend to study these forms of traumatic memory 
in individuals: “although none of the various forms of traumatic memory 
are mutually exclusive,” they write, “and several may, to a greater or lesser 
degree, coexist in any particular individual at any given point in time, it is 
generally true that victims know mostly through retention of unintegrated 
memories or by reliving such memories in transfererence phenomena” (36). 
Somatic theory would situate these individual remembering and know-
ings in a larger circulatory economy of such knowings, which in fact—the 
somatic economy—would be the collective structuring context in which it 
becomes possible to distinguish between, say, decontextualized fragments 
(2d) and transference phenomena (2e). How, after all, is the individual to 
determine what is a false memory and what is a true one, what is a present 
affect and what is a transferential affect grafted onto present relationships 
from the past? This sort of determination can only be made by the group—
at a bare minimum by the analyst–patient dyad. Again like most psycho-
analytically oriented scholars, Auerhahn and Laub tend to thematize these 
group determinations not as collective constructs but as empirical truths, 
objective facts—an epistemologically indefensible position that would seem 
to have more to do with the group fetishization (ideosomatic idealization) of 
scientism in the psychoanalytical community than it does with what can be 
reasonably established empirically.
 If we take the list of (2a–j) ten forms of traumatic memory Auerhahn 
and Laub list not as a stable taxonomy of isolated memory types in individu-
als, then, but as a tentative formulation of group constructions of traumatic 
dysregulations of knowing and remembering—as circulatory organizations of 
deviations from ideosomatic regulations of reality and identity—then we can 
retheorize their list as a collective portrait of the paleosomatic regulation that 
will be retroactively constituted as the etiological ground zero of intergenera-
tional trauma, the (dys)regulatory allostatic regime that will be thematized as 
handed down from generation to generation.
 Auerhahn and Laub next turn to a discussion of the “modes” of the inter-
generational transmission of trauma, the problem that Nietzsche and Freud 
left us, which they solve with Kohutian attachment theory:
We would like to briefly address the question of modes of transmission 
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of memory from one generation to the next. No doubt the pathways are 
multiple, complex, and mediated by numerous variables. Using a popula-
tion of women who were sexually abused as children, Armsworth, Mou-
ton, De Witt, Cooley, and Hodwerks (1993) and Stronck and Armsworth 
(1994) have researched the indirect effects of parents’ childhood trauma 
on the second generation, specifically the manner in which parents’ own 
traumatic past induces insecure attachment to their own mothers and dis-
connected, intrusive, and flawed parenting styles that result in insecure 
attachments in their own children. We have focused in much of our work 
(see especially Auerhahn & Laub (1994); Auerhahn & Prelinger (1983); 
Laub & Auerhahn (1984, 1993); and Peskin et al. (1997) on a second path-
way of intergenerational effects, that of direct effects, or what is sometimes 
called vicarious traumatization—the fact that children both pick up on 
the defensive structures of traumatized parents and intuit the repressed, 
dissociated, and warded off trauma that lurks behind the aggressive and 
traumatic overtones that are found in adults’ parenting styles. It is an irony 
of the PTSD literature that it is widely accepted that therapists working 
with victims of trauma will suffer vicarious traumatization (see such recent 
publications as Pearlman [1995]), yet the fact that a young child who can-
not readily differentiate his or her boundaries from those of the parent on 
whom his or her life depends should pick up on the parent’s warded off, 
dissociated, and traumatized self and be seriously impacted by identifica-
tion is still in dispute (see Solkoff 1992). (37–38)
What the authors seem to mean by their direct/indirect binary there is that 
insecure dyadic mother–child attachments transfer traumatoregulatory orien-
tations that only indirectly “transmit trauma to” (actually reconstruct trauma 
in) the child, while weak ego boundaries in infancy and early childhood 
directly facilitate the transfer (or perhaps leakage) of the “parent’s warded off, 
dissociated, and traumatized self.” In somatic theory, however, this is a dif-
ference without a difference. There simply is no “self ” that can be transferred 
without the regulatory orientations of the group: the dissociated and trau-
matized parental self is only available for somatomimetic reconstruction in 
the child because ideosomatic regulation circulates through both parent and 
child.
 Like Nietzsche, Freud, and Kohut before them,2 however, Auerhahn and 
Laub construct a model that is powerfully protosomatic; as Allan Schore (also 
relying heavily on Kohutian attachment theory) theorizes the somatic mimesis 
that makes the intergenerational transmission of trauma possible:
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As episodes of relational trauma commence, the infant is processing 
information from the external and internal environment. The mother’s 
face is the most patent visual stimulus in the child’s world, and it is well 
known that direct gaze can mediate not only loving but powerful aggres-
sive messages. In coding the mother’s frightening behavior, Hesse and 
Main described “in non-play contexts, stiff-legged ‘stalking’ of infant on 
all fours in a hunting posture; exposure of canine tooth accompanied by 
hissing; deep growls directed at infant” (1999, p. 511). The image of the 
mother’s aggressive face, as well as the chaotic alterations in the infant’s 
bodily state that are associated with it, are indelibly imprinted into the 
infant’s developing limbic circuits as a “flashbulb memory” and thereby 
stored in imagistic implicit-procedural memory in the visuospatial right 
hemisphere.
 But within the traumatic interaction the infant is presented with 
another affectively overwhelming facial expression, a maternal expression 
of fear-terror. Main and Solomon (1986) noted that this occurs when the 
mother withdraws from the infant as though the infant were the source 
of the alarm, and they reported that dissociated, trancelike, and fearful 
behavior is observed in parents of type D infants. Studies show a specific 
link between frightening, intrusive maternal behavior and disorganized 
infant attachment (Schuengel, Bakersmanns-Kranenburg, and van IJzen-
doorn, 1999).
 During these episodes, the infant is matching the rhythmic structures 
of these states, and this synchronization is registered in the firing pat-
terns of the right corticolimbic brain regions that are in a critical period of 
growth. And thus not just the trauma but the infant’s defensive response 
to the trauma, the regulatory strategy of dissociation, is inscribed into the 
infant’s right-brain implicit-procedural memory system. In light of the 
fact that many of these mothers have suffered from unresolved trauma 
themselves (Famularo, Kinscherff, and Fenton 1992), this spatiotemporal 
imprinting of terror and dissociation is a primary mechanism for the inter-
generational transmission of trauma. (125–26)
There, in “not just the trauma but the infant’s defensive response to the trauma, 
the regulatory strategy of dissociation,” is the somatic corrective that collapses 
the direct/indirect binary: the infant somatomimetically reconstructs not 
only the trauma (directly) but the parent’s “defensive response to the trauma” 
(indirectly), builds both into an integrated paleoregulatory regime that is then 
passed down from generation to generation.
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3.2  literary rePreSentationS: 
  welch, morriSon, everett
I will, as I say, be taking a slightly different approach in this final essay: 
rather than moving more or less systematically through a series of empirical 
approaches and one or two literary representations to a series of postcolo-
nial theoretical spins, I want to focus almost all of my attention this time on 
three different literary representations: James Welch’s The Death of Jim Loney 
(1979), Toni Morrison’s Beloved (1987), and Percival Everett’s “The Appro-
priation of Cultures” (1996). My sense, in fact, is that novelists have explored 
the somatics of intergenerational trauma far more powerfully and insightfully 
than either the empirical scholars or the two poststructuralist theorists, Cathy 
Caruth and Dominic LaCapra, who have most systematically addressed it. 
In the remainder of this essay, then, I’ll be looking first at Welch’s attempt to 
pose the problem of intergenerational trauma without naming it or having the 
slightest idea what to do about it; then at Morrison’s full-out exploration of 
the survival of the traumatic past into a repeatedly retraumatized present, in 
the return of the greedy revenant Beloved, with only the vaguest suggestion at 
a resomatizing solution to it; and finally at Everett’s moral fable that explicitly 
offers resomatization as a utopian solution.
3.2.1 James welch, The Death of Jim Loney
James Welch (1940–2003), son of a Blackfeet father and Gros Ventre mother, 
was one of the leading figures in the Native American Renaissance of the 
1970s. He grew up and attended schools on the Blackfeet and joint Gros 
Ventre-Assiniboine Fort Belknap reservations in northern Montana, studied 
at the University of Montana under Richard Hugo, and in addition to teach-
ing at the University of Washington and Cornell, served on the Parole Board 
of the Montana Prisons System in Missoula, where he lived until his death in 
2003.
 Welch wrote poetry (Riding the Earthboy 40 [1990]) and history (Killing 
Custer: The Battle of Little Bighorn and the Fate of the Plains Indians [1994]), 
but he is best-known for his novels: Winter in the Blood (1974), The Death 
of Jim Loney (1979), Fools Crow (1986), The Indian Lawyer (1990), and The 
Heartsong of Charging Elk (2000). Two of those novels, Fools Crow and Charg-
ing Elk, are set in the Indian Wars era of the late nineteenth century, the 
former ending with the infamous Marias River massacre in 1870, in which 
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173 women, children, and a few old men of the Blackfoot Confederacy were 
slaughtered by Major Eugene Baker’s men in retaliation for the Indian murder 
of a white trader, the latter stranding Charging Elk, taken to London in 1887 
as a part of Buffalo Bill’s Wild West show, in Marseilles, France, where he can-
not speak more than a couple of words of English or French. The other three 
are set in contemporary times and places, especially the reservation towns in 
Montana where Welch grew up.
 The novel I want to read in this section, The Death of Jim Loney, is in one 
critical sense an anomaly in Welch’s literary production; as Ernest Stromberg 
writes:
One of the most powerful explorations of the challenges to contemporary 
Native American identity takes place in James Welch’s The Death of Jim 
Loney. In his second novel, Welch casts a grim shadow across the represen-
tational space of contemporary American Indian fiction. Unlike his other 
three novels—Winter in the Blood, Fools Crow, and The Indian Lawyer—
The Death of Jim Loney refuses to provide the ultimately affirmative vision 
of Native American cultural survival that many readers have come to asso-
ciate with contemporary American Indian fiction. For instance, in his first 
novel, Winter in the Blood, the critical consensus is that by the story’s end 
the nameless narrator finally achieves access to a place in a larger Blackfeet 
cultural history, an access which will help him to develop a more meaning-
ful, less alienated life. With his third novel, Fools Crow, Welch spins a his-
torical fiction of the Blackfeet people before subjugation to white authority. 
Densely layered with ethnographic detail, Fools Crow portrays a rich and 
dynamic culture. Although this work ends with a chilling account of the 
brutal Marias River massacre, the novel’s overall narrative celebrates Black-
feet history and tradition in what critic Owens calls a “full act of cultural 
recovery” (156). And in his most recent novel, The Indian Lawyer, Welch 
provides a protagonist, Sylvester Yellow Calf, who, after nearly succumb-
ing to the Faustian temptation of power in the inauthentic white world, is 
“found” at the end of the story dedicatedly working to protect Indian water 
rights. (32–33)
The eponymous Charging Elk, too, in the novel published after Stromberg 
wrote, manages to build out of destructive circumstance a mode of survival 
that offers collective hope. That leaves only Jim Loney as a narrative emblem 
of the complete collapse of cultural meaning and direction, and thus of failure 
and despair: half-Indian, half-white, Jim Loney had “never felt Indian” (102) 
but certainly never identified with white culture either (his white girlfriend 
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Rhea “had said he was lucky to have two sets of ancestors. In truth he had 
none” [102]), and after spending the entire novel trying to create a collective 
past for himself, to think an ancestry and a history into being, fails, and com-
mits a complex kind of suicide.
3.2.1.1 The criTicS
There have been roughly two kinds of critical response to this failure. One, 
represented by Kathleen Sands and John Purdy, reads the imagery of the 
novel as grounding Loney’s death in Gros Ventre spirituality, and thus in what 
Stromberg calls a redemptive “authentic Indianness.” The other, represented 
by Jennifer Lemberg, reads Loney’s failure to construct a usable Indian past in 
terms of intergenerational trauma: in her reading, Loney does truly fail, and 
his suicide truly is cause for despair, but his failure becomes an indictment of 
the U.S. policies that decimated Indian populations and severely traumatized 
the survivors. What I want to suggest is that these readings are not mutu-
ally exclusive—that failure/success and authentic Indian/non-Indian are false 
dichotomies in the novel, and perhaps more broadly in and for the ideoso-
matic realities and identities that circulate through the novel and its readers 
as well.
 As John Purdy lays out the former reading, it revolves around the “dark 
bird” Loney begins seeing early in the novel: “And he saw the smoke ring go 
out away from his face and he saw the bird in flight. Like the trembling, the 
bird was not new. It came every night now. It was a large bird and dark. It was 
neither graceful nor clumsy, and yet it was both. Sometimes the powerful 
wings beat the air with the monotony of grace; at other times, it seemed that 
the strokes were out of tune, as though the bird had lost its one natural ability 
and was destined to eventually lose the air” (Welch 20). Purdy explains:
Loney later states that he has never seen a bird like his before in the sur-
rounding country. The dark bird, however, bears a number of similarities 
to Bha’a, one of the most powerful beings in the world of the Gros Ventre. 
Like Coyote, or Sinchlep of the Salish and Na’pi of the Blackfeet, he is 
the most powerful agent of the “Supreme Being,” and as such his influ-
ence is far-reaching. He is most commonly associated with summer thun-
derstorms, and in this connection a ceremony and a story have evolved 
around him. The Feather Pipe—one of the two most powerful pipes in 
Gros Ventre ceremonialism—is said to have been given by Bha’a to a boy 
who was unlike any of the other children in his village. Although there are 
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different versions of the story, they can be seen to relate to Loney. The boy 
who receives the pipe does not play with the other children but instead 
stays to himself; he is told in a dream that he is going to be given something 
so he moves his lodge away from the others in the village, and he is visited 
by Bha’a, who takes the boy’s lodge and everything he owns but leaves 
him with the pipe (Flannery 446). Isolation, alienation, and vision are 
directly connected in the story to the power gift of Bha’a; the loss of mate-
rial possessions and human companionship results in the gift of something 
immensely more valuable for individual and community alike: knowledge 
of new ceremonial actions and power derived from a relationship with a 
supernatural being. (69–70)
Loney, as his name suggests, is a loner. He has a girlfriend, Rhea, whom he 
loves, but as soon as he begins seeing the dark bird in visions, he begins to 
alienate himself from her as well (“they were lovers and he was blowing it. And 
he didn’t know why” [22]); soon they are more or less broken up, and she is 
packing to move home to Dallas. He knows people in town, he grew up there, 
played high school basketball there, but has no friends, and often goes days 
without talking to anyone but his old dog, who early in the novel wanders off 
to die alone. “Isolation, alienation, and vision” are all defining attributes of Jim 
Loney. He receives nothing vaguely resembling a Feather Pipe in the novel, 
unless we count the shotgun his father gives him; but Purdy adds, following 
Sands, that Bha’a can give a man the power to become a great warrior and to 
stir up storms:
As Sands demonstrates, Loney becomes a warrior after he is given the shot-
gun—as he foresees in his vision—but he also becomes a maker of storms. 
When Loney walks to Rhea’s later, she comments about the severity of the 
wind. Loney replies, “I think I might have something to do with it” (28). 
The possibility that he might be affecting the weather is never explored, at 
least overtly, but this slight and seemingly inconsequential statement says 
a great deal about Loney’s vision of the bird, the image of which remains 
with him. As he stares into Rhea’s fireplace, he sees it again, and either it, 
or his memory of it, arises to direct his actions throughout the remainder 
of the novel. The novel ends, as does Loney’s life, with a reference to his 
vision; the sense of complicity lingers, as does the sense that any distinc-
tion between Loney’s vision of the bird and Loney himself has disappeared: 
“And he fell, and as he was falling he felt a harsh wind where there was 
none and the last thing he saw were the beating wings of a dark bird as it 
climbed to a distant place.” (70)
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Loney dies, in other words, not miserably, cold, alone, gunned down by a 
tribal cop; he dies a warrior’s death, a death of great spiritual power that gath-
ers him to his ancestors, whom he has been seeking throughout the novel in 
vain. As Welch told an interviewer, “He does orchestrate his own death. . . . He 
creates it, he creates a lot of events to put himself on top of that ledge in the 
end . . . he knows how his death will occur. And to me, that is a creative act 
and I think all creative acts are basically positive” (Bevis 176).
 I think it would be difficult to deny that some such spiritual undercurrent 
is at work in the novel’s imagery. The question, though, is what Welch is doing 
with it. If, as Purdy says, “the loss of material possessions and human com-
panionship results in the gift of something immensely more valuable for indi-
vidual and community alike: knowledge of new ceremonial actions and power 
derived from a relationship with a supernatural being,” where do we see this 
power? Where is the knowledge of the new ceremonial actions? Loney dies, 
and the novel ends.3 If he is indeed gathered to his ancestors, that is something 
we have to infer from the vaguely adumbrated Gros Ventre imagery; certainly 
there is no indication that his death will change anything, improve anything, 
bring the Gros Ventres in the novel or any of its readers new hope or new 
knowledge or new direction.
 In The Sacred Hoop, Paula Gunn Allen offers a mitigated version of this 
“authentic Indian” reading, based only on the perception that Jim Loney 
chooses his death, and so dies like a warrior:
Loney dies like a warrior, out of choice, not out of defeat. Though he could 
not plan or control his life, he could, finally, determine his death. Per-
haps the most destructive aspect of alienation is that: the loss of power, of 
control over one’s destiny, over one’s memories, thoughts, relationships, 
past, and future. For in a world where no normative understandings apply, 
where one is perceived as futile and unwanted, where one’s perceptions are 
denied by acquaintance and stranger alike, where pain is the single most 
familiar sensation, the loss of self is experienced continually and, finally, 
desperately. (145–46)
While still grounded in the notion that The Death of Jim Loney is defini-
tively shaped by Indian ritual and myth, Allen’s 1992 reading pushes us hard 
in the direction of the intergenerational trauma reading offered in 2006 by 
Jennifer Lemberg: Loney lives in “a world where no normative understand-
ings apply” not because he just is alienated, where he alone “is perceived as 
futile and unwanted, where [only his] perceptions are denied by acquaintance 
and stranger alike, where pain is the single most familiar sensation” for this 
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random man in the world—and certainly not because alienation is any kind 
of general human condition—but because the historical traumas inflicted on 
Native Americans by expansionist white Americans over three and a half cen-
turies have depleted the Indian world of normative understandings.
 “The possibility that Loney has inherited a legacy of trauma,” Lemberg 
writes, “is difficult to dispute” (70)—meaning that, based on the work done 
by Eduardo and Bonnie Duran, Maria Yellow Horse Brave Heart, and Lemyra 
M. DeBruyn applying intergenerational trauma theory to the American Holo-
caust, as an Indian Loney has indisputably inherited that legacy:
As the Durans and Brave Heart write, “European contact decimated the 
indigenous populations of this hemisphere,” through disease, alcohol, vio-
lence, and “policies systematically attacking the core of identity—language 
and the family system,” including the creation of the boarding schools 
and the outlawing of religious practices (“Trauma of History” 62–64). 
The latter half of the nineteenth century brought the reservation system, 
the destruction of the buffalo herds, and the forced cession of land under 
the Allotment Act (Flanner 22–23; Brave Heart and DeBruyn 64). Like 
that of other Plains tribes, the history of the Gros Ventres was shaped by 
these events, the population decreasing sharply around the turn of the 
century following the settling of the boundaries of the Fort Belknap Res-
ervation (Flannery 24). A period of “revitalization” followed, though after 
the Indian Reorganization Act the “reservation entered a period of steady 
decline” (Fowler 98–102). Loretta Fowler notes that the middle of the cen-
tury, when Loney would have been growing up, was a time of “outright 
despair,” for the Gros Ventres, as Termination Era policies led to economic 
hardship, a decrease in traditional practices, and an increase in migration 
away from the reservation. (99–102) (70–71)
Citing Loretta Fowler’s account of the return of many Gros Ventres to the 
reservation in the 1960s, and the revivification of both ritual practices and 
economic opportunities (1), and Robert M. Nelson’s argument to the effect 
that there were Gros Ventres Loney’s age and older who were active on the 
reservation (101), Lemberg notes that “in portraying Loney’s grief and isola-
tion, Welch denies him access to these” (72). Loney has a family, but they are 
no help: his white father Ike lives locally but until late in the novel the two 
have not spoken in twenty-five years; his big sister Kate has moved to Wash-
ington, D.C., to work for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and dismisses the past 
as nonexistent and not worth thinking about (91); his mother left the family 
when Loney was an infant and never made an attempt to contact her children 
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again. The story his father put out was that his Gros Ventre wife Eletra had 
gone crazy and was probably dead, or in an insane asylum somewhere; in high 
school Loney discovers that his mother had gone to live with his schoolmate 
Yellow Eyes’ father, on the reservation (118–19), but never tells anyone of his 
discovery, and never (until the end of the novel) asks anyone about her or 
attempts to look her up. Lemberg writes:
His mother’s absence is the sharpest reminder of Loney’s personal dev-
astation. As Owens writes, she “exists in some undefined place—maybe 
a madhouse, maybe death—just outside the picture,” and her haunting 
presence appears in Loney’s dreams and visions (149). What Loney even-
tually learns of her story hints at larger meanings in her disappearance, 
as it is after marrying a white man that she goes from participating in 
traditional dances and training as a nurse to dissolution and death. Loney 
fantasizes about their reunion, consistent with the “compensatory fanta-
sies” described by the clinicians, and his unresolved grief for her is an 
important part of the emotional crisis that leaves him immobilized at his 
kitchen table. (73)
“Loney’s separation from his mother,” Lemberg adds, “contributes to his feel-
ing that he lacks an Indian identity” (73). He does not feel like an Indian, and 
is surprised to discover that others regard him as one, because he has an ideal-
ized image of Indians as a functional community where “the old ones [passed] 
down the wisdom of their years, of their family’s years, of their tribe’s years, 
and the young ones [soaked] up their history, their places in history, with a 
wisdom that went beyond age” (Welch 102). “Focused as he is on memory and 
the past,” Lemberg writes, “Loney understands Indian identity to be based on 
precisely those things he lacks. Rhea remarks that Loney ‘is lucky to have two 
sets of ancestors’ so that he ‘can be Indian one day and white the next,’ but he 
does not experience his background as an opportunity to create a multiple 
or hybrid self (14). Instead, he struggles with it as a heavy burden of loss” 
(73–74).
 Lemberg’s explanation of Loney’s quasisuicidal death is that “he suffers 
from what Fine calls ‘the guilt of nonparticipation,’ worsened by his lack of 
a connection to a living, thriving community” (74), a reading that draws on 
Ellen S. Fine’s discussion of the crushing effects of trauma on the next genera-
tion, the children of the survivors:
They are haunted by the world that has vanished; a large gap exists in their 
history, and they desire to bridge this gap, to be informed about what 
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occurred, to know something about members of their family who per-
ished. However, they feel frustrated by the impotence of incomprehen-
sion; the past eludes and excludes them. Repeatedly met with the silence of 
their parents and relatives—who transmit the wounds of genocide, and not 
the memory—they grow up in the “compact voice of the unspeakable,” as 
Nadine Fresco affirms. (Fine 43–44, quoted in Lemberg 72)
When Loney finally confronts and exculpates his father, then, he assigns all 
guilt for his empty life to himself, the guilty nonparticipant: “Loney knew 
who the guilty party was. It was he who was guilty, and in a way that made his 
father’s past sins seem childish, as though original sin were something akin to 
stealing candy bars” (Welch 146). Lemberg comments: “His guilt contributes 
to his desire to participate in an incident similar to those that he imagines 
have preceded his birth: seeing himself as ‘marked’ by his wrongdoing, he 
leaves his father’s trailer prepared to be hunted down and killed” (74), pre-
pared to reenact “a painful scene from American cultural narratives of Indians 
being destined to perish” (75). As Louis Owens puts it, “Loney enacts the fate 
of the epic Vanishing American” (155, quoted in Lemberg 78n2). He “recre-
ates what seems to be an originary trauma. He engages in what historian and 
trauma theorist Dominic LaCapra calls ‘acting out,’ a mode of dealing with 
trauma in which ‘the past is performatively regenerated or relived as if it were 
fully present,4 rather than working through it, by engaging in the only kind 
of ‘cultural performance’ he sees himself as being capable of, his death” (75).
3.2.1.2 The dark conSTrucTiviST Bird
Lemberg’s discussion of the dark bird that Loney sees all through the novel, 
and that seems to lead him upward out of death at the very end, opens a fruit-
ful interpretive avenue beyond the impasse at which the polarized readings of 
the novel leave us:
Earlier, when Loney is incapable of telling Rhea what troubles him, he 
instead tells her of the dark bird that appears in his visions. His description 
of the bird subtly replaces a description of his past. While the bird may 
indeed be a vision sent by his mother’s people, as he suspects, unskilled as 
Loney is in tribal modes of understanding, its meaning always eludes him. 
It becomes a signifier that reveals nothing, an emblem of a past he cannot 
remember, both his own personal history and that of the Indian tribe to 
which he belongs. In this reading, the dark bird is the symbol of Loney’s 
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absent memory, the loss that is always present to him: his missing mother 
and his inability to consider himself an Indian, which has rendered his 
existence meaningless. The absent memory that has haunted him through-
out his life drives him to his own death, and the last things he sees before 
he dies are “the beating wings of a dark bird as it climbed up to a distant 
place” (179). The dark bird leads Loney onward, but, like his memory, it 
seems forever out of his reach. (75–76)
For Sands and Purdy, the dark bird is Bha’a, a powerful spirit unquestionably 
“sent by his mother’s people” to lead him back to them, to reincorporate him 
into the tribe in death; for Lemberg, this may be true, but even in death Loney 
does not know how to surrender to that reincorporation, does not know how 
to let the vision circulate the ideosomatics of belonging through him, and so 
remains an outsider.
 The telltale phrase in that quotation from Lemberg that I want to focus 
on is “as he suspects”: Lemberg constructs the temporal sequence from Loney 
talking about his childhood to Loney talking about the dark bird as a con-
scious connection Loney draws not only between his childhood and the dark 
bird but specifically between the Gros Ventres and the dark bird. I suggest that 
this is problematic in useful ways. Here is what Welch gives us:
“But what is it that really troubles you? For pity’s sake, don’t you know I 
want to help you?”
 “It’s not something . . . I don’t even know myself. It has to do with the 
past.” But Loney realized this wasn’t good enough. He had thought and said 
it too often to believe it anymore. “It has to do with certain things. I know 
it has to do with my mother and father, but there are other things. It has 
to do with an aunt I lived with when I was a kid. I loved her and she died. 
That’s okay. It was enough to love her. But I would like to know who she 
really was and how she died and why. I don’t know.”
 Rhea felt her hands loosen on the steering wheel. She hadn’t realized 
how tense she had been. But Loney was talking finally and she held her 
breath, in her mind urging him on.
 “I know this is kind of strange, but I see a bird—I don’t know what 
kind of bird it is—but I see it every night. Sometimes it flies slowly enough 
so that I can almost study it, but even then . . . it is a bird I’ve never seen in 
real life. I don’t know. It comes and I look at it and then it fades away.” (104)
That’s it. That is Lemberg’s evidence for her suspicion that Loney suspects that 
the dark bird was sent to him by “his mother’s people.” The motherly “she” of 
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which he is speaking before he breaks off and tells Rhea of the dark bird is not 
even his mother, whom he doesn’t remember, but his father’s girlfriend Sha-
ron, a white woman he lived with for a few years after his father decamped. 
He does mention his mother, in the collocation “my mother and father,” but 
he does not speak of her as having a “people.” It would seem that “as he sus-
pects” is actually Lemberg’s way of incorporating the Sands/Purdy reading of 
the dark bird as Bha’a into her own, as something that Loney “suspects” but 
cannot grasp.
 But Lemberg’s interpretive overreach here points us, I suggest, to a telling 
failure in both readings: namely that nobody, not even Ernest Stromberg in 
his intelligent critique of the Sands/Purdy/Allen “authentic Indian” reading 
of the novel,5 problematizes the novel’s narrative structure, the Bakhtinian 
rather than Russian Formalist narrative structure, author-narrator-character 
rather than fabula and syuzhet. All the critics seem to be focused on what 
Loney knows or doesn’t know; no one asks what the narrator or the author 
knows. At the very simplest level, it seems reasonable to agree with Lemberg 
that Loney is completely at sea with the Gros Ventre Bha’a mythology—and to 
argue that case even more strongly than she does, that he doesn’t even suspect 
that the dark bird might be sent by his mother’s people—and still at the same 
time consider the possibility that the close-third-person narrator knows and 
drops bread crumbs throughout the novel that will lead us to the “spiritual” 
meaning of the dark bird; or that the narrator doesn’t know either but the 
author does.
 Think for example of Martin Amis’s complex novelistic exploration of per-
petrator trauma in Time’s Arrow, where the character lives time in a forward 
direction, as we do, but the narrator lives time backwards, starting with the 
character’s death and moving “forward” to his birth. This allows Amis to give 
us a narrator who has no idea of the concentration camp traumata that might 
have caused the endosomatic symptomatologies he experiences inside the 
character’s “revivified” and then (de)aging body, because from his narrative 
point of view they haven’t happened yet: they’re in the character’s past but his 
future. As the narrator brings us closer to the concentration camp experience, 
where the character was a doctor performing medical experiments on intern-
ees, he begins to suspect that something bad is coming; but once he’s there, he 
still fails to understand, because all he sees is the character taking in sick or 
tortured people or dead bodies and healing them, magically restoring them to 
relative health. From his sequentially backwards point of view, traumatizing 
torture becomes healing, leaving him essentially puzzled as to the origins of 
the character’s endosomata from the period after the concentration camp in 
the character’s life but before the concentration camp in the narration.
DiSPlaCemenT Of  T ime |  193
 Amis, of course, clearly signals to his readers what he is doing by manipu-
lating the clash between the unreliable narrator’s backwards point of view and 
the traumatized character’s forwards point of view—the narrator’s puzzlement 
is ours too, until he brings us sequentially to the concentration camp and it 
all makes sense. We realize that the traumatic experience of inflicting griev-
ous harm on fellow human beings destroyed the character’s life ever after—
even though he managed to escape Europe and hide out in the United States 
under an assumed name, and even to practice medicine. We reconstruct the 
reversed temporal sequence, restore cause and effect as an explanatory “fic-
tion” to which the narrator does not have access, but to which the author 
deftly points us. The author and the reader communicate across the heads, as 
it were, of the unreliable narrator and the monstrous (but himself also trauma-
tized) character.
 If we assume that something like this is going on in The Death of Jim Loney 
as well, that Welch wants us to do the research Kathleen Sands did and dis-
cover that the dark bird is Bha’a, then the question becomes not only what 
does he allow the narrator and the character to know but why does he make 
it so difficult for everyone involved—character, narrator, and reader—to fig-
ure out what’s going on. He could have tipped his hand much more clearly, as 
Amis does. He could have dropped hints of the Feather Pipe or other arcane 
narrative elements of the Gros Ventre myth; he could have had the narrator 
tell us outright that Loney had no idea what these images meant, because he 
was out of touch with the tribe and its stories, its ritual practices. He could 
have made the narrator patently unreliable, had the narrator offer patently and 
revealingly inadequate explanations of the dark bird imagery (“the dark bird 
that Loney kept seeing was not Bha’a, the powerful Gros Ventre spirit, it could 
not have been, because Loney knew nothing of his mother’s people’s ancient 
stories”), in order to signal to the reader that there is a hidden meaning to be 
worked out.
 The fact that Welch doesn’t do this is significant, I think. If in fact he does 
want us to identify the dark bird as Bha’a, he gives us no help in making the 
identification; he throws us entirely back on our own interpretive resources. 
In this sense he is doing to us the exact same thing he is doing to his charac-
ter, Jim Loney, and, obviously, doing it to us through his doing it to Loney: 
asking a question that seems to have no answer; posing a problem that seems 
insoluble. The question is, of course, how to construct a usable past, a collec-
tive tradition, a temporal community that will structure our realities and iden-
tities meaningfully.6 That is the question Welch asks and answers in his first 
novel, Winter in the Blood, whose unnamed narrator and protagonist spends 
the first three parts of the novel searching for the past that his (unsuspected) 
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grandfather Yellow Calf gives him in the beginning of the fourth part. As Paul 
Eisenstein suggests, Welch uses a Hemingwayesque strategy of narrative omis-
sion to build suspense around this quest for meaning, withholding from the 
narrator and the character—and thus the reader as well—all sense of his tribe’s 
spiritual tradition:
As his interview with Bill Bevis reveals, lean sentences—when crafted 
poetically—enable Welch to imply the spiritual world that is so much a part 
of a Native American worldview. But more than that, Welch wants to imply 
the historical/ancestral cause of the narrator’s malaise, that is to say, how 
this thirty-two-year-old man’s inability to connect is, at least in part, deter-
mined by the voice which characterizes his and other Native Americans’s 
[sic] (and the dominant culture’s) historical consciousness. What exactly 
this consciousness ought to consist of—the kind of life blueprint that might 
be formulated therein—is omitted for the first three-fourths of Winter in 
the Blood, paralleling an omission that, for Welch, has characterized the 
transmission of history for over a century. The dominant culture’s writing 
of history may record events (i.e., land surrendered, treaties signed), it 
may even extol a handful of minority individuals for their achievements, 
but its discourse cannot include the recounting of events that threaten the 
image of itself it must maintain. That image, the product of power rela-
tions that construct it, at every step determines what does and does not 
get told; stories of cruelty committed in its name are either concealed or 
rewritten for absorption into America’s monocultural narrative. Beholden 
to the self-image that narrative is bent on reproducing, such telling only 
continues the cruelty. The history produced may protect the interests of 
its writers, but to do so, those writers must distort or leave out altogether 
certain occurrences, thus burying (and doing violence to) the larger body 
of communication that conveys the way of life and way of seeing of those 
they have subjugated. For minority cultures like those of Native Americans 
to resist absorption, for them to maintain identity, this body of communi-
cation—heretofore lacking, heretofore omitted—must be articulated. (5)
 What the movement from Winter in the Blood to The Death of Jim Loney 
suggests, then, is that Welch grew dissatisfied with the solution he offered to 
the problem in the earlier novel—that it was too easy, too pat: that putting a 
character in the novel who possesses the omitted knowledge and can impart it 
to the questing protagonist makes the quest seem like a simple matter of open-
ing the right door and possessing the treasure hidden behind it.
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 More than that, I would argue, the movement from Welch’s first to sec-
ond novel suggests a paradigm shift in Welch’s conception or construction 
of the nature of the quest. If the answer exists and must simply be found, as 
it seems in Winter in the Blood, the quest is essentially objectivist; if not only 
the answer but the right question must be painstakingly (and in fact unsuc-
cessfully) sought, then the quest is constructivist, based not on our ability to 
discover and embrace the truth about the past but on our willingness to build 
a working past, and our recognition that this is not just a facile matter of fan-
tasizing one but of actually feeling the redemptive power of the newly created 
past tradition or “truth.”
 In fact the striking thing about all the conflicting readings of The Death of 
Jim Loney is that they are uncritically predicated on the objectivist assump-
tion that the answer to Loney’s questions exists and must simply be sought 
out, uncovered. Sands and Purdy assume that the answer lies in Gros Ventre 
mythology, and once they have provided the key, the mystery is solved. Lem-
berg assumes that the answer lies in the traumatic destruction of an Indian 
past, and once she has provided the key to that, the mystery is solved. What 
all of the novel’s critics inchoately recognize, however, it seems to me, is that 
the keys they provide do not solve the novel’s mystery at all—that if the dark 
bird is Bha’a, as Lemberg says of Sands’s and Purdy’s reading, Loney can’t read 
it; and that if Loney’s problem is intergenerational trauma, as Lemberg insists, 
we can’t read it. It still makes no sense to us—precisely because that is the 
historical effect of intergenerational trauma, to suck collective meaning out of 
the world, to deobjectify our realities and identities. If objectivity is a commu-
nal construct, a collective exosomatization of the world, then the systematic 
decimation and dysregulation of the community in the American Holocaust 
disables objectification. The quest for the objective truth about the collective 
past is a phantom pain in the amputated communal limb, an illusory turbu-
lence in the proprioception of the body politic. The trick, then, would be to 
create a new community that might circulate a new exosomatization of the 
world, might reobjectify what it needs to know in order to construct a coher-
ent meaning, structure, identity, and reality.
 And this, I suggest, is something like Welch’s project in The Death of Jim 
Loney. It is certainly the project he and his narrator assign Loney himself. The 
patent failure of that project, however, signals not the objective impossibility 
of ever completing it but rather the expansion of the project to encompass the 
novel’s readers, who take over from Loney and the narrator the quest for an 
interpretive construct of the past that will allow them—us—to impart both 
hope and collective meaning to the ending. In that sense Lemberg might be 
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read as not so much overturning Sands and Purdy as collaborating with them 
in the construction of a collective reideosomatization of time’s arrow from 
the pre-European past, through centuries of genocide and subjugation at the 
hands of white Americans, through the current confusion and alienation, into 
a transformed future. That this arrow’s trajectory, indeed the arrow itself, is 
“only a fiction” is a failure in an objectivist purview, which requires the truth 
or nothing at all; in the post-Kantian constructivist purview of somatic theory, 
it is the only kind of realistic hope of success we have.
 The methodological implication of this constructivist perspective is that 
the “diagnosis” of intergenerational trauma must by default be imposed on 
the primary endosomatic signs and symptoms as a kind of etiological myth: 
we begin with the disproportionately high prevalence of suicide, alcohol-
ism, domestic violence, obesity, diabetes, and other disorders in a population 
whose ancestors are known to have suffered severe trauma, and organize those 
disorders narratively by reading them as transferentially caused by a history of 
trauma.
3.2.1.3 caTharSiS
What makes this etiological diagnosis more than hypothetical or phantas-
matic is its ideosomatization as fact by the group. A good example of this is 
the group therapy led by Maria Brave Heart-Jordan with her own tribe, the 
Lakota, grounded in collective mourning, social support for the painful affects 
arising out of the working-through of historical traumata, “codifications in 
self- and object representations as well as world representations, . . . validation 
and normalization of the trauma response and techniques such as visualiza-
tion and pseudohypnotic suggestibility” (Duran et al., “Healing” 351). The 
“codifications in self- and object representations as well as world representa-
tions” there constitute a cognitive response aimed at reorganizing the group 
construction of reality and identity; the rest of those therapeutic strategies 
are counterregulatory interventions aimed at restructuring the circulatory 
group affects that undergird the cognitive response, make it feel real. In other 
words, what Brave Heart-Jordan is attempting to engineer is an ideosomatic 
counterregulation of Lakota culture through the recognition and healing of 
an allostatic “soul wound” that is collectively constructed as paleosomatically 
regulating the body politic. In this therapeutic process the intergenerational 
trauma model is both the definiens and the definiendum, both the channel by 
which reality is reobjectified and reregulated and the objective reality that is 
thus reconstituted, so that constitutive group belief in the narrative of inter-
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generational trauma facilitates healing, which in turn confirms the objective 
truth of the narrative.
 In fact, in summarizing the results of Brave Heart-Jordan’s therapeutic 
experiment, Duran et al. invoke a contested Aristotelian term: having noted 
that “education about the historical trauma leads to increased awareness about 
trauma, its impact, and the grief-related affects,” they report that “the process 
of sharing these affects with others of similar background and within a tra-
ditional Lakota context leads to a cathartic sense of relief ” (“Healing” 351, 
emphasis added). It is no accident, perhaps, that a psychotherapeutic model 
should refer back to catharsis theory—the chain of influence from Jacob Ber-
nays on catharsis through Nietzsche to Freud is well known—but note that 
Aristotle’s theory is itself arguably protosomatic, in his insistence that tragedy 
strategically awakens in the audience the emotions of pity and terror precisely 
in order to effect a therapeutic purgation or purification of those emotions. 
As Charles Segal writes, this theory is grounded in the ancient Greek belief 
that “the sharing of tears and suffering creates a bond of common humanity 
between mortals” (149); what Aristotle adds to that tradition is a model for 
analyzing the ways in which tragic drama instigates and structures this sort of 
shared emotional healing process:
The ritual and emotional aspects of catharsis come together closely in the 
formal lament that ends many plays, for these lamentations in themselves, 
with their release in tears, constitute the cleansing discharge of emotion, 
and they are also part of a ritual act. Aristotle here, as often, is firmly within 
Greek cultural practice, in this case the free expression of emotion in weep-
ing. . . .
 Viewing Aristotle’s catharsis theory in the light of such passages sug-
gests that the emotions of pity and fear are ‘cleansed,’ that is, purified, made 
cleaner, in the sense that we feel them vicariously for others. Such emo-
tional participation—that is, the arousal and catharsis of pity and fear and 
similar emotions—enlarges our sympathies and so our humanity. . . .
 This expansion of our sensibilities in compassion for others, I would 
suggest, is also part of the tragic catharsis. (Segal 164–65)
In somatic terms what is happening here is that a dramatic construct, an 
invented story, acted out on stage, elicits an empathetic somatomimesis in 
the audience: they shudder at horror, physically shrink away from fearsome 
things, shed tears of pity for the sufferers on stage. The fact that these feelings 
circulate not only between actors and audience members but among the audi-
ence as well works iterosomatically to constitute the actions being performed 
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as “real,” and in particular the blood guilt and pollution that almost invari-
ably forms the core of ancient Greek tragedy therefore also as a “real” threat 
to the community. The outpouring of shared emotion in the climax effects 
a group ritual-becoming-dramatic-becoming-therapeutic purification of the 
blood guilt—which is, Segal argues, the origin of drama out of ancient reli-
gious ritual—or a somatic dysregulation/reregulation cycle that ideosomatizes 
a threat to group stability only in order to effect an ideosomatic restabilization:
The ancient audience too, we should recall, is accustomed to group emo-
tional participation in both public and private rituals, and so would also be 
accustomed to the resolution of intense emotion through the performance 
of ritual-like actions within the play. To this aspect of tragedy, as we shall 
see, the ritual meaning of Aristotle’s catharsis as ‘purification’ would be 
especially relevant. The presence of death, particularly physical contact 
with a corpse, as anthropologists like Mary Douglas point out, is a source 
of disorder and pollution. The rites of lament and burial that frequently 
end Greek tragedies effect closure by literally putting an end to this disor-
der. In epic and drama, from the Iliad on, such rituals help the audience to 
achieve a sense of ‘purification’ from the strong and dangerous emotions 
through ritual participation and to experience the restoration of order and 
communal solidarity that rituals produce. (150)
 The American Holocaust, obviously, was not exactly a “source of disorder 
and pollution,” but if we read “disorder” broadly enough, to encompass the 
dysregulatory effects on the American Indian survivor groups of “total envi-
ronmental and ‘lifeworld shock’ [and] genocidal military actions” (Duran et 
al., “Healing” 343), of forced removal from traditional homelands, and of the 
“systematic assault on Native cultures” (344), the cathartic effects of histor-
ical-trauma therapy undertaken by Maria Yellow Horse Brave Heart-Jordan 
with the Lakota is remarkably similar to the cathartic effects of ancient Greek 
tragedy as theorized by Aristotle. In both cases the telling or performance of 
a powerfully mythic/historical story elicits and circulates an empathetic affec-
tive response that collectively constitutes the story as true, as real, as histori-
cal, and then transforms therapeutically (“purifies” cathartically) the feelings 
of pity, fear, and grief through collective mourning, the collective working-
through of traumatosomatic affect, the “codifications in self- and object rep-
resentations as well as world representations, . . . validation and normalization 
of the trauma response and techniques such as visualization and collective 
mourning pseudohypnotic suggestibility.” That the dramatic spectacle (Aris-
totle’s opsis) is obviously visual, and that stage plays have long been under-
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stood as wielding a kind of “pseudohypnotic suggestibility” in and for their 
audiences, further underscore the parallels here.
 What I’m suggesting, then, is that The Death of Jim Loney offers not so 
much a static image of the protagonist’s inclusion in or exclusion from the 
Indian community as rather an invitation to the kind of collective cathartic 
dramatization of the past that we’ve been seeing at work in the plays Aristotle 
theorized. The collective involved in that dramatization and that potentially 
cathartic transformation of the audience includes Kathleen Sands and John 
Purdy in their persuasive insistence that Jim Loney is rescued in death by the 
dark spirit bird Bha’a, and Jennifer Lemberg in her equally persuasive insis-
tence that Jim Loney is not and cannot be rescued by Bha’a because the com-
munity that might wield Bha’a as its redemptive spirit has been destroyed by 
white America, and Maria Yellow Horse Brave Heart in her cathartic work 
with the Lakota—and it includes me as well, perhaps, in my attempts to theo-
rize all these scholars as the community that might wield Bha’a or any other 
symbol or vision or story as a redemptive spirit.
 For Aristotle catharsis is, after all, an audience effect. It is found neither 
in the text nor in the criticism of the text, nor in the actors’ bodies, but in the 
circulation of shared affect through the bodies of the audience. In a sense it 
is a construct of the somatics of literature, imagined as drama: the reader of 
Welch’s novel projects a theatrical performance in which exosomatic actor-
images body forth the confusions, the failures, and perhaps the mythical 
hopes that Welch circulates through his narrator and characters, and is aided 
in this projection by other readers like Sands, Purdy, and Lemberg. If the pro-
jection works, the novel can be experienced as cathartic.
 Even more, however, it is a construct of the somatics of culture, for which 
the literary text is merely an occasion, a channel. What it channels to and 
through us is at least a paleoregulatory Indian culture of unnamed hopeless-
ness and despair, based on our sympathetic endosomatization of Jim Loney’s 
destructive isolation from the community and confusion about the sources of 
his identity. What it channels through us, in other words, is not just isolation 
but a culture of isolation, a paleosomatic economy of isolation that circulates 
shared depersonalization or desomatization through us. This would be the 
somatics of intergenerational trauma, which Jennifer Lemberg theorizes as 
Jim Loney’s problem, but through the circulatory effects of the somatic econ-
omy of literary response becomes ours as well. In a sense it “becomes ours” 
only symbolically, by imaginative projection; unlike Jim Loney, we can put the 
book down and walk away from his isolation, confusion, despair, and death. 
Somatically speaking, however, this “symbolic” projection is far more pow-
erful than we have thought, far more communally inclusive: as Lev Tolstoy 
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would say, Welch infects us with Jim Loney’s despair, which is what we mean 
when we say that the novel is “depressing” or “bleak.” (As Mick McAllister 
writes: “If you thought Winter in the Blood was depressing! The Death of Jim 
Loney, also set on a contemporary Montana reservation, is a kind of Leav-
ing Las Vegas with a young Indian protagonist, Jim Loney. You can probably 
guess how it ends?”) The paleosomatics of post-traumatic despair is a cultural 
prison that can trap those who only experience it “vicariously,” by having it 
circulated through them by the community.
 If we are persuaded by Kathleen Sands and John Purdy, however, and come 
to project a cathartic ending onto the novel, what happens then is not simply 
that we think about the novel differently, nor even that we feel about it differ-
ently, but that the novel becomes the occasion or channel for the circulation of 
a cathartic or therapeutic culture, a shared resomatization of paleoregulatory 
post-traumatic despair, confusion, and isolation.
3.2.2 toni morrison, Beloved
morrison’s use of apocalypse to figure trauma is a method for engaging politics 
and history, not avoiding them. Trauma—the apocalypse of the psychoanalytic 
narrative, a formative and revelatory catastrophe—obliterates (removes from 
memory) old modes of life and understanding at the same time that it gener-
ates new ones. after the trauma, everything is changed, even as the trauma 
itself has been forgotten. and yet, the impact of the trauma is continually felt 
in the form of compulsive repetitions and somatic symptoms. The attempt 
to work through these effects and remember the traumatic event gives shape 
to a new narrative, a new history. and, as morrison recognizes, trauma and 
symptom, remembering and forgetting, are not merely personal but also social 
and historical phenomena. her representation of the familial and political 
forms taken by the forgetting and remembering of infanticide recalls Cathy 
Caruth’s observations on the role of trauma in the construction of historical 
narratives. “history can be grasped,” Caruth writes, “only in the very inacces-
sibility of its occurrence.” and yet, “history, like trauma, is never simply one’s 
own. . . . [h]istory is precisely the way we are implicated in each other’s trau-
mas” (“Unclaimed experience” 187, 192).
—James berger, “Ghosts of liberalism:  
morrison’s Beloved and the moynihan report” (410–11)
In almost every way the intergenerational transmission of trauma is less of 
a mystery in Toni Morrison’s Beloved than it is in The Death of Jim Loney: 
not only are the intergenerationally traumatizing effects of slavery every-
DiSPlaCemenT Of  T ime |  201
where explicitly foregrounded in the novel, but the novel itself is named 
after a revenant who physically embodies the paleoregulatory effects of slave 
trauma, the survival of trauma beyond the death of its own generation. In 
fact Beloved’s first (unpunctuated) monologue in Part II (248–52) begins 
with a paragraph about her undifferentiated longing for her mother (“I am 
not separate from her there is no place where I stop” [248]) but then is satu-
rated with horrific images of the Middle Passage (“those able to die are in a 
pile I cannot find my man the one whose teeth I have loved a hot thing the 
little hill of dead people a hot thing the men without skin push them through 
with poles the woman is there with the face I want the face that is mine they 
fall into the sea which is the color of the bread” [249]), suggesting that she 
is “more” (314) than Denver’s sister, as Denver herself later guesses. Some 
critics, such as Deborah Horvitz (162–63), read this monologue as voiced 
by Sethe’s mother, who did come over on the Middle Passage; but while the 
speaker of this monologue dies (but says “I am not dead” [252]) and Sethe’s 
mother survives, the implication seems to be that Beloved is the revenant or 
paleoregulatory reincarnation not just of the daughter Sethe killed but of all 
slave trauma, the “Sixty Million and more” who died on the Middle Passage, 
to whom the novel is dedicated, and the untold millions who died in slavery 
as well.
 Despite Morrison’s willingness to give intergenerational trauma a demand-
ing human body in her novel, however, her treatment of it still remains a mys-
tery. Who is Beloved, exactly? Why does she haunt 124 Bluestone Road, first 
as a “baby ghost,” then as a flesh-and-blood revenant? What does the haunt-
ing mean for the cognizing and possible healing of intergenerational trauma? 
What does her double exorcism mean, first (as the vindictive baby ghost) by 
Paul D, then (as the revenant Beloved) by the community women led by Ella? 
Beloved’s apparition and disapparition have something to do with hearing the 
voices and feeling the bodies of the ancestors, obviously, but Beloved is also 
violent, capricious, tyrannical, narcissistic, an infant in a 19-year-old body, 
and Paul D and Ella seem to be quite right to want to be rid of her. It seems, in 
other words, to be equally healing for her to return and to be driven out. What 
do we do with that?
 Nearly every critic who has published on Beloved has addressed these 
questions; all have slightly but often significantly different answers.7 James 
Berger, whose introductory remarks I gave above in the epigraph to this sec-
tion, engages the phenomenon of intergenerational trauma (or in his terms 
“historical trauma”) most explicitly, but he is interested specifically in the 
novel as a whole read as Morrison’s response to parallel denials of historical 
trauma on the right and the left in the 1980s:
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The discourse of race on the 1980s, then, was constrained by a double 
denial: Reaganist conservatives denied American racism, and descendants 
of the New Left denied any dysfunction within African American com-
munities.
 Toni Morrison’s novels oppose both forms of denials. Beloved is a chal-
lenge to all American racial discourse of the 1980s—to Reaganist con-
servatism and to the New Left and black nationalism. The novel revives 
the liberal position of Frazier, Myrdal, and Moynihan, placing historical 
trauma—the continuing apocalypse within history—at the center of Amer-
ican race relations. (414)
Berger’s reading of the novel is largely social-historical, an attempt to situate 
it in this debate on race and racism in the 1980s; he interprets the incidents in 
the novel briefly (415–16), mainly in order to show the urgency with which 
Morrison’s critics read both the infanticide and the final exorcism as a healing 
process, part, he argues, of that idealizing denial of dysfunction in African-
American communities, a dysfunction that Morrison in fact stresses, places 
center-stage, and seeks to understand as the product of historical trauma.
 Most critical studies of the novel examine the dysfunctional familial 
dynamic more closely, almost invariably recognizing the ongoing power of 
historical or intergenerational trauma—it would be difficult to ignore com-
pletely in this novel—but without quite knowing what to do with it. One of the 
best readings of this dynamic, in my opinion, is Caroline Rody’s “Toni Mor-
rison’s Beloved: History, ‘Rememory,’ and ‘A Clamor for a Kiss,’” and I’d like to 
explore her reading in some detail for a few pages here.
 While Rody does not cite Cathy Caruth’s 1991 article in her 1995 read-
ing, her approach is based on something like Caruth’s notion, cited by Berger 
in the epigraph, above, that “history is precisely the way we are implicated in 
each other’s traumas” (“Unclaimed” 192, Unclaimed 24):8 in a way her project 
is to retheorize the historical novel based on the model of Beloved, more gen-
erally perhaps on the model of magic realism as a generic channel of postcolo-
nial resistance favored mostly by South American novelists (85). The problem 
as Rody presents it is not only that historical trauma leaves what Morrison’s 
Ella calls “holes” in stories—“Ella wrapped a cloth strip around the baby’s 
navel as she listened for the holes—the things the fugitives did not say; the 
questions they did not ask. Listened too for the unnamed, unmentioned peo-
ple left behind” (Morrison 108)—or, as Rody puts it, that “Beloved is mani-
festly about the filling of historical gaps” (84). It is also that the collective 
forgetting and remembering of traumatic events send turbulences through 
the impulse to write history, or what Rody calls “historiographic desire”:
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For an African-American writer, slavery is a story known in the bones and 
yet not at all. “How could she bear witness to what she never lived?” asks 
Gayl Jones’s Corregiadora (103), crystallizing the paradox of contemporary 
black rewritings of slavery. Writing that bears witness to an inherited trag-
edy approaches the past with an interest much more urgent than historical 
curiosity or even political revisionism. Inserting authorial consciousness 
into the very processes of history that accomplished the racial “othering” 
of the self, novels of slavery make their claims to knowledge and power 
face-to-face with destruction. We might think of such fictions as structures 
of historiographic desire, attempts to span a vast gap of time, loss, and 
ignorance to achieve an intimate bond, a bridge of restitution or healing, 
between the authorial present and the ancestral past. (88)
I would add only that the present consciousness that is linked up with “the 
very processes of history that accomplished the racial ‘othering’ of the self ” 
is not only authorial but lectorial as well, and that the “intimate bond” or 
“bridge of restitution or healing” is a circulation of traumatic and therapeutic 
images through the somatic economy in which the novel includes its author 
and readers. And indeed Rody seems to want to go somewhere like a somatic 
economy as a model for this knowing “in the bones and yet not at all”: “When 
first conceiving her rewriting of Margaret Garner’s life, Morrison has said, ‘It 
was an era I didn’t want to get into—going back into and through grief ’ (45).
This ‘grief ’ seems almost a palpable atmosphere; in the personal psychological 
return required to write Beloved, it was not history Morrison had to go ‘back 
into and through’ but an intensity of hovering emotion attributed neither to 
the ancestors nor to herself but filling the space between them” (90). “Palpable 
atmosphere,” “hovering emotion”: these are manifestly somatic experiences, 
and the notion that the emotion “fills the space” between the ancestors and 
Morrison herself seems like Rody groping toward a formulation of the somatic 
exchange. Without somatic theory, though, we are left with a series of tropes: 
“known in the bones,” “palpable atmosphere,” “hovering emotion,” “filling the 
space between them.” Known where? Palpable how? Hovering where? Filling 
what space? Reading Beloved as sensitively and complexly as she does, Rody 
has a powerful intuition about the interpersonal phenomena she is attempting 
to trope in Morrison’s novel, but the tropes mostly work in her reading like 
the blind men’s descriptions of the elephant in the Mullah Nasrudin parable—
“like a tree trunk,” “like a saber,” “like a leather fan,” “like a snake,” “like a wall”: 
they don’t add up to an explanation.
 This infinite intuitive approach to a vision of the somatic exchange is even 
more obviously at work in Rody’s discussion of Sethe’s notion of “remem-
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ory”: “‘Rememory’ as trope postulates the interconnectedness of minds, past 
and present, and thus neatly conjoins the novel’s supernatural vision with 
its aspiration to communal epic, realizing the ‘collective memory’ of which 
Morrison speaks. For while the prefix ‘re’ (normally used for the act, not the 
property of consciousness) suggests that ‘rememory’ is an active, creative 
mental function, Sethe’s explanation describes a natural—or a supernatural—
phenomenon. For Sethe as for her author, then, to ‘rememory’ is to use one’s 
imaginative power to realize a latent, abiding connection to the past” (93). 
“The interconnectedness of minds,” yes: but what are the connections? And 
what does she mean by “minds”? Are the minds in this characterization just 
another trope in a string of tropes: bones, atmospheres, emotions, spaces, 
and minds? Or should we assume that Rody is now describing the actual seat 
of the interconnectedness? And what about Rody’s suggestion that “Sethe’s 
explanation describes a natural—or a supernatural—phenomenon”? Obvi-
ously the traumatic revenant Beloved is the supernatural phenomenon, but 
the self-correction of “a natural—or a supernatural” suggests that Rody sees 
the supernatural events in the novel as a screen of some sort for a natural phe-
nomenon—but what?
 My greatest qualm about Rody’s formulation there, though, comes in her 
last sentence there: “For Sethe as for her author, then, to ‘rememory’ is to use 
one’s imaginative power to realize a latent, abiding connection to the past.” 
The words that bother me in that sentence are “imaginative,” “realize,” “latent,” 
“abiding,” and “connection.” Working backwards: again, what kind of connec-
tion? How and where does it abide? “Latent” is another vague trope for “in the 
bones”: what kind of latency? Does “realize” mean “make real” or “become 
aware of ”? Since it’s an imaginative power that is used to “realize” that latent 
connection, I’m assuming Rody means “make real”; but since the connection 
is abiding, I’m also assuming that it isn’t unreal before the imaginative power 
is used to make it real, only latent. But what is the real/unreal/made-real phe-
nomenon Rody is trying to describe through this semantic fog?
 What bothers me even more than these individual words, though, is the 
suggestion that Morrison and Sethe are somehow doing the same thing in the 
novel, in “rememorying” slave traumata. For most of the novel, the “latent, 
abiding connection to the past” is a nightmare for Sethe that she uses her 
imaginative power not to realize. Sethe’s connection with her past is born not 
out of her rememorying but out of the natural—or supernatural—phenome-
non of Beloved’s haunting, first as an angry ghost, then as a greedy 19-year-old 
revenant infant; and as she is terrorized by her rememories of Sweet Home, 
so too is she terrorized and nearly consumed by Beloved’s greed for her sub-
stance, her life, the milk of her stories. Beloved returns not because Sethe 
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imagines her; she returns and then demands that Sethe rememory her. And 
while there is undoubtedly an emotional overlap between Sethe’s terror of 
rememories and Morrison’s reluctance to enter into the grief she mentions, 
it seems unnecessarily reductive to me to equate the two “rememoryings,” by 
author and character, as the rather bland process of imaginatively realizing a 
“latent, abiding connection to the past.”
 Look, for example, at the actual passage from Beloved that Rody is com-
menting on here:
“I was talking about time. It’s so hard for me to believe in it. Some things 
go. Pass on. Some things just stay. I used to think it was my rememory. 
You know. Some things you forget. Other things you never do. But it’s 
not. Places, places are still there. If a house burns down, it’s gone, but the 
place—the picture of it—stays, and not just in my rememory, but out there, 
in the world. What I remember is a picture floating around out there out-
side my head. I mean, even if I don’t think it, even if I die, the picture of 
what I did, or knew, or saw is still out there. Right in the place where it 
happened.”
 “Can other people see it?” asked Denver.
 “Oh, yes. Oh, yes, yes, yes. Someday you be walking down the road and 
you hear something or see something going on. So clear. And you think it’s 
you thinking it up. A thought picture. But no. It’s when you bump into a 
rememory that belongs to somebody else. Where I was before I came here, 
that place is real. It’s never going away. Even if the whole farm—every tree 
and grass blade of it dies. The picture is still there and what’s more, if you 
go there—you who never was there—if you go there and stand in the place 
where it was, it will happen again; it will be there for you, waiting for you. 
So, Denver, you can’t never go there. Never. Because even though it’s all 
over—over and done with—it’s going to always be there waiting for you. 
That’s how come I had to get all my children out. No matter what.”
 Denver picked at her fingernails. “If it’s still there, waiting, that must 
mean that nothing ever dies.”
 Sethe looked right in Denver’s face. “Nothing ever does,” she said. (43–
44)
This is a bogeyman story: “it’s going to always be there waiting for you.” The 
terror that feeds Sethe’s attempts to block out the past also feeds her determi-
nation that no child of hers ever have to confront that past as a present, as “a 
rememory that belongs to somebody else.” Denver, she says, is never to go to 
Sweet Home, because the traumata that Sethe and Paul D and Grandma Baby 
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and the other slaves experienced there are real, and will traumatize her too. 
It is the same terror that causes her to murder her unnamed two-year-old 
daughter to “keep her safe,” to protect her from Sweet Home and the trauma-
tizing experience of slavery. How exactly, then, are the dangerously real shared 
rememories Sethe theorizes the same as the imaginative “realization” of a 
“latent, abiding connection to the past” undertaken in the novel by Morrison?
 In somatic terms, it should be clear, rememories are paleoregulatory exo-
somata, traumatic memory images circulated so intensely through the group 
of (ex-)slaves that they seem to take on an independent reality of their own, 
and so seem to keep the traumatizing degradations and dehumanizations of 
slavery alive and frighteningly potent more than a decade after emancipa-
tion. For Sethe, clearly, the serial hauntings of 124 by the baby ghost and then 
the beloved revenant are the literal fulfillments of her dire warning to Den-
ver: Beloved is the rememory of her murdered daughter, the flesh-and-blood 
rememory that cannot die because nothing ever does. She is not a memory 
image of the murdered child somehow “realized” by Sethe’s “imaginative 
power”; she is real. She is, to Denver, “a rememory that belongs to somebody 
else,” a living and breathing and ferociously hungry and seductive remem-
ory that belongs to her mother Sethe. The latent but abiding memory image 
realized through imaginative power of which Rody writes is the Beloved not 
of Sethe but of Morrison—and, through participation in the viral somatic 
economy fleshed forth by the novel, of Morrison’s reader as well. That’s the 
difference: Sethe believes that exosomata are real, and (in consequence?) her 
exosomatized revenant daughter is real; Morrison knows the power of belief in 
the reality of exosomata, and so creates a fictional world in which that belief 
seems fully justified. In that sense Beloved is for Morrison a representation of 
the reality not of ghosts or revenants but of the belief in ghosts or revenants 
as real—a representation, to put that differently, not of the ontology of occult 
beings but rather of the ontologization of exosomata as occult beings.
 This distinction between Sethe’s traumatized/traumatizing rememories 
of the past and Morrison’s fictionalization of those rememories would also 
seem to be the obvious answer to the charge leveled by James Berger that 
Morrison’s critics are trying to whitewash the dysfunctionality in African-
American culture by reading the exorcism of Beloved as a healing: “Events in 
the United States today make it difficult to agree with readers who claim that 
the exorcism of Beloved represents a successful working through of America’s 
racial traumas. Indeed, in my view, such optimistic interpretations of Beloved 
participate in the repressions and denials of trauma that the novel opposes. 
For instance, Ashraf Rushdy holds as exemplary Sethe’s friend Ella’s repressive 
attitude toward the past, arguing that by ‘exorcising Beloved, by not allowing 
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the past to consume the present, [Ella] offers Sethe the opportunity to reclaim 
herself ’ (584)” (415). Surely there is an important epistemological distinction 
to be made here between “not allowing the past to consume the present” and 
repressing or forgetting the past? It seems to me that the two can intelligently 
be equated only if Beloved is the past, if Beloved is the whole traumatizing 
paleosomatic past of slavery, and if there is only one way to experience her/it, 
as a real flesh-and-blood “rememory that belongs to somebody else.” By fail-
ing to distinguish between the two, Berger is able to assimilate Ella’s group’s 
exorcism of Beloved and the community’s subsequent forgetting of Beloved—
along with the critical celebration of that ending as a healing process—to the 
dual denials he is examining, of white racism on the right and of intergenera-
tional trauma and its endosomatic dysfunctionality in the African-American 
community on the left. As soon as we recognize that there is a key differ-
ence between ontologizing an exosomatized past and putting the exosomata 
into a story as fiction, Berger’s whole argument collapses. “What these and 
similar interpretations miss, in my view,” he writes, “is that Beloved’s story 
is not over, that the child will return—indeed, has returned” (416): yes, but 
to whom, and in what form? If the revenant has only one form (real flesh-
and-blood) and only one allegorical referent (the repressed past), then her 
exorcism can only mean the (temporary) re-repression of the past, which is 
bound to fail because the repressed will continue to return, for example in 
the endosomatic symptomatologies of paleoregulatory cultural dysfunction. 
But note Berger’s endnote to that last passage: “I agree entirely with Deborah 
Horvitz that ‘the paradox of how to live in the present without canceling out 
an excruciatingly painful past remains unresolved at the end of the novel. 
At the same time, something healing has happened’ (166). See also Caroline 
Rody, who describes how Beloved brings ‘history to an unclosed closure and 
the haunt to our own houses’ (113)” (419n15). Beloved brings “the haunt to 
our own houses” as a fiction. “The child will return—indeed, has returned”—
as a fiction. This is how Morrison engages (without resolving) “the paradox 
of how to live in the present without canceling out an excruciatingly painful 
past”: she cancels out the traumatized/traumatizing ontologization of an exo-
somatized past without canceling out the past or any of the pain it continues 
to inflict, indeed by exacerbating the pain it inflicts in order to free us from 
the paleosomatic regulation that is sustained by repression. By reworking a 
traumatic past as fiction, a fiction in which a traumatizing exosoma comes to 
flesh-and-blood life and then is “exploded” through a communal exorcism, 
Morrison makes us relive and resomatize that past. By reading the novel we 
become able to experience the “haunt” as a painful fiction: painful because so 
powerfully grounded in the traumatizing past that we have repressed, trau-
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matizing both for the African Americans descended from the victims of slav-
ery and for the European Americans descended from its perpetrators; but a 
painful fiction that serves to reminds us that the exosomatic images (bogey-
men, the walking dead) that terrorize us in its pages—as well as, perhaps, the 
paleoregulatory endosomatic symptomatologies (poverty, crime, drug abuse) 
that plague many African-American communities—are constructs, somatic 
regimes that can with great communal effort be banished, exorcised.
3.2.3 Percival everett, “the appropriation of cultures”
Let’s now look quickly at one recent fictional representation of this sort of 
communal resomatization of paleoregulatory trauma, Percival Everett’s 1996 
story “The Appropriation of Cultures.” In the story Daniel Barkley is an inde-
pendently wealthy black man who spends his evenings playing jazz with some 
older musicians near the University of South Carolina campus in Columbia:
Daniel played standards with the old guys, but what he loved to play was 
old-time slide tunes. One night, some white boys from a fraternity yelled 
forward to the stage at the black man holding the acoustic guitar and began 
to shout, “Play Dixie for us! Play Dixie for us!”
 Daniel gave them a long look, studied their big-toothed grins and the 
beer-shiny eyes stuck into puffy, pale faces, hovering over golf shirts and 
chinos. He looked from them to the uncomfortable expressions on the 
faces of the old guys with whom he was playing and then to the embar-
rassed faces of the other college kids in the club.
 And then he started to play. He felt his way slowly through the chords 
of the song once and listened to the deadened hush as it fell over the room. 
He used the slide to squeeze out the melody of the song he had grown up 
hating, the song the whites had always pulled out to remind themselves 
and those other people just where they were. Daniel sang the song. He 
sang it slowly. He sang it, feeling the lyrics, deciding that the lyrics were 
his, deciding that the song was his. Old times there are not forgotten . . . He 
sang the song and listened to the silence around him. He resisted the urge 
to let satire ring through his voice. He meant what he sang. Look away, look 
away, look away, Dixieland.
 When he was finished, he looked up to see the roomful of eyes on him. 
One person clapped. Then another. And soon the tavern was filled with 
applause and hoots. He found the frat boys in the back and watched as they 
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stormed out, a couple of people near the door chuckling at them as they 
passed. (24)
The “uncomfortable expressions on the faces of the old guys” and “the embar-
rassed faces of the other college kids in the club” are Everett’s rather milder 
versions of Morrison’s Beloved, endosomatizations of paleoregulatory trauma, 
the lingering somatic effects of slave trauma and perpetrator trauma, respec-
tively. Daniel has grown up hating Dixie specifically, Everett tells us, because 
it was “the song the whites had always pulled out to remind themselves and 
those other people just where they were,” a personal response to events occur-
ring in his own lifetime; but the song has that somatic power to remind and 
to place and to hierarchize because it evokes paleoregulatory endosomata, 
because it continues to channel ancient wounds into the present. There is 
nothing overtly racist about the song itself, its melody or lyrics; it is the cir-
culation of racist response to the song through the somatic economy in the 
American South that continues to charge it with the paleosomatic history of 
the enslavement and cultural subjugation of African Americans over several 
centuries. In a sense that history is over—the history of slavery in the Ameri-
can South ended in 1863, the history of the systematic legal oppression of 
African Americans ended in the 1960s and 1970s—but the singing of this 
song makes it clear that the history only really ended in the history-book 
sense, in terms of laws and dates. In the somatic economy of the South, in the 
paleoregulatory circulation of somatic responses to slavery and Jim Crow, it is 
an ongoing phenomenon.
 Hence the significance of Daniel’s subversive appropriation of this one cul-
tural channel of paleosomatic regulation: by playing Dixie in such a way as to 
make it his own, “feeling the lyrics, deciding that the lyrics were his, deciding 
that the song was his,” he launches a counterregulatory impulse out into the 
audience, an attempt to resomatize the song as an inclusive Southern anthem, 
white and black. In that sense, in fact, he is only mediately and strategically 
making the song his: he makes it his in order to make it ours; he circulates 
the revisionary exosoma of one black jazz musician “owning” the quintes-
sential hymn of Southern plantation nostalgia through the crowd in order to 
infect the whites and the blacks in the club—including those up on stage with 
him—with this resomatized ownership, so that it becomes collective. That he 
is successful in this attempt is clear both from the applause—which also “cir-
culates” slowly—and the disgusted exit of the racist frat boys. Daniel’s exoso-
matic transracial ownership of the song does infect the crowd, does transform 
their ideosomatic response to the history of whites subjugating blacks, so that, 
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when the small portion of the crowd that is not ideosomatically transformed 
by this new impulse “storms out,” the newly inclusive group chuckles at them. 
They are no longer an ideosomatic threat to the collective; their barely sup-
pressed racism no longer causes embarrassment.
 As the crowd congratulates Daniel, he tries to process what just happened:
Daniel didn’t much care for the slaps on the back, but he didn’t focus too 
much energy on that. He was busy trying to sort out his feelings about what 
he had just played. The irony of his playing the song straight and from the 
heart was made more ironic by the fact that as he played it, it came straight 
and from his heart, as he was claiming southern soil, or at least recognizing 
his blood in it. His was the land of cotton and hell no, it was not forgotten. 
At twenty-three his anger was fresh and typical, and so was his ease with it, 
the way it could be forgotten for chunks of time, until something like that 
night with the white frat boys or simply a flashing blue light in the rearview 
mirror brought it all back. He liked the song, wanted to play it again, knew 
that he would. (25)
The paleoregulatory anger is there, in other words, and his singing of the song 
is fueled by it; but by refusing to satirize it, by “playing the song straight and 
from the heart,” he finds in himself a love for the song, and through that love 
a love for the South, the land of cotton—despite the fact that he will not forget 
the traumatic past that the song has for so long helped channel into the pres-
ent. Again, this is not about forgetting the past or canceling the past; it’s about 
resomatizing the past, rechanneling the paleosomatics of past trauma so that 
it no longer traumatizes. Another way of putting this is that the anger remains, 
but it no longer paleoregulates behavior, or no longer paleoregulates behavior 
quite so rigidly or binarily—it no longer makes it impossible for Daniel to love 
things ideosomatically associated with the targets of his anger.
 In the next few weeks, Daniel begins to extend his new resomatizing 
approach to the South’s past to other areas as well: after a dream in which he 
“stopped Pickett’s men on the Emmitsburg Road on their way to the field and 
said, ‘Give me back my flag’” (25), he buys a 1968 three-quarter-ton truck 
with “a full rear cab window decal of the Confederate flag” (26), and, when 
his friend Sarah asks what he needs a truck for, he replies, “I’m not buying 
the truck. Well, I am buying a truck, but only because I need the truck for the 
decal. I’m buying the decal” (27). Sara thinks he has flipped: “You need a job 
so you can be around people you don’t care about, doing stuff you don’t care 
about. You need a job to occupy that part of your brain. I suppose it’s too late 
now, though.” Daniel replies: “You should have seen those redneck boys when 
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I took Dixie from them. They didn’t know what to do. So, the goddamn flag 
is flying over the State Capitol. Don’t take it down, just take it. That’s what I 
say” (28). And when the racist couple delivers the truck to Daniel’s place, and 
they are disturbed by the ideosomatic dissonance of a middle-class black man 
living in a nice house buying a redneck truck, he explains, “I was just lucky 
enough to find a truck with the black power flag already on it” (28), and points 
to the Confederate flag. “You mean,” he says, when they look blankly at him, 
“you didn’t know?” (28). When whites later aggressively ask him what he’s 
doing with that flag, he tells them that he’s “flying it proudly. . . . Just like you, 
brothers” (29). One guy seems inclined to fight him over that word, “broth-
ers,” but then a car full of young black men drive up and ask what’s going on, 
and the white man backs off. Daniel sends his new resomatizing impulse into 
this new group as well, saying to the black teenagers, “‘We fly the flag proudly, 
don’t we, young brothers?’ Daniel gave a bent arm, black power, closed-fist 
salute. ‘Don’t we?’ he repeated. ‘Don’t we?’” (29). Daniel keeps playing Dixie 
at white bars, fast enough to dance to, slow enough to cry to, keeps driving his 
truck around town and resomatizing the Southern-pride symbols, and gradu-
ally the community begins to circulate the new resomatizations as well:
Soon, there were several, then many cars and trucks in Columbia, South 
Carolina, sporting Confederate flags and being driven by black people. 
Black businessmen and ministers wore rebel flag buttons on their lapels 
and clips on their ties. The marching band of South Carolina State Col-
lege, a predominantly black land grant institution in Orangeburg, paraded 
with the flag during homecoming. Black people all over the state flew the 
Confederate flag. The symbol began to disappear from the fronts of big rigs 
and the back windows of jacked-up four-wheelers. And after the emblem 
was used to dress the yards and mark picnic sites of black family reunions 
the following Fourth of July, the piece of cloth was quietly dismissed from 
its station with the U.S. and state flags atop the State Capitol. There was no 
ceremony, no notice. One day, it was not there. (30)
And Everett concludes his story: “Look away, look away, look away . . .” (30).
 “The Appropriation of Culture” is, of course, a utopian parable; it’s 
easy enough to dismiss Everett’s moral lesson as unrealistic, impractical, a 
mere wish-fulfillment fantasy. But it should be clear that his moral lesson is 
grounded in something like the somatic model I’ve been developing in this 
book, according to which a phenomenon like racism is both social (a “mere” 
interpersonal fiction) and real (a deeply felt orientation that seems so stable as 
to be virtually impossible to change). What makes Everett’s fable seem unreal-
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istic, I suggest, is bad theory: the impulse to treat racism as innate and there-
fore impossible to change, and the binarizing corollary according to which if 
racism is this malleable, it must be—or we must thematize Everett as assuming 
that it is—a mere performative mask, a role we can put on or take off at will.
 Much the same critique was leveled, in fact, at Judith Butler’s Gender Trou-
ble: if identity is performative, then being gay or straight or masculine or femi-
nine isn’t “real”; it’s a mere role or game or fiction that can be donned or doffed 
from one moment to the next. It didn’t help Butler in combating that false 
binary that she didn’t have somatic theory to draw on to explain her sense that 
performative identities are “deep-seated play,” a performative presentation of 
something you feel deeply: for where does that deep feeling come from?
When and where does my being a lesbian come into play, when and where 
does this playing a lesbian constitute something like what I am? To say 
that I “play” at being one is not to say that I am not one “really”; rather, 
how and where I play at being one is the way in which that “being” gets 
established, instituted, circulated, and confirmed. This is not a perfor-
mance from which I can take radical distance, for this is deep-seated play, 
psychically entrenched play, and this “I” does not play its lesbianism as a 
role. Rather, it is through the repeated play of this sexuality that the “I” is 
insistently reconstituted as a lesbian “I”; paradoxically, it is precisely the 
repetition of that play that establishes as well the instability of the very 
category that it constitutes. For if the “I” is a site of repetition, that is, if the 
“I” only achieves the semblance of identity through a certain repetition of 
itself, then the I is always displaced by the very repetition that sustains it. 
(“Imitation” 18)
And so on: Butler goes on for another twelve lines, and in some sense for the 
rest of her essay, deconstructively worrying this notion of “repetition,” a con-
cept that can indeed be deconstructed forever because it is only an abstract 
concept, yanked out of the social and (I would argue) somatic context implied 
by Butler’s word “circulated” there, or more generally that whole list of parti-
ciples. Obviously, it seems to me, “being” can only be “established, instituted, 
circulated, and confirmed” by the group; and the group circulation of identity 
images only has the power to constitute identity as “reality” to the extent that 
what the group is circulating is somatized images.
 By the same token, place, race, and trauma too are “established, insti-
tuted, circulated, and confirmed” ideosomatically and paleosomatically by the 
group. They are, to put that differently, “deep-seated play,” in Butler’s term, not 
in the sense that play is fun but in her specific insistence that “it is precisely the 
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repetition of that play that establishes as well the instability of the very category 
that it constitutes.” The somatic economy that circulates stabilizing images of 
home and place and is so disturbingly disrupted in the refugee experience, or 
that circulates counterregulatory colonizing impulses that remain unstable but 
astonishingly persistent in a decolonizing context, or that continues to circu-
late allostatic adjustments to long-past trauma and thus to keep the trauma 
present and alive and active, is “deep-seated play, psychically entrenched play,” 
ideosomatized play that can be replayed, reiterated, resomatized—but only 
through the kind of therapeutic group recirculation that Everett explores in 
“The Appropriation of Culture,” or that Morrison explores in the epilogue 
(unnamed final section) of Beloved. It is only as Daniel is able to infect other 
members of the community with his resomatizations of racist symbols, and 
they begin to circulate them too, rather than simply responding to them with 
bafflement, that Everett’s moral fable begins to nudge us toward a post-racist 
utopia.
3.2.4 conclusion: acting out and working through
In Writing History, Writing Trauma, Dominic LaCapra adapts the Freudian 
distinction between “acting out” and “working through” to the historical anal-
ysis of trauma:
I would make a correlation that will be significant in my later argument—
a correlation that indicates the desirability of relating deconstructive and 
psychoanalytic concepts. I would argue, or at least suggest, that undecid-
ability and unregulated difference, threatening to disarticulate relations, 
confuse self and other, and collapse all distinctions, including that between 
present and past, are related to transference and prevail in trauma and in 
post-traumatic acting out in which one is haunted or possessed by the past 
and performatively caught up in the compulsive repetition of traumatic 
scenes—scenes in which the past returns and the future is blocked or fatal-
istically caught up in a melancholic feedback loop. In acting out, tenses 
implode, and it is as if one were back there in the past reliving the trau-
matic scene. Any duality (or double inscription) of time (past and pres-
ent or future) is experientially collapsed or productive only of aporia and 
double binds. In this sense, the aporia and the double bind might be seen 
as marking a trauma that has not been worked through. Working through 
is an articulatory practice: to the extent one works through the trauma 
(as well as transferential relations in general), one is able to distinguish 
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between past and present and to recall in memory that something hap-
pened to one (or one’s people) back then while realizing that one is living 
here and now with openings to the future. This does not imply that there 
is a pure opposition between past and present or that acting out—whether 
for the traumatized or for those empathetically relating to them—can 
be fully transcended toward a state of closure or full ego identity. But it 
does mean that processes of working through may counteract the force 
of acting out and the repetition compulsion. These processes of working 
through, including mourning and modes of critical thought and practice, 
involve the possibility of making distinctions or developing articulations 
that are recognized as problematic but still function as limits and as pos-
sibly desirable resistances to undecidability, particularly when the latter is 
tantamount to confusion and the obliteration or blurring of all distinctions 
(states that may indeed occur in trauma or in acting out post-traumatic 
conditions). (21–22)
 Working through, of course, is the ideal model for the talking cure, here 
extended to historical and critical processes in general; what is striking about 
the literary representations of intergenerational trauma that we’ve been con-
sidering here is that the fictional works themselves set up a working-through 
for their readers but not for their characters, or even their narrators, all of 
whom continue to act out. What is most interesting about Toni Morrison’s 
Beloved and Percival Everett’s “Appropriation of Cultures” in this sense is that 
the central characters in those works act out trauma therapeutically, and thus 
chart an interesting middle ground between the two binary poles LaCapra 
theorizes.9 Because Morrison and Everett give their characters “objective” 
(exosomatic) correlatives of intergenerational trauma to work or play with, to 
“act out” with—the revenant Beloved in Morrison’s novel, the song Dixie and 
the Confederate flag in Everett’s story—their acting out has something like the 
same therapeutic effect as a more conscious, analytical, “articulatory” working 
through would have had (perhaps an even more powerfully therapeutic effect, 
in fact). In The Death of Jim Loney, Jim is given no such exosomatic correlative 
and so cannot act out therapeutically—and fails in his self-appointed task of 
working through—leaving him the sole option of acting out endosomatically 
until he dies. The process of working through his intergenerational trauma is 
thus left to his critics.
 From the standpoint of somatic theory, the weakness in LaCapra’s 
approach to trauma is its individualism: just as the unattainable ideal product 
of working through is for him “full ego identity,” so too are both acting out 
and working through processes definitively undergone by the individual. Even 
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empathy, which LaCapra precariously maneuvers into his model, remains an 
individualistic phenomenon: there are those who are traumatized, and those 
who empathize with trauma victims, and each person experiences the trauma 
individually. He recognizes that empathetic identification with trauma victims 
is itself traumatizing, suggesting something like the somatic economy that I’ve 
been theorizing here, in which shared affect is circulated regulatorily through 
the group; he even insists that what others might call “illusions” are in fact 
“regulative ideals” (4), suggesting that he is in fact very close to somatic the-
ory; but he continues to binarize the individual and the group and to associate 
the former with health and the latter with trauma:
Unchecked identification implies a confusion of self and other which may 
bring an incorporation of the experience and voice of the victim and its 
reenactment or acting out. As in acting out in general, one possessed, 
however vicariously, by the past and reliving its traumatic scenes may be 
tragically incapable of acting responsibly or behaving in an ethical man-
ner involving consideration for others as others. One need not blame the 
victim possessed by the past and unable to get beyond it to any viable 
extent in order to question the idea that it is desirable to identify with this 
victim, or to become a surrogate victim, and to write (or perform) in that 
incorporated voice. (28)
 The important question here, I suggest—and I’m guessing that LaCapra 
would agree—is not whether the individual should merge with the group 
or remain ideally isolated from group experience, but where the working 
through comes from and how it is channeled: what is the locus of the thera-
peutic sorting out of pasts and presents, selves and others, that may make it 
possible for the traumatized to begin to “act responsibly or behave in an ethi-
cal manner.” Another way of asking that question is to note that “unchecked 
identification” is not simply one of two binary poles—that there is an entire 
sorites series of “identification,” several positions in which might be charac-
terized as “unchecked”—and then to wonder who or what does the “check-
ing”: the individual, the group, or some complex configuration of the two. To 
put it in psychoanalytical terms, the critical question is whether the working 
through is an individualistic process undergone in and by the analysand and 
only guided and observed by the analyst, as Freud would have it, or a collec-
tive—(counter)transferential—process undergone by the analyst–analysand 
dyad, or any other group, as in Lacan’s revisionary reading. It does seem to me 
that LaCapra leans toward the Freudian approach, while somatic theory draws 
from the Lacanian notion that the movement toward health involves not a 
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rationalist (analytic) splitting of self from other and past from present but a 
collective (re)organization of selves and others, pasts and presents, through the 
transferential and countertransferential circulation of shared affect.
 To reframe this notion more generally, we might say that “identification” is 
the circulatory effect of the somatic exchange and “checking” is the regulatory 
impulse imposed on identification by the group. In this sense there would be 
no such thing as “unchecked identification”: only dysregulation of group con-
trols (checking) or group empathy (identification), the former leading to the 
form of allostatic overload known as post-traumatic stress disorder, the latter 
leading to the form of allostatic overload that I discussed in Estrangement and 
the Somatics of Literature as depersonalization or desomatization.
 In that sense the three postcolonial experiences we’ve been exploring in 
this book, the refugee encounter, (de)colonization, and intergenerational 
trauma, might be seen as three different dysregulations of group “checking”: 
the first imposed on a culture more or less randomly, as a byproduct of natural 
or societal violence; the second imposed on a culture systematically, “civiliz-
ingly,” by an occupying foreign power; and the third imposed on a culture 
from within, endosomatically, as a result of the “dynastic” reproduction of 
long-past dysregulations.
 But in fact the three dysregulations overlap. In the First Essay, for exam-
ple, we saw the emergence of mythological nation-building among the Hutu 
refugees as a paleoregulatory recirculation not only of their collective trau-
matizations through internecine violence and forced relocation but also of 
their colonial counterregulation at the hands of the British. The counterregu-
lations imposed on colonized cultures in the Second Essay were designed to 
disrupt or dysregulate the existing local somatic economies, and the cultures’ 
allostatic adjustment to those counterregulations became paleoregulatory as 
well, continuing to shape “decolonization” in the colonial image in generations 
born into political (but not cultural) independence. The forced relocations of 
Indians in the Americas and Africans to the Americas, and their cultural sub-
jugation and genocide at the hands of the “civilizing” white colonizers, con-
tinue to dysregulate the present paleosomatically.
 At the broadest level, this book is about the persistence of ideosomatic reg-
ulation as reality—as what members of groups are conditioned by the somatic 
exchange to experience as reality. When an existing ideosomatic regulation is 
disrupted, whether accidentally (as by a natural disaster) or through deliberate 
destructive violence or the concerted counterregulatory pressures of a colo-
nization process, the resulting dysregulation itself tends to become the new 
ideosomatic regulation that is circulated paleosomatically through the group, 
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so that the group’s allosomatic adjustment to dysregulation persists as “reality” 
for generations, often for hundreds of years.
 At issue here methodologically, I suggest, is not simply the fact that we 
need something like somatic theory to explain these phenomena—the persis-
tence of cultural regimes long past the era of their situational relevance, often 
“regimes” that are stored unconsciously or even physiologically, indeed often 
allostatic regimes born out of a collective response to trauma and chronic 
stress, and the power of these regimes to naturalize group constructs as reali-
ties and identities. It is also, and more important, that without somatic theory 
it would be difficult even to construct them as related phenomena in need of 
explanation—difficult to ask the questions that might problematize the many 
local and topical remedies that have been offered, like “refugees need to be 
integrated into the community,” “postcolonial cultures need to break free of 
the legacy of colonialism,” and “the descendants of trauma victims need to 
work through their ancestors’ trauma therapeutically.” What do these pana-
ceas, and the postcolonial phenomena to which they are offered as solutions, 
have in common? Somatic theory is one way of rendering such questions ask-
able. Whether the answers I have offered to those questions are viable, or even 
a useful step on the road to viable explanations, is up to you.

allostasis: homeostatic adaptation to changed conditions; raises the baseline set-point at 
which homeostatic stability is achieved, causing allostatic load.
allostatic load: the destabilizing effects on the group or individual organism of chronic 
allostatic adaptation; caused by the incomplete activation or inactivation of stress hor-
mones, or repeated abrupt on/off fluctuations, leaving the organism exposed to too 
much stress or too many stress hormones, or both by turns.
allostatic overload: an allostatic load of traumatizing intensity or duration.
body-becoming-mind: a Deleuzean construction for the operation of the homeostatic 
emergence of feelings as mental mappings of emotions and other body states, and of 
thoughts as mental mappings of feelings.
counterideosomatic: referring to any specifically rebellious or deregulatory impulse against 
ideosomatic regulation; a subset of idiosomaticity, which includes both failures and 
refusals to conform; to be distinguished from ideosomatic counterregulation, which 
is organized around an oppositional group norm.
counterregulation: see ideosomatic counterregulation.
depersonalization: the chronic desomatization of the self, others, or familiar things; usu-
ally a defense against allostatic overload.
deregulation: see idiosomatic deregulation.
desomatize: to withdraw (usually defensively or self-protectively) somatic response from 
an individual’s interaction with a person or thing; similar to Freud’s concept of “with-
drawal of cathexis” or Lacan’s of “foreclosure,” except that what is being withdrawn or 
foreclosed is not libido but evaluative behavioral memory; chronic desomatization is 
usually called depersonalization. See also endosomatize, exosomatize, ideosomatize, 
idiosomatize, iterosomatize, resomatize, somatize.
displacement: in postcolonial studies, the relocation of persons from their homelands or 
the counterregulation of their culture; in psychoanalysis, the rechanneling of affect 
from feared to safe objects; in poststructuralist language theory, the deferral of mean-
ing along the syntagmatic chain of signifiers.
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dysregulation: see ideosomatic dysregulation.
endosoma: a physiological symptom(atology) (pain, illness, addiction, etc.) read as a physi-
cal manifestation of a relational (ideosomatic) injury or trauma.
endosomatic: referring to “inside the body” symptomatologies read etiologically as mani-
festations of a relational (ideosomatic) injury or trauma. Roughly synonymous with 
the clinical term “psychosomatic.”
endosomatize: to manifest an outward (relational, group-circulated) injury inwardly, in 
physical pain, illness, addiction, or other physiological dysregulation; a “primary” 
process that is imagined secondarily as an etiological interpretation of an empirically 
experienced physical symptomatology. Close to what clinicians refer to as “somatiza-
tion,” except that the mental pain “somatized” as physical pain is traditionally thought 
of individualistically, as something the individual subject suffers, rather than, as in 
somatic theory, a form of ideosomatic turbulence. See also desomatize, exosomatize, 
ideosomatize, idiosomatize, iterosomatize, resomatize, somatize.
exosoma: a somatized image of an object, including skin and its pigmentation, circulated 
regulatorily through the somatic exchange.
exosomatic: in anthropology, referring to tools and other “outside the body” technologies, 
or more broadly to material culture; in somatic theory, referring to the somatization 
of objects, places, skin colors, and so on, the circulation through the somatic exchange 
of a somatized image or exosoma of the object.
exosomatize: to circulate iteratively through the somatic exchange a somatized image or 
exosoma of a place or a thing. See also desomatize, endosomatize, ideosomatize, idio-
somatize, iterosomatize, resomatize, somatize.
homeostasis: the self-regulation of a group or individual organism, aimed at stabilization of 
the inner and outer environment; somatic markers are homeostatic or self-regulatory 
mappings of potentially destabilizing body states; ideosomatic regulation is group 
homeostasis. See also allostasis.
ideosomatic counterregulation: the attempt to circulate a new “corrective” set of regula-
tory/normative pressures through the somatic exchange; found in both colonization 
and decolonization; typically leads to polynormativity. See ideosomatic regulation.
ideosomatic dysregulation: a breakdown in the circulation of regulatory/normative pres-
sures through the somatic exchange, generating allostatic load. See ideosomatic regu-
lation.
ideosomatic regulation: the homeostatic conformation of the somatic states of all 
involved by means of normative pressures circulated through the somatic exchange.
ideosomatic reregulation: an attempt to repair or restore the dysregulated circulation of 
regulatory/normative pressures through the somatic exchange. See ideosomatic regu-
lation.
ideosomatics: the regulatory group-normative circulation of somatic response through 
group members’ perceptions, attitudes, understandings.
ideosomatize: to somatize collectively; to circulate regulatory group-normative (dis)ap- 
proval pressures through the somatic exchange, and thus to install regulatory somatic 
markers in the autonomic nervous system of each group member. See also desomatize, 
exosomatize, idiosomatize, iterosomatize, resomatize, somatize.
idiosomatic deregulation: the attempt to decrease the regulatory power of the group over 
individual actions; as it becomes a new group regime, it becomes ideosomatic reregu-
lation or counterregulation.
idiosomatics: somatic response perceived by the group as deviant, divergent, insufficiently 
regulated by ideosomatic norms.
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idiosomatize: to somatize group-deviantly, un- or counterideosomatically; to circulate 
failed, incomplete, or dissident conformity-response through the somatic exchange, 
and thus (intentionally or unintentionally) to set up somatic dissonance with estab-
lished ideosomatic markers. See also desomatize, exosomatize, ideosomatize, itero-
somatize, resomatize, somatize.
iterosomatics: the iterative circulation of normative somatic response through a group 
over a period of time, creating a feeling of “natural” or “organic” grouping; the absence 
of iterosomatic circulation in a group creates “granfalloons” (Vonnegut); derived from 
the protosomatic “genealogy” of Nietzsche (“A thing is branded on the memory to 
make it stay there; only what goes on hurting will stick”) and the “archeology” of Fou-
cault, as well as Deleuze’s and Guattari’s insistence that “the social machine fashions a 
memory.”
iterosomatize: to circulate normative somatic response through a group over a period of 
time; the process is phenomenologically “naturalizing,” making group constructions 
feel like reality. See also desomatize, exosomatize, ideosomatize, idiosomatize, reso-
matize, somatize.
loconormativity: ideosomatic norms constructed and maintained (circulated iterosomati-
cally) by the hegemonic group in the current location. See also panicked loconorma-
tivity, metanormativity, polynormativity, xenonormativity.
metanormativity: the ability to perform the multiple shifting normativities of different 
groups.
mimesis, somatic: see somatic mimesis.
paleoregulatory: referring to paleosomatic regulation.
paleosomatic regulation: the continuing circulation through a group of long-outdated 
ideosomatic norms formed around allostatic overloads; temporal xenonormativ-
ity. Typically an etiological interpretation placed on endosomatic symptoms. May be 
referred to adjectivally as paleoregulatory.
panicked loconormativity: a desperate attempt to protect and police the ideal naturaliza-
tion of loconormative ideosomatics through the analytical containment of the refugee 
(or anyone else whose deviance from loconormativity seems to threaten that ideal); 
derived from Judith Butler’s “panicked heterosexuality.”
polynormativity: the simultaneous regulation of a group by two or more ideosomatic 
regimes, typically stratified either temporally (older and newer) or spatially (loconor-
mative and xenonormative), or both.
proprioception of the body politic: the collectivized body of ideosomatic regulation, 
which identifies the parts and sets the limits of the group body-becoming-mind. 
Defined in Robinson, Estrangement (106–12).
regulation: see ideosomatic regulation.
reregulation: see ideosomatic reregulation.
resomatize: to circulate counterregulatory or reregulatory (therapeutic or “corrective”) 
somatic responses through the somatic exchange. See also desomatize, exosomatize, 
ideosomatize, idiosomatize, iterosomatize, somatize.
somatic: referring to an affective body state that is felt as evaluatively oriented (toward 
approval or disapproval).
somatic exchange: the circulation of group norms, values, orientations, and inclinations 
through the somatic economy of those involved, in the form of somatic approval and 
disapproval responses that are viewed as outward body language and mimetically 
simulated as inward body states; the result is a rough conformation of somatic states 
in all involved, or ideosomatic regulation.
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somatic marker: a tiny subliminal quantum of emotional pleasure or pain emitted by the 
ventral-tegmental area of the autonomic nervous system to signal what the organism 
has learned from experience; offers “gut-level” guidance for decision-making (Dama-
sio’s hypothesis).
somatic mimesis: the almost instantaneous mimicking of other people’s body language and 
concomitant simulation of their somatic states; the transfer mechanism of the somatic 
exchange; also called “somatomimesis” (adjectival form “somatomimetic,” noun form 
for the process “somatic mimeticism”).
somatic response: the felt phenomenology of somatic marking; referred to colloquially in 
terms of the “gut” (“gut reaction,” “gut feeling,” “gut instinct,” “gut check,” “go with your 
gut,” “know something in your gut”), a synecdochic use of the enteric nervous system 
to represent the entire autonomic nervous system.
somatic state: an emotional body state that is felt as evaluatively oriented (toward approval 
or disapproval), displayed as body language, and somatomimetically simulated by oth-
ers involved as part of the somatic exchange.
somatic transfer: the transmission of somatic response from one person/body to another, 
through somatomimetic simulation.
somatize: to mark a thing somatically (see somatic marker); similar to Freud’s “to invest/
cathect” (besetzen), with the difference that somatization invests not libido but evalua-
tive behavioral memory. See also desomatize, exosomatize, ideosomatize, idiosoma-
tize, iterosomatize, resomatize.
virality: the self-replicativity of somatic mimesis, leading to the contagion of somatic 
response from body to body within a group and from group to group.
xenonormativity: ideosomatic norms constructed and maintained (circulated iterosomat-
ically) by the hegemonic group(s) in refugees’ culture of origin; hegemonic xenonor-
mativity is typically successfully imported (loconormativized) counterregulatorily by 
colonizers in colonies and by Western aid organizations in refugee camps (often lead-
ing to polynormativity); subaltern xenonormativity is typically unsuccessfully import-
ed by refugees and other migrants (but partial success may lead to metanormativity).
Preface
 1. For studies of the genealogy of racism, see Jordan, Gossett, Montagu, and West.
 2. For this critique, see especially Ahmad, but also JanMohamed, Slemon and Tiffin, 
and Dirlik “Grinch,” “Aura,” “Response.” For discussion, see Moore-Gilbert 17–22.
 3. For discussion of the proprioception of the body politic, see my Estrangement 106–
12.
 4. For discussion of Williams’s “structures of feeling,” see my Estrangement 221–23.
firSt eSSay
 1. For a contrasting view, see Brennan’s Transmission of Affect, which rejects mimetic 
theories of affect transmission in order to argue that affect is transmitted chemically, main-
ly by smell (pheromones). Ironically enough, Brennan agrees with me that shared affect 
is the basis of all ethics, all societal regulation of behavior, a claim utterly vitiated by her 
insistence that affect is transmitted physically rather than imaginatively: if I am consider-
ing a course of action that will harm someone not physically present, the only channel of 
shared affect that can have any significant ethical impact on my decision is not smell but 
my imaginative reconstruction and imitation of the absent person’s body state. There is 
also a time problem with her claim: the hormonal transfers she discusses take minutes to 
transform the target organism; the Carpenter Effect has been measured to transform the 
imitating organism within several hundred milliseconds. The apparent instantaneity of 
shared affect could not possibly be created chemically.
 2. The direction in which I take somatic theory is heavily influenced by Foucault:
Imbedded in bodies, becoming deeply characteristic of individuals, the oddi-
ties of sex relied on a technology of health and pathology. . . . The power which 
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thus took charge of sexuality set about contacting bodies, caressing them 
with its eyes, intensifying areas, electrifying surfaces, dramatizing troubled 
moments. . . . There are equal grounds for saying that it [modern society] has, 
if not created, at least outfitted and made to proliferate, groups with multiple 
elements and a circulating sexuality: a distribution of points of power, hierar-
chized and placed opposite to one another; ‘pursued’ pleasures, that is, both 
sought after and searched out; compartmental sexualities that are tolerated or 
encouraged; proximities that serve as surveillance procedures, and function 
as mechanisms of intensification; contacts that operate as inductors. . . . [A]ll 
this made the family, even when brought down to its smallest dimensions, a 
complicated network, saturated with multiple, fragmentary, and mobile sexu-
alities. (History of Sexuality 1:44–46)
Where I deviate from Foucault is in his conception of “power” as a force with agency; 
my understanding of how normative pressures get circulated through groups is far less 
centralized, based more on Heidegger’s notion of das Man, Wittgenstein’s notion of social 
practices, and Elias’s and Bourdieu’s notions of habitus. Another Nietzschean book that 
has significantly shaped my conception of ideosomatic regulation is the Anti-Oedipus of 
Deleuze and Guattari; see §1.3.1 for discussion.
 3. Both the placebo effect and its opposite, the nocebo effect, in which a patient who 
does not trust the doctor gets worse, are ideosomatic effects, based on guided response to 
group norms governing the doctor’s effective authority, the patient’s expected obedience, 
the contextual significance of the doctor-patient relationship, and the instrumental signifi-
cance of treatments. Some scholars (see Jospe and Thompson) estimate that as much as 50 
percent of the efficacy of modern medicine relies on ideosomatized belief structures: as 
unconscious collective support for the purely mechanical activities of cutting tissue, set-
ting bones, and intervening chemically in various physiological processes we are trained 
to expect to get better under a doctor’s care, expect to get better when we like our doctor, 
expect to get better when we swallow a pill, and want to get better to please the doctor—and 
often do get better when those expectations are met.
 4. For an extended discussion of this sort of cultural misunderstanding, and what small 
recourse we have when confronted with it, in terms of metalocutionary implicature (adapt-
ing H. Paul Grice) and reimmediatization (adapting Charles Saunders Peirce), see chapter 
14 of my Performative Linguistics.
 5. For a problematic excluded-middle argument about groups and territories that is 
clearly in need of somatic theory, see Warner “Voluntary.” Warner devotes the first pages 
of his article to an attack on what he calls the “liberal mathematics” that equates the indi-
vidual with the group with the territory with home with the government with the state with 
democracy: “Questions of identity are resolved through associations and attachments that 
can be described by first-degree equalities. Individual/group identity is solved by homo-
geneous grouping. Home/place identity is solved by attaching the individual/group to a 
specific place that comes to be called home. Individual/group/homogeneous grouping is 
inseparable from home/place; the identity of one is equal to the other” (164). “For [Wil-
liam E.] Connolly,” Warner adds, “these associations and alignments, or rather the desire 
for alignments that are part of the search for a ‘singular hegemony of any set of identities’ 
(Connolly, Identity 1991a:158), are elements of a politics of homesickness and place” (164). 
This seems reasonable—except, perhaps, to the extent that this characterization seems to 
carry with it the implicit suggestion that, because a politics of homesickness is typically 
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dolled up as something else, something nobler, like “liberal political philosophy,” it is itself 
necessarily cheap and tawdry, something to be ashamed of: I see no need to sneer at people 
who get homesick.
  But Warner is hunting bigger game: he wants, ultimately, to demolish the notion 
that group identity may be definitively connected with place at all. He cites Cuny et al.’s 
introduction to their edited collection Repatriation: “One of the more interesting common 
denominators found in the case studies is the formation of politically organized, cohesive 
communities by uprooted peoples. Rounded up by the host government and relocated to 
refugee camps, refugees are placed in unaccustomed communal situations that may change 
their way of life and crowd them in among strangers. In these circumstances refugees show 
an impressive ability to organize and cohere as a new community with its own mores and 
values” (quoted in Warner, “Voluntary” 165). This empirical observation seems unexcep-
tionable to me: groups may be disrupted by the scattering of members and the destruction 
of place, but human beings are adaptable. They can regroup. And Warner’s first gloss of 
this passage, “The relation between individual and group does not have to be physically 
grounded” (165), suggests that Warner wants to carve out a middle ground between “has 
to be” and “can’t be,” between “groups are always physically grounded” and “groups are 
never physically grounded.” But then he draws his binary conclusion: “It is the relations 
with other people that ground man in his existence, and not the physical grounding of the 
individual and group with a given space” (165). Based on this principle, he argues his main 
case that refugees (and generally humans) can never go home in the simple nostalgic sense, 
because by the time they get there both they and what they have idealized (narrativized) as 
“home” have changed.
  Somatic theory would be most interested there in the middle that Warner so assidu-
ously excludes: the ways in which it is the relations with other people that ground us in 
our social and physical existence, that iterosomatize a random collection of people as “our 
group,” as a “homogeneous group,” and a specific place as “home,” as “ours,” as the “true” 
setting of community. For example, Warner summarizes Emanuel Marx’s article “The 
Social World of Refugees”: “In Marx’s analysis, the social world is based on relationships 
that are not related to physical space. Social networks are not tied to a particular place since 
the dynamics of interpersonal relationships are not territorial in nature” (164). Viewed 
somatically, these absolute negations (“not related,” “not tied,” “not territorial”) are a bit 
simplistic. It should be quite obvious that it matters enormously to a congregation whether 
their services are held in their usual church, a high school gym, or a slaughterhouse—the 
dynamics of a church congregation are in that sense powerfully territorial. That territori-
ality is not absolute—it can be changed—but it has a felt tenacity that may make it seem, 
phenomenologically, to many members of the congregation, absolute. A face-to-face uni-
versity class is not absolutely bound to the classroom—the specific classroom they are 
assigned to is only gradually, over the first few weeks of the semester, ideosomatized as 
“their own”—but it does substantially change the intellectual and socioemotional dynamic 
of the class’s “social network” when the professor gives in to the students’ pleading and they 
all go out and sit on the lawn, or meet in a coffee house. And while it is almost certainly 
true that refugees (and the rest of us, having moved away) can never go home again, that 
is not because social relationships “are not related to physical space”; on the contrary, it 
is precisely because social groups somatize specific spaces and places as “their own,” as 
“home,” as “familiar,” even as “sacred,” that the disruption and reconfiguration of social 
relationships makes homecoming problematic. In order to feel as if one were returning 
home, one would have to return not only to the same place but to the same group that 
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somatized that place as home and to the same time frame in which that somatization was 
ongoing.
  For a more flexible discussion of the “performance of terrains of belonging,” drawing 
on Judith Butler’s theories of performative identity, see Fortier; see also Probyn.
 6. For a review of the research on refugee children’s assimilation, see Huyck and Fields 
(who in fact suggest that traumatized children may be even more at risk than their parents 
and grandparents); for a study of elderly Chinese migrants to New Zealand, see Abbott et 
al.
 7. Significantly, though, Pfister-Ammende gives examples of communists and other 
“politically oriented unions of those electing to fight” who “proved equally strong” (10), 
and Zionists, from Vonnegut’s point of view almost certainly to be considered another 
granfalloon, who were typically also able to maintain stable ideosomatic regulation in refu-
gee camps. Presumably this divergence stems from Vonnegut’s membership in the “karass” 
(a team of people that “do God’s Will without ever discovering what they are doing” [14]) 
of what Pfister-Ammende calls Problematiker: “They are as little rooted in their social 
environment as they are dedicated to a clear-cut spiritual idea. Rootless individuals of this 
type also need the world, but in a different way. Their vitality does not spring from an 
inner relatedness to the world, since they do not give themselves away to it; instead they 
take what the world offers them. They are not deeply attached to the world as a whole or 
to any of its individual manifestations. They are not object-related, nor do they have a 
binding commitment and unshakable superpersonal hold” (13). Vonnegut’s membership 
in this karass makes it seem as if many functioning ideosomatic groups are in fact sham 
groups.
 8. Pfister-Ammende writes:
Four situational reactions were found common to persons uprooted from 
their social milieu and compelled to flee:
1. Fear of the persecutor with subsequent tendency to develop anxi-
ety when the real danger is over, coupled with projection on to 
neutral persons of the new environment.
2. Hypertrophy of the instinct of self-preservation with deteriora-
tion of moral values. The main sphere affected appears to be that 
of moral behavior based on super-ego control of the drives. The 
ego-ideal, the “personal ethos” (Binder 1951) tends to remain unaf-
fected.
3. Clinging to values that have remained intact or to the lost home-
land amounting in some cases to fixation.
4. Overvaluation of the country of asylum or of persons in authority, 
a projection of savior phantasies which have remained in a mental 
vacuum without object-cathexis owing to the frustration inherent 
in expulsion from their own country. (7)
 9. En route to their discussion of the stressors of exile proper [(3)–(4)], for example, 
Miller et al. deal with preflight (1) and flight (2) stressors among Bosnian refugees—espe-
cially the violence brought by the war (345–46). In her study of mental illness among 
Somali refugees, Carroll similarly quotes stories told by the refugees of the disruption of 
their happy lives by the outbreak of civil war in 1991 (121–22). For rare studies focused 
on dysregulation in the preflight context, see Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo, and Gorden-
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ker; for studies focused on the dynamics of refugee flight, see Kunz and Prins; for a study 
focused on refugees just arriving at a refugee camp, see Drumm, Pittmann, and Perry. For 
useful summaries of refugee research, most of which, as I say, is focused on problems of 
assimilation [(3)–(4)], see Cohon, and Dewind and Kasintz.
 10. For a discussion of the virality of literature, see my Estrangement: Lev Tolstoy argues 
in What Is Art? that literary texts both emulate and themselves participate in this perfor-
mative power to “infect” readers with the author’s feelings and sensation, Viktor Shklovsky 
theorizes the estrangement device, and Bertolt Brecht theorizes the estrangement effect as 
infection with a defamiliarizing twist, an estrangement designed to infect the reader or the 
theatergoer with deestrangement.
 11. Papa Doc reigned from 1957 to 1971, Baby Doc from 1971 to 1986, having become 
president for life at age 19 upon his father’s death. The first wave of Haitian “boat people” 
left the island in 1972; the second wave, consisting of some 40,000 people, occurred in 
the winter of 1991–92, during the Tonton Macoute coup that overthrew President Jean-
Bertrande Aristide and installed General Raoul Cédras in the presidency. Danticat, implic-
itly setting her story in the context of that second wave, has her girl write: “they’ve closed 
the schools since the army took over. no one is mentioning the old president’s name. papa 
burnt all his campaign posters and old buttons. manman buried her buttons in a hole 
behind the house. she thinks he might come back. she says she will unearth them when he 
does” (Krik? Krak! 4).
  Part of Danticat’s anger and frustration in the writing of the story no doubt stems 
from the decision first of President George H. W. Bush not to grant any Haitian boat people 
asylum in the United States—to instruct the Coast Guard to interdict the boats and return 
them to Haiti. This move was widely criticized, among others by presidential hopeful Bill 
Clinton, as a violation of the Geneva Convention on Refugees, of which the United States 
was a signatory; but upon assuming office in January of 1993, Clinton continued the 
Bush policy, arguing that he was actually saving Haitian lives by preventing refugees from 
drowning in the treacherous ocean crossing. On June 21, 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided (by a vote of 8–1) in favor of the Clinton administration that the interdiction of 
Haitian refugee boats did not violate the Geneva Convention on Refugees (Sale v. Haitian 
Centers Council).
 12. It is important to note that Danticat does not frame these wishful invocations of 
magic as performatives, direct or indirect; the reader is coached to construct them that way 
not by anything Danticat does explicitly or even implicitly in writing the story but by the 
ideosomatized conventionality of you-address, a group structuring of emotional response 
to which the reader has been somatically conditioned by his or her own groups. All Dan-
ticat has to do to bring the reader into the transformative somaticity of these indirect per-
formatives is to have her storytellers address their wishes and longings to you.
 13. For discussion, see also Butler, Gender Trouble 141–43, and Bell, “Mimesis” 135–
36.
 14. For an extended discussion of “doubling,” or what Friedrich Schleiermacher calls das 
Doppeltgehen “doubled-going”—“daß der wenigstens nicht doppelt geht wie ein Gespenst” 
(“Ueber” 64), “that he at least does not go doubled like a ghost” (“On” 236)—see the “Magi-
cal Doubles” chapter of my Translation and Taboo, especially 176–89.
 15. In light of Freud’s famous association of sadism with the death drive, it is significant 
to note that Danticat explicitly invokes doubling and mimetic violence in order to explain 
the dysregulated/dysregulatory violence channeled through the Tonton Macoutes: “There 
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were many cases in our history where our ancestors had doubled. Following in the vaudou 
tradition, most of our presidents were actually one body split in two: part flesh and part 
shadow. That was the only way they could murder and rape so many people and still go 
home to play with their children and make love to their wives” (156). This suggests, in fact, 
that the dynastic trauma is passed on not only from mothers to daughters but from fathers 
to sons, perhaps mothers to sons as well—and that the sexual violence unleashed on female 
bodies in this novel is thus the product of doubling in a double sense, the effect of doubling 
both on women (causing them to turn their violent impulses both inward, against their 
own bodies, and outward, against their daughters’ bodies, in “testing”) and on men (caus-
ing them to rape, beat, murder, and otherwise brutalize other bodies). Her 2005 novel The 
Dew Breaker is a powerful exploration of a man like this, a former Tonton Macoute now 
living in the U.S., through his relationships with his wife and daughter.
 16. For discussion of the notion that we are all deterritorialized, see Warner, “We Are 
All Refugees,” which draws on Connolly’s reading of Nietzsche on homesickness in the 
last chapter of Political Theory and Modernity in order to argue that “we all have a certain 
homesickness that cannot be fulfilled,” that, “no matter where we are, even in our countries 
of origin, we are all strangers to ourselves,” so that “the protected home that distinguishes 
us from refugees is only an illusion” (371). Or, as Warner sums up his argument:
To categorize certain people as refugees suggests that we deny the refugeeness 
inside us all, or deny the “normalcy” that is part of all refugees. Categorizing 
people as refugees serves an important legal function. It allows millions of 
people the right to international protection which they may otherwise not 
enjoy. On the other hand, the categorization delimits one group from another, 
creating insiders and outsiders. This brief essay has argued that the bridge 
between the two groups is shorter than one may imagine, and that the solution 
to the “refugee experience” may be more complex, as, indeed, is the solution 
to our own existence. (372)
Even at home, in other words, surrounded by familiar people and things, we do not feel at 
home; we still (always) miss some inchoate idealized “home” or “community” to which we 
have no access, and in that sense are forever phenomenologically “in flight” from or toward 
home. Equally indebted to Nietzsche on this point, of course, are Heidegger and Freud in 
their theorizations of das Unheimliche, the uncanny or the unhomely. See Homi Bhabha’s 
postcolonial theorization of the unhomely in The Location of Culture (9–18); on Freud, see 
Cixous and Kristeva (182–92); on Heidegger, see McNeill; and on both, see Krell. (See also 
Ziarek on Kristeva’s discussion of strangers, foreigners, and the uncanny.)
  I will be returning to Nietzsche’s argument in the Genealogy about the “civilizing” 
transmission of “slave morality” from generation to generation—one of the topics usefully 
illuminated by Connolly, Identity/Difference 151–54—in my theorizations first of coloni-
zation as counterregulation in §2.1, and then of intergenerational trauma as paleosomatic 
regulation in the introductory paragraphs of the Third Essay.
 17. See also Kaplan’s Questions of Travel (85–91) on Deleuze and Guattari, and especially 
91–96 on the spread of Deleuzean romanticizations of the nomad through Euro-American 
cultural studies in the 1980s and 1990s; and see 96–98 for a reading of Spivak’s “Can the 
Subaltern Speak?” as a critique of this development. For a discussion of that essay in this 
book, see §2.2.2.3.
 18. For an extended reading of Nietzsche’s “ecology” of somatic coding in the Genealogy, 
see §4.3 of my “Ecologies of Translation.”
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Second eSSay
 1. I’m thinking specifically here of Judith Butler’s reading of Foucault in Gender Trou-
ble:
In a sense, for Foucault, as for Nietzsche, cultural values emerge as the result 
of an inscription on the body, understood as a medium, indeed, a blank page; 
in order for this inscription to signify, however, that medium must itself be 
destroyed—that is, fully transvaluated into a sublimated domain of values. 
Within the metaphorics of this notion of cultural values is the figure of history 
as a relentless writing instrument, and the body as the medium which must be 
destroyed and transfigured in order for “culture” to emerge. (166)
 2. The entire island of Hispaniola was originally named Santo Domingo by the Spanish 
and Saint-Domingue by the French. In 1697, the western portion of the island was officially 
recognized by Spain as a territory of France, whereupon it kept the French name Saint-
Domingue and the larger Spanish territory on the eastern part of the island continued to be 
called Santo Domingo. When Saint-Domingue won its independence from France in 1804, 
it was renamed Haiti; when Santo Domingo won its independence from Spain in 1844, it 
was renamed la Republica Dominicana or Dominican Republic. Like many American and 
British authors of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, James rather confusingly 
refers to the French colony that became Haiti as “San Domingo.”
 3. For a useful overview and critique of scholarly readings of Nietzsche on physiol-
ogy, see Brown, who notes that On the Genealogy of Morals has the most references—33 in 
all—to physiological phenomena of all Nietzsche’s works (64). Emden’s piece on Nietzsche’s 
neurophysiological conception of rhetoric in that same collection is less germane, as it does 
not deal with On the Genealogy of Morals and is more concerned with what contemporary 
research Nietzsche had read before writing his early lectures on classical rhetoric.
 4. For Nietzsche’s stomach disorders, see Moore 77–78.
 5. For a passing postcolonial discussion of Nietzsche on slave morality, see Beverley: 
“In both Gramsci’s and Guha’s construction of the subaltern one can detect a residual trace 
of Nietzsche’s characterization of slave morality as founded on resentment of the low for 
the high. It is true that the characterization is itself turned on its head to constitute now 
a theory of the epistemological privilege and agency of the subaltern, in the way Marx 
claimed that he had turned the Hegelian dialectic upside down. But the subaltern would be 
well within its rights to reply: Fuck you” (38).
  The only other study I have found that comes close to addressing the postcolonial 
implications of Nietzsche’s theory of slave morality is an article by Mark Migotti with the 
promising title of “Slave Morality, Socrates, and the Bushmen: A Reading of the First Essay 
of On the Genealogy of Morals”; but Migotti is not interested in the emergence of a slave 
morality in a colonial or postcolonial context. The San or Bushmen work in his argument 
not as the victims of (de)colonization but as an egalitarian “ur-community” that offers a 
potential counterexample to Nietzsche’s empirical claims about slave morality and slave 
revolts: “By examining and rejecting the idea that the egalitarian culture of the San might 
pose a knock-down counter-example to the slave revolt hypothesis, we have, it seems to 
me, been brought to recognize a deeper and more precise sense in which the history of 
GM I is a history of western morality” (778). That Western moralists were still involved in 
the enslavement of black Africans throughout most of Nietzsche’s lifetime—indeed slav-
ery was abolished in Brazil in the exact same year in which he wrote On the Genealogy of 
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Morals, 1888—and that Nietzsche’s pronouncements on slave morality and slave revolts 
might therefore tell us something about the European colonization of other cultures, never 
seems to occur to Migotti.
  One more: in a 1995 interview, Albert Memmi says, “I love reading Nietzsche, for 
example, but he always places himself outside circumstances. This is the shortcoming of 
philosophers” (Wilder, “Irreconcilable” 177). It seems to me that in taking issue with the 
relative tolerance to pain in “Negroes” and “bluestockings,” not to mention in theorizing 
the genealogy of “slave morality,” Nietzsche places himself far more radically and contro-
versially inside circumstances than many of his critics.
 6. Does Memmi mean that European Americans are decolonized but African Ameri-
cans are not? Or that no one in the former English colony that became the United States is 
decolonized, because—what, they aren’t recently decolonized?
 7. See also Dirlik’s “American,” “Empire?,” “Spectres,” and “Globalization.”
 8. See, e.g., the articles by Nietschmann, Ryser, and Connor; for an overview of Fourth 
World theorizing, see Seton.
 9. See, e.g., Caren Kaplan’s strictures against the “theoretical tourism” of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s minoritarianism:
“Becoming minor” is a strategy that only makes sense to the central, major, or 
powerful, yet it is presented as an imperative for “us all.” Constructing binaries 
between major and minor, between developed and undeveloped, or center and 
periphery, in Deleuze and Guattari’s collaborative texts modernity provides 
borders and zones of alterity to tempt the subversive bourgeois/intellectual. 
Becoming minor, a utopian process of letting go of privileged identities and 
practices, requires emulating the ways and modes of modernity’s “others.” 
(Questions 88)
 10. Indeed there is a rhetorical excitement to his third chapter that Fanon himself seems 
hard put to quell:
During the time when I was slowly being jolted alive into puberty, I had the 
honor of being able to look in wonder on one of my older friends who had just 
come back from France and who had held a Parisian girl in his arms. I shall 
try to analyze this problem in a special chapter.
 Talking recently with several Antilleans, I found that the dominant con-
cern among those arriving in France was to go to bed with a white woman. As 
soon as their ships docked in Le Havre, they were off to the houses. Once this 
ritual of initiation into “authentic” manhood had been fulfilled, they took the 
train for Paris.
 But what is important here is to example Jean Veneuse. (72)
The stories about the Martinican blacks sleeping with white prostitutes in Paris are digres-
sions from his discussion of the René Maran novel, but thrilling ones that he is only with 
great difficulty able to defer to a later chapter.
 11. For further feminist discussions of this moment in Fanon, see Wright 124–33; Fuss; 
and McClintock 360–63.
 12. The classic study of the colonizer–colonized relation in Memmi as “Manichean” is 
JanMohamed; see also Alschuler for a Jungian “psychopolitical” study of that relation in 
terms of narcissism, under the rubric of “duo.” Tony Judt situates the tendency to under-
stand the colonizer–colonized relation in Manichean terms in the context of French intel-
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lectual thought in the years immediately following the Second World War: “Everything was 
classified in Manichean terms. Communists/capitalists, Soviet Union/United States, right/
wrong, good/evil, them/us. . . . It was once again Sartre who gave this idea its more rarified 
expression. Hell being other people” (54, quoted in Gibson 210n1). Note that Fanon too 
writes of a colonized/racialized “Manichean conception of the world . . . white or black, that 
is the question” (Black Skin 44–45)—but attributes it to Mayotte Capécia.
 13. For a detailed and useful reading of this chapter in the sociohistorical context of both 
Césaire on Negritude (and the sociohistorical context that Fanon saw as undermining the 
effectiveness of Negritude) and Dominic La Capra on intergenerational trauma, see Wilder, 
“Race.”
 14. Cf. the conclusion to A Dying Colonialism:
The originality and the impatient richness of the Revolution are now and 
forever the great victories of the Algerian people. This community in action, 
renovated and free of any psychological, emotional, or legal subjection, is pre-
pared today to assume modern and democratic responsibilities of exceptional 
moment.
 . . . It is true that independence produces the spiritual and material con-
ditions for the reconversion of man. But it is also the inner mutation, the 
renewal of the social and family structures that impose with the rigor of a law 
the emergence of the Nation and the growth of its sovereignty.
 We may say firmly that Algerian man and Algerian society have stripped 
themselves of the mental sedimentation and of the emotional and intellectual 
handicaps which resulted from 130 years of oppression. . . .
 The Revolution in depth, the true one, precisely because it changes man 
and renews society, has reached an advanced stage. This oxygen which creates 
and shapes a new humanity—this, too, is the Algerian Revolution. (179–81)
In The Wretched of the Earth he is less sanguine: “But if we want humanity to advance a step 
further, if we want to bring it up to a different level than that which Europe has shown it, 
then we must invent and we must make discoveries. . . . For Europe, for ourselves, and for 
humanity, comrades, we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts, and try 
to set afoot a new man” (315–16). He envisions here the same utopian decolonized future, 
but envisions it now as the product of hard work rather than as a magical transformation 
brought about in the twinkling of an eye by the revolution.
  For discussions of Fanon’s revolutionary thought, see Bulhan (esp. Part III) and Per-
inbaum.
 15. Note that Jentsch’s primary examples of the uncanny effect of psycho-ontological 
uncertainty are children, “hysterics” (i.e., women), and “primitive man, . . . [whose] igno-
rance is therefore hidden from him to a great extent by the everyday” (9): “The affective 
position of the mentally undeveloped, mentally delicate, or mentally damaged individual 
towards many ordinary incidents of daily life is similar to the affective shading that the per-
ception of the unusual or inexplicable generally produces in the ordinary primitive man” 
(10). What is required for the experience of the uncanny is significant dysregulation of the 
group’s ideosomatic construction of reality, and the ideosomatics of reality-construction 
seem to Jentsch to be on a considerably firmer footing (and therefore the phenomenon 
of the uncanny far less common) among groups of educated European men than among 
these “other” groups—suggesting that one of the ways groups of educated European males 
regulate the ideosomatic construction of reality is by repressing their own uncertainties and 
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confusions and projecting them onto their childish, womanish, lower-class, “primitive,” 
and mentally deranged others. Indeed Jentsch’s conception seems to be definitively shaped 
by the circulatory exosomatization of Western colonialist images of the “primitive” or the 
“native”:
Conversely, the same emotion occurs when, as has been described, a wild man 
has his first sight of a locomotive or of a steamboat, for example, perhaps at 
night. The feeling of trepidation will here be very great, for as a consequence of 
the enigmatic autonomous movement and the regular noises of the machine, 
reminding him of human breath, the giant apparatus can easily impress the 
completely ignorant person as a living mass. There is something quite related 
to this, by the way, when striking or remarkable noises are ascribed by fearful 
or childish souls—as can be observed quite often—to the vocal performance 
of a mysterious being. The episode in Robinson Crusoe where Friday, not yet 
familiar with the boiling of water, reaches into simmering water in order to 
pull out the animal that seems to be in it, is also based on an inspiration of the 
writer that is psychologically very apposite. (11)
Women and children, for Jentsch, are the “primitives” or “fearful or childish souls” in “our” 
(male European) midst; when “we” white educated males have our rare experiences of the 
uncanny, it is like the surfacing of something long since outgrown in us, or what Freud will 
call the return of the repressed.
 16. Note that Fanon is not really interested in this postcolonial assault on the Hegelian 
dialectic; in Chapter 5 of Black Skin, White Masks he just happens to experience Sartre’s 
invocation of the dialectic as paralyzing. Cf. his discussion in A Dying Colonialism of the 
decolonizing transformation of the colonized’s use of the colonizer’s language: “What is 
involved here is not the emergence of an ambivalence, but rather a mutation, a radical 
change of valence, not a back-and-forth movement but a dialectical progression” (90n8).
 17. For a useful discussion of Fanon in terms of the impact on French intellectual circles 
of Alexandre Kojève’s lectures on Hegel’s master–slave dialectic in the late 1930s (among 
those in attendance were Lacan, who is cited in Black Skin [152n15], and Merleau-Ponty, 
whose lectures Fanon attended in Paris, and whose concept of embodied “lived experience” 
is implicitly interwoven with Fanon’s analysis throughout), see Gibson, chapter 1 (on Sartre 
and Merleau-Ponty esp. 24–27).
 18. Dirlik does deal with Bhabha and Spivak and generally postcolonial theory and criti-
cism in “Past,” “Response,” and “How the Grinch.”
 19. For critiques of Bhabha, see Parry “Signs,” Lazarus, Ahmad, Cedric Robinson, 
Loomba, Tiffin, the articles in Slemon and Tiffin, and Moore-Gilbert (chapter 4, esp. 
132–40).
 20. “However, the ‘signs’ that construct such histories and identities—gender, race, 
homophobia, postwar diaspora, refugees, the international division of labour, and so on—
not only differ in content but often produce incompatible systems of signification and 
engage distinct forms of social subjectivity. To provide a social imaginary that is based on 
the articulation of differential, even disjunctive, moments of history and culture, contem-
porary critics resort to the peculiar temporality of the language metaphor” (Bhabha, “Post-
colonial” 176). His examples are taken from Cornel West, Stuart Hall, Hortense Spillers, 
Deborah McDowell, Houston A. Baker, Jr., and Henry Louis Gates, Jr.
 21. Bhabha apparently quotes this passage from memory: he adds “a text of ” in front of 
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“pulsional incidents” and renders “the articulation of the body, of the tongue, not that of 
meaning, of language” as “the articulation of the tongue, not the meaning of language.”
 22. See, e.g., Moore-Gilbert:
While it is surprising that Bhabha makes no comment on Barthes’s exoticism, 
more problematic is the fact that he is in fact at times seduced by Barthes’s 
rigid ontological distinction between the “sentence,” and what is “outside the 
sentence”; consequently, despite himself, he reinscribes rather than displaces 
a whole series of binary oppositions between (neo)colonial and postcolonial 
culture. The West, for Barthes and Bhabha alike, is associated with writing, the 
symbol, pedagogy (all of which denote monological, fixed and authoritarian 
qualities), abstract forms of thought and a conception of culture as an epis-
temological object of the kind associated with the museum, in other words 
divorced from everyday experience. Meanwhile, the postcolonial is associated 
with the “text,” the voice, the sign, performance (all of which denote dialogi-
cal, democratic and mobile properties), sensual modes of apprehension, and 
a conception of culture as active, present and enunciatory. The oppositions 
which Bhabha sets up between Casablanca (which he uses to figure the West, 
by virtue of the film of that name) and Tangiers are in fact schematic to the 
point of caricature, with the effect that the West itself then takes on all the 
qualities of fixity and repetition associated with the “eternal East” of Oriental-
ist discourse. This is nothing other than the “reverse ethnocentrism” of which 
he (like Spivak) so often complains. (128–29)
 23. In Elizabeth Jane Bellamy’s reading of this moment in Bhabha’s essay, “these disjunc-
tive and only partial modes of opposition militate against a truly collective action. Thus 
the Muslim peasants are less the site of ‘individuation’ (in the bourgeois, Western sense of 
the word) than the site of ‘ambivalence’ as ‘an intersubjective affect’ induced by the incom-
mensurability between the religious and the militant” (347). But what manner of unified 
truth would “a truly collective action” be, and why should we conceive of conflicting ideo-
somatic regimes as “militating” against it? To be “truly collective,” must an action be insti-
gated and regulated by the intersubjective affect of a single group? If one or more members 
of the group engage in the action for “the wrong reasons,” does it thereby become a false 
collectivity? And why must “individuation” and “ambivalence” be binarized? Is individua-
tion ever anything less than ambivalent? Bhabha himself does not binarize them; he writes 
of “ambivalence at the point of ‘individuation’ as an intersubjective affect” (187), suggest-
ing that for him scare-quoted “individuation” is the intersubjective affect whose “point” or 
transformative verge is characterized by ambivalence. I would revise that formulation only 
by calling individuation the attributive product of the somatic exchange, which will always 
be characterized by “ambivalence” in the sense of being shot through with conflicting ideo-
somatic and idiosomatic pressures, but in the counterregulatory contexts of colonization 
and decolonization will in fact be not just “ambivalent” but actively polynormative.
 24. I would also suggest, however, that Moore-Gilbert is wrong to conflate this passage 
from “Articulating the Archaic” with the passage from “The Other Question” that JanMo-
hamed critiques: “What is denied the colonial subject, both as colonizer and colonized, 
is that form of negation which gives access to the recognition of difference” (Bhabha, 
“Articulating” 75). For one thing, I think that both Moore-Gilbert and JanMohamed take 
Bhabha out of context, reading him to be saying that there is no “form of negation which 
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gives access to the recognition of difference” between colonizer and colonized, that for 
Bhabha colonization mutually transforms both the colonizer and the colonized until there 
is no difference between them, until they become a single unified subject. (JanMohamed 
writes that “Bhabha asserts, without providing any explanation, the unity of the ‘colonial 
subject (both colonizer and colonized)’” [59]; Moore-Gilbert seconds him in arguing that 
Bhabha’s remark tends “to produce an unwarranted unification of colonizer and colonized 
as a (single) ‘colonial subject’ which discounts the deep objective differences in the politi-
cal power and material conditions of these ‘secret sharers’” [147].) What Bhabha is saying 
there specifically is that both types of colonial subject are denied that form of negation. He’s 
not unifying them; he’s comparing them on a single point of similarity. The other thing is 
that the passages from “Articulating the Archaic” and “Sly Civility” do differentiate clearly 
between colonizer and colonized, by assigning the former an enslaved/paranoid subjectiv-
ity and reducing the latter to the blank negativity of refusing mastery.
 25. For a representative logical critique of Spivak’s essay, see Moore-Gilbert 98–109: 
Spivak presents the subaltern as “wholly Other,” a purely discursive/differential category, 
and “as a ‘real’ and concrete historical category, more particularly as a material effect of the 
export overseas of Western capitalism” (103); “this politically comforting reconstruction of 
motive . . . makes Bhaduri ‘signify’ (if not literally speak), in apparently blatant contradic-
tion of the assertion that the subaltern ‘as female cannot be heard or read’” (105); “Spivak 
at times seems to present [the subaltern] as a forever passive and helpless victim of forces 
beyond his/her control. This makes it rather difficult to understand, let alone accept, her 
complaint about the West’s historic ‘refusal to acknowledge the colonial peoples, post-
colonial peoples, as agents’” (107).
  One strategy for logical critique that I haven’t seen, but that I adumbrate myself in 
§2.2.2.3 in connection with Kant, is fuzzy logic—for clearly the aporetic series of subaltern 
not-yet-subjectivities en route to the subject-as-such is a sorites series: is the subaltern a 
subject yet? Not yet. Fuzzy logic would make the differentiality that is subalternity aporetic 
and therefore “unreadable” in a perhaps less strict sense than the one Spivak charts out:
  Imagine that “we” (a member of the Western or Indian English-speaking intellectual 
elite) are standing at one end of a long corridor, with an Indian tribal woman (TW1) and 
Spivak (GCS) standing together in the center and another Indian tribal woman (TW2) at 
the far end. GCS takes one step toward us, away from TW1 in the center, and TW2 takes one 
step toward TW1: is TW1 still subaltern, and is she still silenced by power? Almost certainly 
yes. Because TW1 is still in the company of a member of the elite, not yet among her own, 
she is still subaltern and cannot speak. GCS and TW2 take another step, both in the same 
direction, GCS away from TW1, TW2 toward her. Is TW1 still subaltern, and is she still 
silenced by power? Probably still yes. They take another step, and another, and another. At 
some point GCS will be standing with us, chatting easily in English, and TW1 and TW2 will 
be alone in the center of the corridor, and we will want to say that TW1 is no longer subal-
tern and now can speak. But at what point in the sorites series did the politico-ontological 
transformation from subaltern to not-subaltern occur?
  It is, of course, demeaning to use logical puzzles to talk about the poorest and most 
disenfranchised people on the planet; but my point is not simply to use logic against logic, 
to cancel the effects of Spivak’s binary logic with a slightly more complex logic. It is also to 
show that the “not yet” that Spivak would deny Kant, grounded as it is not merely in fuzzy 
logic but in affective fuzzy logic, in the liberal-progressivist evaluative affect of colonialist 
thought, is, in the end, less demeaning than Spivak’s desomatized binary logic, which would 
make the subaltern’s politico-ontological status depend on the on-off gates in the Western 
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observer’s head. And in fact I would guess that Spivak herself knows this, and feels uneasy 
about it; after all, she begins her famous essay, in its 1985, 1988, and 1999 forms, with a 
deconstruction of that binary logic in Ranajit Guha’s formulation of subalternity in his 
introduction to the first volume of Subaltern Studies:
In subaltern studies, because of the violence of imperialist epistemic, social, 
and disciplinary inscription, a project understood in essentialist terms must 
traffic in a radical textual practice of differences. The object of the group’s 
investigation, in this case not even of the people as such but of the floating 
buffer zone of the regional elite—is a deviation from an ideal—the people or 
subaltern—which is itself defined as a difference from the elite. It is toward 
this structure that the research is oriented, a predicament rather different from 
the self-diagnosed transparency of the first-world radical intellectual. What 
taxonomy can fix such a space? (Critique 271–72)
Her insistence, despite this diagnosis, on retaining the Gramscian definition of subalter-
nity as a “space of difference” suggests that she finds “the violence of imperialist epistemic, 
social, and disciplinary inscription” so inexorable that the radical intellectual can do noth-
ing but continue to understand the project of subaltern studies essentializingly—or rather, 
perhaps, anti-essentializingly, but in Spivak’s own Derridean purview, of course, that binary 
opposition remains complicit in the same essentializing stance.
 26. I quote here from the original version of the article in Cultural Critique, because 
in this one case Spivak’s editing for the reprinted version in Outside seems to me to have 
introduced unnecessary syntactic confusion: Mahasweta, she writes there, “lingers in post-
coloniality and even there in the space of difference on decolonized terrain in the space of 
difference” (77). The remainder of the quotations from this essay are taken from Outside, 
and page citations reflect that pagination.
 27. It may be that the most problematic term in Spivak’s borrowings from Deleuze and 
Guattari is “code,” a term they take from Saussurean linguistics to indicate the discursivity 
of laws and rules, the social organizations or codifications of experience and behavior. To 
the extent that she intends “affective value-coding” to mean the discursive organization of 
affective value, she is binarizing discourse and affect in ways that would appear to recuper-
ate Cartesian mind-body or subject-object dualisms—or, for that matter, Western power 
discourse and the silenced body of the subaltern woman. A more interesting reading of 
“affective value-coding,” however, would be that value is “coded” in and by and through 
affect—that Spivak is troping affect as the “discourse” by which value is “coded.” This latter 
(protosomatic) construction of affective value-coding would have to depend heavily on the 
metaphoricity of affect = discourse and affective approval/disapproval=code, of course, but 
I think that is a useful metaphorical orientation—that is, until Spivak begins making dis-
tinctions like “economically rather than affectively coded,” “represented within rather than 
prior to an accepted code,” and “the figuration of the woman’s body before the affective 
coding of sexuality” (93). Then the spatial (economic vs. affective) and temporal (prior to 
vs. within) binaries of coding render the metaphor problematic in ways that Spivak does 
not address, because she does not theorize her terms. In a protosomatic metaphorization 
of the normativizing circulation of approval/disapproval body language and body states 
as “affective value-coding,” evaluative affective states would certainly saturate and norma-
tively condition economic coding as well; indeed it’s hard to imagine what economic cod-
ing would look or feel or act like without affective coding. Those evaluative affective states 
would also saturate and normatively condition representation and figuration, of course; 
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somatically speaking “representation,” “figuration,” and “code” are not so much cuts the 
group makes in the affective flows, as Deleuze and Guattari would say, as they are bodily-
becoming-mental mappings of affective channels of social organization and circulation—
homeostatic attempts to understand and regulate those flows whose relation to the flows is 
iterative rather than scissive.
  If on the other hand the “code” of affective value-coding is thematized as a clearly 
bounded discursive structure, with spatial boundaries that separate it from economic val-
ue-coding and temporal boundaries that separate it from pre-affective/pre-coding regimes 
(or perhaps pre-regimes?) of representation or figuration, then affect = discourse is not a 
trope at all but a simple post-linguistic ontology.
  For a reading of Nietzsche on the “somatic codes” developed for the comparative 
corporeal-becoming-affective calculations of guilt and debt, see my Ecologies of Transla-
tion (§4.3).
 28. See also Shetty’s passing remarks on Spivak’s reading of “Douloti the Bountiful” (71) 
as a counterpoint to her discussion of motherhood as an “allegorical seme” in Mahasweta’s 
“Stanadayini” 67–73, and Judith Butler’s reading of Spivak on Devi in Undoing Gender 
229–30. That book concludes with an essay whose title seems to promise a philosophical 
rethinking of Spivak’s essay—“Can the ‘Other’ of Philosophy Speak?”—but it is an autobio-
graphical reflection on Butler’s own theoretical speaking from outside philosophy, and does 
not even mention Spivak.
third eSSay
 1. And, strikingly, Cathy Caruth is as unable to theorize the intergenerational transmis-
sion of trauma as Freud is, despite the fact that Moses and Monotheism is the central text 
in Unclaimed Experience, a text to which she devotes fully two of her chapters, chapters 1 
and 3. She does not seem to be aware of Freud’s roots in this area (as in so many others) in 
Nietzsche. See also notes 21, 26, and especially 28.
 2. For discussions of Nietzsche’s protosomatic theory, see §4.3 in my Ecologies of 
Translation and §2.1 in the current volume; for Schore’s protosomatic reading of Kohut, see 
my Estrangement 46.
 3. Judith A. Antell seems to be arguing for some such ceremonial transformation in the 
novel, but her description remains vague:
Like the writings of Momaday, Welch’s novel is best understood in the context 
of the dream/vision ritual structure of plains tribal life. Welch, like Momaday, 
uses correct ritual sequencing of events rather than the chronological lines of 
organizational life. It is this structure of Welch’s novel which holds the major 
clue to its function as a tribal document (Allen, 1986:9386). The Death of Jim 
Loney is ritualistic in approach, structure, theme, symbol, and significance, 
and in order for Jim to confront and resolve the bicultural and colonial prob-
lems to which he is exposed, he must participate in the ritual tradition—a 
tradition that affirms the power of the female. For Jim Loney, as for Abel and 
Tayo, the solution to male alienation is personal integration through insight 
and action, and the ritual for Jim, as for Abel, leads him to the decision to 
arrange his own death. (219)
What “personal integration”? What “insight”? The power of what female? Antell isn’t say-
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ing. But perhaps she means something like “in order for Jim to confront and resolve the 
bicultural and colonial problems to which he is exposed, he would have to participate in the 
ritual tradition—a tradition that affirms the power of the female—but he can’t”? Perhaps 
she’s setting up this ritual tradition grounded in the power of the female as the impossible 
goal that Loney finds himself unable to reach? Not really: “So, while on the surface the 
novels of Momaday, Welch, and Silko appear to be stories of alienated Indian men, they 
are really much more the stories of female power as acknowledged through ritual and cer-
emony” (219–20). In the case of The Death of Jim Loney, at least, this strikes me as wishful 
thinking.
 4. Lemberg here quotes from the Critical Inquiry article version of LaCapra’s chapter 
in Writing History, Writing Trauma, “Trauma, Absence, Loss” 716. We will be returning to 
LaCapra’s trauma theory in §3.2.4.
 5. Stromberg, it seems to me, seriously overstates his case. He argues, for example, that 
the reading offered by Sands, Allen, and Purdy, to the effect that Loney dies a warrior’s 
death of his own choosing, “reveals a critical paradox: Loney, who declares he does not 
feel Indian and who spends much of the novel seeking a state of authenticity, is read as the 
novel’s representation of authentic Indian identity” (38). But of course they only argue that 
he becomes something like a “representation of authentic Indian identity” at the end—that 
that is the goal of his quest, and he reaches it—not that he represents “authentic Indian-
ness” all the way through. He also insists on reading Loney’s wish to belong to some com-
munity, white or Indian (Welch 14), as an “imperative of purity that is part of a process of 
‘othering’ which has no room for overlap or admixture. Loney’s desire to be wholly Indian 
or wholly white is not a natural response to a genetic condition but is an internalization 
of a powerful cultural logic” (39)—and in order to make this case utterly ignores Welch’s 
recontextualization of this moment later in the novel when the narrator remarks that Rhea 
“had said he was lucky to have two sets of ancestors. In truth he had none” (102).
 6. For example:
He was restless. He had been thinking of his life for a month. He had tried 
to think of all the little things that added up to a man sitting at a table drink-
ing wine. But he couldn’t connect the different parts of his life, or the various 
people who had entered and left it. Sometimes he felt like an amnesiac search-
ing for the one event, the one person or moment, that would bring everything 
back and he would see the order in his life. But without the amnesiac’s clean 
slate, all the people and events were as hopelessly tangled as a bird’s nest in 
his mind, and so for almost a month he had been sitting at his table, drinking 
wine, and saying to himself, “Okay, from this very moment I will start back—I 
will think of yesterday, last week, last year, until all my years are accounted for. 
Then I will look ahead and know where I’m going.” But the days piled up faster 
than the years receded and he grew restless and despondent. But he would not 
concede that his life had added up to nothing more than the simple reality of a 
man sitting and drinking in a small house in the world (20–21).
He thought of his earlier attempts to create a past, a background, an ances-
try—something that would tell him who he was. Now he wondered if he had 
really tried. (88)
 7. A very short list of Morrison’s critics who have addressed these issues would include 
Boudreau, Caesar, Cooley, Coykendall, Davis, Ferguson, Finney, Fitzgerald, Fritz, Handley, 
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Henderson, Horvitz, House, Jablon, Kelly, Krumholz, Lawrence, Mathieson, Mohanty, Osa-
gie, Phelan, Powell, Rody, Rushdy, Schapiro, Vickroy, and Wyatt.
 8. “If PTSD must be understood as a pathological symptom,” Caruth writes in her 
introduction to Trauma, “then it is not so much a symptom of the unconscious, as it is a 
symptom of history. The traumatized, we might say, carry an impossible history within 
them, or they become themselves the symptom of a history that they cannot entirely pos-
sess” (5). Without somatic theory, of course, Caruth is unable to bridge the binary between 
“the unconscious” and “history,” but she is on the right track: if “history” is the ideosomati-
zation of experience, the organization of collective experience via the circulation of shared 
affect through the group, then traumatic history does indeed endosomatize individuals as 
its symptoms. In Unclaimed Experience, the 1996 book-length study that incorporates her 
1991 essay by that title as its first chapter (on Freud, her central theoretical interest, espe-
cially his theorization of individual trauma in Beyond the Pleasure Principle and historical 
trauma in Moses and Monotheism), her concern is primarily with history as the pain-
ful verbal repetitions of traumatic experience that was not understood when it was first 
encountered: “In trauma, that is, the outside has gone inside without any mediation” (59). 
This becomes a model not only for historiography but for the history of psychoanalysis as 
well:
Freud suggests that psychoanalysis, if it lives on, will live on not as the 
straightforward life of a known and understood theory, but as the endless 
survival of what has not been fully understood. If psychoanalysis is to be con-
tinued in its tradition, it is paradoxically in what has not yet been fully grasped 
in its survival that its truest relation to its insight must be found. I would 
suggest that trauma theory is one of the areas today in which this survival is 
precisely taking place, not only in the assuredness of its transformation and 
appropriation by psychiatry but in the creative uncertainties of this theory that 
remain, for psychiatry and psychoanalysis, in the enigma of trauma as both 
destruction and survival, an enigma that lies at the very heart of the Freudian 
insight itself. (72)
In her theorization of “historical trauma” (67–72), based on a close reading of Moses and 
Monotheism, Caruth does not problematize the question of the intergenerational transmis-
sion of trauma; she writes about historical trauma as if the survival of a traumatized/trau-
matizing paleoregulatory regime from generation to generation in the life of a culture were 
no more mysterious (but also no less) than the survival of PTSD symptomatologies in the 
life of a traumatized individual: “The history of chosenness, as the history of survival, thus 
takes the form of an unending confrontation with the returning violence of the past” (69). 
Implicit in that rather sketchy formulation is the notion that “the history of chosenness” 
is an overt (verbalized) paleoregulatory regime that both expresses and carries (endoso-
matizes) the covert (nonverbalized, repressed, unconscious) “unending confrontation with 
the returning violence of the past.”
 9. LaCapra also mentions in passing that fiction seems to be much better suited to 
the study of historical trauma than history, because it can generate “a plausible ‘feel’ for 
experience and emotion which may be difficult to arrive at through restricted documen-
tary methods. One might, for example, make such a case for Toni Morrison’s Beloved with 
respect to the aftermath of slavery and the role of transgenerational, phantomlike forces 
that haunt later generations” (13–14). He does not notice the excluded middle that Beloved 
seems to insert into his acting-out/working-through binary.
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